









PAPERS

RELATING TO

MILITARY OPERATIONS

IN

AFFGHANISTAN.

---

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Majesty, 1843.*

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# PAPERS

RELATING TO

## MILITARY OPERATIONS

IN

### AFFGHANISTAN.

No. 1.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee of the East India Company.*

*Fort William, December 22, No. 109, 1841.*

HONORABLE SIRS.—It may be of advantage to your Honorable Committee, that we endeavour to draw out a succinct narrative of the disastrous events which have lately occurred at Cabool, and in other parts of Afghanistan, with some examination of the causes which have led to these events, and an exposition of the views with which, in the present state of our information, we are disposed to regard them.

2. We are unfortunately able but most imperfectly to perform this task; we have before us but few authentic documents; the latest date of the dispatches received from Sir William Macnaghten is only of 26th October; and all else that we know is collected from two or three dispatches written, upon this side of the Passes, by Sir Robert Sale, from fragments of private correspondence, and from the rumours which have reached Candahar and Peshawur; but we believe that the facts in our possession, such as we shall give them to your Honorable Committee, may be relied upon.

3. The force at and near, Cabool, consisted, at the beginning of October, of Her Majesty's 13th and 44th Regiments of Foot, the 5th, 35th, 37th, and 54th Regiments Bengal Native Infantry, the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry, a company of Foot, and a troop of Horse Artillery, besides minor details, in addition to two regiments of the disciplined infantry of the Shah's contingent, the head-quarters of one of the corps of Hindoostanee Cavalry belonging to that contingent, a mountain train of Artillery attached to the same force under Captain Backhouse, of the Bengal Army, and a number of the Shah's guns under the charge of Lieutenant Warburton, with some strength, of the extent of which we are not accurately informed, of Affghan horse, partly under British command. And of this force it was intended that Her Majesty's 13th, and



the 35th and 37th Native Infantry, with a company of Artillery, some Sappers, &c., should proceed in the autumn to the provinces ; two Native regiments, and, if it should be found necessary, one European regiment; the 9th, being held in readiness for their relief. One of the Shah's Hindoostanee regiments, the 6th, was stationed at Chareekar, about 130 miles to the north of Cabool, and the remainder of the force was divided between the Bala Hissar, which overlooks the town, and in which the Shah resides, and the cantonment, which is a strong post about three miles to its north. The aspect of things at the capital, even to the very end of October, appears to have been altogether pacific. Many of our officers resided, some with their families, in the town. The Commissariat establishments were partly placed within its walls, our officers are said to have walked and rode in all directions without apprehension or interruption ; and, though it was notorious that the Priesthood and the Chiefs of Clans, with a large portion of the military retainers immediately dependent upon them, regarded with extreme dislike the state of things introduced under our influence, no idea was entertained of an universal discontent, or of the hazard of a general and formidable outbreak. Indeed, for many weeks previously, almost every communication, public and private, had represented the country as improving, and the difficulties of our Affghan relations as in a fair train for permanent satisfactory settlement.

4. An expedition against a predatory tribe at Zao, in the direction of Ghuznee, had been undertaken at the end of September. It had terminated successfully, and without bloodshed, in the submission of the tribe. Our troops were on their return to Cabool, and the 20th of October had been named by Sir William Macnaghten as the day on which he should put Sir Alexander Burnes in charge of his office, and set out on his journey to Bombay.

5. By a private letter from Sir W. Macnaghten, dated 6th of October, we learnt that some discontent had exhibited itself on the part of several of the chiefs of the tribes of the Eastern Ghilzies, who command the passes leading from Gundamuck, to within twelve or thirteen miles of Cabool. These passes are of a very difficult character, but a good understanding had been maintained with the chiefs from our entrance into the country, up to that time. The ground of this discontent was a reduction in the amount of the grain allowances granted to the chiefs, the portion of the allowances remaining, being regarded as more valuable to them than their receipts in the time of Dost Mahomed Khan, in consequence of the high prices at present prevailing. It appears that, on this reduction being made, the chiefs left Cabool, and an insurrection took place in the passes, that the dawks were robbed, and that all regular communications were stopped. These disturbances were lightly treated ; an Affghan chief, of opposed loyalty and influence, was sent forward to deal with the malcontents ; and it was hoped that peace would be restored, rather by negotiation than by force of arms. Towards the 12th it had been determined that the passes should be forced. Her Majesty's 13th, the 35th Native Infantry, and, subsequently, the 37th Native Infantry, a squadron of the 5th Bengal Cavalry, and some other horse, with a portion of artillery, were allotted to this service, and placed under the command of Brigadier Sale ; and Captain Macgregor, the Political

Agent at Jellalabad, was attached to it. The Khoord Cabool Pass, as may be seen by the official dispatches, was gallantly forced on the 12th, though with a loss to the British troops employed, of from thirty to forty men. A night attack was the next day repelled by the 35th Native Infantry, and the enemy's position at Tezeen was subsequently attacked on the 22nd with success. Captain Macgregor unguarded, with Captain Paton, visited the camp of the insurgents. He was kindly received by the chiefs, and he believed that he had made a satisfactory arrangement with them ; but, though for some days afterwards the professions of the chiefs were invariably those of peace and of friendship, the attacks from the hills upon the detachment in its advance were unceasing, and it will be seen, by Sir Robert Sale's reports, with what difficulties, and with how severe a loss of men and baggage, he made good his advance on the 31st of October, to the station of Gundamuck, where was Captain Burn with a strong detachment of mountaineer Jezzailchees, chiefly of the Afreedee or Khyber tribes.

6. Sir William Macnaghten's official report, the latest we have received from him upon any subject, under date the 26th of October, gives his view of the origin and progress of this quarrel with the Eastern Ghilzies. A copy of that report is appended to this dispatch.

7. Sir Robert Sale had found it desirable only to take on with him the 13th and 35th, with artillery, cavalry and details from Khoord Cabool ; and the 37th Native Infantry was ordered, in the first instance, to remain in position, with a view mainly to keep open the communication, and was, subsequently, on the outbreak of the insurrection in the city, called back to Cabool ; a movement it was only able to effect with a loss of baggage and some men, (five killed and fifteen wounded.)

8. At Gundamuck, Sir Robert Sale was in a position of some difficulty ; his camel-men were deserting him ; his ammunition was in great part expended ; he was overhung by the enemy in the hills, and the post was not a strong one, whilst it was distant from any support which could be afforded to him from Peshawur. He had received a summons to return to Cabool, to which he felt himself obliged to represent, in answer, that, without means of carriage, that with the enemy in force upon every point of his passage, and ill-provided as he was with ammunition, the absolute destruction of his Brigade would be the certain result of the attempt. He determined, therefore, on the advice of a council of war, upon retiring upon Jellalabad, and of making a strong intrenchment at that place. Upon the 6th of November he destroyed a fort of one of the insurgent chiefs, of whose flight in revolt from Cabool he had received intimation, and, upon the 11th, he marched to Jellalabad, leaving Gundamuck in charge of Captain Burn, with his detachment of Jezzailchees and a corps of Jan-Baz horse. These troops became rapidly disordered. The Jan-Baz horse, and a large number of the Afreedee Jezzailchees, went over to the enemy, or deserted to their homes. With such of the Jezzailchees as adhered to him, Captain Burn retired also to Jellalabad, leaving, however, two guns and much baggage behind him.

9. Brigadier Sale found himself at Jellalabad, surrounded and attacked by all the armed population of the country. He had at first but six days' provision ; his men were harassed, and the defences of the

place were exceedingly weak. The latest letters from him are of November 27th ; he had attacked and dispersed the enemy, and collected supplies for thirty days. Ammunition had been sent from Peshawur ; but it is uncertain whether it had reached him. All the later reports, however, from this post are in a tone of laudable and increasing confidence. The enemy, after their first defeat, had not again ventured to assail it ; and we may look, we trust, with certainty, to the security of this portion of our troops.

10. Captain Ferris, an officer commanding one of the Shah's irregular Affghan regiments, had been posted at Pesh-Boolak, between the Khyber Pass and Jellalabad, with a detachment of his corps. When the country became disorganized in consequence of our troops falling back to Jellalabad, his camp was attacked by numbers of the surrounding tribes, but his men, chiefly Eusofzye Patans, from the country subject to the Sikhs, fought bravely, and he was able to cut his way through the enemy, and to make good his retreat, though compelled to abandon about 38,000 rupees of public treasure, and all private property.

11. Mr. Mackeson, a gentleman not in the regular service, had charge of the fort of Ali Musjid in the Khyber Pass, with 150 men, also of the Eusofzye tribe ; and the Khyberies, when the infection of alarm and disorder reached them, shewed an inclination to disturb the peace of the Pass. The chiefs disavowed all participation with the tribes in this feeling, but the fort was nevertheless attacked, and the enemy nearly crowned the heights, but the Eusofzyes were faithful, and the assailants were repulsed ; and, in the end, by the interference of General Avitabile and Captain Mackeson, the insurgents departed, and the fort has been replenished. The known march of large Sikh and British reinforcements towards Peshawur, and the interest of the chiefs in keeping on terms with us, for the sake of their considerable pecuniary allowances, may, possibly, lead the Khyberees not to declare against us.

12. We know not with accuracy what indications of trouble preceded the tragical events which took place on the 2nd of November at Cabool. In the letter from Captain Mackeson, at Peshawur, of the 11th of October, forwarded to your Honorable Committee with our dispatch of the 20th ultimo, mention is made of six leading Dooranee Chiefs having incurred the King's displeasure with reference to discontents, openly and disrespectfully evinced by them, in consequence of reductions in the allowances, to which the narrowness of the King's finances led him, under Sir William Macnaghten's advice, to have recourse. We have received no official report regarding that occurrence, but your Honorable Committee are aware from the papers which we have at different times forwarded to you, that a reduction of the retainers of the military khans, and the formation of bodies of horse, paid directly by the Crown, had been among the objects of policy which have appeared most important for giving strength and stability to the King's Government. Your Honorable Committee are sensible also that it has been a necessary and prominent object of our care to bring the Shah's disbursements, as nearly as possible, within the limit of his income. In pursuance of these objects, the six chiefs referred to appear to have been subject to some retrenchment, and opposition at one time seems to have been attempted in an indirect manner, to the organization of the bodies of horse to be

paid by the State. The Shah himself, who has made over for the most part the duty of administration to his minister, Mahomed Oosman Khan, an individual possessing the entire confidence and approbation of Sir William Macnaghten, may be believed to have thrown the responsibility of these distasteful measures mainly on that officer, with whom the Envoy and Minister was, doubtless, in general estimation, identified; and we find accordingly that, in the popular rumour which have prevailed, at least the dissatisfaction of the Shah with the state of things existing at Cabool has been very readily taken for granted. We attach to this dispatch, such notices as the Governor-General has found in the private or demi-official letters addressed to him, on the resistance and disgrace of the six chiefs alluded to. These notices become of importance, since we find, from a comparison of Captain Mackeson's dispatch before cited, with the names which have subsequently been most bruited as those of the leaders of the insurrection, that several of these six chiefs have taken the leading part in exciting the troubles which we have now to lament. Meer Uzul Khan Urzbegee is the chief on whose flight from Cabool, and rebellion, Brigadier Sale proceeded to occupy his fort as above described; and others of the chiefs, such as Abdoola Khan Atchikzye, Secunder Khan, and Abdool Salam Khan, are those most generally mentioned, in reports which have reached us alike from Caudahar and Peshawur, as the heads of the disturbance.

13. On the 1st November, we learn that Meer Uzul Khan Urzbegee left the city and set up the standard of revolt, but we must suppose that there was no keen apprehension of serious danger. On the next day, however, our countrymen were attacked on every side. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Burnes, with his brother Lieutenant Burnes, and Lieutenant Broadfoot, of the Bengal European regiment, were surprized and murdered in the city. Lieutenant Sturt, of the Engineers, received, it is said, in the presence of the Shah, but under circumstances of which we have no information, five wounds. Captain Trevor, and his family, but narrowly escaped. The houses of the British residents were burnt or pillaged. The Commissariat stores and treasure in the city were lost, and the enemy obtained possession of a fort in the immediate vicinity of the cantonment. We subjoin to this narrative a précis of intelligence addressed by Lady to Sir Robert Sale, by which your Committee will learn that there was a succession of engagements from the 2nd to 8th November, by which, though our troops invariably behaved well, and obtained advantage, but little impression was made upon the enemy. We further know that a successful sally was made on the 13th, and that the stock of provisions, which on the 8th was estimated as only sufficient for five, was, on the 14th, equal to ten days' consumption; and the tone in a note from Sir William Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor, at Jellalabad, of the 18th, was certainly not one of any immediate apprehension. Negotiations were still apparently open between Sir William Macnaghten and some of the chiefs, but, as far as is stated, with no satisfactory prospect. Copies of all papers which have reached us on the progress and aspect of events at Cabool, since the insurrection commenced, accompany this dispatch. We must necessarily regard the position of our force at that city with great anxiety. It was divided; its means of supply were narrow and precarious; the whole surrounding country

was opposed to it ; and the season was approaching at which the passes of the hills would be closed by the snow. On the other hand, there are bravery and discipline ; the interval between the Bala Hissar and the Cantonments is open, and a junction could easily be made ; and the town may be forced to afford supplies ; whilst the falling of the snows may have the effect of forcing, at least, a partial dispersion of the enemy. We must painfully await the result, for it seems to be physically impossible, that troops could, before the spring, approach Cabool for rescue.

14. Simultaneously with the events which we have related as having occurred at Cabool, the Kohistan broke into insurrection, and two officers, Captain Maule and Lieutenant Wheeler, attached to the irregular regiment of Kohistanecs, were murdered, and the Goorkha regiment of the Shah's service, posted at Chareekar in that country, was attacked, and all of its officers were wounded, of whom Captain Codrington has since died. We have since heard that this corps has been overpowered and destroyed, and that Major Pottinger, the Political Agent at Chareekar, and one officer, Lieutenant Haughton, have made their way to the camp at Cabool.

15. Beyond these sad details we have to report the surprize, and almost entire destruction, by a large party of Ghilzies at Sydahod, between Ghuznee and Cabool, of Captain Woodburn, of the Shah's service, and a detachment of 138 invalids, proceeding from Ghuznee towards Cabool ; and we know that the disturbances had extended to between seventy and eighty miles south of Ghuznee, and that the country was disordered in that quarter up to the 17th or 18th of November.

16. Our latest direct accounts from Candahar are of the 19th, but there is a letter from Major Leech, at Kelat-i-Ghilzie, of the 20th, which must have been forwarded from Candahar on the 22d or 23rd of November. At that time all was quiet in that neighbourhood, yet it must be apprehended that eventually disturbances of a similar nature may also take place there ; but the country is less unfavourable to action. General Nott's force is strong, and we must hope that he will lose no time in calling in every detachment which is not securely posted. The three regiments, the 16th, 22nd, and 43rd Bengal Native Infantry, that had been on the point of returning to India by the Bolan Pass and Shikarpore, with a troop of Horse Artillery and Cavalry, were, upon a requisition from Major-General Elphinstone, dated 3rd November, the day after the insurrection at Cabool, directed to march from Candahar towards Ghuznee and Cabool, and we learn that they actually marched on the 16th. We are told that the seasons will not be opposed at any time of the year to such a march as far as Ghuznee ; but the ground between Ghuznee and Cabool rises 2000 feet, and the road will, it is to be feared, not be passable until late in the spring. We have intelligence of the advance of the brigade, without difficulty, half-way to Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and we shall watch, with anxious interest, its further progress. We have, further, a post at Quetta, which has been reinforced by Major Outram, and which, it is possible, may be harassed by the Kakur Affghans, though Major Outram apprehends no serious attack from that tribe ; and he is confident that the late arrangements with Nusseer Khan are so satisfactory to the Brahoes and Belooch chiefs and people, that he

has nothing to fear from them. He is strong, too, in Upper and Lower Sinde, and has wisely determined upon not parting with a single soldier until any excitement which may be caused by the events of Cabool, shall have subsided.

17. We have thus stated, in as accurate an outline as the means at our command will permit, the afflicting events by which our position in Afghanistan has been so suddenly and seriously endangered. We have marked the obstinacy with which, notwithstanding the apparent accommodation of the Eastern Ghilzie chiefs with Captain Macgregor about the 22nd of November, the tribes under them, stated not to be numerous or powerful, though in possession of a very difficult country, contested every portion of the advance of the British troops eastward, at a time when these tribes stood alone openly committed to insurrection. We cannot doubt that the comparative success of the Ghilzie mountaineers in their defiles, the report of which must have reached Cabool with much exaggeration, had an important effect in giving encouragement to the disaffected in that city. And we think it may be assumed as certain, that the discontent of the Dooranee chiefs at Shah Shooja's court, with the arrangements of the king's government, which partially affected their pecuniary interests, and threatened to destroy their political influence, has been the direct operative cause of the formidable rebellion by which our authority has been shaken. This discontent found ready material for the excitement of hostility and disorder, in the national and religious feelings of the Affghan tribes, whom our presence, and the measures pursued under our influence, have failed to conciliate. The population, with the exception of the labouring cultivators, who probably regard our ascendancy with satisfaction, but whose good will is of little value in such a crisis, is armed, and accustomed to turbulence and violence ; and time has not admitted of any effectual repression of these habits, or of giving stability to the new order of things.

18. We have applied ourselves immediately to concerting such measures, and issuing such instructions, as the exigency of the case seemed to require and admit ; and we forward with this communication copies of our several dispatches to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to the Government of Bombay, to Sir Wm. Macnaghten, Mr. Clerk, and our principal political functionaries. It will be seen that we have laid it down as a rule of our conduct that we would do all in our power to rescue our detachments wherever they may be encompassed by danger ; but that, if the position of command and influence, which we have held at the capital of Afghanistan, should once be absolutely and entirely lost, we would make no more sacrifices of the very serious and extensive nature which could alone be effectual, except under positive instructions from England, for the re-establishment of our supremacy throughout the country. If matters should, by force or negotiation, be restored at Cabool, we shall have time for deliberation ; and if they should be but barely maintained in their present state of precarious difficulty, we must await the approach of spring before we can act with vigour or advantage. We have particularly, however, felt it our duty distinctly at this distance to give instructions applicable to all contingencies, and therefore to contemplate the most unfavourable issue to the struggle which our troops are maintaining at Cabool ; and, in this case, upon the anticipation of which

we cannot conceal from ourselves the hazard of extending dangers, and of the insurrection assuming in other quarters also the same national and united character, we have authorized General Nott and Major Rawlinson, with such caution and deliberation, in their military and political proceedings, as may serve to avoid discredit, and to promise safety, so to shape their course as best to promote the end of the eventual relinquishment of our direct control in the several Affghan provinces, and to provide for the concentration of all forces and detachments as may be most conducive to the security of the troops. On our side, we would immediately collect a strong force at Peshawur, with the view of its acting in aid of Sir Robert Sale at Jellalabad, and making a demonstration of strength on that frontier; and the troops as here enumerated are already on their march, viz., 60th, 64th, 30th, and 53rd Regiments Native Infantry, with details of Cavalry, and a company of European Foot Artillery. Two other regiments, one of them Her Majesty's 9th Foot, are held also in readiness to march, in the event of Mr. Clerk and the Commander-in-chief so determining; and a Sikh detachment, consisting of four battalions of Infantry, 2000 Horse, and Artillery, has been directed by the Lahore Durbar to act in co-operation with it. We hope that this force will be sufficient to keep in awe the tribes of the Khyber Pass, or, if necessary, to force that defile, and give support to General Sale, and ultimately, should circumstances admit of such a course, to form a base from whence communications may be opened with Cabool. We have requested the Government of Bombay, and Major Outram, to detain, for the present, all the troops which are present in Upper Sind, and in any event to look to his having a force of not less than two effective brigades, at Sukkur, and Shikarpore. We feel it to be absolutely necessary that we thus hold a strong front upon the line of the Indus. And this front it is our intention and determination, subject to the orders of your Honorable Committee, firmly to maintain; and we have endeavoured to do this, without in any degree relaxing from that care which is due to the protection of our frontiers, and to the preservation of tranquillity in the territories of India, and in those of our dependent allies. Even if six regiments should be sent to Peshawur, the state of our northern cantonments will be such as to enable his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to collect, at a very short notice, for the field, besides an ample force of Artillery, an army of not less than twelve or fourteen regiments of Infantry, and nine or ten of Cavalry, of which at least three of the former, and two of the latter, would be Europeans. For details of the orders which we have given, and of the discretion which we have requested his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in communicating with Mr. Clerk, to exercise, we would refer your Honorable Committee to the copies of our several dispatches, the purport and effect of which will, we trust, meet with your approbation, particularly in the part of them which relates to the using the occasion, in order to establish more intimately our union with the Sikh Government.

19. It is possible that we shall, at the earnest request of the Court at Catmandhoo made after a compliance with all of Mr. Hodgson's demands, and the strongest professions of friendly intentions, withdraw the force which had been stationed immediately on the Nepalese frontier, at

Mullye and Segowlee ; but, in this case, we shall keep more than the customary complement of troops at the stations of Benares and Dinapore, and shall be able, in the event of the Nepalese Court relapsing into unfriendly movements, to bring a strong force into the field. We most confidently believe, however, that there will be no necessity for the assemblage of such a force, either towards Nepal, or in the north-west provinces. The professions of the Rajah of Nepal are yet fresh, and he is in no state of preparation ; while the interests of the British Government and the Sikh Durbar, in all that regards the state of affairs in Afghanistan, are substantially the same, and the Durbar appears to be acting cordially in concert with us upon that conviction. But we are aware that the occurrence of serious disaster to the British arms in any quarter, will give rise, if not to injurious attempts, at least to something of excitement, and to evil report, and we would appear strong and prepared on every side.

20. In concluding this dispatch, we would observe, that your Honorable Committee are aware, that three regiments on the Indian establishment are now detached, and are likely for some considerable period to continue so, with the expedition in China, and that one of the regiments in Bengal, Her Majesty's 3rd Foot, has nearly completed its term of Indian service. Under these circumstances, we should think it prudent that the Government in England should, at the earliest convenient period, send out two fresh regiments to Bengal, affording a reinforcement which would enable your authorities here to maintain the exhibition of unquestionable commanding strength in every part of the empire. It will be remarked that, for the present, an European regiment has been withdrawn from Nagpore, a post which ought not to be so weakened, excepting in emergency, and to which an European corps should be returned at the earliest possible time.

21. Your Honorable Committee will find, among the inclosures of this dispatch, a correspondence respecting the temporary detention of the Ameer, Dost Mahomed Khan, on his route to Loodiana. We learn from Captain Nicolson, that the Ameer has submitted to this detention without making any serious difficulty. He is now at Kurnaul, and it is Captain Nicolson's opinion that he has no desire or intention of abandoning the protection he is under, within our frontier.

22. In one of the later reports from Captain Mackeson, it is mentioned that letters had been received by the chiefs of the Afreedee tribes, from the Nawabs Zeman Khan and Jubbar Khan, brothers of the Ameer, stating that they were active in the insurrection, and that they awaited the arrival of his son, Mahomed Akbar Khan, who was then expected to place himself at its head. This is the only notice, which has reached us, of the family of the Ameer being connected with the disturbances.

We have, &c.

AUCKLAND.

W. W. BIRD.

WM. CASEMENT.

H. T. PRINSEP.

P.S.—Since this dispatch was prepared, advices have been received from Major Outram, at Dadur, to the 29th, with intelligence from



Candahar to the 23rd November ; at those dates, all is said to have been perfectly quiet at Candahar ; and Major Outram writes, in his usual tone of confidence and ease, respecting the country under his control.

We have accounts from Peshawur to the 6th, and from Jellalabad to the 3rd December, representing the entire success of the troops at the latter post to the 1st instant ; and mentioning that native reports represent an improving state of things at Cabool ; it being said that supplies are brought into camp at night for sale.

No. 2.—*Sir W. H. Macnaghten, Bart., Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Shoojah, to T. H. Maddock, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Cabool, October 26, 1841.*

SIR,—I have now the honor to report the circumstances attending the recent rebellion of certain of the Eastern Ghilzie Chiefs.

2. The first intimation I received of this rebellion was about three weeks ago, to the effect that the chiefs had suddenly left Cabool ; and, the day after, I learnt that they had stopped a caravan on the high road, and had taken the property and its owners to the hills, at a distance from the road.

3. I immediately waited upon His Majesty, and prevailed upon him to send the Governor, Humza Khan, with a message to the rebels, inviting them to return to their allegiance, and promising redress of any real grievance they might have sustained. This mission failed of success, because Humza Khan was the chief instigator of the rebellion.

4. Two reasons have been assigned for this rebellion. First, the reduction of the allowances of the Ghilzie Chiefs ; and, secondly, the engagement that was required of them to be responsible for robberies by the Eastern Ghilzies, wherever committed.

5. On the first point I may observe that the necessities of His Majesty, and the frequent prohibitions I had received against further reliance on the resources of the British Government, appeared to admit of no alternative. I was assured that the chiefs had admitted the justice of, and cheerfully acquiesced in, the reduction ; moreover, that, after the reduction was effected, the chiefs would, in consequence of the enhanced value of grain, receive larger allowances than they did in the time of Dost Mahomed.

6. On the second point, I am compelled to state that the grievance of the chiefs was well founded. Their liabilities should have been only co-extensive with their respective jurisdictions. Unfortunately, they never represented their grievance to me. They had been prohibited from visiting me by the beforenamed Governor, on the part of the Shah, (Humza Khan) a worthless man, alike inimical to us and to His Majesty. The good result of the recent rebellion, is the disgrace and imprisonment of this man. His father was killed in the Shah's service ; and His Majesty, an amiable weakness, was unwilling to acknowledge the demerits of the son, of which, however, he is now fully sensible.

7. One of the chief rebels, Mahomed Shah Khan, has very large possessions in the district of Lughman. I therefore urged the minister to send out a relative of his own with 300 Huzarbash Horse to that

neighbourhood. This was done without the delay of an hour, and the designs of the rebels were for the time frustrated. They attacked the party, *en route*, but did comparatively little damage; and the conspirators found it necessary to separate, and each to look after his individual interests, before the plot was matured.

8. There are four thanas, or posts, guarded by Ghilzies, between Cabool and Gundamuk. The first belongs to a chief named Khoda Buksh, a relative, by marriage, of the ex-Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan. The second to Sher Mahomed Khan, the third to Allahzar Khan, and the fourth to Gool Mahomed Khan. The second named of these (who has by far the greatest influence) was gained over to our cause at an early period, and the third was always staunch in his allegiance. Khoda Buksh and Gool Mahomed went into open rebellion, and with them was joined Mahomed Shah Khan already mentioned, a Ghilzie Chief, possessing extensive property in Lughman, and a relative also, by marriage, of the ex-Ameer.

9. The conduct of Gool Mahomed was the most inexcusable of all. On the Shah's arrival in this country, that individual was in a state of destitution, and was placed in power and affluence by His Majesty. He has been indefatigable in his endeavours to stir up the surrounding tribes to rebellion, but I have much gratification in adding that he has in no one instance succeeded, a fact which speaks well for His Majesty's Government. Gool Mahomed Khan was immediately deposed, and his place supplied by Burkut Khan, a chief of great influence and respectability.

10. On the separation of the rebels, Mahomed Shah Khan retreated to Lughman. Khoda Buksh Khan, with not more than 100 followers, proceeded to occupy the Khoord Cabool Pass; and Gool Mahomed Khan went into his own country to raise the tribes. Lughman was already occupied by the Huzarbash horse, and I had no apprehension from that quarter. I had the greatest confidence in the new chief appointed by His Majesty to supersede Gool Mahomed, and the first thing to be done was to dislodge Khoda Buksh and his party of rebels from the strong defile which they had occupied. The manner in which this service was performed, has doubtless been reported to Government by Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., and it only remains for me to add, that the prowess displayed by the British troops on this occasion was the admiration of all the Afghans, and there were not a few on our side who witnessed it.

11. Captain Macgregor, having in the mean time returned from the Zoomut expedition, I caused him to communicate with the rebels, and he promised, in His Majesty's name, and my own, to inquire into, and redress, all their grievances. Messengers with conciliatory proposals were also sent, but to no purpose. Whilst professing the greatest desire to return to their allegiance, the party of Khoda Buksh and Gool Mahomed, which latter had joined the former after his expulsion from the pass, made a night attack on the position of the 35th regiment of Native Infantry at Khoord Cabool, the particulars of which also have no doubt been communicated to Government.

12. On this occasion, a party of His Majesty's own Affghan Horse were present in our camp; and rumours, I understand, are rife that this party (consisting of about 80 persons) were guilty of treachery, and

actually fired upon our troops. The particulars of the case have not yet reached me, but it shall be duly inquired into, and His Majesty will, I feel assured, make a signal example of any one who may be proved to have thus offended. But if this party of Affghans suffered themselves to be surprized by a night attack, or even if, in the confusion of the moment, they fired shots in the direction of our own camp, it would be uncharitable in any one familiar with the Affghan character, to form from such premises the conclusion that they were guilty of deliberate treachery. But I merely wish his Lordship in Council to suspend his judgement on this transaction, for I well know the predisposition that exists in certain quarters to condemn, without hesitation and without reason, every Affghan institution, and that even the irreproachable character of His Majesty has not secured him from the attacks of malevolence and calumny.

13. After the night attack, the 35th N. I. were joined by Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and the 37th Regiment N. I., with a suitable proportion of artillery and cavalry, and the rebels were in the meantime joined at Tazeen by Mahomed Shah Khan, Azeez Khan, and a party from Tugno. Captain Macgregor estimates their united numbers at about 700 men.

14. Our troops moved upon Tazeen on the 22nd instant, and I need not detail the operations which there took place, as they will have been reported to his Lordship in Council by the General commanding in Affghanistan.

15. I have now received information from Captain Macgregor to the effect, that our differences with the chiefs have been amicably arranged. The particulars have not reached me; but when Captain Macgregor submits a statement of his negociations, a copy of it shall be forwarded without loss of time for the information of Government. From what little I know of the terms conceded to the rebels, they would seem to me to be too favorable; but I have the fullest reliance on Captain Macgregor's discretion. The chiefs have furnished hostages, and have consented to the appointment of Burkut Khan, by which means their confederacy has been dissolved.

16. I have been thus particular in detailing the circumstances of this rebellion, from my conviction, that the most false and exaggerated reports regarding it will be circulated by a class of persons whom I have already described to his Lordship in Council, and whose sole pursuit is the dissemination of groundless and alarming reports, through the medium of the public prints.

17. The inconvenience to which we have been subjected, by the interruption of our communications, has been very great, but it only shows how easily annoyance may be inflicted, by means which would otherwise be contemptible, on a government, which has so long a line of mountainous country to defend, and whose chiefs have been so accustomed to a life of lawless turbulence, that they do not hesitate to array themselves in opposition to authority upon the slightest provocation, and without a hope of ultimate success.

18. We have learned, by the experience of this rebellion, one important fact, which is, that our regular European and Hindostanee troops fight against Affghans, in their native hills, to a great disadvan-

tage. The superior agility of the latter enables them to evade pursuit, and their fuzils, or long guns, carry with deadly precision to a distance, where our muskets are harmless. There is now no enemy to oppose us in the open plain, and should we hereafter be forced into hostilities, the desultory mountain warfare will doubtless be that with which we shall have to contend. Should his Lordship in Council therefore resolve on increasing His Majesty's force, with a view of recalling the regular regiments from this country, I would suggest that instead of organizing any more Hindostanee troops, three infantry corps should be raised from the Eusufzyes, Suhaks, Undurees, Kohistanees, Khyberries, and the inhabitants of other mountainous regions, to undergo a moderate degree of discipline, and to be armed with the jezzail of the country. By a judicious admixture of different tribes, by attention to their prejudices, and by regular pay, I should have little fear of their fidelity. In the meantime, endeavors will be made to impart as great a degree of efficiency as possible to His Majesty's Jezzailchees, who are a very useful body of men. In the above opinion I am supported by the authority of Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes, C.B., and of Brigadier Anquetil.

19. It is my intention to forward a copy of this letter, for the information of the Honorable the Secret Committee, through the Government of Bombay

I have, &c.

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,  
*Envoy and Minister.*

No. 3.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Fort William, November 22, 1841.*

Sir,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch, dated 1st instant, recommending, for the reasons stated by the Accountant North-West Provinces, that the dispatch of the second convoy to Afghanistan, be changed from the 10th January to 10th February next, and to inform you that the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council has sanctioned this arrangement.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 4.—*Major-General Sir Robert Sale to Captain Grant.*

*Camp, Bootkhak, October 12, 1841.*

Sir,—I have the honor to state to you, for the information of Major-General Elphinstone, C. B., that the task of forcing the pass of Khoord Cabool, and defeating the rebels posted within it, has, this morning, been accomplished.

After fully weighing the whole of the information brought to me at various periods in the course of yesterday, I came to the conclusion that the main body of the insurgents was posted behind a breastwork near the middle of the pass, and that they would defend it, as well as the almost inaccessible heights on either flank of it.

My plan of attack was therefore arranged as follows. I determined to employ 200 Jezzailchees, under the well known Sirdar Jan Fishan Khan, to create a diversion by assaulting, in flank and rear, the precipitous ridge which forms the southern side of the Durra, whilst the troops under my command entered its gorge, and attacked the enemy in front. The force left camp at 6 A.M. The advanced guard consisted of the two guns of Foot Artillery, under Lieutenant Dawes, two companies of the 13th Light Infantry, under Captain Fenwick and Lieutenant George King, the flank companies of the 35th Native Infantry under Captain Younghusband, and a detachment of pioneers under Captain Broadfoot, the whole being in charge of Captain Seaton, 35th Regiment of Native Infantry. The remainder of the 13th and 35th formed our main body. As we approached the insurgents' position, we found that the reports of our spies had been substantially correct, but that the enemy were withdrawing from behind their breastwork in the valley, and occupying the rocky ridges of the mountains on either side. They opened upon us a well-directed fire, and, at the very commencement of the affair, I received a wound from a ball, above the ankle, which ultimately compelled me to leave the field. Whilst I remained on it, however, I directed two companies of the 13th, and one of the 35th, to ascend the precipices on either hand in face of the enemy, and I must, in justice to them, mention the gallantry, activity, and perseverance with which this duty was performed, and the enemy driven by our skirmishers from point to point of eminences almost perpendicular. When compelled to retire, I resigned the command into the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie, C. B., and have the pleasure to forward his report, detailing the further progress and completion of the affair.

I beg to add that, whilst I remained at the head of the force, the conduct of both officers and men afforded me the highest satisfaction, and I am greatly pleased with the spirited and judicious manner in which Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie brought the matter to a close.

The exertions of my Brigade-Major, Captain Wade, and of Captain Havelock, and Lieutenant Airey, of Major-General Elphinstone's personal staff, who attached themselves to me as volunteers on this service, demand my amplest acknowledgments. The last-mentioned of these officers had a horse shot under him. I beg to forward the casualty return of the 13th; that of the Artillery, Sappers, and 35th Native Infantry shall follow.

A Memorandum of the ammunition expended, is also annexed. I am thankful for the promised reinforcement of two guns; and if the 37th Regiment Native Infantry can also be promptly sent out, it will relieve the troops from part of a very harassing outpost duty, in an exposed plain, in the vicinity of mountains.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

P.S.—I ought not to have forgotten, to mention, that Captain Bellew, Assistant Quartermaster General, who had previously, under General Elphinstone's instructions, reconnoitred the passes occupied by the enemy, accompanied me during my march from Cabool, and ably aided me, until the moment of my being wounded, upon which he continued to

render valuable assistance to Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie. To Brevet Captain Trevor, 3rd Light Cavalry, politically employed on this occasion, I was indebted for the information obtained at Bootkhak ; upon it my plan of attack was based, and it proved correct in every particular ; and he was personally active and conspicuous throughout the engagement.

No. 5.—*Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Dennie to Major-General Sir R. H. Sale.*

*Camp, Bootkhak, October 12, 1841.*

SIR,—I beg, on my return to camp, to report the details of the progress and completion of the affair with the rebels, in the Khoord Cabool Pass, begun in so spirited a manner under your personal command this morning.

On receiving over charge of the troops, in consequence of your wound compelling you to leave the valley, I pursued your plan of operations by pressing the enemy as much as the nature of the ground would admit, on both flanks and rapidly moving on the main column and guns, with the intention of dislodging them from their breastworks, if still occupied, but this the insurgents had evacuated, though they ventured to dispute the possession of the precipitous heights, and to direct a well-aimed fire against our main force. Disconcerted, however, by the bold manner in which they were met by our skirmishers, as they scaled the mountain sides, and by the steady progress of the advance, they gradually abandoned their first position, and retired to the highest ridges and pinnacles of the Durra.

I had resolved, from the first, not to allow any lateral opposition to divert me from the main purpose of clearing the valley, and a little after 7 A. M., I had the satisfaction of reaching the southern gorge of the pass, and establishing there the 35th Native Infantry, and the guns, in an excellent post, constituted by the walls of a strong and capacious, though deserted, fort. By this time our skirmishers had every where got possession of the heights, and the Affghan force under Jan Fishan Khan, had also crowned the mountains, and displayed their banners on its summit.

You are aware, that it was part of your original plan, that the 13th Light Infantry should return to their encampment at Bootkhak. As the column marched back, the enemy again showed themselves on several points of the defile, and opened a fire, and some loss was sustained in repelling these attacks, and in withdrawing our flanking parties.

The troops finally arrived at Bootkhak about 2 P. M., a good deal harassed by the exertions of the morning. You will see by the returns, that the casualties have not been few, which arose from the great advantage afforded by the ground to an enemy trained to mountain warfare.

Permit me to add the expression of my admiration of the fearless manner in which the men of the 13th, chiefly young soldiers, ascended heights nearly perpendicular, under the sharp fire of the insurgents. The Sepoys of the 35th rivalled and equalled them in steadiness, activity, and intrepidity. I am happy to say, that no loss whatever of the bag-

gage of the Native Infantry was sustained in traversing this valley of plunderers.

I have not yet received the casualty return of the 35th Regiment Native Infantry, but have reason to believe that it is in amount about equal to that of the 13th, and am informed that they have one officer, Captain Younghusband, severely wounded.

I have &c.

W. H. DENNIE.

*Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the Force under the command of Major-General Sir R. H. Sale, in forcing the pass of Khoord Cabool, on the 12th October, 1841.*

2nd Company 6th Battalion Artillery—1 private, 3 horses wound.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—2 privates killed; 2 subalterns, 2 serjeants, 16 privates, wounded.

35th Regiment N.I.—2 privates killed; 1 captain, 1 naick, 8 sepoys, wounded.

Sappers and Miners.—2 privates killed; 2 privates wounded.

Total—6 privates killed; 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 2 serjeants, 1 corporal, 27 privates, 3 horses, wounded.

Grand Total—6 killed: 33 wounded, and 3 horses wounded.

*Names of Officers Wounded.*

General Staff.—Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., commanding, severely; Captain Wade, Major of Brigade, slightly.

13th Light Infantry.—Lieutenant Mein, severely; Ensign Oakes, slightly.

35th Regiment Native Infantry—Captain Younghusband, severely.

H. WADE, Major of Brigade.

*No. 6.—Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Grant.*

*Camp in the Valley near Tezeen, October 23, 1841.*

SIR,—I beg to acquaint you for the information of Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., that the force united under my command, consisting of the 1st Brigade of Infantry, No. 6 Light Field Battery, the Mountain Train, the corps of Sappers and Miners, a Squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry, and a Rissalah of the Shah's 2nd Cavalry, marched from Khoord Cabool towards Teezeen yesterday morning. Lieutenant Colonel Monteath, 35th, commanded the advanced guard, Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie, 13th, the main column, and Captain Oldfield, 5th Light Cavalry, the rear guard, in each of which troops of the several arms were appointed according to the best of my judgement. The force felt its way cautiously through the defiles of the Huft Kotul, occupying with skirmishers the hills on either flank, and leaving parties for the protection of our baggage and rear on selected points. Nothing was seen of the enemy until the advance and main body had halted in the Valley of Tezeen. From this low ground another vale stretches out towards the south-east, and on the sides and summits of the mountains which enclose the latter, were posted in every quarter bodies of the insurgents, whilst another portion of their force, consisting of foot, led on by Sirdars on horseback, and their mounted followers, showed a determination to dispute with us the possession of a conical hill, which partly closes the entrance of the branching valley, and barred our approach to Mohamed Uzfal's fort, a large work backed by gardens, which the rebels still garrisoned. From

this eminence the advanced guard under Colonel Monteath drove them by a combined attack, and I then directed the 13th Light Infantry and a portion of Captain Abbott's battery to advance under Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie, and assault the fort itself. The insurgents, however, abandoned it after directing from it a feeble fire.

I immediately determined to establish in it a depôt for my sick and wounded, and to take it as a point of support for ulterior operations and an appui to my camp, to be fixed under its walls, but as the enemy continued to occupy in force a nearly circular range of heights, and even boldly to skirmish in a lower part of the valley, it became necessary to drive them from such segments of the mountain as would, if remaining in their hands, have given them the power to command our position, and fire upon the troops with advantage at night. This led to a succession of skirmishes, which were maintained with great coolness and spirit by several companies of the 13th and one of the 35th, aided by the guns of Captain Abbott's battery and the Mountain Train, and supported by the cavalry. The combat was prolonged until after dusk, and the ammunition of one of the companies of the 13th having been expended, it was compelled temporarily to retire, and a very promising officer, Lieutenant Edward King, was killed at its head. A supply of cartridges and a reinforcement were promptly sent up, and the affair ended by the rebels being pushed off every part of the steep mountains which we designed to retain. The returns will show that our loss has been slight, and I have no doubt that the enemy suffered severely from the fire of our skirmishers and the shot of our batteries. The force bivouacked in position without an attempt being made upon our line. Morning showed us the heights everywhere deserted by the rebels, and if a negotiation, which they have opened in very humble terms, should not end in their entire submission, I purpose to attack their principal fort to-morrow.

I regret to have to add, though every precaution was adopted for the security of our line of communication, a large interval was created between our main body and rear guard, by the circumstance of the latter having to await at Khoord Cabool the arrival of carriage from the capital for part of the public baggage. A light armed enemy, well acquainted with the country, did not fail to take advantage of this, and I fear that some ammunition and valuable stores have fallen into their hands. I beg to forward the report of Captain Oldfield, detailing every occurrence whilst he commanded the rear-guard, also the returns of killed and wounded and of ammunition expended.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

*Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the Force under the command of Major-General Sir R. H. Sale, in the attack on the enemy's position in the valley of Tezeen, on the 22nd October, 1841.*

2nd Company 6th Battalion Artillery.—1 serjeant, 1 horse wounded.

Squadron, 5th Light Cavalry.—1 horse killed; 1 private, wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.—1 lieutenant, 3 privates, killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 corporal, 7 privates, wounded.

Sappers and Miners.—1 private killed; 1 lieutenant, 5 privates, 1 mule, wounded.

Mountain Train.—2 privates, wounded.

Total.—1 lieutenant, 4 privates, 1 horse, killed; 2 lieutenants, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 15 privates, 1 horse, 1 mule, wounded.



*Names of Officers killed and wounded.***Killed.**—Lieutenant Edward King, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.**Wounded.**—Lieutenant Frere, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, slightly; Lieutenant Orr, Sappers and Miners, severely.H. WADE, *Major of Brigade.**No. 7.—Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Grant.**Camp, Jugduluk, October, 28, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., that the force under my command reached this place to-day; last night passed over without the slightest insult to our out-posts at Cuttah Sung, but during the morning's march we descried small parties at a distance on both flanks, especially near the outlet of the Puree Durree, which afterwards united in a combined attack on our rear-guard. Our loss has been small, and the enemy was everywhere baffled and held in check by the fire from our guns and skirmishers. Owing, however, to the jaded state of our camels, it became necessary to destroy a good deal of camp equipage to prevent its falling into the rebels' hands.

The daily repetition of these attacks has given rise to suspicions of the sincerity of the chiefs, in the mind of the Political Assistant, in which I am compelled to participate, though I shall be happy to find that their submission at Tezeen was made in good faith, and that these petty hostilities are the acts of men not under their control.

I have, &amp;c.,

R. SALE.

*No. 8.—Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Grant.**Camp, Gundamuk, October 30, 1841.*

SIR.—Yesterday the force under my command was again engaged with the insurgents of these mountains, and the affair was the sharpest which we have had since penetrating the pass of Khoord Cabool. I experienced little molestation in my camp at Jugduluk, but observed, towards sunset and by moonlight, evident indications of the enemy, which had attacked our rear-guard earlier in the day, being in the act of moving off over the hills, with a view of concentrating between my force and Sookhabul. Major-General Elphinstone is acquainted with the localities, and will not have forgotten that the only entrance to the valley at Jugduluk, from the eastward, is by a long and winding kotul, overlooked and commanded by a lofty range of mountains, partially clothed with bushes and dwarf trees. Of these really terrific eminences the rebels had, as I had anticipated, taken possession, in more considerable numbers than we have been opposed to since leaving Tezeen. Holding all the salient points of the hills, and secured by breastworks, they showed a determination to obstruct with the utmost obstinacy the progress of our flanking parties, and to endeavour to prevent the debouche of our advance and main column. To enable us to effect this I had to detach companies from every corps in the force to the right and left, which,

aided by the artillery, won their way inch by inch up the lofty heights. Much, however, remained to be done, and the fire of the mountaineers from several of the tallest summits was unabated, and success was everywhere doubtful, when a single company of the 13th, under Captain Wilkinson, was directed to advance up the defile itself. It pressed forward at a rapid pace, supported by all the reserves which remained available, and, to the surprise of the whole force, found that the enemy had neglected to guard the main outlet. This van guard, therefore, its supports, and the guns, were quickly established on the narrow table-land, from which they had it in their power to take the whole of the defences of the rebels in reverse. Our troops commanded the route to Sookhab, and the enemy seemed to decline all further opposition. The march was resumed; but as the cumbrous train of baggage filed over the mountain, the insurgents, again appearing from beyond the most distant ridges, renewed the contest with increased numbers, and the most savage fury. Our rear-guard made the best dispositions for defence and rescue; but the suddenness of the onset caused some confusion, during which, notwithstanding the efforts of the troops, some baggage and camp-equipage fell into the hands of their opponents. Captain Wyndham, of the 35th, was killed at this crisis of the affair; and several brave men of all the corps fell or were wounded. Soon, however, by the praiseworthy exertions and cool and soldierlike order and example of Captains Backhouse and Broadfoot, of the Shah's service, and Fenwick, of the 13th, confidence was restored, the aspect of the affair changed, and the rear-guard extricated from the defile. It continued in the best order to retreat, and to repel the enemy, who had followed it up to the point at which the loftier hills wear away. Our casualties of yesterday and the day before amount to 130; amongst whom are one officer killed and four wounded. This loss will not be considered heavy by those who have seen the heights from which the rebels were driven, and are acquainted with the habits and character of the mountaineers to whom we were opposed. I have to-day marched to this place without any interruption worthy of mention.

From the details of this dispatch the Major-General commanding in Affghanistan will be enabled to draw his own inferences as to the actual state of our relations with the refractory Chiefs who were admitted at Tezeen into a treaty of reconciliation with the Government against which they had rebelled. But it belongs more peculiarly to my vocation in the field, now that there is a prospect of brief repose in the vicinity of this cantonment, to report with much satisfaction the cheerfulness, steadiness, and perseverance with which the troops have performed every duty required of them: since leaving Cabool they have been kept constantly on the alert by attacks by night and day; from the time of their arrival at Tezeen they have invariably bivouacked, and the safety of our positions has only been secured by unremitting labour, and throwing up intrenchments, and very severe outpost duty; whilst each succeeding morning has brought its affair, with a bold and active enemy, eminently skilful in the species of warfare to which their attempts have been confined, and armed with jezails, which have enabled them to annoy us at a range at which they could only be reached by our artillery. Though compelled by the effects of my late wound to witness these conflicts from

a doolie, I must bear my unequivocal testimony to the gallantry of officers and men, on every occasion of contact with the enemy, and especially in scaling the tremendous heights above Jugduluk. I inclose a casualty return.

I beg to express my sense of the highly able assistance which I have received in all our attacks and skirmishes, and throughout the operations, from Lieut.-Colonels Dennie and Monteath, C. B. I have been much pleased with the address and able management of Captain Abbott, of the Artillery, who has twice commanded the advanced guard; and the exertions of Captain Wade, my Brigade-Major, and of Captain Havelock, Persian Interpreter to General Elphinstone, (temporarily attached to me,) in conveying my orders from point to point, and aiding in the dispositions, deserve my warmest commendations.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

*Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the Force under the command of Major-General Sir Robert Sale, on the advance to, and storming of, the Pass of Jugduluk, on the 28th and 29th of October, 1841.*

2nd Company 6th Battalion Artillery—1 private killed; 5 privates, 2 horses, wounded.

5th Regiment Light Cavalry Squadron.—2 horses killed; 1 private, 2 horses, wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.—4 privates killed; 3 lieutenants, 30 privates, wounded.

35th Regiment Native Infantry.—1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 soobadars, 1 jemadar, 1 corporal, 12 privates, killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 jemadar, 4 serjeants, 1 corporal, 25 privates, wounded.

Sappers and Miners.—1 serjeant, 6 privates, killed; 1 soobadar, 1 jemadar, 4 serjeants, 1 corporal, 13 privates, wounded.

2nd Regiment Shah Sooja's Cavalry.—1 horse wounded.

Total.—1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 soobadars, 1 jemadar, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 23 privates, 2 horses, killed; 4 lieutenants, 1 soobadar, 2 jemadars, 8 serjeants, 2 corporals, 74 privates, 5 horses, wounded.

*Names of Officers killed and wounded.*

Killed.—Captain Wyndham, 35th Regiment Native Infantry.

Wounded.—Lieutenant Jennings, 13th Light Infantry, severely; Lieutenant Holcombe, 13th Light Infantry, severely; Lieutenant Rattray, 13th Light Infantry, severely; Lieutenant Coombe, 35th Native Infantry, severely.

No. 9.—*Captain Paton to Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar.*

*Cabool, November 3, 1841.*

SIR.—I have the honor, by direction of Major-General Elphinstone, commanding in Afghanistan, to request you will immediately direct the whole of the troops under orders to return to Hindoostan from Candahar, to move upon Cabool, instead of Shikarpore, except any that shall have got beyond the Kojjuck Pass, and that you will instruct the officer who may command to use the utmost practicable expedition; you are requested to attach a troop of his Majesty the Shah's Horse Artillery to the above force, and likewise half the 1st Regiment of Cavalry.

I have, &c.,

J. PATON.

*Assistant Quartermaster-General.*

No. 10.—*Captain Mackeson, Political Agent at Peshawur, to Captain Lawrence, Assistant-Governor-General's Agent, Ferozepore.*

*Peshawur, November 9, 1841.*

SIR.—I have the honor to inclose a copy of a letter, this instant received, from Captain Burn, dated Gundamuck, 5th November, and with reference to its contents, have to request that you will communicate with the military authorities at Ferozepore, and urge on them the necessity of hastening, by every means in their power, the dispatch of the brigade, warned for the Cabool relief.

I doubt the correctness of the report Captain Burn has received, of our troops being shut up in the Bala Hissar, and yet there must be some cause for the absence of all letters from the Envoy; under any circumstances, the state of the country, owing to the rebellion among the eastern Ghilzies, is such as to make it highly desirable that the brigade destined for Afghanistan should arrive here as expeditiously as possible, consistent with a due regard to preserving its efficiency for work when it does arrive.

I have, &c.

F. MACKESON.

No. 11.—*Major-General Sir Robert Sale to Captain Mackeson.*

*Camp, Fultabad, November 11, 1841.*

SIR,—In the course of my operations against the Eastern Ghilzies, undertaken in pursuance of instructions from Major-General Elphinstone, I reached Gundamuck on the 30th ultimo, and whilst there, was made aware of the critical position in which the force of Cabool is placed, by the occupation of the city and of the heights around it by bodies of insurgents, who have captured, it is said, one magazine, and seem to have it in their power, now at the approach of winter, to cut off every supply from the troops in the Bala Hissar and intrenched cantonment. I was unable as they and I had desired to march to their relief, partly in consequence of the desertion, in great numbers, of the owners of our hired carriage with their animals, and partly from our want of ammunition, half of our supply having been expended in our numerous affairs with the enemy, Jellalabad being at the same time menaced on the side of Lughman. I have determined to secure that important point by falling back upon it, and hope to reach it to-morrow. The Commissariat Officer will probably communicate with you on the subject of any want he may have in that department; and I have now urgently to request the favor of your exerting your influence with the Sikh authorities at Peshawur, to obtain for me, without delay, 200,000 rounds of musket ammunition, or if that amount be not in readiness in their arsenal made up into cartridges, the material complete for the same.

I have, &c.

R. SALE,

*Commanding Field Force.*

No. 12.—*Captain J. Paton, Assistant Quarter-Master General,  
to Major-General Sir R. Sale.*

*Cabool, November 9, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor, by direction of Major-General Elphinstone, commanding in Affghanistan, to acquaint you that the condition of the force here is at present unfortunately such as to compel him to request you will march the troops under your command to its assistance immediately on receipt of this, at all risks, and with the utmost possible expedition.

I have, &c.

J. PATON.

No. 13.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Paton.*

*Jellalabad, November 15, 1841.*

SIR,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, requiring the force under my command to move again upon Cabool. In reply I beg to represent that the whole of my camp equipage has been destroyed; that the wounded and sick have increased to upwards of 300, that there is no longer a single dépôt of provisions on the route; and that the carriage of the force is not sufficient to bring on one day's rations with it. I have at the same time positive information that the whole country is in arms, and ready to oppose us in the defiles between this city and Cabool, whilst my ammunition is insufficient for more than two such contests, as I should assuredly have to sustain for six days at least. With my present means I could not force the passes of either Jugdulluk or Khoord Cabool, and even if the *débris* of my brigade did reach Cabool, I am given to understand that I should find the troops now garrisoning it without the means of subsistence. Under these circumstances, a regard for the honor and interests of our Government compels me to adhere to my plan already formed of putting this place into a state of defence, and holding it if possible, until the Cabool force falls back upon me, or succours arrive from Peshawar or India.

Yesterday this city was invested by the enemy, amounting at the least to the lowest calculation to five thousand men, which had kept up a heavy fire on the defective walls for upwards of twenty-four hours, by which we suffered much. I directed Lieut.-Colonel Monteath, at the head of 700 bayonets, and the cavalry to sally forthwith and make a general attack. The enemy were totally routed at every point; but I must of course expect successive investments, and to have to make unremitting efforts for our defence.

I have, &c.

R. SALE.

No. 14.—*Major General Sir R. Sale commanding Field Force,  
to Major Craigie, Acting Adjutant-General.*

*Jellalabad, November 13, 1841.*

SIR,—Be pleased to acquaint the Commander-in-Chief, that whilst the force at Cabool is by the last account surrounded by enemies, we are

now closely invested here by the hostile Ooloos from every side. Two regiments, and the corps of Sappers, do not more than suffice to man these extensive walls, and great efforts are demanded of us. We need succours in every way; troops, treasure, provisions, and ammunition now, and a siege train to enable us to retrieve things, by active operations, on the conclusion of the winter. In an affair with the rebels yesterday, our cavalry made a gallant charge, and the enemy left 150 dead on the field.

I have, &c.,

ROBERT SALE.

No. 15.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major Craigie.*

• *Head Quarters, Jellalabad, November 18, 1841.*

SIR,—The troops under my command reached this city on the 12th instant.

My line of march on the 11th was no otherwise interrupted than by the attacks of bodies of plunderers on the baggage, who received signal punishment from our precautionary parties.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie commanded the rear guard; he retired slowly before the enemy, repelling him by skirmishes and cannon as long as the ground continued abrupt and rugged, but on approaching the plains, he commenced to manœuvre with the view of drawing them into an action on the level. Their boldness favoured his stratagem, and foreseeing this result, I had dispatched the Rissalah of Shah's horse to reinforce him. At length the desired moment arrived, and the Lieutenant-Colonel directed Captain Oldfield, of the 5th Cavalry, and Lieutenant Mayne, of the Shah's 2nd, to make a combined charge against the Ooloose; this was executed with great rapidity and resolution, and in very compact order, and in a few minutes upwards of 100 Affghan matchlock men were sabred and shot, and the rest driven in irremediable confusion to the heights. It was ascertained on the spot, that the Ooloose had left in the course of the whole affair 150 dead on the field, and the proportion of their wounded must have been heavy. After this salutary lesson, their efforts to annoy our columns on their route up to the walls of this place were cautious and feeble. The defences of Jellalabad consist of a mud *enceinte*, of upwards of 2000 yards, of weak curtains, and round towers, which have a narrow rampart, but insufficient parapet. On the northern face the profile is less bold than elsewhere, and there was excellent cover for an enemy within pistol shot. On the evening of the 12th, our infantry occupied the gates, and the ill-constructed citadel, whilst the artillery and cavalry were dispersed in the enclosures adjacent to the residences of the King, and Envoy and Minister, without the walls.

On the morning of the 13th, more regular occupation was taken of the place. Troops were posted on the whole of its bastions, the two infantry corps were established in the citadel, the artillery in an open space in front of it, and the cavalry in the Shah's garden. About 250 of the Khyberees had remained steady to their allegiance; the Jezzailchees were emulating the regular battalions in zeal and courage, and unremitting

efforts were made by plying our intrenching tools and the substitution of camel saddles for sandbags, to put the town into a state of decent defence ; in the meantime a great force had assembled under the walls to the southward and westward, whilst other masses came down from the direction of Lughman, crossed the river, and invested us closely to the northward, detaching parties to set fire to the cantonment, raised at so great an expense in 1840. It had been in part burnt down the night before, and was now involved in a general conflagration ; the enemy, masked by trees and old buildings, kept up an incessant fire of musquetry against the walls at a very short range for upwards of twenty-four hours, by which our men sustained some loss behind their growing defences, and as it was desirable to diminish the consumption of provisions within the city, I adopted the measure, first, of telling the women and children to withdraw, next, of excluding all strangers and suspicious persons, and finally, of getting rid, as far as it was practicable, of the whole male population, excepting the shopkeepers whose stay was valuable to us.

On the morning of Sunday the 14th, I determined to attempt to dislodge the enemy from a part of their position. I placed for this purpose a force consisting of 300 men of the 13th, 300 of the 35th, 100 sappers, three guns of Captain Abbott's battery, the whole of the cavalry, and 200 Khyberees, at the disposal of Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, C. B., and directed him to sally from the town, and assail that part of the enemy's line from which I was most desirous of expelling them. I beg to forward the report of the very gallant affair which followed, and which I had the satisfaction of witnessing from the walls. This spirited attack upon not fewer than 5000 men, has wholly broken up the enemy's investment, and we have from that hour scarcely seen an armed Affghan in our neighbourhood ; we have availed ourselves of this pause to put the walls into a state of defence, which will, I trust, enable us to defy the efforts of any Asiatic force unaided by siege artillery, and are using every exertion to store our magazines with grain from the adjacent villages. I inclose reports from Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie and Captain Oldfield, and casualty returns from the 11th to the 14th instant, inclusive.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

*No. 16.—Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie to Captain Wade, Major of Brigade.*

*Jellalabad, November 14, 1841.*

SIR,—As commanding the rear guard on the 12th instant, I have the honor to report for the Major-General's information, that previously to the troops leaving their bivouac a sharp fire was opened upon the loading baggage from the hills on our right, which afterwards was taken up along our rear. The piquets at either point kept the enemy for some time in check, but as his numbers and confidence increased, I deemed it advisable to reinforce them ; Captain Oldfield with his troop also pushed those who had descended into the plain, back to the highest covered by by our skirmishers (under Lieutenant Wade 13th, and Ensign Norton 35th) extended across the valley, and crowning the hills ; the baggage

safely debouched through the gorge in which the village is situated, and in about an hour afterwards I gradually retired in the same order. On clearing its narrow outlet at the other extremity, the enemy again pressed upon us and were very numerous, completely enveloping our flanks and rear. As the country, however, soon opened in our front, as the troops were perfectly steady and could be fully relied upon, and as I was desirous to disengage them from the broken and close ground, and the fire of the village and that of a large fort, I continued to retire and permitted the confident pursuit of the Ooloose until I had drawn them to the point which I had fixed upon in my mind. Here whilst the squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry, under Captain Oldfield, was drawn up in line, I was joined by a Rissalah of Anderson's horse under Lieutenant Mayne, sent back by the Major-General, who had witnessed the heavy firing, and judged that the ground was favourable to the movements of cavalry. I now directed a combined charge, which was instantaneous and overpowering: bringing their right shoulders forward, they swept the plain and bore down all opposition; not fewer than one hundred fell under their sabres, and the wounded were in proportion. The cavalry was ably supported by Captain Broadfoot with his detachment of sappers, who carried all before them to the right, and cleared the hills which had been covered by our assailants. The route was now general and complete. After the halt, necessary for the recall of the cavalry and reforming my party, I resumed my march, which, for at least ten miles, was not interrupted by a shot. On the road then becoming difficult and contracted, a body of the enemy, encouraged by some Jan-Bazes, who had deserted at Gundamuk, again made their appearance, but they preserved a distance at which their fire was harmless. On extricating the column from this ground, I once more awaited their approach, but, instructed by the recent lesson, they could not be induced to cross the ravines, and from thence, until we marched into Jellalabad, we saw no more of an enemy.

Though the conduct of every officer and soldier in this affair was excellent, I must be permitted particularly to remark the gallant manner in which Captain Oldfield led the charge of cavalry, in which he was emulated by Lieutenant Mayne at the head of his Rissalah, and Lieutenant Plowden in command of a troop of the 5th Cavalry; Captain Broadfoot's support of them was most soldier-like and intrepid. The services of Captain Backhouse in command of the artillery were very valuable to me, and I have to thank Captain Scaton, 35th, senior officer of the infantry, for his able assistance.

I have, &c.,

W. H. DENNIE.

*Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the force under the command of Major-General Sir Robert Sale, from the 11th to the 14th of November, 1841.*

Squadron 5th Light Cavalry.—1 camp follower, 1 horse, killed; 5 privates, 1 syce, 7 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Rissalah 2nd Regiment Cavalry. S. S. F.—7 sepoy, 11 horses, killed; 1 duffadar, 10 privates, 4 horses, wounded.

Sappers and Miners.—1 naick, 1 sepoy, killed; 1 serjeant, wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.—11 privates, wounded.

45th Regiment Native Infantry.—1 sepoy killed; 6 privates, 2 camp followers, wounded.



Detachment Jezzailchee Regiment.—1 havildar, 2 naicks, 19 sepoy, 1 camp follower, killed; 1 captain, 1 jemadar, 12 sepoy, wounded; 1 havildar, 8 sepoy, missing.

Total.—1 havildar, 3 naicks, 28 sepoy, 2 camp followers, 12 horse killed; 1 captain, 1 jemadar, 3 staff serjeants, 1 duffadar, 44 privates, 1 syce, 2 camp followers, 11 horses, wounded; 1 havildar, 8 sepoy, 1 horse, missing.

Grand Total.—33 men, 12 horses, killed; 53 men, 11 horses, wounded; 9 sepoy, 1 horse, missing.

*Names of Officers wounded.*

Jezzailchee Regiment.—Captain Gerrard, 2nd in command.

H. WADE, *Captain, Major of Brigade.*

*No. 17.—Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath to Captain Wade.*

*Jellalabad, November 14, 1841.*

SIR,—Having been entrusted with the command of the troops named in the margin\*, by Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., for the purpose of making a sortie to dislodge the enemy from the several positions of investment taken up by them around Jellalabad, I have now the honor of addressing you to report, for the Major-General's information, the arrangements made by me towards the fulfilment of his views.

Having made a reconnoissance of the enemy's posts, as well as the sharp fire upon the ramparts would admit, I determined, as a preliminary measure, to carry the walled garden immediately in front of the southern gate, the walled enclosure and mosque to the south-west of that gate, from whence the flank of the sallying column could be assailed in its advance, and the garden immediately in front of the Cabool gate.

The first of these posts was taken by a party of one hundred men of the Khyber corps, under Lieutenant Hillersden; the second, by a party of fifty men, of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, under Lieutenant Cox; and the third, by a similar party of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, under Captain Fenwick.

Having seen the troops established in these three posts, a sortie was immediately made with the remainder of the force from the southern gate, for the purpose of storming the heights in front of that face of the town on which the enemy had collected in masses, and which seemed to be considered the head quarters, from their standard having been planted there, but on the approach of the column of infantry and guns, they immediately fled from them with the utmost precipitancy.

Captain Oldfield, commanding the cavalry stationed in the Shah Bhag, at the south-east angle of the town, had received my instructions that as soon as he saw the infantry debouche upon the plain, he was to move forward as expeditiously as possible, gain the rear of the heights, there form line out of reach of the enemy's fire, and remain prepared to charge them upon their being driven down by the infantry.

In order that he might not be impeded by fire behind the walls during his advance, a party of one hundred of the Khyber corps, under Captain Bruce, was placed under his command, to enable him to dislodge any small parties of the enemy so posted. Circumstances, however, occurred

\* 300 Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; 300, 35th Regiment; 100 Sappers and Miners; 200 Khyber corps; 3 guns, Abbott's Battalion; 1 Squadron 5th Light Infantry; 1 Rissalah Anderson's Horse; a duffadar and 12 men, Skinner's Horse.

which completely prevented Captain Oldfield from acting in the manner prescribed by me, and which, in the end, proved of no consequence whatsoever. A report of the occurrences which took place in that officer's quarter is herewith inclosed.

Having occupied the heights from which the enemy had fled, by one hundred men of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and the same number of the 35th Regiment, and placed the cavalry with one nine-pounder gun under Captain Backhouse, commanding the Mountain Train (but who was present as a volunteer), on the plain at a short distance in the front to watch the movements of the enemy, who, both horse and foot, had again collected on a distant height, I moved the rest of the troops and guns round to the right, for the purpose of driving the remainder of the enemy from the western and northern faces of the town, and, on a well-directed fire being opened by Lieutenant Dawes from the guns on one of their positions, they broke in every quarter, and fled with the greatest consternation, when I am given to understand the Jezzailchees stationed on the northern face, sallied in a very gallant manner, and cut up a number of them.

On seeing the hopeless state of affairs in every direction, the chiefs with about three hundred of the Jan-Baz who had deserted our cause at Gundamuk, descended from the height on which they had in the first instance rallied, and made off in the direction of Cabool; but having come within range of Captain Backhouse's gun, that officer had the opportunity afforded him of firing some admirably directed round shot amongst them, which seemed to create an instant feeling to remove themselves as speedily, and as far from our vicinity as possible.

Having now detailed the operations of the day, it is a most gratifying reflection to think how much has been gained at so trifling a loss to ourselves, and so considerable a one to the enemy, 5,000 of whom must have been present on the occasion.

As after sallying from the town, I had the opportunity of witnessing the conduct of the cavalry, I have no hesitation in saying they acquitted themselves entirely to my satisfaction. My thanks are therefore justly due to them, and to that gallant and meritorious officer, Captain Oldfield, for the able manner in which he extricated himself from a very critical situation, in the first instance, and for the brilliant manner in which he afterwards led his men to the charge, placing himself in that situation that he was attacked by two Affghan horsemen at the same moment, against whom he had to defend himself until they were sabred by two of his men.

Lieutenant Mayne, commanding the Rissalah of Anderson's Horse, than whom I know not a more gallant and zealous officer, has also well deserved my thanks for his conspicuous conduct, and that of Lieutenant Plowden, 5th Light Cavalry, has been mentioned to me by his commanding officer, Captain Oldfield, in terms of the highest commendation.

In regard to the remainder of the troops, viz., the Artillery, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 35th Regiment, Sappers and Miners, Shah Shooja's force, and detachment Khyber corps, under Lieutenant Hillersden, nothing could exceed the gallant spirit manifested by them; and I have to return my thanks to Captain Havelock, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, who volunteered to accompany me as staff

for the very ready and zealous assistance he was always prepared to render me ; to Captain Backhouse, who volunteered to take charge of a nine-pounder, left with the Cavalry ; Lieutenant Dawes, commanding the Artillery with the detachment ; to Captain Fenwick, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, who took the walled inclosure and mosque : Lieutenant Cox, who took possession of the garden in front of the Cabool gates, and Lieutenant Hillersden, who took possession of the walled garden in front of the southern gate.

Herewith I beg to inclose a return of the killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,

T. MONTEATH.

No. 18.—*Captain Oldfield to Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, November 14, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report that, in obedience to orders, I formed the cavalry at mid-day of 14th instant, consisting of 1st Squadron 5th Cavalry, and part of 3rd Squadron of Shah's 2nd Cavalry, under the fort wall of this town and facing to the east ready for sally.

As the Khyberees would not act in our front, I was compelled to give up the line of march pointed out, particularly after the occupation by the enemy of the mission grounds and house. The fire on us was very heavy from our front and right ; to check this, I ordered Lieutenant Plowden to the front with the skirmishers, and sounded the charge ; this frightened the enemy, who soon disappeared from the points above-mentioned. Lieutenant Plowden led the skirmishers gallantly, and rendered me most essential service.

As I advanced, I directed Lieutenant Mayne to clear the ground from left to right, and join me at South Mission Gate : here we were again exposed to a heavy fire, but a charge drove the enemy away, and we soon were in the midst of their Foot, whom we cut up right and left.

The enemy's horse being in force on my right towards the southern gate of the town, I halted to form my troops ; the Janbaz fancying they had an easy prey actually charged me, and two of their number were killed in my ranks ; this was their last effort. I dashed at and drove them to the hills, then withdrew out of shot covered by skirmishers, and formed in parade order ready for work, but the enemy had had enough.

I deem it but justice to mention, that the moment I advanced the Khyberees supported me.

The whole of the troops under my command behaved most gallantly, and I received the greatest assistance from Lieutenants Mayne and Plowden, and Subadar Sheik Mykhan of the 2nd Troop, 5th Light Cavalry.

I have, &c.,

C. OLDFIELD.

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*Return of killed, wounded, and missing, in the sally made on the enemy's position, on the 14th November, 1841.*

Artillery, Abbott's Battery—None killed or wounded. 1st Squadron 5th Light Cavalry—1 naick, 1 rank and file, 1 horse wounded.

Rissalah Anderson's Horse, 4 horse killed ; 1 naick, 3 rank and file, 10 horses, wounded.

Detachment of Skinner's Horse—None killed or wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—3 rank and file, wounded.

35th Regiment Native Infantry—None killed or wounded.

Sappers and Mipers, S. S. F.—None killed or wounded.

Detachment Khyberees—None killed or wounded.

Total—4 horses, killed ; 2 naicks, 7 rank and file, 11 horses, wounded.

T. MONTEATH, *Lieutenant Colonel,*  
*commanding the sallying party.*

No. 19.—*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor.*

*Cabool, November 18, 1841.*

SIR,—I have received your letters of the 13th instant. The cossid gave us an account of your action of the 14th instant, which, if he speaks truth, must have been a very successful one ; we are in statu quo. Our chief want is supplies. I perceive now, that you could not well have joined us. I hope you have written to Mackeson, asking aid from the Sikhs under the treaty. If there is any difficulty about the Sikhs getting through the pass, Mackeson should offer a bribe to the Khybers, of a lac of rupees or more, to insure their safe passage. These are not times to stick at trifles. The Gorkha regiment has been annihilated, but Pottinger and Haughton are here ; the latter has lost his hand. I believe I told you that Paton lost his arm in the action we had near cantonments the other day. It is raining here, and the water is very cold, but I am not sure that this is not as bad for the enemy as for ourselves. I do not hear anything from Ghuzni or Candahar ; but I should not wonder if they are in the same mess as ourselves : we must look for supplies chiefly from Peshawur. Write to Mackeson continually ; tell him to urge Government to send as many troops into this country, and as speedily as possible. John Conolly is in the "Bala Hissar" with his Majesty, who, as you may imagine, is in sad taking about all this "fussad." I am making no progress in my negotiations with the rebels.

Your's, &c.,

W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

No. 20.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major Craigie.*

*Jellalabad, November 24, 1841.*

SIR,—The communication being on all sides interrupted, I am compelled to write in the most condensed form. Lest previous letters should have been intercepted, I would ask of you now to acquaint the Commander-in-Chief that the substance of our intelligence from Cabool is, that a sudden and sanguinary insurrection broke out there on the 2nd of November. Armed bodies attacked simultaneously the houses of all the British residents in the city. Sir A. Burnes, his brother, and Lieutenant Broadfoot, were murdered. Brigadier Anquetil, Captains Johnson and Troup, were fortunately at the moment in the cantonment. Captain Skinner has been secreted ; Captain Mackenzie, S. S. F., cut his way through the assailants (wounded). The insurgents proceeded to establish

themselves on the hills around the city ; and, making an unexpected attack on our commissariat magazine, carried and plundered it. There was a simultaneous rising in the Kohistan : the Shah's Goorkha battalion, and his regiment of Kohistanees, were both defeated, and every officer put to the sword, excepting Major Pottinger and Bieutenant Haughton : the latter has lost one hand. Our troops at Cabool maintained themselves on the two points of the Bala Hissar and the entrenched cantonment. They repelled several attacks on the latter, and made a brilliant sally on the 5th. Actions were fought with varied success up to the 10th, on which day the British attacked, and carried with great slaughter, several forts, and obtained very considerable supplies of provisions. The enemy assailed the cantonment on the 13th, but were repulsed with great loss, and two guns, which had been captured from the Wuzeer, were retaken. Since that time it would appear that there has been no engagement, but the investment continues, and the numbers of the enemy daily increase. All tribes are united against the Shah. The insurgents have proclaimed Mahomed Zeman Khan Barukzye, King ; Jubber Khan, Wuzeer ; and Abdoollah Khan Alchukzye, the assassin of Sir A. Burnes, Surdari-Surdaran. The earlier part of these events and transactions became known to me on the night of the 10th instant, at Gumdammuck ; and I was urged by General Elphinstone to advance to the succour of the capital, if I could place my sick and wounded in security. This was impossible ; my ammunition also was insufficient for the operation ; we had no supplies ; and our carriage cattle were daily diminishing in number. I determined, therefore, to retire on Jellalabad. On the 11th the Jan-Bazees went over to the enemy, and they have since been followed by the Khyberce corps. I reached this place on the 12th, after a successful rear-guard affair, in which my cavalry charged, and the enemy left 150 dead on the field. Five thousand men invested this place on the 13th ; on the 14th I ordered a sally and general attack with part of my garrison. The enemy were totally routed, and I have since scarcely seen an armed Afghan around us, though a force is known to have assembled within a few miles. Incessant labor has put this place into a respectable state of defence. Eleven guns and five mortars are mounted on the works, which have now a widened rampart and growing parapet of three feet. Meanwhile the Khyber is in a state of insurrection. Ali Musjid has been besieged ; Captain Ferris' corps at Pesh Boluk was attacked, and it is believed that he only escaped with his people by concluding a convention with the assailants and retiring to Peshawur. We have, however, no certain information regarding him. I forward copy of General Elphinstone's last communication, written in French, in consequence of its being known that the enemy have employed two young men, instructed in English in Delhi or Loodianah, to read our intercepted dispatches. I am happy to perceive that the General approves of my measures. Captain Macgregor and I have written to Captain Mackeson to send up through the Khyber to us, ammunition, treasure, and provisions, and to call upon the Sikh Government to aid us, according to treaty with 5,000 troops. I can, in every event, I trust, maintain himself here for thirty days, and await reinforcement from India ; and I should hope that Major-General Elphinstone will be enabled to retain possession of all the

holds at Cabool. His Excellency will not fail to perceive from the above detail that, all measures of reinforcement and succour ought, at this crisis, to be prompt and energetic.

I have, &c.

R. SALE.

*Copy of a letter from Major-General Elphinstone to the Address of Sir R. Sale.*

*Cabool, November 18, 1841.*

MON CHER SALE,—J'ai reçu votre lettre du 15mo. Je pense que vous avez très bien fait is vous envoi des renforts de la place de Peshawur, et que vous vous trouvez dans la situation de nous aider, ne manquez pas de le faire ; nous sommes dans en peril extrême.

No. 21.—*Captain Lawrence, Assistant Agent to the Governor-General, Ferozepore, to Colonel Wild, commanding at Ferozepore.*

*November 14, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to request, with reference to the dispatch from Lieutenant Mackeson, which I showed you this morning, that the troops, now under orders for Cabool, should start with the least possible delay.

I would also suggest that the 60th Regiment, now in orders for Sukkur, and any other infantry regiment you may think proper, as well as the 10th Cavalry, should be held in immediate readiness for a move towards Afghanistan, as soon as instructions can arrive from Mr. Clerk, Agent Governor-General, which will be the 19th instant, so that they could, without any difficulty, overtake the Kafilâ at the Ravee.

I would further offer my opinion that the commanding officer should not be hampered with any extra stores by the charge of ladies ; but have under his care simply the treasure and such magazine stores as are deemed absolutely necessary for supplying the immediate wants of our troops in Afghanistan.

Perhaps you will agree with me that the better plan will be only to warn the officers of the crops above alluded to, that they may be required to move, it being desirable to give as little room as possible for reports. In this view, I should not have suggested the ladies remaining behind, if their going now did not involve a certain degree of risk to themselves, and that they and their establishments must be in the way, should the troops be called on for any rapid movements.

A copy of Lieutenant Mackeson's letter shall be forwarded to you immediately.

I have, &c.

H. M. LAWRENCE.

P. S. Arrangements now in progress at the Ghaut will be completed by the 17th instant, and will enable me to cross the whole Kafilâ in one day.

No. 22.—*Captain Mackeson to Mr. Clerk.**Peshawur, November 15, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward for your information a letter received this afternoon from Major-General Sale commanding field force, dated Futteabad, 11th November.

Several days before the receipt of this letter I had dispatched powder, &c. to Captain Macgregor sufficient for 100,000 rounds, but I am not positive that it has reached him, nor can I be that the quantity I shall now send will reach Jellalabad.

It appears that on General Sale's brigade leaving Gundamuck that post was again left to be guarded by Captain Burn's corps of Afreedees, Captain Dowson's Janbaz, and 200 of Captain Ferris' Jezailchees. The whole of the Janbaz and one-third of Captain Burn's corps of Afreedees deserted and went over to the enemy, and the remainder refused to remain at Gundamuck, Captain Burn was consequently obliged also to retire with the remainder, and joined General Sale's column at Futteabad. He was unable to bring away with him from Gundamuck two of the Shah's guns, that had been left there for his protection, and it is not mentioned whether the guns were spiked on leaving them behind.

There can be no doubt, that if the troops at Cabool do not succeed shortly in making the towns people sue for terms, the tribes in Nungrahar, as well as those towards Cabool, will combine against us; and the force that moves from Ferozepore should consist of two brigades, with one, if not two regiments of Europeans; the brigades should follow each other as quickly as possible.

I have written to General Avitabile (in French, in order to avoid making use of a Persian writer,) and for the information of Koonwur Purtab Sing, who is with Rajah Golap Sing, and the Sikh troops in Hazara, an outline of the state of affairs at Cabool. I have told them, that though I am in no alarm for the safety of our troops, either at Cabool or Jellalabad, still so long as they are confined to one spot, the present rise among the Affghan race will extend every day; and as the Affghans about here have long ago declared that the Sikhs only hold Peshawur through the power of the British Government, it became me, as a well-wisher to the two Governments, to draw his attention to the small number of troops now at Peshawur, and to recommend the reinforcing them without delay.

I shall not think of asking for Sikh troops excepting in the last extremity, but the movement of a large force from Hazara to Peshawur, accompanied as they may perhaps be by the Koonwur himself, cannot fail to have a good effect.

I have, &c.,

F. MACKESON

*Political Agent.*

No. 23.—*Mr. Clerk to Colonel Rich, commanding at Loodiana.**November 16, 1841.*

SIR,—An express having been received from the Political Agent at Peshawur, requiring the dispatch of the brigade warned for the Cabool

relief to be hastened by every means; in consequence of an alarming insurrection at, or near Cabool, I have the honor to request that you will accordingly dispatch, with the utmost expedition, the 53rd regiment Native Infantry; which had been already warned to proceed to Peshawur.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE CLERK,

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 21.—*Mr. Clerk to the Officer commanding at Ferozepore.*

*November 16, 1841.*

SIR,—An express having been received from the Political Agent at Peshawur, requiring the dispatch of the brigade for the Cabool relief to be hastened by every means, in consequence of an alarming insurrection at or near Cabool, I have the honor to request that you will dispatch at the same time with the 64th, which is preparing to march on the 20th instant, or as soon after as possible, the 60th Regiment, which had been warned to proceed to Affghanistan, via Sinde.

I have requested the officer in command at Loodiana to hasten the departure of the 53rd Native Infantry, which is already warned to proceed to Cabool.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE CLERK.

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 25.—*Mr. Clerk to General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K. C. B., Commander-in-Chief.*

*Camp, Mynpooree, November 17, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to annex a copy of the demi-official letter which I received yesterday from the Assistant Agent to the Governor General at Ferozepore, with a copy of Captain Mackeson's express of the 9th instant, of which I yesterday transmitted a copy to your Excellency; also a copy of another letter from Captain Lawrence to my address, dated the 14th instant, forwarding a copy of his letter of the same date, to Colonel Wild.

2. Your Excellency will have observed that I have limited the requisitions which I have presumed to make upon the commanding officers at Loodiana and Ferozepore, to the three infantry regiments which were already preparing to march to Affghanistan. I consider that this is what Captain Mackeson means in his urgent request for the dispatch of "the brigade warned for the Cabool relief." I therefore have not followed up the intimation made by Captain Lawrence to the commanding officer at Ferozepore, regarding artillery and cavalry, by requesting that a detachment of either should move forward. That intimation, however, will enable Colonel Wild now to make preparations that will facilitate the execution of the orders he may receive, should your Excellency see fit to direct that artillery or regular cavalry should accompany the 60th or the 53rd Regiments.



3. I trust that you Excellency will approve of my having recommended to Colonel Wild, not only that no women should accompany the 64th Regiment, but that the eight lacks of rupees which were to have been escorted by the regiment to Jellalabad, should await the departure of the other regiments about to follow, in order that nothing may retard the arrival at Peshawur of the first regiment moving up.

4. I had failed in procuring boats to carry the 60th Regiment down to Sukkur. Those in which the company of artillery embarked last month for Sukkur, have not returned. The remaining boats are not sufficient, and if they were so, they are so greatly in demand at this season for the trade, that the hire, which Government would have to pay, would be most exorbitant.

5. A party of fifty horse, appointed at my request by the Lahore Government, together with a respectable Sikh officer, who has before given satisfaction on similar occasions, has arrived at the Ferozepore ferry, to attend upon the 64th Regiment to Peshawur.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE CLERK,

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

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No. 26.—*Mr. Maddock, Secretary to the Government of India, to Mr. Clerk, Agent to the Governor-General.*

*Fort William, November 29, 1841.*

SIR,—The Right Honorable the Governor General in Council has directed me to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatches, dated respectively the 16th and 17th instant, enclosing copies of correspondence regarding the dispatch of troops towards Afghanistan, and in reply to inform you that his Lordship in Council approves of your proceedings therein reported.

I have, &c.,

T. II. MADDOCK.

No. 27.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.*

*Loodiana, November 21, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit a letter just received from Captain Mackeson to your address, dated the 14th instant, with its inclosure from Captain Macgregor.

The 64th Regiment, N. I., crossed the Sutlej on the 17th, the 60th yesterday, and the 53rd marched hence on the 19th instant, to cross the Sutlej at Ferozepore also.

Colonel Wild has dispatched a large supply of ammunition, which will be pushed forward under a cavalry escort.

I have also called upon the Lahore Government to direct General Avitabile to supply ammunition on Captain Mackeson's requisition, and I have informed Captain Mackeson of my having done so.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK,

*Governor-General's Agent.*

No. 28.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Earl of Auckland.*  
*East of Mynpooree, November 26, 1841.*

MY DEAR LORD,—Although Mr. Clerk will have transmitted, by express, all he can collect, regarding Sir Robert Sale and our troops at Cabool, I hasten to dispatch copies of three letters just received by express from Captain Lawrence at Ferozepore.

They are anything but agreeable, I am sorry to say.

What I have immediately done, your Lordship will be anxious to know, and I hope you will approve.

If the Light Infantry Battalion, according to Captain Lawrence's suggestion, has been sent on with the 53rd, I have desired Major-General Boyd to order the most efficient native corps at Kurnaul to Ferozepore.

Though much against such employment of the Light Battalion, it may be quite necessary to have four corps to force the Khyber, if rebellion should extend to that formidable pass.

Her Majesty's 9th Regiment to continue its march to Ferozepore ; there to await events and orders, and to be ready, if your Lordship permits it, to relieve the 13th.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wild has been ordered to push on another lac of musket ammunition.

The Commissary of Ordnance at Delhi to send three or four lacs of the same to Ferozepore.

Also 100 rounds a gun for Abbott's guns, and the Mountain Train.

There is no want of money at Ferozepore, and no doubt Mr. Clerk will supply what Sir Robert requires, with his usual address and skill.

Provisions may, perhaps, be sent by Captain Mackeson if the Khybercees are faithful ; but such demands can only be met upon or near the spot.

I hope the letter from Sir W. Macnaghten, alluded to by Captain Lawrence, may reach your Lordship safely, and be more cheering.

I shall not detain the express to say more.

Believe me, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 29.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.*

*Loodiana, November 22, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit copies of three letters received from Captain Mackeson at the same time by express No. 1, dated the 15th instant, inclosing copy of a letter from Major-General Sale, commanding field force, dated Futteabad the 11th instant, and Nos. 2 and 3, dated the 16th, inclosing two demi-official notes from Captain Macgregor, one of which refers to a letter received by him from Sir William Macnaghten of the 16th instant, which Captain Macgregor has inadvertently omitted to forward to Captain Mackeson.

2. As reported in my letter of this date, dispatched by the regular dark, the 64th Regiment Native Infantry, with 8 lacs of rupees and 100,000 rounds of ammunition for Captain Macgregor, crossed the Sutlej on the 18th instant, the 60th Native Infantry on the 20th and the 53rd, which marched from Loodiana on the 19th instant, will cross at Ferozepore, on the 23rd or 24th instant.

3. With regard to moving up another brigade with at least one European Regiment, I have requested the Major-General commanding this division to prepare and dispatch such a brigade if he can. But I doubt whether Her Majesty's 3rd Foot is in a fit state to march, on account of the great sickness that has lately prevailed in that regiment; and as the European Regiment has so lately returned from Afghanistan, it will probably be deemed advisable to send Her Majesty's 9th Foot from Meerut. I shall therefore forward a copy of this letter to Sir Robert Arbuthnot as well as to Major-General Boyd, in order that they may be prepared for whatever selection may be made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, whose camp is now approaching Agra, and to whom a copy of Captain Mackeson's letter of the 15th instant, with a copy of Major-General Sale's letter of the 11th instant, has been transmitted by express.

4. I have called upon Maha Rajah Shere Sing to cause the immediate march of his son Koonwur Purtab Sing on Peshawur with five thousand of their best troops from the neighbouring district of Chuch Hazara, and to direct the Koonwur to be prepared to assist Captain Mackeson to the utmost in sending up ammunition under escorts approved by that officer to our posts at Ali Musjid and Jellalabad, and to co-operate in any manner that Captain Mackeson may require.

I have, &c.

GEORGE CLERK.

P. S.—I inclose a copy of a letter from General Sale to Major Craigie, dated the 13th instant, of which a copy has reached me by express, while the original has gone down to the head-quarters of the army by express.

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No. 30.—*Mr. Clerk to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*November 22, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency copies of three letters received from Captain Mackeson, under date the 15th and 16th instant, forwarding dispatches from Major-General Sale, dated the 11th and 13th, the former in original to Captain Mackeson, the latter a copy of a letter addressed to the officiating Adjutant-General of the Army, together with copies of my letter of this date to the Secretary to the Government of India, to Major-General Boyd, commanding the Sirhind division, to Major-General Sir R. Arbuthnot, commanding the Meerut division, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, commanding at Ferozepore.

2. I have prepared the Lahore Government to expect the immediate march of another brigade across the Punjab, and to collect boats for the passage of all the rivers.

3. The Sikh troops, which I have called upon the Lahore Government to dispatch to Peshawur under the command of the Maha Raja's son, are at present engaged in the field in the Hazara country, and can soon reach Peshawur.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK,

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 31.—*Mr. Clerk to Major-General Sir R. Arbuthnot, commanding the Meerut Division.*

*Meerut, November 22, 1841.*

SIR,—The intelligence which I do myself the honor to forward to you, rendering it necessary to move up another strong brigade to the relief of our troops in Afghanistan as expeditiously as possible, I would beg to recommend, in consideration of the severe sickness prevailing in the regiments of Europeans at Kurnaul, that Her Majesty's 9th Foot should march to Kurnaul, where, at all events, it will be required to strengthen this frontier, should his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to whom Major-General Sale's dispatches have been forwarded by express to Agra, select any other regiment to accompany the brigade.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK,

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 32.—*Mr. Clerk to Major-General Boyd, commanding the Sirhind Division.*

*Kurnaul, November 22, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter which I have this day addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, commanding at Ferozepore.

The intelligence from Jellalabad and Peshawur which I inclose, renders it necessary to move up another strong brigade to the relief of our troops in Afghanistan as expeditiously as possible, and as I believe you have not a regiment of Europeans in condition to march on account of the late severe sickness prevailing at Kurnaul, I have recommended Major-General Sir R. Arbuthnot to dispatch Her Majesty's 9th Foot to Kurnaul, where, at all events, it will be required to strengthen this frontier, should his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to whom Major-General Sale's dispatches have been forwarded by express to Agra, select any other regiment of Europeans to accompany the brigade.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK,

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

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No. 33.—*Mr. Clerk to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, commanding at Ferozepore.*

*November 22, 1841.*

SIR,—The Political Agent at Peshawur having transmitted intelligence of Major-General Sale's being hemmed in at Jellalabad, and called for another brigade, I have the honor to apprise you that I have requested Major-General Boyd, commanding this division, to prepare the brigade required.

I presume, from the intimation which Major-General Boyd informs me he has previously made to you, that the 30th regiment is prepared to

proceed from Ferozepore, and I would therefore recommend its marching with the 53rd, or following that regiment as soon as possible.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK,

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 34.—*Mr. Clerk to Captain Mackeson.*

*November 22, 1841.*

SIR,—In consequence of my receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, the 64th Regiment, Native Infantry, crossed the Sutlej on the 18th instant, the 60th Regiment, Native Infantry, on the 20th, and the 53rd marched from Loodiana on the 19th instant, and will also cross the Sutlej at Ferozepore about the 26th instant ; all in progress to Peshawur.

2. Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, Commanding at Ferozepore, has directed Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, commanding the 64th Regiment, to proceed with all practicable expedition consistent with the efficiency of his men.

3. Lieutenant-Colonel Wild has also dispatched one hundred thousand musket cartridges, in forty-two loads, with twenty-one good spare camels, and has requested Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley to send them on by long marches, under an escort of irregular horse.

4. A remittance of eight lacs of rupees to the Paymaster of the Army in Affghanistan, has been forwarded by the 64th Regiment.

5. The following statement shows the strength of this regiment, and the amount of the stores, &c., escorted by it :—

Sikh Motimud, Commandant Ghyare Sing :			
British ditto, Mohamud Hoosain.			
64th Regiment, Native Infantry	...	...	1048
3rd Local Horse	...	...	100
Sappers	...	...	137
Goolundazees	...	...	164
Syces and followers	...	...	855
Horses	...	...	247
Camel loads of Ordnance Stores	...	...	166
Ditto Commissariat	...	...	137
Ditto Baggage, &c.	...	...	540
Ditto 8 lacs of Treasure	...	...	100
Officers	...	...	36

6. I have apprised the commanding officers of the 53rd, 60th, and 64th Regiment, of your recommendation that they should order the "Posteens," or warm cloaks, which you believe are allowed by Government to be prepared for their men against their arrival at Peshawur, in anticipation of their proceeding to Cabool during this winter.

7. The Sikh Government has been requested by me to direct General Avitabile to supply ammunition on your requisition.

8. Native Agents, on the part of the British Government, are in attendance on the regiments, as well as Sikh Agents appointed by the Durbar, with an escort of Sikh Horse. The Sikh officers and escort should receive suitable presents from you on their dismissal at Peshawur

if their conduct is well spoken of by the commanding officers of the regiments, and you will be so good as to ascertain and report to me whether our Native Agents in attendance have given satisfaction.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK,  
*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 35.—*Mr. Clerk to Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, commanding 64th Regiment Native Infantry, Camp in the Punjaub.*

November 23, 1841.

SIR,—I would beg leave to recommend that 100,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition which you have for the troops in Affghanistan should be pushed on, in the manner you think most expeditious through the Punjaub, some servants of the Sikh officer with you accompanying it; and I have suggested to Captain Mackeson to send down an escort of Sikh Horse from Peshawur to take it on to that place, in order to relieve the party you may send on with it.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE CLERK,  
*Agent to the Governor-General.*

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No. 36.—*Sir Jasper Nicolls to Lord Auckland.*

Mynpooree, November 27, 1841.

MY DEAR LORD,—I would not detain Mr. Clerk's express dispatch of the 22nd to Mr. Maddock even for half an hour, deeming it of the utmost importance that the intelligence should reach your Lordship without any delay.

This early and earnest call for a second brigade I was not prepared for, as your Lordship will be fully aware from the difficulty I expressed regarding a native regiment for Kurnaul or Ferozepore.

However this demand will be thus met :—

64th	60th	1st division.
53rd	36th	2nd ditto.
H. M. 9th	26th	3rd ditto.

Or a Regiment from Loodiana.

To this last I have attached half the light field battery, (that is, two 9-pounders and a howitzer) now at Ferozepore, and a rissallah of the 3rd Irregular Horse.

If Ali Musjid should be in the hands of an enemy the guns will be required.

The four first regiments will be well commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, until Major-General M<sup>c</sup>Caskill joins: I shall endeavour to instil energy into him by showing that his military prospects and hopes will, in a great degree, depend on his management of the forces.

It is possible that I may receive your Lordship's commands upon the subject of this important charge.

The vacancies occasioned on our frontier will be partly supplied as follows :

The 2nd Light Infantry Battalion I shall have at Loodiana.

A regiment was ordered yesterday from Kurnaul to Ferozepore. The 33rd Native Infantry has been ordered to-day from Meerut to Ferozepore.

The 72nd will, instead of being stationed at Agra, proceed to Meerut or one of the northern stations.

Also to meet this very heavy call upon the frontier, I have taken upon me to order the 6th Native Infantry from Cawnpore to Kurnaul.

The 57th from Lucknow to replace it, and one of the Oude Infantry corps to Lucknow.

Your Lordship will remember that the 6th was intended for Sangor, but I hope the two regiments now there may be sufficient.

The 9th regiment has also been ordered from Benares to Delhi.

When the 51st reaches Benares there will be as usual three regiments.

I have written to Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland requesting him, if he safely can, to spare me a regiment from Nusseerabad, and if so, to direct Brigadier Kennedy to order its march to Kurnaul. The route to Ferozepore may be objectionable at this season.

I hope these measures will be approved.

The Sikhs seem to conform to our wishes in a friendly spirit ; had there been any appearance of a contrary tendency I should have moved straight upon Delhi and abandoned my visit to Agra.

Believe me, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 37.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.*

November 23, 1841.

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, copy of letters addressed by me to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to Major-General Sir R. Arbuthnot, to Major-General Boyd, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild.

2. The Agent of the Lahore Durbar having inquired whether Raja Goolaub Sing should proceed to Peshawur along with the troops which I have called upon the Lahore Government to dispatch to Peshawur, I have recommended that the Maha Raja's son should proceed in command, accompanied by other chiefs, and that Rajah Goolaub Sing should remain in the Hazara country, but prepared to move in any direction, with a reserve, if called upon by me or by Captain Makeson.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK,

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 38.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

Fort William, December 2, 1841.

SIR,—Your Excellency will have received full details of the important events which appear to have placed our troops in Cabool and Jellalabad,

in a position of considerable difficulty. We have now to inform your Excellency, that the only measure which we deem it practicable and prudent to adopt at present, for the support of these troops, is to concentrate an effective brigade at or near Peshawur, by which a good front can be shown towards the northern portion of Afghanistan, and a point of union and strength provided in case of emergency. This brigade may have the effect of controlling an extended outbreak of the insurgents on the Peshawur frontier ; and in the event of its being able to advance to Jellalabad, and to hold that post and the line of country dependent upon it, the officer commanding the collected force will have a discretion to make that forward movement, being careful however to maintain the integrity of his communications with Peshawur. Your Excellency will be pleased to give instructions to the officer commanding to that effect. But he will not consider himself authorised, except upon the receipt of further directions of a contrary tenor, to endeavour to make his way to Cabool, unless he should see that the movement could certainly be effected with little hazard, or unless in view to an object of pressing and vital importance to the safety of the troops at that place. We apprehend that the severity of the winter would, under any circumstances, render such an advance impossible until the month of April, and that the obstacles to it arising from the want of means of carriage and of supply, which could be depended upon, would, in the actual state of things in Afghanistan, be exceedingly serious, were the season even more favourable for the attempt.

2. We observe that three regiments of Native Infantry have been hastened on towards Peshawur ; and we are highly sensible of the zeal with which these reinforcements have been expedited. We believe that some proportion of irregular horse has accompanied these corps, but we should be glad, if your Excellency should think it proper to make the brigade complete, with a due proportion of cavalry and artillery.

3. We think it undesirable immediately to detach Her Majesty's 9th Foot to Peshawur ; but circumstances may induce us to alter this opinion, and we will be prepared to adopt any arrangement respecting this regiment, which your Excellency may wish your nearer means of forming a judgment have thought to be advisable.

4. Generally we would solicit your Excellency to exercise your discretion in regard to the details of these arrangements, and to give orders without reference to us, bearing always in mind that our present object is only to establish a point of support and demonstration at Peshawur, and not to require the forcing at all hazards of the passes to Cabool.

5. We will issue instructions to the Political Agent at Peshawur, as to the course to be followed by British officers and troops, in the event of serious collision arising between the Sikh forces in the Peshawur territory, and the Afghan inhabitants of that country. And your Excellency will direct the officer commanding the brigade, to attend to the wishes which, in conformity with these instructions, the Political Agent may express to him on that subject.

6. While these arrangements were made in advance at Peshawur, it will be necessary that a strong force of not less than from 10,000 to 12,000 men should be held ready to be concentrated between the Sutlej and the Jumna ; and we believe that, with a few additions, and without



weakening the means of controlling places of importance, such as the city of Delhi and the Province of Rohilkund, the troops already assembled or directed towards that quarter, will be sufficient for the purpose. We would suggest to your Excellency that Her Majesty's 31st Foot should be moved upwards from Agra to Meerut or Kurnaul, as we are in communication with the Resident at Nagpore, upon his releasing the 39th Foot to take the place of that or of any other corps which your Excellency may deem preferable for such service. We have ordered the 46th and 17th Regiments in progress to Barrackpore, to be halted at Benares, so as to enable your Excellency, should you think it necessary, to arrange for withdrawing two more native corps from Benares, or other more convenient station, to Upper India.

7. In our calculations on this subject, we have not reckoned upon drawing any corps from Rajpootana; but your Excellency will consult Colonel Sutherland as to his means of aiding you in emergency from that quarter. Your Excellency may doubtless regard both the Hurriana Light Infantry and the Jeypore Contingent at Shaka-Wattee, as available for any service which you may desire.

8. We shall address the Government of Bombay, requesting them so to modify the plan which Major Outram may have announced to them for the arrangements to be made for the next year in Upper Sind and Cutchee, as to allow of the assemblage at Sukkur and Shikarpore, of two effective brigade, so that along the whole line of the Sutlej and Indus, our position may be one of imposing strength.

9. We shall keep your Excellency constantly informed of any further arrangements which it may seem advisable to make in connection with the subject of this letter.

We have, &c.

AUCKLAND.  
W. W. BIRD.  
W. CASEMENT.  
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 39.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Fort William, December 2, 1841.*

SIR,—I am directed to transmit for your information, a copy of a letter this day addressed by the Governor-General in Council, to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. It will be desirable that this dispatch shall be communicated without delay to the Political Agent at Peshawur; and it is hoped that that officer will find the means of furnishing Sir William Macnaghten with a copy of it, or of communicating to him the substance of it in a secret and confidential manner.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK,  
*Secretary to the Government of India.*

No. 40.—*Mr. Maddock to Major Outram, Political Agent in  
Sinde and Beloochistan.*

*Fort William, December 2, 1841.*

SIR,—I am directed to transmit, for your information, the inclosed extract\* from a letter this day, addressed by the Governor-General in Council to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and to request that you will give effect to the plans of Government, by detaining in Upper Sinde such portions of the troops which you had designed to relieve, as you may consider sufficient for the end in view.

I am, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK,

*Secretary to the Government of India.*

No. 41.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General  
Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, December 3, 1841.*

SIR,—Since addressing your Excellency yesterday we have received an express from Mr. Clerk, of the 24th ultimo, containing information of the events at Cabool to the 9th, and at Jellalabad to the 15th ultimo.

2. These accounts exhibit a most unfavourable state of affairs at Cabool, but they do not lead us to alter the views and intentions which were stated in our yesterday's dispatch. Your Excellency will, therefore, expedite the movement of whatever may be required to complete one brigade, efficiently provided with all necessaries of equipment and supply, in the direction of Peshawur, to be stationed there, with orders of the tenor which we yesterday fully explained, so as to give succour to our troops in the event of their retiring. We do not now desire to send a second brigade in advance, for we do not conceive it to be called for, for the objects of support and assistance which we contemplate; and we think it inexpedient to detach any greater number of troops than may be absolutely indispensable from our own provinces.

3. It would be vain to speculate upon the issue of the contest at Cabool; but in the extreme event of the military possession of that city, and the surrounding territory, having been entirely lost, it is not our intention to direct new and extensive operations for the re-establishment of our supremacy throughout Afghanistan.

4. We can scarcely contemplate in such case that there will be any circumstances or political objects of sufficient weight to induce us to desire to retain possession of the remainder of that country, and, unless such shall be obvious as arising from the course of events, we should wish our military and political officers so to shape their proceedings as will best promote the end of retiring with the least possible discredit. Of course it will be desirable that this retirement shall be deliberate, and the result of arrangements that will leave some political influence in the country: but it is impossible to shut our eyes to the probability that the first

impulse of the population in the southern districts, upon hearing of our having suffered disaster at Cabool, will be to rise and surround our different positions, cutting off the communication. In this case the commanding officers will be instructed to make it their first aim to fall back on the nearest support, and so to save their troops from the risk of being isolated, it being, of course, a paramount consideration to provide for the safety of the different detachments as far as possible. Major-General Nott, or the officer commanding at Candahar, will be directed, in the event of the loss of Cabool, to take the force at Ghuznee under his orders, and to provide Colonel Palmer with suitable instructions. With regard to the regiment at Ghuznee, we shall instruct Mr. Clerk to arrange with the Sikh Government for giving every aid in its power, should the retirement of that corps to Dhera Ismael Khan, or other point on the frontier, be determined upon. We shall cause a copy of this paragraph to be conveyed to Major Rawlinson, Major-General Nott, and Lieut.-Colonel Palmer, both through Major Outram in Upper Scinde, and Captain Mackeson in Peshawur.

5. We doubt not that your Excellency will have felt it desirable to superintend personally the execution of such measures on our frontier as the exigency of events may have rendered necessary, and will, therefore, have proceeded to establish your head-quarters at one of the advanced stations.

6. It is of high importance at this juncture that we should act in a clear and cordial plan of co-operation with the Government of Lahore, and a dispatch has been this day in consequence addressed to Mr. Clerk, of which we enclose a copy for your Excellency's information.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND.

W. W. BIRD.

W. CASEMENT.

H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 42.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Fort William, December 3, 1841.*

SIR,—In continuation of my dispatch of yesterday's date, I am directed to acknowledge your dispatch by express of the 23rd ultimo, and to send to you, for information and guidance, the accompanying copy of a further letter, which has been this day addressed by the Governor-General in Council to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. Your language to the Lahore Durbar, in the unfavourable crisis which must be anticipated as possible in Afghanistan, will be to the purport, that the Government will take time to consider the eventual policy which it may be most proper to adopt in relation to that country; that in the meanwhile it is proposed only to push on such troops towards Peshawur as may give support to any of our detachments falling back towards that place, and as may be sufficient to act, in emergency, in aid of the Sikh authority within that territory. The possible employment of such troops in advance towards Jellalabad, as referred to in the dispatch to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of yesterday's date,

may be explained by you to the Durbar if occasion should seem to call for it.

3. It is the intention of the Governor-General in Council, with a general view to the repression of any possible disturbance of tranquillity, to hold a strong force, ready to be concentrated in our northern frontier; but your language to the Sikh Government will be that of uniform and cordial friendship, so as to remove any suspicion which might be entertained from a knowledge that reinforcements were assembling in that quarter; and the Durbar will doubtless feel that, in a collision with the Affghan tribes and people, their interests are indetical with ours, and they will be prepared to join heartily with us in measures, the effect of which must contribute to the security of their own Affghan districts.

4. You will instruct Captain Mackeson, in conformity with the intimation in the dispatch of yesterday to the Commander-in-Chief, to call upon the officer commanding the brigade proceeding to Peshawur to assist, in any exigency, the Sikh authorities in defending their power within that territory.

5. The object of the British Government will be to maintain its union with the Lahore Durbar in unimpaired and increasing intimacy, to give all legitimate support to the Sikh Government, and to use our influence for reconciling the differences by which it may be embarrassed, with a fair and friendly regard to the interests of all parties in it. The mode of giving effect to this object, alike by timely cordiality or judicious reserve, is left with confidence to your discretion; and if you should see good to visit Lahore for the promotion of our interests at this period, you will be at liberty to do so.

6. Your attention will be particularly given to the intimation for your guidance in paragraph 4 of the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, and you will make the necessary communication to Captain Mackeson, or any Sikh authority on whom you may depend, desiring him to make every effort to forward a letter to Colonel Palmer at Ghuznee.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK,

*Secretary to the Government of India.*

No. 43.—*Mr. Maddock to Major Outram.*

*Fort. William, December 3, 1841.*

SIR, Information of the important and unfavourable events which have occurred at Cabool will have reached you, and some communication has already been made to you on the views of the Governor-General in Council upon that subject. Such further orders as may be called for will, from time to time, be sent to you, but in the meanwhile I am desirous to forward to you copy of a dispatch addressed on this date to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, consequent on the receipt of intelligence from Cabool to the 9th, and from Jellalabad to the 15th ultimo, and to call your immediate and particular attention to the intimation in regard to the possible withdrawal of our forces from Affghanistan contained in paragraph 4. You will forward a copy of that paragraph

without delay to Major Rawlinson and Major-General Nott, and you will request Major-General Nott to give such directions as he may see necessary, to the officers in command of detached posts with whom he can communicate.

2. You will, on your part, give every aid in the means of support, transport, and supply, to General Nott's force, that may be in your power, in the event of their being required from you.

3. Until further orders, all troops assembling or present in Upper Sind and Cutchee will be held there in united strength. On the ultimate distribution of these troops, and on the affairs of Beloochistan, you will be addressed separately hereafter; but your tone will, of course, be one of continued friendship and intimacy with the governments of the Khan of Kelat and of the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sind.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK,

*Secretary to the Government of India.*

No. 44.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, December 5, 1841.*

SIR,—The letter of Major Craigie to the Military Secretary, detailing the orders given by your Excellency for the movement of regiments, has been communicated by the Military to the Secret and Political Department, and we may assure your Excellency of our entire concurrence in the movement, as proposed, of the 9th, 57th, 6th, 33rd, and 72nd Regiments; and we entirely approve of the manner in which it is proposed that the two brigades shall be composed, provided it is determined, that a second brigade shall march across the Punjab. We would but repeat our doubt, with our present imperfect knowledge of the events which may have happened beyond Peshawur, whether the movement of so large a force is immediately necessary, but we will not press this doubt against what will be the result of a careful consideration of all circumstances by your Excellency and Mr. Clerk, with a full knowledge of the views of policy, as at present entertained by the Government. We have no doubt upon the expediency of having the brigade in readiness, and it is probable that before its march can take place from Ferozepore, accounts will have been received leading to a clear decision upon the propriety of its advance. That decision we will readily leave to your Excellency, who, after communication with Mr. Clerk, will best be able to judge of the arrangements requisite for the two objects which we regard as alike of paramount importance, namely, those of giving every practicable support to our troops across the Indus, and of maintaining the exhibition of clear and concentrated strength within our own provinces.

2. If the second brigade should be sent, we would request your Excellency to select for the command of the whole force thus collected, an officer of distinguished ability and known experience. The attention of Major-General Lumley has latterly been much directed to the events

which have been passing in and beyond the North-West Frontier, and we would suggest his name to your Excellency for first consideration.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND.  
W. W. BIRD.  
W. CASEMENT.  
H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 45.—*Mr. Maddock to Sir W. H. Macnaghten, Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolh.*

*Fort William, December 5, 1841.*

SIR,—The latest accounts which have reached Government from Cabool, give information of the state of affairs at that place up to the 9th ultimo, and notwithstanding the difficulties with which the British forces were then surrounded, the Governor-General in Council entertains sanguine hopes that, aided by the zeal and gallantry of the troops, you will have been enabled to suppress the insurrection, or at all events, to have secured a supply of provisions for the army, whereby it may be secure in its positions for the winter.

2. So serious appear to be the difficulties which are to be encountered at Cabool, amid a hostile population, by a force cut off for several months from support by the impassable state of the roads in the winter season, that the Governor General in Council has felt compelled to take into his contemplation the possible occurrence of still more serious disaster to our troops there, and to provide even for the contingency of our political influence in that quarter being for a time entirely subverted; and the first duty of Government in issuing instructions suitable to such an event having been discharged, I am now directed to assure you that the Governor-General in Council will remain anxiously mindful of your position, and that every measure will be adopted, as the tenor of the information received may show to be necessary, of which the season will admit, and which may be otherwise practicable, for affording relief to yourself and to the troops by whom you are accompanied.

3. A strong and complete brigade has been ordered from India, and is now in progress to Peshawur, where it will be directed to act immediately in aid of Sir Robert Sale, who was by the last accounts posted at Jellalabad; and in the event of further operations being necessary in that quarter, his Lordship in Council has it in contemplation to relieve the 13th Light Infantry and 35th Native Infantry by two fresh regiments; and the movements of these or other corps, which may be dispatched towards Peshawur, will depend upon the events which may have occurred at Cabool, and upon the directions which you and General Elphinstone may think proper to issue. Copies of the instructions which have been issued by the Governor-General in Council to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, will be communicated confidentially, through Mr. Clerk, to Captain Mackeson, and you will be informed of their purport through him as opportunity may require and admit; but in every event you may depend on the desire and determination of the Governor-General in Council to afford all possible succour to your position, and you will have com-

plete and timely information of the political views of his Lordship in Council, under any charge of circumstances which may arise.

4. Major-General Nott will, of course, have been anxious to give you every assistance in his power from the troops at Candahar, and it would be a source of much satisfaction to the Government to know that he has felt himself able to detach with a reasonable prospect of safety at a season in which, ordinarily, many difficulties may be expected, any effective portion of those troops towards Cabool.

5. The remarks or directions of Government must now be limited to the points which have here been noticed. We have only for the present to trust to an overruling Providence, and to the energy and perseverance of our gallant troops, for the maintenance of the power and safety of our arms.

I have, &c.

T. H. MADDOCK,

*Secretary to the Government of India.*

No. 46.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Fort William, December 5, 1841.*

SIR,—In continuation of my letter of the 3rd instant I am directed to forward, for your information and guidance, the inclosed copies of letters this day addressed to the Commander-in-Chief and Sir William Macnaghten, and to draw your particular attention to the third paragraph of the latter document.

2. The original dispatch for Sir William Macnaghten accompanies, and you are requested to take such means of forwarding it as you may consider best calculated to ensure its safe delivery.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK,

*Secretary to the Government of India.*

No. 47.—*Captain Mackeson to Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*

*Futtegghur, November 20, 1841.*

SIR,—The country between Peshawur and Gundamuck continued quiet up to the time of Captain Burn's Afreedees and Lieutenant Dowson's Janbaz abandoning the cantonment there. When the Gundamuck cantonment had been burnt the whole country rose at once, and our posts were attacked on all sides. Captain Ferris's cantonment was attacked on the night of the 13th. He repulsed the assailants, and then withdrew into the cantonment fort. He had a garrison of 250 men, Eusufzyes, and one gun; but, running short of ammunition, he was compelled to abandon the fort on the 16th, and cutting his way through the surrounding Ooloos at night, with the loss of fifteen men, he reached Lalpura in safety, and is now on his way to Peshawur. Captain Ferris had recalled the posts at Landi Khana and Haft Chah, in Khyber, to his assistance, and their leaving the pass was the signal for disturbance

there. A Kafilā was plundered by the Shinwaris, and the huts of the Sepoys at Landi Khana, and some bhoosa set fire to. The Zukha Khail tribe of Gharri Lala Beg came and plundered the bazaar below Ali Musjid, and attacked the fort. The Afreedees of Captain Burn's corps, who had fled from Gundanuck, reached Tira, and spread the report that all the Europeans at Cabool had been murdered and cut up. Hundreds after hundreds came down to Khyber from Tira, bent on rapine and plunder : and from the 16th to the 19th Ali Musjid was invested, and the garrison, consisting of Mr. Mackeson, and 150 Eusufzyes, badly armed, were opposed to 1000 or 2000 Afreedees. At the commencement a burj of the fort was blown up by the explosion of some gunpowder, and about sixteen men of the garrison killed and wounded, with Muhshis. On the evening of the 18th the Afreedees had succeeded in cutting off from the garrison all access to the water, and had taken possession of Mr. Mackeson's house, built on the platform of the hill, nearly as high as the fort, and kept a galling fire from it on the fort. They also made two or three assaults on the gate, or door-way of the fort, but were repulsed, leaving about thirty dead on the ground. Mr. Mackeson and the men with him did their duty well, and though the Maliks frequently offered him and his men safe-conduct to Peshawur, and they had little hope of succour, they remained staunch. From the commencement of the attack I was in communication with the Afreedee Maliks, who disclaimed all participation in it, but said they were unable to control the Ooloos, who had risen up as one man : and now that men had been killed on both sides it would be very difficult to put matters right. I threatened them with the army of the Sikhs at Peshawur, and on the 9th went out with General Aitabile to Jamrud, with 300 or 400 horsemen and the Ooloos of Peshawur. I also dispatched Abul Rahim Khan Malizai, with 1500 rupees, to the Maliks, to enable them to dismiss the Tira Ooloos, and withdraw them from near the fort. This the Maliks succeeded in doing on the afternoon of the 19th. The water of the garrison was released, and the men who had possession of Mr. Mackeson's house withdrawn to below the hill. The Afreedees also asked permission to carry off their dead, which was granted. On the morning of the 20th, as most of the supplies of the garrison had been plundered with the bazaar, I sent fifty bullocks, laden with supplies, to the Maliks, and told them if they sent them to the fort I would believe in their profession of friendship. They sent the supplies, and have re-established their chokis on the road, and the fort has most fortunately been as yet preserved to us. I am now sending in supplies to it, and as soon as the crowd has had time to disperse shall increase the garrison to 600 men.

The Afreedee Maliks are to restore the property the tribes have plundered, and have sworn to serve us as they have hitherto done, and to keep the road open so long as a Feringee remains alive at Cabool. They may keep their promise of serving us, unless any fresh disaster occur to our troops at Cabool before succour can arrive. The tribe talk of Shah Haidur, the King of Islam, and war with the Kafirs. The Maliks care nothing either for Shah Shooja, or Shah Zeman, or his son, or Islam. They are waiting to see if we are equal to the present contest.



As long as they think we are they will continue our friends, and prefer us even to a King of Islam, because they know that no one can pay them so highly as we do. Should our troops at Cabool be overpowered we cannot expect to hold the pass one day. The Afreedees have reports that the garrison at Ghuznee has been cut off to a man; that Candahar and Beloochistan are up in arms. The whole country has risen against us, and is looking towards Cabool,—we have no friends. Turebaz Khan, of Lalpura, a chief of our own creation, is an exception; for to what place could Captain Ferris, with his family and handful of soldiers, have directed his steps, had he not felt confident of the reception he would meet with from Turebaz Khan?

It is the general opinion, among Affghans, that if our troops should be overpowered at Cabool, we shall see Shah Shooja a second time crowned as King of the Affghans and of Islam.

Captain Ferris was compelled to leave all his baggage behind at the fort at Pesh Bolak; and I regret to say, 38,000 rupees of Government money which he had under his charge, belonging to the Peshawur treasury. The whole investment of a Parsee merchant, some eighteen camel-loads, has also fallen into the hands of Ooloos.

I have, &c.,

F. MACKESON,

*Political Agent.*

No. 48.—*Captain Mackeson to Mr. Clerk.*

*Jallighur, November 21, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to inclose for your information, and that of the Secretary to the Government of India, the copy of a letter addressed by me to the Envoy and Minister on the 20th instant.

This morning, by a letter from Jellalabad, I learn that an engagement took place between our troops and the rebels at Cabool on the 11th instant, in which our troops were completely victorious, and recaptured from the enemy the two guns taken in the city. A prospect appeared of their being able to gain over the Ghilzies, and thus break the confederacy against us. The troops at Jellalabad, after defeating the Ooloos on the 15th instant, had placed the city in a state of defence, got in supplies from the country, and were quite safe. They expected another attack on the 20th (yesterday), but were quite confident as to the result.

The Afreedees are still hovering around Ali Musjid, and the Maliks apparently unable to keep them off, or probably unwilling. Until they are dispersed I cannot send more ammunition or provisions through the pass. The 100 maunds of powder and lead I first sent have, I hope, reached Jellalabad.

The whole country appears to have arisen, but we have no certain intelligence from Candahar, Ghuznee, or Beloochistan. We shall require a large force to put things to rights again. A large army should be stationed at Cabool, another at Peshawur, another at Candahar, and our troops should not again be dispersed in small detachments, as hitherto,

but wherever a disturbance arises bear with all force on one point, and make a severe example of any excitors of rebellion.

I have, &c.,

F. MACKESON,  
*Political Agent.*

No. 49.—*Captain Ferris, Commanding Jezailchee Corps, to Captain Lawrence.*

*Peshawur, November 22, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of Sir William H. Macnaghten, Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, that on the night of the 13th instant, about 10 P. M., an attack was made on my post by a party consisting of six horsemen and about 120 foot, which were driven back after some sharp firing by the outlying picquet; our only casualty was one troop horse of the 5th Cavalry, shot through the neck\*.

On the morning of the 14th instant I deemed it expedient to move into the fort, and was occupied during the greater part of the day in filling up a very large breach in the curtain in the north side of the fort, and making banquettes and loop-holes for the men to fire through, in which I was most ably assisted by my Adjutant, Lieutenant Lukin. At about 3 in the afternoon the enemy came down in great force from the direction of the Goolar Forts, and made an attempt to enter the cantonment. I immediately ordered out a sallying party of a detachment of 5th Cavalry, consisting of one havildar, one naick, and troopers, supported by one company of Jezailchees, and succeeded in driving the enemy back to their forts. This movement was executed entirely to my satisfaction; and I have great pleasure in recording the gallant behaviour of the small detachment of cavalry, as well as the steadiness of the company who supported them. The casualties were, one trooper killed, three Jezailchees wounded, and three horses wounded. Towards evening the fort was completely surrounded, and during the night the enemy succeeded in occupying the officers' bungalows and the lines, and kept up a heavy fire; the firing on our side continued throughout the night, and a number of the enemy were killed. On the morning of the 15th instant the Goolar people were joined by the Shinwaries of Deh Surroah Sungoo Khail, Beshbilgees, and a numerous body of Koochies, amounting to upwards of 5000 men. The firing from the fort continued the whole of the day and throughout the night. I this day got the 6-pounder in position on one of the centre bastions, and fired several rounds of grape and round shots, by which a number of the enemy were destroyed, and their advance on that side of the fort checked.

\* Strength of the party in Fort. Captain Ferris, commanding Jezailchee corps; Dr. Kitchie; Lieutenant and Adjutant Lukin; Captain Ponsenby, Assistant Adjutant-General; Dr. Stiven, Superintending Surgeon; Lieutenant Harington, 5th Light Cavalry; 1 Natiye Adjutant; 4 Jemadars; 4 Naib ditto; 12 Havildars; 17 Naicks; 249 Sepoys; (including sick) 1 Havildar, 5 Cavalry, 1 Naick, 20 Troopers.

On the morning of the 16th the enemy increased in numbers, and towards evening large bodies of men were seen coming from the direction of Jellalabad to join them. Having no prospect of relief from any quarter, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Lukin having reported to me that the ammunition was only sufficient for the day, I attempted to treat with the insurgent chief, but failed, with the exception of one Meer Affghan, who withdrew with a portion of the Shinwaries; towards evening, our defenceless position having become known to our men, from the failure of ammunition, they became disheartened, and many made preparations for throwing themselves over the walls, five of whom did so, and were fortunately cut up by the enemy, which evidently deterred many others from following their examples. Prior to this, I had endeavoured to open a communication with Captain Mackeson and Captain Macgregor, as well as with Turibaz Khan, Kalid Khan, and other chiefs of influence, who I thought might have rendered me assistance, and had also sent off orders for two companies of Shahzada's Levies, stationed at the posts of Haftchah\* and Lundikhana, to reinforce my post, but from the state the country was in I conclude my cossids never could have reached their destinations. The enemy had now been in possession of the officer's bungalows, Adjutant's office, men's lines, and hospital, (which closely adjoin the fort) for two days, and as the strength of my detachment would not admit of my sending out parties to dislodge them, they had succeeded in throwing up loop-holed defences on the roofs of the houses, so as partly to command the north and west walls.

At this crisis I called a meeting of the European and Native officers, (Lieutenant Harington, 5th Cavalry, was unable to attend, being seriously ill from a severe bilious attack and too weak to leave his bed,) and laid before them the desperate state we were in, and it was resolved that at dusk we should make an attempt to cut our way through the enemy, leaving the treasure and all public and private property behind us. We had no means of conveyance, and our passage from the gateway through the lines being strongly occupied by the enemy, it being a point of honour amongst the Affghans to sacrifice everything for the safety of their zunnas, the few spare horses, the property of the officers, were given up for this purpose. Accordingly at dusk, the time the enemy's fire usually slackened, I formed my men in columns, the women in the centre, the rear protected by the detachment of 5th Light Cavalry, the defences that we had built at the gate were thrown down and the gate opened; the men then moved forward, and on our arriving at the ditch of the cantonment the enemy opened a heavy fire on us, by which three troopers and two horses were killed, one trooper wounded, and fourteen Jezailchees killed or missing, my horse wounded, twenty Jezailchees wounded, the camp followers also suffered severely. On reaching the plain I detached a company to the rear to check any advance that might be made by the enemy, this they effectually did, and with the exception of being fired on by one fort we were not molested until we arrived at the pass which turns Hazar No, when a party of forty men attacked our

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\* Captain Ferris's orders reached, and the withdrawal of these companies brought the Afreedees down upon Ali Musjid.

rear, but were beaten off by the rear-guard. No further interruption occurred, and we reached Girdia about three on the morning of the 17th instant, where we met the Mohmund Chief Turibaz Khan. Although our loss has been severe, I attribute the safety of the party to the eagerness which the enemy evinced to enter and plunder the fort in our rear. At day-break we marched for Lalpura under the escort of Turibaz Khan. Arrangements were here made by the Chief, to whom a promise of 3000 rupees was given by me if he would assist the detachment in reaching Peshawur, as he assured me it was unsafe our remaining at Lalpura in consequence of his tribe being in a most unsettled state; accordingly in the afternoon of the 18th instant we left under charge of his nephew Hyder Khan and 200 Mohmands, who conveyed us in safety through the Tatar Pass (as the Khyber was closed) and reached Peshawur on the morning of the 21st instant.

I have every reason to suppose, that the quantity of treasure (about 38,000 rupees,) known to be in the fort together with a large and valuable investment belonging to a Parsee merchant, stores for Sir William Macnaghten, Bart. and Major Pottinger, and that of the other officers, acted as a considerable incentive to the exertions of the enemy, and tended to swell their numbers.

In conclusion, I beg leave to bring to the notice of the Envoy the valuable assistance I received, on every occasion, from my Adjutant, Lieutenant Lukin, throughout this affair, as also from Mr. Assistant Surgeon Ritchie: their exertions were beyond all praise. Captain Ponsonby, Assistant-Adjutant General, and Dr. Stiven, Superintending Surgeon, both rendered me great assistance. I regret that Lieutenant Harington's health was such, that he was unable to leave his bed. To Alli Wardir, my native Adjutant, the native officers and men, all did their duty most nobly on this most trying occasion, and are deserving of every confidence.

I have, &c.,

JOS. FERRIS.

No. 50.—*Captain Ferris to Captain Mackeson.*

*Peshawur, November 23, 1841.*

SIR,—Inclosed I have the honor to forward you my dispatch to the address of Captain Lawrence, Military Secretary, which after perusal, I shall feel obliged if you can possibly forward it by cossid to Jellalabad.

Having made a promise of 3000 rupees to Taribaz Khan, for his safe-escort across the hills to Peshawur, I have the honor to request this sum may be disbursed from your treasury, pending the sanction of Government. In addition to this sum, Company's rupees 240 was paid by me as subsistence-money to the Mohmund escort.

I have, &c.,

J. FERRIS.

No. 51.—*Captain Macheson to Mr. Maddock.*

*Futtegghur, November 26, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honour to forward, for the information of Government, a copy of a report received from Captain Ferris, Commanding Jazailchee Corps, on the 23rd instant.

Simultaneously with this report I received letters from Turibaz Khan, Chief of the Mohmunds, informing me that Saadut Khan, Ex-Chief of the Mohmunds, was advancing on Lalpura, with 1000 men, to attack him. It occurred to me that a sum of money might at this crisis be of great service to Turibaz Khan. I therefore did not hesitate to advance to him the 3000 rupees, promised to him by the officers who accompanied Captain Ferris's detachment to Peshawur, on the guarantee of those officers, pending the sanction of Government.

By letter from Jellalabad of the 21st instant, and from Cabool of the 14th instant, it would appear that our troops at both these places continue to be in a most critical position. It is, however, confidently reported at Peshawur that either on the 16th, the day of Eed, or one day afterwards our troops at Cabool obtained a decided victory over the rebels; that many of their leaders had fled, leaving their families behind at Cabool, and that many had come in to Sir William Macnaghten, and that our troops had possession of the city of Cabool.

We are still without positive information as to the movers of this rebellion. The persons first pointed out in the letters from Cabool were Abbulla Khan Achakzai, Moola Monim, and Sikander Khan Ghilzais. These persons were no friends to the Sullogaishut Mir Afzul, who fled from Cabool. Mir Ahmed and one or two others were people in the confidence of Shah Shooja. Firmans, bearing the signature of Shah Zaman, are said to be circulating in Bajore, Koonar, Kashgar, Baneer, Suat and the Eusofzai territory, calling on the tribes to rise and join the sons of Shah Zaman at Jellalabad. These may be forgeries, circulated by some needy Affghan, who lives upon his wits. From the tenor of the last native Akhbars at Peshawur, the Barukzais, Nawab Mahomed Zaman Khan, and Nawab Jubbar Khan, are pointed at as the great encouragers of disturbance at present. From whatever beginning it arose the insurrection has been general throughout the country; the population have not stopped to enquire in favour of whom they were rising;—it was sufficient that the object in view was to rid themselves of the Kafir yoke,—to expel the Feringees from Afghanistan.

Should our troops hold their own at Cabool until succour reach them, matters may be with little difficulty restored to their former footing; and should any misfortune occur to them, either from a scarcity of provisions or other cause, it will require an overwhelming force to retrieve our lost ground. Such is the excitement among Affghans, that those who have reputation for discernment venture to pronounce that the fate of the British Empire in India depends on the issue of the contest at Cabool. It is profitless to speculate on events on which our information is so defective; but if it should appear that the Sullozais, have been the instigators of this insurrection, and the keeping a large army in Affghanistan be too great a drain on the resources of India, to be continued as a

permanent measure, much might be done, after force has had its effect in subduing opposition, by putting forward again Amir Dost Mahomed Khan, and merely leaving with him a representative of the British Government, as a pledge of our support when it might be needed.

I inclose a copy of two Persian Akhbars, which will show the nature of the rumours prevailing at Peshawur.

I have, &c.,

F. MACKESON,

*Political Agent.*

P.S.—Since writing the above intelligence has reached me of Saadut Khan having attacked Lalpura, and having been defeated by Taribaz Khan.

No. 52.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.*

November 27, 1841.

SIR,—I have the honor to inform you that the 30th and 53rd Regiments Native Infantry, with convoy as below, crossed the Sutlej this day, in progress to Peshawur :—

Colonel Wild, 30th Regiment, in command ; Commandant Cheyt Sing Sikh Motuimmud ; Sheikh Sadut-oolla, British Do.

30th Regiment Native Infantry	1,008
53rd ditto ditto	1,045
Total Soldiers	2,053
Officers	49
Followers	860
Baggage Camels	599
Commissariat ditto	650
Ordnance Stores ditto	71
Horses and Ponies	150

The Ordnance stores are the annual indents of the 5th Light Cavalry, Her Majesty's 44th Regiment, 5th and 54th Native Infantry.

The 60th Regiment crossed on 20th instant—mustered 1044 men and 14 Officers.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE CLERK.

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 53.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.*

November 27, 1841.

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit copy, with an English translation, of a letter from Maha Raja Shere Sing, in reply to my letter to His Highness, of the 19th ultimo, a copy of a translation of which accompanied my letter to your address, of the 20th ultimo, relative to the withdrawal of Vizeer Zorawur Sing to Ladakh.

2. Rase Kishen Chund waited upon me this morning, and read to me a Perwannah addressed to him from the Maha Raja, directing him to

state to me that his Highness, hearing of the rebellion of the tribes around Cabool and Jellalabad, had dispatched Raee Keisaree Sing with four battalions, 2000 horse, and six guns, with a good deal of ammunition; and that Keisree Sing has been directed to proceed by forced marches, and to perform whatever Captain Mackeson and General Avitabile, may, after consultation, require him to undertake.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE CLERY,

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 54.—*Mr. Clerk to Major-General Boyd, commanding the Sirhind Division, Kurnaul.*

November 27, 1841.

SIR,—Though I have not yet heard that any artillery is ordered up to this frontier, I would beg leave to recommend, in anticipation of the speedy arrival of reinforcements so necessary on the Sutlej, that some artillery should move forward from hence.

2. I shall transmit a copy of this letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, in case he may think proper to halt one of the regiments under his command, until the arrival of such artillery as you consider can best be spared from Loodiana or Ferozepore; but the latter is, I believe, for want of horses, incapable of moving, and this leaves an insufficiency for the due protection of this border, during an unsettled state of parties at Lahore.

3. Though Captain Mackeson made no application for artillery, I called upon the Sikh Government to send some guns to Peshawur; and I am apprised that six have been dispatched from the nearest Sikh force to be placed at the disposal of that officer.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE CLERK,

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 55.—*Mr. Clerk to Captain Mackeson.*

November 27, 1841.

SIR,—The Lahore Durbar apprizes me that it has sent off ammunition direct to Peshawar, besides warning Koonwur Purtaub Singh, and Rajah Goolaub Singh, in the Huzara county, to comply with your requisitions.

2. If money will secure it, you will, at any price, convey to General Sale's force, through means of the tribes, with whom you may think it best to negotiate its safe delivery, whatever ammunition you obtain either from General Avitabile, or from Colonel Tulloch's advance party.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK,

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 56.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, commanding the Convoy, to Mr. Clerk.*

*Buna Moltarjan, November 27, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd instant, recommending the immediate dispatch to Peshawur of the ammunition under my charge. In reply, I beg to inform you that Lieutenant Liptrot, of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, will proceed to-morrow morning towards Peshawur, in charge of those stores, which he will deliver over to the escort that may be dispatched by Captain Mackeson, Assistant Political Agent, to receive charge of them.

Lieutenant Liptrot will then proceed with his Rissalah, by easy stages, to Peshawur.

I have, &c.,

J. TULLOCH.

No. 57.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch to Mr. Clerk.*

*Camp, Parehwalla, December 3, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report the arrival, at this place, in progress to Afghanistan, of the detachment under my command, as noted below. It may be proper to add that we were detained by heavy rain, at Noce Wallah, on the 1st instant.

4th Company 6th Battalion, Artillery.		60th Regiment Native Infantry.
5th Company Sappers and Miners.		64th ditto ditto.

I have, &c.

J. TULLOCH.

No. 58.—*Mr. Clerk to Major-General Boyd.*

*Loodiana, December 2, 1841.*

SIR,—I having had the honor to receive from the Acting Adjutant-General of the army, a statement of the reinforcements which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has ordered to be put in motion for the purpose of forcing the Khyber, I beg leave to state to you, that I would not now wish that the 3rd troop, 2nd brigade, Horse Artillery, should move from the British frontier, on my requisition; though I do not propose, in consequence of this information, to request Lieutenant-Colonel Rich to recal the order for the intended march hence of that troop to-morrow, in progress to Ferozepore.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK,

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 59.—*Captain Mackeson to Mr. Maddock.*

*Futtehghur, November 28, 1841.*

SIR,—Our last letters from Cabool date on the 14th instant, and from Jellakabad the 21st instant. Since then we have a rumour very prevalent



at Peshawur, that our troops at Cabool gained a complete victory over the rebels on the 16th or 17th. Another rumour also prevails, that the Kohulies had managed to conduct water so as to flood the cantonments near the Bagh-i-shah, and that the scarcity of grain at Cabool was such, that not only our troops, but the people of the city also, were likely to suffer from it during the cold season. At Jellalabad also grain is every dear and scarce. Our troops at Cabool and Jellalabad are said to be in no danger from the attacks of the hostile Ooloos, who now cease to come near them in very large bodies : but their position must still be considered as imminently critical with reference to the want of provisions and the roads continuing interrupted. Neither have we any intelligence from Candahar beyond a rumour, that the rising has been as general there as in this part of the country.

2. The Peshawur territory will supply provisions ; but without a large force to keep open our communications, these provisions cannot reach Cabool or Jellalabad. The brigade of native troops now on its way from Ferozepore and Loodiana, incumbered as it is with 8 lacs of treasure and commissariat stores, can do little. The Khyber Pass has been closed for the last 10 days. Ali Musjid, which will be of vital importance to us in forcing the pass, still remains in our possession, and we shall endeavour to keep it, till our troops arrive, at all hazards ; but the insurrection has been so general, that the Afreedee tribes are not to be controlled by the Maliks, and we can place no dependence on them. When the brigade arrives at Peshawur, I purpose to leave most of the treasure at Peshawur ; and such stores and ammunition as are necessary to the troops at Jellalabad can be sent by the Sittaree Road, while the brigade will take only its own baggage, and march through the Khyber to Jellalabad. One regiment of Native Infantry and Captain Ferris's Jezailchee corps might suffice to garrison Jellalabad, whilst three Native regiments and one regiment of Europeans proceed to the relief of the troops at Cabool. This will, however, only be a partial relief. We shall require a larger body of troops to restore matters to their former state, and the more troops are necessary because the army must be mainly supplied with provisions from this side of Khyber, and our communications must be kept open at all risk.

3. The necessity of sending up an overpowering force must be obvious when it is remembered that the whole population, with exception to the Tajik cultivators, has risen against us. At the approach of our troops they will all withdraw their families from the villages in the plains, and if we have a small force we shall have to fight our way against the whole armed people, but if our strength is put forth in full vigour, the people of the country, seeing the hopelessness of resistance, will by degrees renew their intercourse with us, and return to their villages.

4. To keep up our communications through Candahar, a large force will be necessary, but the same force will enable us to obtain a command of the pass which it will not be in the power of the Afreedees again to disturb. Towers require to be built at regular intervals from the eastern entrance of the pass to Ali Musjid, and a strong mud fort must be constructed at the top of the Landi Khana Pass near Lohargi, where we have sunk wells. The present system of paying the Afreedees has been found not to answer at the time of need, neither have hostages been found of use to us. The sons and brothers of the Maliks of the Gakha-

keel and Sepai tribe were with me, and the Gakhakheil tribe were the first to attack Ali Musjid. The son of the Mahomed chief Saadat Khan was with me, and his father led a force against Lalpura. When we have posts built in the pass that can be held, we may, to a limited extent, pay the tribes and take hostages from them with more success.

5. It is fair to observe that the Afreedee Malikhs have not hitherto willingly acted against us. The first disturbance in the Khyber was caused by Captain Ferris' withdrawal of the posts at Landi Khana and Haftchab. The Ooloos proceeded to invest Ali Musjid and had cut off the water, and but for the active interference of the Malikhs on my remonstrances and threats, might soon have got possession of the fort. The Afreedees who fled from Gundamuck spread reports in Tira that all the Feringees had been murdered at Cabool; the Ooloos of Tira rose as one man and came into the pass. It has been with much difficulty that the Malikhs have succeeded in dispersing this multitude. The Malikhs wish to preserve their allowances, but the tribes are decidedly hostile to us. Their Moollas are preaching against us, and the popular feeling is too strong for the Malikhs to oppose or restrain. The Malikhs are now looking anxiously towards Cabool; should our troops be successful there the pass will be again open, but so long as the issue of events remains doubtful we cannot trust the Afreedees. The system, therefore, of paying the Malikhs is found not to answer. Meanwhile I have made temporary arrangements with the Moolla Goris for opening the Tatara road, and I have no doubt of our being able to use the Ali Khana road which is practicable for artillery, should the Khyber continue closed. I also expect that the opening of the Tatara Road will have much effect on the Afreedees.

6. Major-General Sale has sent urgent requisitions on me for ammunition, supplies, and treasure. All these can be supplied from Peshawur, but there is risk of their falling into the hands of the enemy. I have applied to General Avitabile for 200 Afghan horsemen, whose families are at Peshawur; and with the assistance of these, and that I can raise myself and the horsemen of the Mahomed chief Turibaz Khan at Lalpura, and 400 Eusofzyes, I hope to be able to forward ammunition to Jellalabad, if not by Khyber by the Tatara road.

7. Some days after receiving intelligence of the critical position of our troops at Cabool and Jellalabad, I called on the Sikh authorities here to furnish me with 6000 men to march on Jellalabad, being certain that they had them not to furnish. General Avitabile replied to the effect that there were few troops at Peshawur, and that he required them all for the protection of the Peshawur territory.

I have, &c.

F. MACKESON, *Political Agent.*

No. 60.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.*

December 4, 1841.

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit a letter to your address from Captain Mackeson, which that officer has enclosed to me for my inspection. It has just reached me, and I forward it hence by express.

2. I have pointed out to Rao Gobind Jus, for communication to the Sikh Durbar, the inability manifested by General Avitabile to comply immediately with Captain Mackeson's requisition, for a force of 6,000 men to penetrate to Jellalabad. Although I shall avail myself of this circumstance, in a letter which I propose to-day to address to the Maharaja, indicating again the necessity for every exertion on the part of the Durbar, for a powerful co-operation with the British troops proceeding to Peshawur, and for prompt attention to Captain Mackeson's applications for escorts, supplies, and ammunition, I do not consider it to be necessary at present, in addressing the Maharaja, to advert more particularly to the consequences, respecting the Treaty, of General Avitabile's being unprovided with the force called for by Captain Mackeson. The discussion of this subject now can answer no good purpose, because, since the long disregard of the terms of the Article respecting it, by the parties concerned, both Affghans and Sikhs, it cannot present to the British Government any difficulties in adjustment hereafter.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK,

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 61.—*Mr. Clerk to Captain Alexander, commanding 3rd troop 2nd brigade of Horse Artillery.*

*December 4, 1841.*

SIR,—Having heard that it is possible the guns which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has directed to move across the frontier may not be ready to move so immediately as the passage across the Sutlej of your troop, now in progress to Ferozepore, may be effected, I deem it to be advisable, adverting to the emergency of the occasion, to recommend that you, nevertheless, to proceed on, in anticipation of the sanction of his Excellency to your doing so by orders of the Major-General commanding the division, issued at my request, provided that you can do so without crippling the means of marching requisite for the artillery which his Excellency has directed to be put in motion from the frontier, and which should follow as expeditiously as possible.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK.

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 62.—*Mr. Clerk to General Sir J. Nicolls.*

*December 7, 1841.*

SIR,—I do myself the honor to inform your Excellency that in consequence of my receiving your Excellency's letter of the 2nd instant, prohibiting the advance of Horse Artillery as a reinforcement to proceed to Affghauistan, I have apprised Captain Alexander, commanding the 3rd troop, 2nd brigade, now on its way to Ferozepore, and Major Huish,

commanding that station, that they are to consider the request made by me for the advance of that troop to be withdrawn.

2. In reply to the question contained in the 8th paragraph of your Excellency's letter under acknowledgment, I beg leave to state to your Excellency that I have offered no suggestions to the officer commanding the 60th and 64th, or to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, either respecting the progress of those two regiments beyond Peshawur by themselves, or when they may be joined by the 30th and 53rd.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK.

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No. 63.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, December 15, 1841.*

SIR,—Upon reconsidering the latest intelligence which we have received, extending (though comprising no detailed particulars of facts) to the 18th of November from Cabool and to the 23rd of November from Jellalabad, and on a review of the large extent of available means which will be very shortly collected for the support of tranquillity within our own provinces, it has appeared to us likely, that on the discretion which we requested your Excellency to exercise, in our dispatch of the 5th instant, you will have determined to send on Her Majesty's 9th Foot and a fifth native regiment to Peshawur, and to place Major-General Lumley in command of the force assembled on that frontier. We beg to intimate to your Excellency, that if you should have come to that decision, it is one of which we would cordially approve.

2. The objects of the force collected towards Peshawur would, as before stated to your Excellency, be mainly those of demonstration and strength upon that part of the Afghan frontier; but for these objects it may, as it seems to us on our present information, be advisable to employ two effective brigades under an officer of the high reputation and ability possessed by Major-General Lumley.

3. Should your Excellency have resolved to give effect to this arrangement, we would commit to Major-General Lumley the political as well as military direction of proceedings within the tracts wherein he will have to act. The Political Agents, Captain Macgregor and Captain Makeson, will place themselves in subordination to him, and will be guided by his orders.

4. Your Excellency will cause a copy of this intimation to be sent to those officers by Mr. Clerk, if Major-General Lumley should proceed on this duty.

5. We shall hereafter communicate any detailed instructions which it may seem desirable to send, to Major-General Lumley, if so employed, but he will, in the first instance, be guided by the spirit of the dispatches addressed to your Excellency on the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th instant. The safety of the troops under Sir Robert Sale will, of course, be the nearest and most prominent object of his care; and he will hold himself in such

force towards the Ghilzie or other Passes leading in advance of Jellalabad to Cabool, (which will be closed for the winter) as circumstances will admit.

6. If there should be no longer a question of giving a support to the position of our troops at Cabool, and the supply of a force in or in advance of the Jellalabad Valley should be difficult and precarious, it will be for Major-General Lumley to decide whether it will be expedient to remain in that forward position, in dependence on the receipt of provisions and material from the Peshawur territory, to the roads communicating with it in his rear. We should regard this as a matter to be regulated entirely by his military discretion, and on his knowledge of the present political ends which are contemplated by the Government.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND,  
W. W. BIRD,  
WM. CASEMENT,  
H. T. PRINCEP.

No. 64.—*Mr. Maldoock to the Residents at Hyderabad, Lucknow, Indore, Gwalior, Nagpore, Nepal, Mysore, and Commissioner or Agent to the Governor-General in Rajpootana.*

*Fort William, December 16, 1841.*

SIR,—In the present state of affairs at Cabool and at other points in Affghanistan, you may feel it to be of importance that you should be acquainted with the probable measures and intentions of the Government, and I am accordingly directed to inform you that the immediate objects of the Governor-General in Council are to give every practicable support to our troops across the Indus, and at the same time to maintain the exhibition of clear and concentrated strength within our own dominions. Measures have been already taken for the advance of troops in the direction of Peshawur and Jellalabad, and for gathering our forces in powerful and collected bodies along the line of the Sutlege and Indus down to the sea, and, beyond this, the public authorities will, of course, be aware of the necessity of maintaining for a time a system of more than usual vigor and vigilance throughout India.

2. It has been very satisfactory that throughout the course of the late campaigns we have been able to rely, and that we may now yet more confidently rely upon the concert and co-operation of the Government of Lahore. The union of the British and Sikh Governments promises, under present circumstances, to become yet more close than before, and the sincerity and notoriety of that union will afford a most powerful guarantee for the tranquillity of India.

3. It remains only that within our Indian territories and those of our dependent allies, we be watchful over every movement of mischief, that we keep our forces in readiness for action, and be forward to repress decisively the least advances towards disorder. After a brief interval, when it is seen that our hand is prompt and powerful as heretofore, any tendency to agitation, which may possibly, in certain situations, be the

first effect of our present difficulties in Afghanistan, may be expected to subside.

4. In the event of further reverses in that country, your language will, of course, still be one of calmness and confidence, such as is suited to the stability and vast variety of our resources, and whatever may be the future policy of the Government towards Afghanistan, you may rest assured that it is and will continue to be the firm resolution of his Lordship in Council, to maintain unimpaired the military strength of the Government in the territories subject to your political control, as well as in all other quarters of the empire.

5. The Governor-General in Council has judged it right to communicate to you thus much of the present objects and policy of Government, and if any important change should take place which it would be necessary for you to know, the same will be communicated for your information and for the guidance of your conduct in the duties entrusted to your charge.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK,

*Secretary to the Government of India.*

No. 65.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major Craigie.*

*Jellalabad, December 1, 1841.*

SIR,—I have to request that you will acquaint the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy continue to occupy a position amongst hills, at the distance of about three miles from this place. I have reason to believe that their present numbers do not exceed 2,000, and they have not ventured on any serious movement since the 14th ultimo. Daily, however, they push forward parties in advance, which direct a desultory fire of musquetry upon the bastions and curtains to the north-westward. From Cabool our direct latest intelligence is the letter of the 18th ultimo, from Major-General Elphinstone (copy of which was transmitted with mine of the 24th ultimo.) A spy, however, who visited the enemy's camp reports to us that they there describe the situation of the Feringees at the capital as similar to our own in Jellalabad, meaning that they are invested, subject to petty attacks, and anxiously awaiting reinforcements and supplies. We shall, indeed, be well pleased to hear that their position is not more unfavorable than our own. Captain Mackeson writes us, that he has continued to throw provisions into Ali Musjid, and expects to be able to add a reinforcement of Eusofzyes. He likewise informs us, that one Regiment of Native Infantry was to leave Ferozepore on the 19th ultimo, and another on the 20th, and a third to march from Loodianah on the 21st. We trust, if provision can be obtained, that both the force at Cabool, and we at Jellalabad, may be enabled by God's blessing, to maintain ourselves until the arrival of these troops, should they be here early in January, but I must beg of you to make known explicitly to his Excellency, my opinion that the crisis in Afghanistan demands much larger reinforcements than this, and that European Infantry and Dragoons ought to form a part of it. I consider also the present artillery, in the eastern part of the country.

viz., two batteries, to be insufficient ; I would recommend that a third be added without delay, which ought to consist of 9-pounders. I would also remind you that the whole of the camp equipage of the force now under my command, with the exception of the hospital tents, and one single Sepoy pall of the 35th Regiment, has been destroyed, having been left in charge of the irregulars at Gundamuck, whose defection has been already reported. If also it be the intention of Government to subjugate the provinces now in a state of universal revolt, it is to be remarked, that there are, in this immediate vicinity, besides the strong place of Lughman, other forts which cannot be breached without the aid of siege artillery, or reduced without a complete engineer establishment, guided by the most skilful officers.

I take this opportunity to annex a return of my force.\*

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

No. 66.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major Craigie.*

Jellalabad, December 2, 1841.

SIR,—I have to request the favor of your informing the Commander-in-Chief, that the enemy, who had for some days annoyed my garrison, by sending forward parties to open a desultory fire on our soldiers labouring on the works, appeared in force yesterday morning, closely environed the northern and western faces, and partially surrounded the whole place. A desire, under present circumstances, to reserve our ammunition, would, perhaps, have induced me to tolerate this audacity somewhat longer ; but as these continued attacks had at length the effect of compelling our people to suspend their exertions to complete the parapets, and as the reports of our spies indicated an intention on the part of the rebels to establish mines under the scarp of our defences, (a species of operation in which some Khails of this country are exceedingly skilful) I determined to remove them by a sally to a more convenient distance. I therefore formed a column within the Cabool gate, consisting of 300 of the 13th, 300 of the 35th, a detachment of Sappers and Jezailchees, two guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery, and the whole of the cavalry. I placed this force under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie, purposing to superintend the operation myself from the ramparts.

On the gate being thrown open, the column advanced at a rapid pace, and then, according to my previous instructions, the sappers diverging to the left, swept the whole space in front of the walls in that direction, and moved towards the rocky mounds on the right of the main road from Cabool. The security of the other flank was in like manner provided for, by a company of the 35th being extended facing towards the river, whilst the cavalry had been ordered to follow the track of the main column, then forming and wheeling to their left to intercept all fugitives on the plain in that quarter. These movements were made in uninterrupted succession, and with great spirit, and an animating cheer burst from our soldiers the moment they found themselves beyond the walls. The enemy poured their fire upon Colonel Dennie's column as soon as it debouched, but dismayed by the unchecked speed of its advance, broke,

and deserting the ruined forts in their rear, fled across the plain obliquely towards the river. They were promptly and hotly pursued up to its bank by the Jezailchees and the skirmishers of the 13th; and Captain Abbott pushing his guns at the gallop up to a point which commanded the stream, formed battery, and completed the *deroute*. His practice here was excellent, and the enemy suffered visibly and severely from his round shot and shrapnell. Many of them fell under his fire and that of the infantry and irregulars, and many rushing into the river, and missing the ford in their consternation, got into deep water, and were swept away and drowned. The cavalry also successfully sought an opportunity of charging on the level, and once more found ample employment for their sabres. The sappers too, surprised, by a sudden onset, a mass of the Ooloos, which was moving on apparently with the intention of operating against the southern front of the walls, and dispersed them with slaughter. The enemy now were in panic flight on every side, and the reserves having been steadily reformed, the work of demolishing the walls of old forts which had afforded cover to petty assailants, was commenced.

The effect of this sudden and unexpected blow has been electrical. The insurgents have not only fled from the near holds of the Zilne Urbol and two others, in which the Ghiljee chiefs Uzeez Khan and Gool Mahomed and Golan Jon, son of the revolted Urz Bezie, had taken up their quarters, but retired from the whole line of the Char Bhag forts, and only rallied at Umr Khail, at the cautious distance of twelve miles from our ramparts. The latest information is to the effect, that the rebel commander has demanded a strong reinforcement of horse from Cabool as an indispensable condition of his making any further attempts against us. Our loss has been trifling beyond calculation or hope.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

No. 67.—*Captain Macheson to Mr. Clerk.*

*Fullyghur, December 2, 1841.*

SIR,—On receipt of copy of Sir W. H. Macnaghten's letter to the address of Captain Macgregor, dated Cabool, 18th November, 1841, (a copy of which has been forwarded to you) in which I am desired "to ask for aid from the Sikhs under the treaty, and to urge Government to send as many troops into this country, and as speedily as possible," I lost no time in again calling on General Avitabile to send five or six thousand men to Jellalabad. General Avitabile consulted with the commanding officers of the four Mussulman Auxiliary Battalions now at Peshawur. These officers made objections to ordering their men to march. The principal were, 1st, That the four Battalions could not parade more than 2,200 fighting men fit for service; that this small body could not make its way to Jellalabad. That on reaching Lalpura it would be surrounded by overpowering numbers of the Ooloos. 2ndly, That there were no troops at Peshawur, either for the protection of Peshawur in their absence, or to march to their support, and that their supplies would be cut off. 3rdly, That when they last marched with our troops towards Cabool, after passing Khyber, their own Government took



no measures to provide for them, although Konwar Kharall Sing and Nao Nehal Sing were then at Peshawur with 40,000 men, and that when they applied to Colonel Wade to be supplied from the Company's godowns, they were told that they must look to their own Government to provide for them ; what hope, therefore, could they now have that they would be supported, when there were no troops at Peshawur ? Further, that one of the Nujib Battalions had been completely annihilated in the Khyber Pass, and no measures taken, either by the Sikh or British Government to save them. Finally, that the promises of extra pay made to them had never been fulfilled, and that, although the semblance of discipline was still kept up in the Sikh Army, it was well known that the Sepoys no longer obeyed, or had any fear of their officers, and they feared that these battalions, if ordered to march to Jellalabad, would break out into open mutiny, an event which might encourage the Afghan tribes round Peshawur to imitate the example of the tribes at Cabool. I had offered General Avitabile to pay the troops a gratuity of two months' pay, or 20,000 rupees, if they would march towards Jellalabad 4,000 strong, and this had been made known to the Commandants.

I have no fresh intelligence from Cabool. Mulla Najaib, the pensioner of the British Government, returned to Peshawur from Cabool a few days ago. He was in Cabool up to the action of the 14th, and there had been no action since : but friends of his, who had left Cabool eight days later than he had, told him that the Cabooles were meditating another attack on the cantonment troops, and were waiting the arrival of those Kohistanies who had hitherto been held in check, and occupied with the Goorkha corps. Mulla Najaib states, that there had been four great actions, in all of which our troops had been successful, and he expressed great admiration of our mode of fighting ; he compared the sallies of our troops with their artillery to the thunder flash, rapid, and carrying destruction wherever it alighted.

I desired Mulla Najaib to draw out an account of what he had seen and heard, which I will send you on some future occasion. I learn from him, that on the first outbreak, the Shah sent his own battalion, under Mr. Campbell and Nizamood Dowlah, to seize the rebels in the city ; but after a great struggle, and much loss, they failed. His Majesty also entreated our troops, who had been marched to the Balla Hissar, to go in support of his own ; but they pleaded that their orders were to remain in the Balla Hissar, and near his person. Captain Skinner was seized by the rebels in the shop of a seller of wood, where he had been concealed some days. He is now made to read any letters of ours that fall into their hands ; there is also a son of Cazi Mulla Hussan, educated at Loodiana, who is in the city of Cabool, who reads these letters.

A detachment of 300 men coming up to Cabool from Ghuznee, is said to have been annihilated by the Warduk tribe. Another detachment of Affghau Dooranee Horse of similar strength to the above, bringing up the Zamin Dawar prisoners from Candahar towards Cabool, had been overpowered on the other side of Ghuznee in an engagement with the tribes. An European officer commanded ; but he reached Ghuznee with a few horsemen in safety. The troops at Ghuznee are said to have put to death two of the principal Affghans in the city there. No disaster is mentioned by Mulla Najaib, as having occurred to the garrison

there, and there is reason to hope that our troops will weather the storm much better at Candahar than at Cabool.

I have, &c.,

F. MACKESON.

*Political Agent.*

No. 68.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddoch.*

*December 10, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter to my address from Captain Mackeson, dated the 2nd instant.

2. It is fortunate, I think, that circumstances prevented the execution of Captain Mackeson's intention of dispatching 4,000 Sikh troops, unsupported, towards Jellalabad. In the best days of the Sikh army they would have been worsted in that undertaking before they had accomplished one march, and at such a time as this, affording the Khyberrees a means of triumph is peculiarly to be deprecated.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK.

*Agent to the Governor-General.*

No 69.—*Captain Mackeson to Mr. Clerk.*

*Peshawur, December 4, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward, for the information of Government, Persian letters, as per margin\*, which may convey some idea of the spirit and motives that actuate the movers of the present insurrection at Cabool, and throughout Afghanistan. The papers may be depended upon as authentic.

2. Our open enemies are now the Barukzais, that is, the Dooranee and Kazilbashi Khawanni, and the Kohistanis and Ghilzais have chosen Mahomed Zuman Khan, as temporary ruler : Nawab Jabar Khan is his Minister; Shawishooden Khan Sardar, and Aminooolla Loghari Naib. Shah Shooja, who is now, of necessity, and to all appearance on our side, is in the Balla Hissar, with Mahomed Oosman his Vizier, and Syed Mohamed Khan Paghnam. It is fortunate for us that the Barukzais head the rebellion, as we are thereby sure of the Shah. His Majesty from what I can gather from respectable natives arriving from Cabool, had not altogether escaped the imputation of favouring the rebels in the outset. After the murder of Sir Alexander Burnes, when the rebels were committing further excesses in the city, His Majesty first sent his

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\* No. 1. From the Cabool Khawanur to the Afreedee chief.

No. 2. From the leaders among the Ghilzie, Lughman Khogani, and Shinwary rebels to the Shinwaris of Khyber.

No. 3. From Fouz Mahomed Khan, nephew of Nizam Odonlah to Aboul Rahim Malikzar, the officer of Shah Shooja with Captain Mackeson at Peshawur.

No. 4. From Abdool Kumeeni to his father Abdool Rahim Khan Maligar, the Shah's officer with Captain Mackeson at Peshawur.

own troops to quell the disturbance there, with Mahomed Shariff Khan, his father-in-law, at their head. Mahomed Shariff Khan had a parley with the leaders of the insurgents, Abdoolla Khan and others, and remonstrated with them on their rising against the English, to whom His Majesty was so much indebted, and who were moreover their guests. The rebel leaders declared their determination to exterminate or expel the whole of the race of Kafirs from Afghanistan. On which Mahomed Shariff Khan is represented to have suggested to them the necessity of their choosing for themselves a head. Intimation had reached the Envoy and Minister of this overture having been made by Mahomed Shariff Khan, on the part of the King, but His Majesty was not aware that he stood otherwise than fair with our people. The conference between Mahomed Shariff Khan and the rebels was broken off by a cannon shot discharged from our guns in the Bala Hissar, which fell among the rebels, and killed several of them. They then turned upon the Shah's troops, and drove them back to the Bala Hissar. Sir William Macnaghten, in telling me to urge Government to send as many troops into this country, and as speedily as possible, is probably aware that hereafter we must stand on our strength, and act in our own name.

3. The leaders among the Ghilzai Khograni and Shinwari rebels, Aziz Khan, Gul Mahomed Khan, and others, in writing to the Afreedees, and exciting them against us, after pointing out that the wealth of a future world is much better than the wealth of this, and the only lasting wealth, guarantee to them, in the name of the future King of Islam, whoever he may be, the same allowances that they now receive from us. From this it would appear, that Nawab Mahomed Zaman Khan, though temporarily elected Chief, is not the King the rebels have in contemplation.

4. The Ghilzies, and other rebels in Ningrahar, after representing our force at Jellalabad as only 2,000 strong, ask the Afreedees to send men to their assistance. The receipt of their letter no doubt has tended greatly to keep the Afreedees on our side. They do not fail to perceive that the cause must be weak, if all the tribes in Ningrahar and the Ghilzies to boot, cannot manage 2,000 men without their assistance. Aziz Khan is represented as delaying, and Barkat Khan on our side, and the levies of the Oolloos are supported by forced exactions from the ryots of the Government share of the produce of the land. The leaders, fearing to take the responsibility of collecting the revenue on themselves, have put up one Khairvullah, a person of no note, to make these exactions. Thus have the rebels in Ningrahar made themselves contemptible even in the eyes of their countrymen. I apprehend no danger to our troops at Jellalabad from such adversaries. A brigade of our troops, when once past the Khyber, will suffice to restore tranquillity in the Ningrahar valley.

5. Yesterday evening I received, from the Afreedee Maliks, a letter communicating the final determination of their Jirgha. They begged me to send any supplies I might wish to send to Ali Musjid, and also to send supplies of grain through the pass; but as our troops had not yet arrived in force, they hoped I would save their purda by sending some troops, in the first instance, by the Tatara road, so that they might be excused in the eyes of their Mussulman countrymen, for having given us a road when all other tribes were against us. The Maliks will do much

to preserve their allowances ; but they will not be able to control their tribes if the latter think they are able to stop our troops. I should, however, have no hesitation in advancing through the pass with the four native battalions now on their way here : and the effect of our troops arriving at Jellalabad would be so beneficial to our interests at Cabool, that I think no delay should occur in pushing them on, provided this can be done without risk. The Maliks of Khyber say, that when our troops arrive, they will write to the Ghilzies and other tribes in Ningrahar, to say that they alone are not able to oppose us, and to request, if they wish to close the road, that they will themselves come and do it.

I have, &c.,

F. MACKESON,  
*Political Agent.*

No. 70.—*Mr. Clerk to Captain Mackeson.*

*December 12, 1841.*

SIR.—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, a copy of which, with its inclosures, will be forwarded to Government.

2. I concur in opinion with you that no delay should occur in pushing on to Jellalabad the four Regiments of Native Infantry now on their march to Peshawur, provided, as you observe, that this can be done without any risk. Jellalabad must stand greatly in need of ammunition and money, and the effect on affairs at Cabool, of the arrival of reinforcements at Jellalabad, will, in all probability, be very favourable. But you will doubtless consider that the first reinforcement proceeding to Jellalabad will have charge of large quantities of supplies and stores. Therefore, this risk on one hand, and the utility of waiting for the second brigade on the other, must be judged by, and depend upon your knowledge of the intentions, and means of co-operation or resistance of the tribes upon the road under your charge.

3. I am informed by Maharaja Shere Sing that Rao Kesree Sing has been dispatched from Lahore by dawk, to take charge of some troops that are marching upon Peshawur to co-operate with the British troops. You will be so good as to let me know when he arrives, and to keep me informed of the assistance of any kind afforded by General Avitabile, as well as by Rao Kesree Sing.

4. Captain Lawrence has been directed by me to join you by forced marches, and you can devolve on him any local duties, connected with the Sikhs, arising out of these disturbances, for which at present you may not be able to find time.

• I have, &c.,

G. R. CLERK,  
*Agent to the Governor-General.*

13. Captain Mackeson is aware of two passes by which the Khyber can be turned ; the Commander-in-Chief would have you be cautious in having two lines of operation, unless they are so near that the firing may be mutually heard, and paths of communication be available. The adoption of either of these new lines must be a subject on which to exercise your judgment.

14. Mr. Clerk prepared last year, a paper of hints to officers passing through the Punjaub ; no doubt you have been furnished with a copy.

In conclusion, his Excellency directs me to ask for an acknowledgement of this dispatch, and for a report of your proceedings, at least every second day, whilst you are acting independently.

Concerning Sikh affairs and Sikh troops, you will communicate freely with Mr. Clerk and Captain Mackeson.

I have, &c.,

P. CRAIGIE.

No. 73.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Camp, two marches north of Agra, December 12, 1841.*

MY LORD,—I have been honored by the receipt of a dispatch from your Lordship in Council, dated 2nd inst., containing instructions for my guidance in certain points, and your Lordship's views and wishes upon others, arising out of the late unlooked-for events in Afghanistan.

2. It gives me much pleasure to think, that your Lordship's directions, touching the concentration of an effective brigade, have been anticipated. The leading Regiments (60th and 64th) will reach Peshawur on or about the 26th instant, and the second division, under Brigadier Wild, in eight days after. This brigade, and the details of corps proceeding with it, somewhat exceeds 4,500 men.

3. I have the honor to transmit a copy of the instructions which were yesterday forwarded to Brigadier Wild. Your Lordship in Council will observe that I have carefully followed the orders contained in the dispatch of the 2nd inst. ; adding such suggestions and cautions as his position, and the state of affairs at Jellalabad, on the 27th ult., seemed to require.

4. I trust that your Lordship in Council will approve of my desiring the Brigadier to act on his own decision, and consequent responsibility ; and I have particularly freed him from orders from Major-General Sir Robert Sale. Brigadier Wild will weigh the advantages more calmly than Sir Robert can be expected to do.

5. A sketch of the Khyber Pass is now preparing by Lieutenant-Colonel Garden, for the Brigadier's use, and will be dispatched to-day.

6. No advance from Jellalabad to Cabool will be authorized, or even encouraged, by me, unless under the circumstances alluded to in the dispatch now acknowledged.

7. Referring to the 6th article of my instructions, I trust that your Lordship in Council will think that there is little probability of any want of artillery for the use of this brigade. Respecting cavalry, I beg to say, that I did not consider it prudent to send the 10th Light Cavalry, wholly or in part ; we can ill spare that Regiment, and if the Sikhs were

unfaithful to us, a single corps of cavalry could do but little. In the Khyber Pass they would very greatly increase the line of march, and require at every yard the protection of infantry.

8 Her Majesty's 9th Foot will not be at Ferozepore until the 28th instant, and I think that I shall, before the 25th, clearly see whether that corps and the 26th Native Infantry should be ordered forward or not. Their presence at Ferozepore will probably have a very good effect, but I shall not send them unless I firmly believe that what it may be necessary to do cannot be done without their aid.

9. Your Lordship will have observed that two 9-pounders and a 24-pounder howitzer are preparing to cross the Sutlej with the 9th Foot.

10. I am much flattered by the confidence reposed in me by Government, and shall not lose sight of the caution contained in the 4th paragraph, relative to the passes leading to Cabool.

11. Being in daily communication with Mr. Clerk, who had on the 5th instant no apprehension of any want of cordiality, or good faith, on the part of the Sikh ruler, or nation, I have not yet warned the regiments which I should collect to form an army of observation. To this I have been led as well by a desire to avoid giving alarm, as by considerations of expense. The corps which are advancing towards the frontier shall, however, be ordered to retain their establishments.

12. Retaining Ferozepore and Loodiana as my outposts, I should collect 8,000 men at or near Munsoorpore, midway between them and Kurnaul.

13. Should Government desire to have these troops drawn together at once, or even placed on their field establishment, I beg your Lordship in Council to signify your pleasure to that effect.

14. I have not availed myself of the permission to move Her Majesty's 31st Foot to Meerut or Kurnaul, for the reasons given in paragraph 11, but I shall do so at once, if the 9th Foot should cross the Sutlej.

15. Her Majesty's 39th Regiment will be a most important and valuable reserve ; it may not, however, be wanting, and I hope it will not be.

16. Your Lordship will observe that I have already called upwards the 73rd and 15th Regiments, replacing them by means of the 17th and 46th Regiments, which have been halted on their march to Barrackpore.

17. I have already had the honor to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland at once yielded to my request that a regiment might be spared from Nusserabad, and the 55th is now on its march to Kurnaul.

I have sent a copy of the instructions to Mr. Clerk.

I have &c.,

J. NICOLLS,

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No. 74.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, December 20, 1841.*

Sir,—Your dispatch of the 12th instant, in reply to our communication of the 2nd instant, has been received and carefully considered, and we return your Excellency thanks for the prompt and able manner in

which you have proceeded to carry into effect the wishes of the Government.

2. We entirely approve the tenor of the instructions which have been addressed by your Excellency's orders to Brigadier Wild.

3. We only feel disposed to regret that your Excellency was only able to attach so very small a number of cavalry to the first division of the brigade. For though the advance of cavalry through the Khyber Pass might be difficult, or dangerous, circumstances might occur on the march and on this side of the pass, in which the presence of this arm would be highly useful.

4. It occurs to the Governor-General in Council, to suggest to your Excellency that it might be very proper to authorize Brigadier Wild to employ, in connection with his operations for the security of the Khyber Pass, a sufficient number of Jezzailchees of the Eusofzye or other tribe, upon whom it may seem likely that dependence could be placed.

5. Experience appears to show that the use of weapons, such as are wielded by this class of the Afghan soldiery, would be of great value in aid of the ordinary arms of our troops in all operations in mountain defiles. Brigadier Wild, in communication with Captain Mackeson would, it may be hoped, be able to make a selection of some trust-worthy men of this description, and would be able to judge what number of them he could hope to employ with benefit, under the near control either of his own force, or of British officers who might be qualified to command them. Perhaps, after a little time, some of our own Sepahees might be trained to the efficient use of this weapon.

6. On the subject of pushing on the last division of the force ordered for Peshawur, including Her Majesty's 9th Foot, with two 9-pounders and a 24-pound howitzer, or detaining it on the Sutlege, we would leave it entirely to your Excellency, with the information which will have reached you before the end of this month, to decide on the course to be pursued regarding it.

7. We repose with perfect confidence on your judgment to decide upon the necessity of immediately drawing together the force alluded to in the 12th and 13th paragraphs of your dispatch. This must mainly depend upon the state of affairs in the Punjab, of which your Excellency will receive the fullest and earliest information, and on which you are fully empowered to act, to the extent of placing the whole of the available force in the North-Western Provinces in readiness to be concentrated or to be moved on any direction where their services may be required.

8. It has occurred to us that it may be expedient to alter the destination of Her Majesty's 39th Regiment from Cawnpore to Agra, in case of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment being removed from the latter station, and in that case your Excellency is requested to issue instructions to the officer in command of the 39th, which may reach him while passing through the Saugor district, where the roads to Agra and Cawnpore diverge, and in that case instructions will also be required by the Resident at Gwalior, and other political authorities, for the collection of supplies on the road that passes through some of the Boondulah States, the Gwalior territory, and that of Dhalpore. An intimation to this effect will be sent from hence to the Agents in Bundelcund, and the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, and the

Resident at Gwalior, so that they may be prepared to meet any requisition consequent on the change in the route of Her Majesty's 39th Regiment.

9. We have resolved that the recruits raised for the service of Shah Shooja by Captain Taylor, shall not be sent on to the frontier, but shall remain for the present at Cawnpore, and we have accordingly thought it proper to place that officer with his levy at the disposal of your Excellency.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND.

W. W. BIRD.

W. CASEMENT.

H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 75.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Camp Muttra, December 13, 1841.*

MY LORD,—I had the honor of replying yesterday to the dispatch of your Lordship in Council, dated 2nd instant; on the morning of the 10th your express of the 3rd instant was received, written after the lamented turn of affairs at Cabool had been officially made known to your Lordship by Mr. Clerk.

2. The injunction, now repeated, not to detach a second brigade, shall be ever borne carefully in view; although by a subsequent dispatch your Lordship has been pleased to permit me to consult my own judgment "after a careful consideration of all circumstances by Mr. Clerk and myself, with a full knowledge of the views of policy, as at present entertained by the Government."

3. I shall, with great reluctance, order the advance of these two last regiments, (Her Majesty's 9th and 26th Native Infantry) but very strong doubts are entertained here whether the four Native Infantry corps can protect a considerable convoy through the Khyber Pass.

4. I beg to record my full and hearty concurrence in the resolution expressed by your Lordship in Council in the 3rd paragraph of your dispatch of the 3rd instant, and of the instructions conveyed in that which follows, by which I shall, on all occasions, be guided.

5. Your Lordship will observe, by the date hereof, that I have already made three marches towards Delhi, where I expect to arrive on the 21st.

6. I have to thank your Lordship for the copy of the dispatch to Mr. Clerk of the 3rd instant, by which his future communications with the Government of Lahore are to be guided.

7. Referring to the concluding part of the 1st paragraph of your Lordship's dispatch of the 5th instant, I beg to say that I have not received any information which requires me to hasten the concentration alluded to, concerning which my views were explained in the 11th, 12th and 13th paragraphs of my letter of yesterday.

8. I very much regret that the state of Major-General Lumley's health entirely forbids the hope of his being able to undertake the com-



mand of the troops advancing to Peshawur. If, therefore, the force is raised to six regiments, I shall order Major-General Sir Edmund Williams to join my camp by dawk, and push him forward, as soon as I shall have furnished him with instructions, and armed him with all the information and advice which the known state of affairs at his departure may seem to require.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 76.—*The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee.*

Fort William, January 9, No. 2, 1842.

HONORABLE SIRS,—We have the honor to submit to your Committee by the opportunity now afforded by the dispatch of the India steamer direct to Suez (in addition to the ordinary news letters up to this date) the subjoined general precis of late intelligence regarding the north-west frontier of British India, since our dispatches of dates noted in the margin.

2. But we must solicit your Committee to remember that the documents from which this dispatch is prepared, are generally of a private or demi-official character, for we have not received from the other side of Jellalabad any formal record to submit to your Committee.

CABOOL.

3. Lieutenant Conolly, in a private letter from the Bala Hissar, dated 27th November, describes the action of the 23rd of November in the following words :—"The enemy rushed on in front and flank. The men became flurried, and came down the hill in a disorderly manner. The Cavalry charged home on the column, and had they not been checked by a party of Anderson's Horse, there is no telling where the mischief may have ended. Our loss was great,—Oliver, 5th Bengal Native Infantry, Makintosh, 5th Native Infantry, and Laing, 27th Bengal Native Infantry, killed. Poor Walker has since died of his wounds. Many more officers were wounded.

"Mahomed Akbar Khan has arrived. The enemy's force in Horse and Foot 10,000 or 15,000. The Envoy tried to negotiate. The enemy demanded the person of the King, and the immediate withdrawal of ourselves. This, of course, was not listened to. They assembled yesterday on the hills, near Cantonments, but a snow-storm came on, and drove them off. Abdoolhah\* is wounded, Meer Musjide dead. The cry, *Ul Koofar Islam*†, increases.

4. Sir William Macnaghten without date, (but supposed to be the 8th,) writes to Captain Macgregor, commenting upon the acts and wishes of the military, and proceeds to state that they had but three days' provisions for the troops, and nothing for the cattle,—that their communi-

\* The assassin of Sir Alexander Burnes, the chief of the Kohistanis.

† I. e. Against the Infidels.

cations had been successfully intercepted,—that his Majesty was in the Bala Hissar, with Lieutenant Conolly,—that the Chief of Lughman was almost the only Chief with the Shah,—and that they were anxiously looking for reinforcements from Candahar. He refers in this letter to the possibility of a capitulation, which, however, he would endeavour to put off to the last moment.

5. On the 7th of December Lieutenant Conolly, writing to Captain Macgregor, mentions that for many days previously the Cabool force was not annoyed by the enemy,—that the latter tried negotiation, requiring from the King that he should separate himself from us, and from the Envoy the person of His Majesty, whilst the Envoy attempted other terms, which proved abortive,—that for the three or four days previous to that on which he wrote, the rebels had tried all their force on the cantonment, with five guns at a long range, and their countless hosts of rabble, that they had gained great confidence by our inertness, having made approaches to within half-musket shot of the works, and mined and taken possession of a fort which was evacuated by our troops, and from which they commanded the cantonment in some way,—that their numbers had decreased considerably, but their activity and courage had increased,—that they burnt the bridge within musket-range of the gate, and had occupied the forts and villages in the neighbourhood, thereby cutting off all supplies. Lieutenant Conolly adds that the King was very staunch, though deserted by all his followess; and gives the following list of Officers who have been killed:

Her Majesty's 44th Regiment.—Colonel Mackerell; Captains Robinson, Mc Creagh, Swayne; Lieutenants Raban, Mc Kay.

5th Regiment Native Infantry.—Colonel Oliver; Captain Mackintosh.

37th Regiment Native Infantry.—Captain Westmacott; Lieutenant Gordon.

4th Irregular Horse.—Captain Walker.

*Officers' Names who have been Killed, and were omitted in the foregoing List.*

Salisbury, Maule, Wheeler, Woodburn, killed near Ghuznee.

Shah's 4th.—Captain Codrington; Lieutenant W. Broadfoot; Sir A. Burnes, C. Burnes, Dr. Grant.

*Officers who have been Wounded.*

Majors Swayne, Thain, Pottinger; Captains Walsh, Paton.

Artillery, Captains Eyre, Wall, Haughton.

6. In the annexed extracts of a journal, by Lady Sale, from the 19th of November to the 8th of December, your Honourable Committee will find many details of events at Cabool; and to this, in the absence of more formal papers, we would invite the special notice of your Honourable Committee.

7. Captain Mackeson reports to Mr. Clerk that a Persian letter was received on the 2nd of December, by the Shah's officer with Captain Mackeson, from K. Adad Khan Afreedee. In this letter it is stated that a letter had been received by some Moollah at Intaba, by the hands of his own cousin, from a certain Dooranee at Cabool, the contents of which went to show that negotiations were going on for the withdrawal of our troops, with their arms, and artillery, and property; for the grant of hostages from among the British for the safe return of Dost Mahomed

and his family to Afghanistan ; and arrangements amongst the Chiefs themselves for the sovereignty, the viziership, and the command of the army.

### JELLALABAD.

8. Captain Macgregor writes, on the 5th December, that of supplies they had sufficient for two months' consumption ; but ammunition was still a desideratum. They were, however, at the time of writing, tolerably off. The Ghilzie chiefs were still in the neighbourhood, with a few followers only. It was then reported that they contemplated trying their luck again in a contest with our troops.

9. Captain Macgregor again writes that they cannot move without abandoning their sick and wounded ; that since their action on the 1st of December, with the Ghilzie and Shinwarree force, the Ghilzie chiefs had retired to Ummar Kheil, twelve miles distant from Jellalabad, where they remained with 300 of 400 followers ; and it was said they were again attempting to collect followers.

10. Sir Robert Sale mentions that his force at Jellalabad had eleven guns and five mortars mounted on the works, and that incessant labour had put the place into a very respectable state of defence.

11. On the 11th December Captain Macgregor reports that he was not afraid of treachery within the walls, that he had turned out of the town all suspicious persons, leaving only tradesmen and artificers,—having at the same time established a market outside the walls, to which the villagers brought atta, sheep, fowls, grain, &c.

12. On the 10th Sir R. Sale writes that the chiefs were still at Ummar Kheil, and were said to be disturbed by dissensions among themselves, and between them and the rebel chiefs at Cabool.

13. On the 20th and 21st December Captain Mackeson despatched, by the two routes of Tattarra and Aktara, 50,000 rupees, to the troops at Jellalabad, with the escort before mentioned.

### KHYBER PASS.

14. On the 10th December Captain Mackeson writes that there appeared to be no doubt that Mahomed Akbar Khan had arrived at Cabool, and that he had sent letters of an inflammatory nature to the Afreedee tribes, calling on them to close the Khyber Pass ; also to the tribes of Ningrahar, calling on them to unite and attack the force at Jellalabad.

15. In his letter of the 11th of December Captain Mackeson further reports, that Mahomed Akbar Khan had sent letters of the above kind to all the chiefs and tribes from Cabool to Peshawur. Captain Mackeson added, " Our enemies are contemptible in everything but their numbers." Every tribe turns out its 10,000 or 12,000 men. The latest accounts from Peshawur state that the intelligence of negotiations for our withdrawal from Cabool had caused much excitement among the Khyberees.

16. In his letter of December 20th, Captain Mackeson states that the British dawks between Jellalabad and Peshawur continued to run without interruption, and regularly by the Tattarra road, and crossing the river at Lalpura. The grain which Captain Mackeson sent to Lal-

pura\*, both by the Tattarra and Akhbara roads, reached in safety. The transmission of money for the troops at Jellalabad had been unavoidably delayed for some days, but 50,000 rupees started on the 20th December, by the Tattarra road. Captain Mackeson had appointed his escort of horsemen, increased in number for the service to 100 men, and 100 Affghan Horse of Peshawur, newly raised, in concert with the horsemen of Toorabaz Khan, to convey the treasure from Lalpura to Jellalabad, whilst from Peshawur to Lalpura, through the Tattarra Pass, there would be a detachment of Captain Ferris's Jezzailchees, 120 strong, under a Native officer, and 300 Eusofzyes, newly raised, to accompany and protect it. These men will remain at Lalpura for some time, both to strengthen Toorabaz Khan and to take charge of the supplies now in the fort at Lalpura; and of such other supplies as Captain Mackeson might send hereafter.

17. The Maliks were holding a council of their tribes as to whether they should be hostile or friendly; but it was rumoured that they contemplated a renewed attack on Ali Masjid.

### THE PUNJAUB AND PESHAWUR.

18. Captain Mackeson writes, under date the 20th December, that Dr. Ritchie, whom he had sent to Raja Goolaub Sing, and to Koonwur Pertab Sing, to remonstrate against their having removed boats from the Attok, had succeeded in getting the Koonwur to release them. Captain Mackeson adds, that the Mussulman Auxiliary Troops at Peshawur had openly refused to leave their cantonments, and had placed their own sentries over their guns, from a fear of their being taken from them. Gratuities had been offered them, but without effect, and they decline going even as far as Jumrood. General Avitabile had been told that while Shere Sing had written to him to order the troops to move, and to move with them himself, the Maharajah had written a separate perwannah to the commandants, desiring them not to move, but Captain Mackeson gave no credence to this charge of duplicity, though there appeared to him to be much wavering and indecision in the councils of the Durbar. The troops at first ordered to move on Peshawur, had been ordered to halt on the road, but only till all our troops should have passed.

19. The accompanying Lahore akbar was forwarded by Mr. Clerk in a letter dated 27th December. From this dispatch it appears the Durbar is making exertions to co-operate with the British troops at Peshawur, but that its power to do so promptly is considerably diminished by disaffection in a portion of the army, which has latterly been inclining to the cause of the Sundhunwalla chiefs, and by Raja Goolaub Sing having been debarred from going to Peshawur.

20. This latter impediment Mr. Clerk has thought it proper at this juncture to do his best to remove, as he is the only chief who retains due authority over the Sikh troops, is a good and courageous General, and is the brother of the active Premier.

21. Captain Mackeson reports, on the 22nd December, that the Sikhs still refuse to move from their cantonments, and that he had again

\* The post of the friendly chief Toorabaz Khan.

remonstrated with Rajah Goolaub Sing, and urged the necessity of his going to Peshawur with the Koonwur and his troops.

22. These papers contain address from Mr. Clerk to Maharajah Shere Sing and the Khurutah of the Governor-General to his Highness on the co-operation which his Highness's obligation by Treaty require him to afford at this period; and an acknowledgment for the orders already issued by the Durbar.

### GHUZNEE.

23. The 27th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, under Lieut.-Colonel Palmer, is quartered at Ghuznee, but we have no intelligence of the exact position of the garrison in regard to supplies, or whether it has been attacked or not.

### KELAT-I-GHILZIE.

24. We have reason to believe this post contains a garrison of 1000 men, two 18-pounders, some 9 or 6-pounders and six months' supplies.

### CANDAHAR.

25. We learn from private communications of 11th December, 1841, that Lieutenant-Colonel McLaren's Brigade returned to Candahar on the 10th December, after an unsuccessful attempt to advance on Cabool. Emissaries from Cabool were trying to incite the Candahar provinces to rise. By the latest accounts, the people it appears had removed their women, goods, and chattels from the town, in anticipation of troubled times. The old-Ghilzie rebel Gooroo, had issued orders to strip every traveller on the road from head to foot, and no one had yet escaped his vigilance. In a few days five of our regiments were to be quartered in the town; a park of artillery had been in position in the town for some days past. It was expected that the force which had been detached to Zamindawur and to Girishk, would also have returned about the 15th, and General Nott would then have under his command six regiments of Native Infantry, one European regiment (40th), and four regiments of the Shah's contingent, with artillery and some cavalry; but from this force, the greater part of which will have been concentrated at Candahar, must be deducted the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie.

26. From these your Honorable Committee will perceive, that with reference to the disturbed state of affairs in Afghanistan, Major Outram has assembled all the available troops in Sinde in his neighbourhood, to be in readiness to ascend the pass if necessary, and to deter the hill tribes from entering into any combination to disturb the peace of the country. Major Outram stated that should the arrangements recommended by him be carried into effect, a strong brigade (one troop horse artillery, a wing or whole regiment of regular cavalry, Her Majesty's 41st Foot, two regiments Native Infantry) from the troops now in Sinde, will be available for the service above the pass (in addition to the Bombay troops already there), and he hopes that it will be fully equipped by the 15th March next.

27. It ~~was~~ intended by the Assistant Political Agent at Quetta to remit three lacs of rupees to the Treasury of the Political Agent at

Candahar, but owing to the disturbed state of the country, and the money not being immediately required, that intention was deferred for the present, and the troops which were to have escorted the treasure were halted at Quetta.

28. The correspondence submitted by Major Outram, with his letter of the 15th December, will show your Honourable Committee the steps which were to be adopted to avert any risk to Quetta, should the object of the flight of the ex-Naib of that place be to bring a body of the Affghan insurgents to that quarter, with a view to incite the Kaker tribes to rebellion, but the Political Agent was of opinion that it was more likely the Naib had no other object in flight than saving himself, on seeing that a Brahooce Naib was about to be appointed in his place, and naturally surmising that, as an object of suspicion, from his near relationship with one of the rebel leaders, he was likely to be arrested. Your Honourable Committee will perceive that Major Outram had considered the post of Quetta sufficiently strong to protect itself before; but that officer thought that, by the greater appearance of strength which increasing it to the utmost force that can be accommodated will give, the efforts of the Affghan insurgents to invite the Kakers to unite in an attack on the place were less likely to be successful.

29. The force, therefore, at Quetta would be two strong Regiments of Native Infantry (minus three companies at Kella Abdulla), and two 9-pounders of the Bombay European Artillery, and two 9-pounders of the Bolan Rangers, of Major Sotheby's Company of Bengal European Artillerymen, with ample provisions and tenable ground. Owing to this arrangement. Major Outram was under no anxiety whatever, were the rebels to come in their utmost strength against that post, which might be their policy, with a view to preventing succour to Candahar, by exciting disturbances in this country.

30. Colonel Stacy and the Khan were at Sebee, where they were to be joined by the uncle of the Murree Chief, their assurances to whom would, Major Outram hoped, remove the personal fears which the chief himself entertained; and once thoroughly assured of our good faith towards him, Major Outram was satisfied that he would not join any combination against us, which indeed he (Major Outram) was not apprehensive of being formed in this country, even although the protracted struggle in Affghanistan was so calculated to encourage disaffection.

31. In the letter of the 17th December your Honourable Committee will be informed of the measures proposed by the Political Agent to the Government of Bombay for the reinforcement of our troops in Affghanistan, at the opening of the season, which he has been induced to do by the increasing spirit of insurrection displayed throughout Affghanistan. These arrangements have had the concurrence of Brigadier England, commanding the Sinde force.

#### DOST MAHOMED KHAN AND FAMILY.

32. From these papers your Honourable Committee will perceive that Dost Mahomed Khan is at present at Seharunpore, and that Mr. Clerk has had an interview with the ex-chief in order frankly to state to him the inconvenience which would attend his residence at the present

moment at Loodiana, and the urgent reasons that require his temporary detention at Seharunpore. The ex-chief, after some discussion, and an expression of unwillingness to be longer separated from his family, has submitted to this detention, and will remain for the present under the care of Lieutenant Nicolson at Seharanpore ; his son, Hyder Khan has been allowed to visit Loodiana and his family.

33. You will perceive that, owing to the ill health of Major-General Lumley, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has selected Major-General Pollock to command the troops assembled, and assembling, at Peshawur ; and that we have approved the selection. Under date the 27th of December, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief forwarded to us a copy of his instructions to Brigadier Wild, and stated that his object in them was to encourage the Brigadier to advance with supplies, treasure, and ammunition, to Jellalabad, if the state of affairs there, and in the Khyber Pass, seemed to promise that it might be done without any great risk. In those instructions his Excellency mentions that (in addition to the 30th, 53rd, 60th, and 64th Regiments) Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and the 26th Bengal Native Infantry, and the 10th Bengal Light Cavalry, and half No. 5 Light Field Battery, had been ordered to march towards Peshawur, without any unnecessary delay ; and adds, that the infantry of the force was to be divided into two brigades, the first brigade consisting of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, the 26th and 53rd Bengal Native Infantry, under Major-General McCaskill ; the second, of the 30th, 60th, and 64th, under Brigadier Wild. His Excellency desired that, if Sikh troops co-operated, the two forces should by no means be mixed.

34. The letter of the Commander-in-Chief, dated 28th of December, contains his opinion on the subject of Sir R. Sale's requisition for a train of heavy artillery, and Captain Mackeson and Captain Macgregor's wishes for very large forces to be sent towards Afghanistan through the Punjab and Khyber Pass, and strongly points out the difficulties which would oppose themselves to the collection of such reinforcements, as well as to the supply of provisions, and of means of carriage, for the numerous armaments which those officers would require ; and, in the same manner, upon some of Major Outram's requisitions, the Bombay Government has requested instructions, and has stated the inconvenience with which a compliance with them might be attended. We share in the opinions which are held by both these authorities, and would refer you to our dispatches addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on December 2nd, 3rd, and 5th, for an explanation of the course of policy, and of the first military measures which, in the present uncertain and most anxious state of affairs, we would wish our officers to pursue. But we may state to you, that the force lately ordered to cross the Punjab will not amount to less than 8,000 men ; and that Major-General Sale, by his last returns, had 2,600 men under his command ; and that Major Outram will have been strengthened by the substitution of two strong and fresh regiments for two which had been long upon service.

35. Our last accounts state that the bridge on the Attok was to have been completed on December 21. Lieutenant Liptrot's detachment of Irregular Horse, which had preceded the first brigade with magazine stores, reached Peshawur on December 13.

36. From the accompanying resolution, dated January 6, your Honorable Committee will learn that in the present circumstances of great military difficulty, and in the absence of all means of receiving orders from Sir W. Macnaghten, the constituted representative of Government in that country, we would throw upon each military commander a more than usual discretion in whatever may regard military movements, or the safety of the troops, or the defence or abandonment of the positions occupied by our forces.

37. The Generals commanding divisions, will not hesitate to give the weight that is due to the advice of the Political Officers, who will also put them in possession of their instructions and all their intelligence; and in the absence of any competent political superior, they will consider themselves under the direction of the Military Commandants, and will address to them all those communications which would formerly have been addressed to the Envoy and Minister. The commanding officers to whom these observations may be fully applicable, are Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar, and Major-General Pollock, proceeding to take the command on the Sikh frontier, towards Jellalabad. We have named Sir R. Shakespeare to be Secretary to Major-General Pollock.

38. The above Resolution will not extend in the case of Captain Mackeson, Political Agent at Peshawur, to any matters of a military or political nature, having relation to the Government of Lahore. In all matters involving the interest of that Government, Captain Mackeson will be exclusively under the authority of Mr. Clerk, the Agent of the Governor-General on the North-West frontier.

39. The Political Agent in Sind and Beloochistan is already in direct communication with the Government of India. It is not proposed to make any change in that respect, nor to place Major Outram under the control of the officer commanding the forces of Sind. With that officer he will maintain a close and confidential communication of the orders that he has received from Government, and of the intelligence that reaches him, and in regard to all military operations whatever Brigadier England will act upon his own discretion, with the same independent power as that conferred on the two officers named above.

40. We confine ourselves, on the present occasion, to a brief outline of such information as is most likely to be of interest. The general scope of our present policy will have been apparent to your Honorable Committee, from our dispatches (already communicated to you) of 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 15th December, to the Military and Political Authorities on the North-West frontier, and in the Punjab, Afghanistan, and Beloochistan. We shall remain prepared and vigilant in India, and have especially enjoined firmness, circumspection, and prudence in the employment of all the forces at their disposal, on the several officers charged with the executive direction of affairs on and beyond the Indus.

41. In the same packet we have enclosed the news-letters from the 20th ultimo, and to those documents we will beg leave to refer your Honorable Committee for further intelligence in respect to political events in this quarter.

42. We have requested the Honorable Company's Agents at Suez and Alexandria to take such steps as they may consider most expedient for



the speedy transit of this packet through Egypt, and for its early arrival in England.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W. W. BIRD, WM. CASEMENT, & H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 77.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.*

December 11, 1841.

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit a copy of a requisition which, in consequence of the dispatch of the British artillery being delayed, I have deemed it advisable to make upon the officer commanding at Ferozepore.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK.

No. 78.—*Mr. Clerk to Major Huish, commanding at Ferozepore.*

December 11, 1841.

SIR,—As it is possible that the artillery of the Sikhs may be made use of in the advance of the British reinforcements from Peshawur, I have the honor to request that if your means admit of it, without crippling the British artillery under orders to proceed with Her Majesty's 9th Foot, you will be so good as to provide a set of drag ropes for six 9-pounders, with spare rope and the usual quantity of small stores, and to consign them on camels lightly laden, to the care of Captain Lawrence, Assistant Agent Governor-General.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK,

No. 79.—*Lieutenant-Colonel J. Tulloch to Mr. Clerk.*

Camp, Jhelum, December 9, 1841.

SIR,—I have the honor to report the arrival at this place in progress to Affghanistan, of the detachment under my command\*, and to add that I purpose marching to Rhotas to-morrow morning.

I have, &c.,

J. TULLOCH.

No. 80.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

Delhi, December 20, 1841.

SIRS,—Referring to the 11th, 12th, and 13th paragraphs of my dispatch of the 12th instant, to the address of your Lordship in Council respecting the assembly of a body of troops on this frontier, I have now the honor to transcribe the paragraph of a letter dated 16th instant, received from Mr. Clerk, on that subject.

\* 4th Company, 6th Battalion, Artillery; 5th Company Sappers and Miners 60th Regiment Native Infantry, 64th ditto ditto.

"I shall not fail immediately to apprise your Excellency, should it appear that the actual assemblage of a large force on this frontier is necessary, or that it would be desirable that the regiments intended for such concentration should entertain their field establishments. It does not seem to me that at present either one or the other of these measures is necessary to the quiet of the north-western provinces, provided the Goorkhas are not encroaching upon us. Even should worse disasters befall our arms in the west than Afghan prowess can inflict, and the whole of the reinforcements now in orders have left this frontier, I conceive that the north-western provinces would still continue to be securely held, if our cantonments could be replenished to the same extent as before, but not otherwise."

2. Relying on this opinion, fully borne out by all present appearances, and the latest information, I have not taken any measures to collect troops.

3. The 6th and 55th Regiments will reach Kurnaul about the 8th of January, and the 9th arrive at Delhi about the 27th. The 15th and 73rd will soon be moving in this direction also. These five corps will replace the five proceeding across the Punjab.

I am, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 81.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

Fort William, January 3, 1841.

SIR,—In reply to your dispatch of the 20th ultimo, we have only to express our entire approval of your Excellency having, on the opinion given to you by Mr. Clerk, borne out, as it was, by all present appearances, and the latest information, refrained from adopting any measures for the assemblage of troops in the northwest provinces.

I have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W. W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, & H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 82.—*Major-General Sir Robert Sale to Major Craigie.*

Jellalabad, December 10, 1841.

SIR,—The enemy have not ventured on even a demonstration towards Jellalabad since the 1st instant.

The hostile chiefs are still at Umr Khail, twelve miles distant, but are said to have few followers, and to be distracted with dissensions among themselves, and between them and the rebel leaders at Cabool. We have received some further account of the affair of the 23rd ultimo. in the environs of that capital. Our ultimate success on that day does not seem doubtful, but our troops met with a check in the first onset, and a gun fell into the hands of the enemy.

Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver, 5th Native Infantry; Captain Mackintosh, of the same corps; and Lieutenant Lang, 27th, were killed: and Captain Walker, Irregular Horse, died of his wounds. On the part of the insur-

gents, Meer Musjeedee, the most influential chief of the Kohistanes, fell; and Abdoollah Khan Achikzie, the assassin of Sir A. Burnes, was wounded.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

No. 83.—*Major Craigie to Mr. Maddock.*

*Delhi, December 24, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor, by direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, copies of dispatches of the 24th ultimo and 10th instant, from Major-General Sir Robert Sale, K.C.B., commanding the force at Jellalabad.

I have also been requested to report, that the troops detailed in the margin\* have been ordered to cross the Punjab towards Peshawur, remaining only two days at Ferozepore after the arrival of Her Majesty's 9th Regiment.

Major-General Boyd, commanding the Sirhind division, has been desired to send forward the 1st Light Cavalry from Kurnaul, to replace the 10th Regiment at Ferozepore.

I have likewise been instructed to add, that Major-General Pollock, C. B., has been ordered to proceed by dawk to Ferozepore, to assume command of the troops moving to Peshawur.

I have, &c.,

P. CRAIGIE.

No. 84.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Delli, December 24, 1841.*

MY LORD,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, this morning, of your Lordship's dispatch of the 15th instant by express.

2. My receipt last night of an express from Mr. Clerk, dated 21st instant, with thirteen inclosures, all of which have been of course communicated by him to Government, removed all remaining doubt as to the propriety of directing Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and the 26th Native Infantry to follow the brigade under Brigadier Wild, which they will accordingly do, early next month.

3. The repeated calls for cavalry, and your Lordship's opinion given in the 2nd paragraph of your dispatch of the 2nd instant, have induced me to order the 10th Cavalry to march with Major-General McCaskill which will, I hope, be approved under the circumstances stated by Mr. Clerk, and quoted in my dispatch to your Lordship in Council, on the 20th instant.

\* 10th Regiment of Light Cavalry; 3 guns of 5th Light Field Battery; Her Majesty's 9th Foot; 26th Regiment Native Infantry; Light Company 6th Native Infantry; 2nd Rissallah, 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

4. In addition to the two 9-pounder guns and 24-pounder howitzer, ordered to move with the Major-General, I beg to apprise your Lordship that five other pieces, indented for by Captain Abbott, will accompany this convoy.

5. In obedience to your Lordship's wishes that Major-General Lumley should be placed in command of the force assembling at Peshawur I requested his attendance at my tent, and placed the dispatch, now acknowledged, in his hands. The General is still very weak, though improved in health; he is willing to proceed, but requested that his medical adviser should be consulted as to his ability to undertake such a service.

Assistant Surgeon Tunner decidedly assured me that his state of health would by no means admit of the required exertion and exposure.

6. In this dilemma, I have ordered Major-General Pollock to proceed by dawk to Ferozepore, and there assume the charge, that is the military command.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 85.—*Mr. Maddock to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, January 3, 1842.*

SIR,—We have received your Excellency's dispatch of the 24th ultimo, and deeply as we regret that the state of Major-General Lumley's health should have deprived the Government of his services, in the important post which we had proposed that he should hold, we are satisfied with the judiciousness of the selection which your Excellency has made for his successor in the person of Major-General Pollock. That officer will be vested with the same Political authority beyond the Indus, which we had designed to confer on Major-General Lumley, and he should be instructed to place himself in direct and confidential communication with Mr. Clerk, as the chief Political authority charged with the control of British interests on our north-west frontier, and in the territories of Lahore.

2. Captain Mackeson and the other subordinate Political Authorities in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, will be apprised of the Major-General's appointment to those duties, and directed to seek their instructions from him from the date of his crossing the Indus, and to keep him fully informed of the state of affairs in that quarter, during his march across the Punjaub.

3. We have resolved to appoint Lieutenant Sir Richmond Shakespear, to hold the office of Secretary to Major-General Pollock, and we trust that the talents of this officer, by which his late services in Central Asia have been distinguished, will prove of much advantage to the Major-General in the field of operations now open to him.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W. W. BIRD, W. CASSEMENT, & H. T. PRINSEP.

No.—86. *Major Craigie to Brigadier Will.**Delhi, December 26, 1841.*

SIR,—On the 11 instant I had the honor to convey to you in dispatch, No. 2,360, the general instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, for your guidance in the important command to which you have been nominated, and I am now required to express the apprehension of his Excellency, that the communication may have miscarried or been delayed in transit, otherwise the receipt of so interesting a paper would at once have been acknowledged; a duplicate of the dispatch has accordingly been prepared, and will be transmitted with the present letter.

I have been instructed to take the present opportunity to apprise you, that Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and the 26th Native Infantry, with the 10th Regiment of Light Cavalry, and half of No. 5 Light Field Battery, have been ordered to march towards Peshawur without any unnecessary delay.

Major-General Pollock, C.B., has been selected for the chief command of the forces, and Captain Ponsonby, now at Peshawur, will be attached to the Major-General, as his Assistant Adjutant-General; you will therefore require that officer to await at Peshawur, Major-General Pollock's arrival.

The infantry of the force will be divided into two brigades. The first brigade, consisting of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and 26th and 53rd Regiments of Native Infantry, will be commanded by Major-General McCaskill. The second brigade will be composed of the 30th, 60th and 64th regiments, and will be under your orders, with Captain Loftie as your Brigade Major.

This distribution of the troops into brigades is not, however, to interfere with your command of the four battalions and details at present in advance, and you will consider the instructions you have received as fully applicable to the present state of affairs, as when they were first prepared.

The Commander-in-Chief has again carefully considered these instructions, and he does not observe that he can improve them.

If you are confident that you can pass through the Khyber Pass with your four corps, it is, his Excellency observes, certainly of importance to show the Affghan nation how speedily (distance considered) we can repair our misfortunes; but you are not unnecessarily to run any very great risk.

You will let the convoy for Jellalabad be as large as considerations of security will warrant, bearing in mind that ammunition is a primary consideration, then treasure, and then food.

Ali Musjid ought to be occupied with three companies of Native Infantry, well provisioned, and with a good store of ammunition; its defences must also be repaired. The remainder of the corps furnishing the garrison, should be posted further in the pass, in some defensible and commanding position; at this season it is hoped that no unhealthiness prevails to prevent this arrangement.

With the four corps of infantry, Captain Ferris's corps of Jezailchees should advance.

If either of the northern passes is attempted, the Commander-in-Chief

desires that the operation may be undertaken by the Sikh troops, keeping the Khyber to our own Native Infantry, and by no means mixing the two forces.

With two established posts in the Khyber, the Commander-in-Chief anticipates no serious difficulty in the advance of the infantry and cavalry under Major-General Pollock.

I have, &c.,

P. CRAIGIE.

No. 87.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General in Council.*

Delhi, December 27, 1841.

MY LORD,—Referring to the 3rd and 4th paragraphs of my letter of the 12th instant, and to instructions sent on the preceding day to Brigadier Wild, I have now the honor to submit a copy of a dispatch addressed yesterday to that officer, which I trust your Lordship in Council will approve.

2. My object is to encourage Brigadier Wild to advance with supplies, treasure, and ammunition, to Jellalabad, if the state of affairs there and in the Khyber Pass seems to promise that it may be done without any great risk. It must have a good effect, even at Cabool, if we can thus promptly replace what we have lost and expended.

3. Regarding the posts to be established in the pass, I can have no doubt as to the firm occupation of Ali Musjid. Military considerations point out Lundikhana as the suitable position on the opposite or western side of the highest portion of the pass; but Brigadier Wild shall be ordered to weigh most carefully all the difficulties and risks by which a detachment placed there may be surrounded before he plans it.

4. If the tribes in the vicinity are resolved to oppose our passage, the four Native Regiments will await the arrival of the third division, but if a junction with Major-General Sir Robert Sale can now be effected, it should not be postponed till February.

5. I am making arrangements for replacing the tents of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and for supplying the Native troops at Jellalabad with the tents now on their way for corps at Cabool, which can be replaced by the February convoy.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 88.—*Major-General Sir Robert Sale to Major Craigie.*

Jellalabad, December 13, 1841.

SIR,—Being doubtful whether the previous cossids have reached Peshawur, and a dawk having been now established along the margin of

the Cabool River, by which three small packets have come safely to this place, I think it advisable to recapitulate, for his Excellency's information, part of the contents of mine of the 10th instant.

Since their defeat on the 1st, the enemy have not ventured on even a demonstration towards Jellalabad. We have received some further accounts of the affair in the environs of Cabool, on the 23rd ultimo. It does not appear doubtful that the ultimate success of the British on that day was decisive; but the troops experienced a check at the first onset, and a gun was captured by the enemy; the loss was heavy on both sides.

On ours, Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver, and Captain Mackintosh, 5th Regiment Native Infantry, and Lieutenant Laing, 27th, were killed; and Captain Walker, 4th Regiment Irregular Cavalry, has died of his wounds. On the part of the insurgents, Meer Musjeeb, the most influential chief in the Kohistan, Abdoolah Khan Achickzye,—the assassin of Sir A. Burnes, and many other men of note and distinction among them, have fallen. Our spies report, that another action was fought at the village of Wuzerabad, near Cabool, on the 4th instant, which terminated most favourably to us; but no communication has reached us on this subject from the Balla Hissar, or the cantonment.

As regards the situation and prospects of the troops at Jellalabad, I must again ask of you to remind his Excellency, that the whole of our camp equipage was destroyed at Gundamuck, and must be supplied again, to enable us to take the field.

Our soldiers are on half rations, and we have provisions at the full rate for six weeks. The troops are healthy, as the accompanying state will show, although they labour six hours daily on the fortifications, and there are not three full reliefs for the guards on the walls. Treasure is urgently required, officers and men being from two to three months in arrears; and our Commissariat's arrangements cramped for want of the means of disbursements. I have mentioned, that I have no official details of the affairs at Cabool; but from all that I can glean of their nature, I conclude that the expenditure of ordnance ammunition, has been very great, and that a large supply, especially of grape and Shrapnell, ought to accompany the reinforcements.

Captain Mackeson informs us, under date the 10th instant, that a Rissalah, in charge of ammunition, was to cross the Attock on that day, and that the 1st brigade of infantry has passed the Jhelum. Whilst on the subject of reinforcement, I would beg to reiterate my recommendation, that a siege train of heavy ordnance be sent here, without which many of the forts of the refractory chiefs cannot be reduced, and that Engineer Officers, capable of conducting the attack of a place, accompany it. At present there is one only at Cabool, who is permanently attached to Shah Shooja.

The regiments of infantry of my brigade urgently require clothing, if not relieved this season. I am given to understand, that a part of that of the 13th was lost some time since, in boats on the Ganges, and the 35th has now in wear its coats of 1838. Both need watch coats.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

No. 89.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General in Council.*

*Camp, one march north of Delhi,  
December 28, 1841.*

MR LORD,—The accompanying dispatch, dated 13th inst., from Major-General Sir Robert Sale, has already been submitted to your Lordship in Council, through the military department; but as Sir Robert has repeated his suggestion that “a siege train of heavy ordnance be sent forward,” without which, “many of the forts of the refractory chiefs cannot be reduced,” I think it necessary to bring this subject to your Lordship's notice.

2. Before we could send this train by Jellalabad, and collect, with extreme difficulty and some risk, the troops which should accompany it, we shall know how Sir William Macnaghten and General Elphinstone have been able to repel or disperse the insurgents. If an amnesty should be granted, we cannot require this great armament. If the rebels are obliged to relinquish their undertaking, and to return home in despair, are we to arouse them again by following them into their valleys and fastnesses?

3. It may be most just and expedient to punish two or three of the greatest traitors, by levelling their stronghold; but war against tribes seems so closely to resemble a resolution to subdue the country again, at whatever cost, that I cannot sanction even preparation for such an object, without your Lordship in Council's express orders.

4. Intimately connected with these repeated suggestions that a heavy train should be sent on, are Captain Macgregor and Captain Mackeson's recommendations, (equally frequent and more urgent,) that 10,000 or 12,000 troops, including three or more European regiments should be sent via the Punjab into Afghanistan.

5. When the corps march next week, the numbers already moving on Peshawur will exceed 7,000 men; and beyond this great reinforcement I shall most unwillingly spare a man from the Sirhind or Meerut Divisions, except for the February convoy.

6. In reply to Mr. Secretary Maddock's dispatch of the 18th instant, I have the honor to state, that the 3rd Native Infantry has been ordered to proceed to Saugor, in order to enable the General Officer commanding there, to relieve the Madras troops at Jabulpore and Husingabad. A regiment will be sent from Benares to Mirzapore, to enable the 3rd to move without any avoidable delay.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 90.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to Sir J. Nicolls.*

*Fort William, January 6, 1842.*

SIR,—We have received your dispatch, dated the 28th ultimo, and have to express our entire concurrence in the resolution of your Excel-



lency, not to comply with that part of Major-General Sale's requisition, which relates to sending a siege train of heavy ordnance to Afghanistan, as this resolution is in perfect accordance with the views of Government, explained to your Excellency in our letter of the 2nd ultimo, as is also the opinion expressed in the 5th paragraph of your letter against sending further reinforcements to Peshawur, beyond the force exceeding 7,000 men, already *en route* to Afghanistan.

2. We entirely approve of the arrangement reported in the last paragraph.

3. We take this opportunity of furnishing your Excellency with a copy of a resolution which has been this day passed, for vesting the Commanding Officers of divisions of the Army employed in Afghanistan, with political authority, independent of the Political Agents and Assistants under the Envoy and Minister, and pointing out the manner in which their correspondence with Government is to be carried on; and we propose, in the course of a few days, to address your Excellency again on the extent to which we desire you to act, without the delay of reference to us, in issuing your own instructions to those officers for the direction of their movements beyond our frontier, and that of Sind and the Punjab.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W.W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, & H.T. PRINSEP.

No. 91.—*Resolution by the Government of India.*

Fort William, January 6, 1842.

In the conduct of military operations at the present crisis in Afghanistan and the adjoining countries, it appears to the Governor-General in Council to be of all things most essential to attend to the expedience, the safety, and the necessity of military movements with reference to military considerations in the first place. These will doubtless always be affected more or less by political circumstances, but they should be under the control of such circumstances no further than commanding officers, responsible for their own military arrangements, and for the honor and success of the troops committed to their charge, may see fitting. His Lordship in Council has come to this resolution in no mistrust of our political officers in that quarter. He is conscious that they are, for the most part, possessed of much talent and information, that they are ever actuated by unbounded zeal in the service of the state, and that they have the means of procuring the best intelligence for the guidance of the military commandants, but in the present circumstances of great military difficulty, and in the absence of all means of receiving orders from Sir W. Macnaghten the constituted representative of Government in that country, his Lordship in Council would throw upon each military commandant a more than usual discretion in whatever may regard military movements, or the safety of the troops, or the defence or abandonment of the positions occupied by our forces.

2. The Generals commanding divisions will not hesitate to give the weight that is due to the advice of the political officers, who will also put them in possession of their instructions, and all their intelligence, and in the absence of any competent political superior they will consider

themselves under the direction of the military commandants, and will address to them all those communications which would have been formerly addressed to the Envoy and Minister.

3. The commanding officers to whom these observations may be fully applicable are, Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar, and Major-General Pollock, proceeding to take the command on the Sikh frontier towards Jellalabad.

4. To these officers instructions will be issued to the above effect, and copies of the resolution will be communicated to the political officers at Peshawur, Jellalabad, and Candahar, with the request of Government, that they will, with their wonted zeal and devotion, render the functions of their respective offices conducive in the fullest manner to the information of the military commanding officers with whom they are to be associated and to the success of all military operations decided on by the military authorities.

5. The above resolution will not extend in the case of Captain Mackeson, Political Agent at Peshawur, to any matters of a military or political nature having relation to the government of Lahore. In all matters involving the interests of that Government, Captain Mackeson will be exclusively under the authority of Mr. Clerk the Agent of the Governor-General on the North-West Frontier.

6. The Political Agent in Sind and Beloochistan is already in direct communication with the Government of India. It is not proposed to make any change in that respect, nor to place Major Outram under the control of the officer commanding the forces in Sind. With that officer he will maintain a close and confidential communication of the orders that he has received from Government, and of the intelligence that reaches him: and in regard to all military operations whatever, Brigadier England will act upon his own discretion, with the same independent power as that conferred on the two officers named above.

7. Major-Generals Nott and Pollock, and Brigadier England, will address the Government of India, in the Secret and Political Department, direct, on all matters of a military and political nature connected with their present commands, and will either forward their dispatches under flying seals to the address of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, or will furnish his Excellency with copies of their dispatches to the Government, according to the circumstances of position of his Excellency's camp, which may render one course or the other most convenient.

8. Copies of this resolution will be communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, the Agent Governor-General on the North-West Frontier, and the Political Agent in Sind and Beloochistan, and extracts, as per margin,\* to the other officers named herein, and a separate letter will be hereafter addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the subject of his Excellency's authority to issue direct orders for the guidance of military operations beyond the Sind and British frontiers.

T. H. MADDOCK.

\* Para. 1, 2, 3, and 7. General Nott.  
 „ 1, 2, 5, & 7, General Pollock.  
 „ 6, and 7, to Brigadier England.

Para. 1 to 5, to Political Agent, Peshawur.  
 „ 1 to 4, ditto Jellalabad,  
 „ 1 to 4, ditto Candahar.

No. 92.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*Fort William, January 22, No. 9, 1842.*

HONOURABLE SIRS,—With reference to our dispatch in this department, under date the 9th instant, per India Steamer, submitting a précis of our latest information regarding the state of affairs in Affghanistan, we have now to communicate, with the deepest regret, the melancholy intelligence, such as it has yet reached us, of the treacherous murder of the Envoy and Minister, Sir William Macnaghten, at a conference to which he was invited, in furtherance of negotiations for the withdrawal of our troops.

2. We pass over the reports of a somewhat improved state of affairs at Cabool, which had reached us at different dates, previously to the receipt of this intelligence. From our dispatch of the 9th instant, your Honorable Committee will be aware of the unsatisfactory accounts which had reached us from Cabool to the 9th of December. From that date to the 25th, we have no letter from any of the British officers, either of the Cabool mission or force; but it appears certain that about the 13th or 15th of December, Sir William Macnaghten judged it necessary to make overtures to the Affghan chiefs in arms against us, on the basis of our evacuation of the positions which we held at the capital. While these overtures were under discussion, supplies were obtained in the cantonment, which gave rise to the more favourable reports that your Honorable Committee will find in letters of different dates from Jellalabad and Peshawur. Mahomed Akhbar Khan, son of Dost Mahomed Khan, who had escaped from confinement at Bokhara, and was proceeding to Cabool, to deliver himself up to the Envoy and Minister, found the insurrection, in full violence on his arrival, and immediately took a prominent part in it. He appears to have been the channel through which Sir William Macnaghten's negotiations for withdrawal were carried on, and was believed in the country to be disposed in some measure to aid our interests. What the motives were, which induced him to take the life of Sir William Macnaghten, by an act which seems to have been one of the most gross and barbarous perfidy, we do not yet know with accuracy, but the fact of the murder is placed beyond doubt, by the brief note of Major Pottinger of December 25th, and by the concurrent tenor of all the reports which have reached Jellalabad. The letter from Cabool of the son of the Governor of Jellalabad to his father of the latter place, of which your Honorable Committee will find a translation appended to Mr. Clerk's dispatch of the 12th instant, gives all the detail of which we are in possession up to this time, respecting this deplorable event.

3. We await further and more accurate reports before we decide on the measures which it may be becoming to pursue in consequence of this bloody outrage; and we must also very anxiously await these reports, that we may learn the fate of the troops which appear to have been reduced to a state of most imminent peril at Cabool. We need not assure your Honourable Committee that, on the first occasion of which circumstances will admit, we will cause the strictest inquiry to be made in regard to the military proceedings of which we are now compelled to anticipate that the result will be so calamitous.

4. It has been our first duty to determine whether further reinforce-

ments ought to be forwarded to strengthen our position on the Afghan frontier, and your Honourable Committee will observe that we have immediately instructed his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to prepare another efficient brigade with cavalry and artillery for an advance to Peshawur, that we have authorized, under the sanction given by the Honourable Court, the raising of another regiment of regular cavalry, and that we have taken measures for adding to the efficiency of the force of artillery in the north-western provinces.

5. It may be satisfactory to your Honourable Committee to be informed that after the march of this further brigade, if it should be ordered to move beyond the Indus, we shall still have an army of fifteen thousand men, (after providing for the security of all stations and cantonments) available for concentration and service on our north-western frontier.

6. We proceed to notice shortly such other papers connected with this subject as may appear to be of prominent interest.

#### PUNJAB AND PESHAWUR.

7. The correspondence here referred to, regards the co-operation of the troops of the Lahore Government. Captain Mackeson writes on the 25th ultimo, that they still showed symptoms of insubordination.

8. In his letter marginally referred to, Captain Mackeson strongly recommended the employment of a body of 700 Patan horsemen, who had last year accompanied our troops through the Khyber Pass. These men seemed willing to serve us, and their example, he observed, might have the effect of shaming the Sikh troops into a proper sense of their duty. He represented, however, that they complained of the non-fulfilment of some promise of extra pay which they alleged to have been made to them on the occasion of their former employment in the Khyber. Mr. Clerk has, as will be seen, authorized Captain Mackeson to fulfil, in so far as the British and Afghan Governments are concerned, any promise of extra pay that may have actually been made to the Sikh troops whilst serving beyond the Khyber last year.

9. We have approved of Mr. Clerk's proceedings on this occasion, and called on Sir C. M. Wade for an explanation of the grounds of the claim to extra batta, while employed in the Khyber, which has been advanced by the Patans.

#### KHYBER.

10. According to our latest information, this pass continued open. Captain Mackeson mentions having paid the Maliks of Khyber 4,000 rupees, on the condition of their dispersing their tribes from Ali Musjid, and keeping the pass quiet, and he also mentions that the Afreedee Maliks had been holding "Jirgha" (council) for several days, and that the result of their deliberations, (previously, however, to the receipt of the latest tidings from Cabool,) had been to keep the pass open, not to molest our convoys or dawks, and to punish the parties who had stopped the dawk some days previously.

11. In a letter dated 3rd instant, Captain Mackeson mentions, that Toorabaz Khan, the friendly Mohumud chief, through whom our communications with Jellalabad had latterly been carried on, apprehended another attack from his rival Saadut Khan, and that he had assisted him with funds for the preservation of his position.

## JELLALABAD.

12. Captain McGregor writes to Captain Mackeson on the 27th ultimo, that they were all continuing to do well at Jellalabad. He has acknowledged the receipt of 25,000 out of the 50,000 rupees sent to him by Captain Mackeson through the agency of Toorabaz Khan, and expected that the balance then at Lalpoora would be sent on as soon as Toorabaz Khan heard of the safe arrival of the first consignment.

## REINFORCEMENTS.

13. With advertence to paragraph 33 of our letter No. 2, we beg to transmit, as a number of the packet, the accompanying copy of the Commander-in-Chief's further instructions to Brigadier Wild, authorizing him to entertain a body of Jezailchces for service in the Khyber.

14. The documents here referred to, regard the deputation of Captain Lawrence to act in conjunction with Brigadier Wild and Captain Mackeson in Peshawur, and the orders issued by the Lahore Durbar to its officers in Peshawur, to co-operate with our troops. In these will be found stated the dates on which the 30th, 53rd, 60th, and 64th Regiments of Native Infantry reach Peshawur.

15. On the 3rd January, Captain Mackeson reported that the four corps of Native Infantry were then encamped within one march of Ali Musjid. He said they had four guns made over to us by the Sikh authorities in camp, and he was in hopes that 700 Patan horsemen in the service of the Sikhs would be ready to accompany them next day.

16. Orders, it appeared, continued to reach General Avitabile for the advance into Khyber of the Mussulman auxiliaries, in support of our troops; but it was supposed that they would not be able, owing to the want of pay, and the defectiveness of the arrangements for obtaining supplies, to advance beyond Ali Musjid. Mehte Singh, with four Sikh battalions, was reported to have arrived at Attock, and Keishree Singh, with troops from Lahore, at Vazecrabad, on his way to Peshawur.

17. On the 8th instant Mr. Clerk reported that the brigade under Major-General McCaskill, K.C.H., composed as below, crossed the Sutlej, on the 4th idem, at Ferozepore, in progress to Affghanistan:—

	Officers.	Soldiers.	Syces and Grass Cutters.	Followers.	Horses.	Tattoos.	Camels.	Hackeries.
Her Majesty's 9th Foot . . .	35	834	50	500	50	50	470	..
Detachment, recruits of Her Majesty's 44th Foot. . . .	10	235	...	276	30	..	200	..
10th Regiment Lt. Cav. . . .	16	493	587	800	530	160	300	1
Detachment, 3d Irregular Cav. .	1	200	200	150	279	100	40	2
26th Regiment Nat. Inf. . . .	19	1,011	...	570	30	30	420	..
Detachment, 60th Nat. Inf. . .	11	146	24	88	11	30	80	..
Commissariat Stores . . . .	...	...	...	1,100	...	...	2,000	..
Ordnance Stores . . . . .	...	...	...	100	...	...	116	2
Det. 2d Comy. 2d Bat. Artillery	1	115	4	30	3	..	22	...
Total . . . .	91	3,034	365	3,614	953	370	3,648	5

18. In our communication to the Commander-in-Chief, consequent on the receipt of Mr. Clerk's dispatch of the 12th instant, your Honourable Committee will see that we have recommended his Excellency to summon Mr. Clerk to his head-quarters, for the convenience of immediate reference to him on the existing exigency of affairs, as we consider that gentleman's opinions on the disposition and probable proceedings of the Sikh Durbar to be entitled to the greatest weight.

#### CANDAHAR.

19. We have received no authentic intelligence from Candahar since the date of our last report of the 9th instant, per "India" steamer. Owing to the reports of a hostile feeling against us having arisen on the part of some of the tribes, between Candahar and Killah Abdoollah, it had been deemed prudent, by our authorities at Quetta, to withdraw our detachment from that post; this detachment accordingly reached Quetta on the 21st ultimo, with loss of only five stragglers, and the private property of the officers, which had been voluntarily left behind them, for the purpose of saving ammunition and public stores. Reports were current of an intended attack upon Quetta, but that place, with a reinforcement of 100 men of Her Majesty's 41st Foot, and a wing of a regiment of Native Infantry, was believed to be quite safe against any force the insurgents could bring against it. It was subsequently stated that the intention to attack Quetta had been for the time abandoned by the rebels, and the leader of the force, destined for that purpose, recalled to Cabool. Major Outram appeared to place confidence in the fidelity of the Murrees and Kakurs to their late engagements, and thought that they had refused to listen to the seditious overtures of the traitor Naib of Shawl.

20. Up to the date of our latest information tranquillity prevailed in Sinde and Beloochistan, and though Major Outram appeared to omit no measure of precaution, he did not seem to apprehend any disturbance within the sphere of his jurisdiction; but your Honourable Committee will be in possession of later intelligence from this quarter, direct through Bombay, than any that we can furnish from hence.

#### DOST MAHOMED KHAN.

21. On the receipt of authentic intelligence of Mahomed Akbar Khan's having assassinated Sir William Macnaghten, Mr. Clerk directed Captain Nicolson to make Dost Mahomed a close prisoner, preventing all communication with him or his retinue by Affghans or Hindoostances, except with his, Captain Nicolson's, permission. Further, giving him authority to increase the guard over the Ex-Ameer's camp.

22. We have approved of Mr. Clerk's proceedings, and intimated an opinion that similar precautions should be taken to ensure the safe custody of all members of the Ameer's family now in Hindoostan; but that no severity of treatment should be practised, beyond what may be required for such custody, and if the Ameer should particularly desire to have one or two members of his family brought from Loodiana, to reside with him, the indulgence, under the precautions indispensable to prevent escape, may be granted to him.

## POLITICAL.

23. In his letter to Mr. Clerk, dated 25th December, Captain Mackeson entered into some speculation respecting the course of policy to be pursued with reference to the present posture of our affairs to the westward of the Indus, and the possibility of our hold on the city of Cabool itself being for the present entirely lost. The only portion of his suggestions which we have noticed, is that which relates to our endeavouring to obtain the cession of Peshawur from the Lahore Government. Your Honorable Committee will perceive, from our instructions to Mr. Clerk, which formed Inclosure No. 8 of our Letter No. 2, that Captain Mackeson has been strictly enjoined to avoid any agitation of this subject, the prosecution of which is wholly foreign from our views alike of justice and expediency.

24. For other particulars, in connection with the subjects adverted to in this letter, we would beg to refer your Honorable Committee to the news letters by this mail.

25. The Lahore intelligence papers your Honorable Committee will receive to a later date, direct through Mr. Clerk.

26. We have but to add with reference to our intimation in our dispatch of 22nd December, 1841, respecting the sending some reinforcements of European regiments to India, that it is of urgent importance, with reference to the season for marching and military operations, that such reinforcement should reach this country at least by the middle of October next. We think it right to notice this circumstance, although we are sensible that considerations of this nature will be fully weighed by your Honorable Committee.

We have, &c.

AUCKLAND, W.W BIRD, W. CASEMENT, & H.T. PRINSEP.

No. 93.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.*

*January 2, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit copies of three letters to my address from Captain Mackeson, dated the 25th and 26th ultimo, forwarding copies of letters addressed to him by Captain Macgregor, on the 20th and 22nd ultimo.

2. Captain Mackeson appears to think that much good may result from the presence of a second brigade and artillery, in addition to the reinforcements which have already reached Peshawur. It is needless to say that I fully concur in that opinion, for it was my conviction from the first, of the advantages to be derived from our appearing, as early as possible after the insurrection, in considerable strength at Peshawur, for the relief of Jellalabad, if not of Cabool, that induced me to request the Major-General commanding this division to expedite the departure of a troop of horse artillery and a second brigade of infantry.

3. Of the events on which Captain Mackeson speculates in his official letter to me of the 25th ultimo, that of a capitulation seems by the last account received from Cabool, the most likely to occur. Should this take place, it is to be hoped that, as Captain Mackeson anticipates, the

British Government may be absolved from the disadvantageous and humiliating consequences of such a capitulation by the Affghans violating its terms.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK.

No. 94.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, January 10, 1842.*

SIR,—In reply to your Excellency's despatches of the 27th ultimo, we have only to express our entire approbation of the instructions addressed to Brigadier Wild, and our concurrence with your Excellency in the great political benefit which may be expected from an early passage of our troops through the Khyber Pass, and the reinforcement of Jellalabad.

2. Captain Mackeson, and the other local officers who have been employed in the pass, will be able to afford to Brigadier Wild the fullest and most correct information of the advantages, or otherwise, of the different posts which it may be resolved to occupy.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W.W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, & H.T. PRINSEP.

No. 95.—*Major Craigie to Brigadier Wild.*

*Camp, Burki-Chokie, December 30, 1841.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to request that you will consider whether, for the advance through the Khyber Pass, or for the subsequent security of it, it may be advantageous to employ a body of Jezailchees, of the Eusofzye, or other tribe, which may be depended upon.

If so, you are authorized to entertain a body of 300 of those men for these services, consulting Captain Mackeson as to the conditions of service, suitable method of treatment, and rates of pay.

It is considered by Government that the weapon wielded by the Affghan soldiery would be of great value, in aid of the ordinary arms of our troops, in all the operations in mountain defiles.

If Captain Ferris has been entertaining men for his corps, and can afford such a detachment, or join you himself, it seems to his Excellency desirable that either should be done. Should you, however, raise men independently of his corps, you must carefully select an officer or two to superintend and command them.

I have, &c.,

P. CRAIGIE.



No. 96.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Paniput, January 1, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the dispatch addressed to me by your Lordship in Council, on the 20th ultimo, and to express the great satisfaction which I have felt on receiving your Lordship's approval of the instructions issued to Brigadier Wild on the 11th December.

2. Respecting cavalry, I trust that the three rissalahs attending the two first detachments will be sufficient for an early passage of the Khyber Pass. If delay be necessary, the 10th Cavalry will have joined.

3. I have the honor to inclose a copy of a letter addressed to Brigadier Wild, on the 30th ultimo, regarding the employment of a body of Jezailchees, which I hope will meet with your Lordship's approbation.

4. I beg to report that, in conformity with the suggestion contained in the 8th paragraph of your Lordship's dispatch, I have directed Her Majesty's 39th Regiment to march, *viâ* Gwalior, to Agra.

5. Captain Taylor's levy has been ordered to remain at Cawnpore till further orders.

I have &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 97.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, December 17, 1842.*

SIR,—We entirely approve of the measures reported to have been adopted in your Excellency's letter of the 1st instant, and of the instructions issued to Brigadier Wild, authorizing him to entertain a body of Jezailchees.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W.W BIRD, W. CASEMENT, H.T. PRINSEP.

No. 98.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major-General Lumley.*

*Jellalabad, December 26, 1841.*

SIR,—In consequence of Brevet-Captain Gerrard having been severely wounded here on the 14th ultimo, I have only to-day received from him a report of the part borne by his detachment in the transactions attending the destruction of the fort of the Urz Beggee, in the fastnesses of the Mamoo Khail, and the subsequent retreat of the irregulars from Gundamuck. I have now the honor to forward that communication, together with a similar one from Captain Burn, commanding the Khyberee Rangers. I beg to add, that I feel greatly indebted to Captain Gerrard and the troops under his command for their conduct on that occasion, and the manner in which the demolition of the castle of the refractory chief was effected, and the men of Shah Sooja's corps of Sappers and

Miners were afterwards withdrawn, appears to me to afford evidence of no ordinary skill, perseverance, and resolution on the part of Lieutenant Cunningham, in charge of the last-mentioned party.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

No. 99.—*Captain Gerrard to Captain Waile.*

*Jellalabad, December 26, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to state, for the information of the Major-General commanding, that, on the morning of the 11th ultimo, I was joined by a detachment of the Sappers and Miners, Shah Shooja's force, and of the 2nd Cavalry, Shah Shooja's force, under the command of Lieutenant Cunningham, with official instructions to destroy the bastions of the Fort of Mamoo Khail. The parties of the Sappers were immediately set to work, and everything was progressing well and quietly, when about ten o'clock I was informed that two houses (one in the larger and one in the smaller fort) were on fire. Flames and smoke filled the place, and the powder and working parties were withdrawn with considerable difficulty. Whilst we were engaged in this a smart firing was heard in our rear, and I was made aware by a party (which I had posted for the purpose) that the enemy were coming down upon us. The assembly was immediately sounded; No. 1 company was thrown to the rear in skirmishing order; No. 2, amongst the trees on the bank of the ravine; No. 3, left in parties of a naik and five, along the walls and bastions, with a strong party at the gateway, to enable us to enter should our skirmishers be beaten back. Lieutenant Cunningham now made an opening in the wall of the vineyard, and set parties to work to drive horizontal shafts from the outside into the centre of the bastions, whilst I joined the skirmishers, and kept down the fire of my men as much as possible: I remained with this party for some time, and on returning to the gateway was informed by Lieutenant Cunningham that, from the nature of the materials, it was a work of great difficulty to mine from the outside, but that as the wind appeared to blow steadily from the westward, he was of opinion that the flames and smoke must have abated sufficiently to enable him to recommence his work from the inside, in the windward bastions. This, he informed me, would completely destroy the strength of the fort on that side. I again returned to my skirmishers, and, to my surprise, found them between two and three miles from the fort. I inquired the reason, and was told that a company of the Khyber corps was advancing along the opposite bank of the ravine, and that my men had moved forward to cover them. The Khyberees opened a fire upon the enemy, drove a few men behind a small fort, and took possession of it. They had not been in it five minutes when a party of about 150 men rushed down upon them, and drove them in disorder to my side of the ravine. Just as this occurred I received a message from Lieutenant Cunningham, to say that the mines were ready, and that Lieutenant Dowson had come down to our assistance with a party of Jan-Baz. I retired quietly and steadily upon

the fort, and gave directions to Hyder Ali Khan (the native commandant) that the instant the skirmishers came under the fire of the men on the walls they were to close up by the right of the fort, and form in front of the gate. The other company retired by the left, and were halted, to keep back the enemy till arrangements were made to move on Gundamuck. It is with great regret I have now to state, that my men could not get space to form up, on account of the Khyberees becoming completely intermixed with the detachment. The Khyberees at once commenced walking hurriedly, and in confusion, towards Gundamuck. The mines exploded without accident, and ruined the two bastions to their foundations. It was here that I first met Lieutenant Dowson, who reported to me that he had brought 150 Jan-Baz to my aid, and that 50 of them had been posted to secure our retreat through the village. The fire at this time having become exceedingly heavy, the Kyberees fairly broke and ran, throwing all into confusion in their progress. The utmost exertions of Lieutenant Dowson and Cunningham, of Hyder Ali Khan, and myself, to get a party to face the enemy, were altogether ineffectual. The confusion increased every moment, and all our endeavours to carry off the magazine, and bring off the dead and wounded, were fruitless; order could not be restored till having got clear of the village (from which I need not say the Jan-Baz had long before moved away), and the steps of cultivation, I called upon the party of the 2nd Cavalry to charge the enemy. The rissalah immediately halted, and faced about, whilst the Jezailchees and Sappers at once rallied, and formed up in good order to their support. At this juncture not a single man of the Khyberees or Jan-Baz was to be seen. The cavalry charged home with me in the most gallant manner, and killed a few of the enemy, the remainder taking themselves to the village and ravines. From the moment that we moved out of the fort the firing upon us had been incessant, and almost entirely from invisible enemies; but this sudden and unexpected attack put a stop to the pursuit, and we were allowed to join Captain Burn without another assault being made upon us. The rest of the events of this day have been reported to the Major-General by Captain Burn.

To Lieutenants Dowson and Cunningham my best thanks are due, for their great exertions on this occasion. I also beg to bring to the notice of the Major-General the exemplary conduct of Hyder Ali Khan, the native commandant of the Jezailchees, and of Jawahis Sing, the Rissaldar of the 2nd Cavalry, Shah Shooja's force. To Lieutenant Cunningham, and his small party of Sappers, the highest praise is due for the effectual manner in which the fort was dismantled under such trying circumstances, and amidst so many obstacles; and to the men of the Jezailchees, for the gallant manner in which they sustained the attacks of the enemy for so many hours.

I have, &c.,

J. G. GERRARD.

*Return of killed, wounded, and missing in the detachment of  
Shah Shooja's Force, under the command of Captain Gerrard,  
Shah Shooja's Force.*

*Jellalabad, December 26, 1841.*

	2nd Cavalry, Shah Shooja's Force.				Sappers and Miners.			Jezailchees.					Khyber- rics.		
	Duffadars.	Sawars.	Total.	Horses.	Naiques.	Privates.	Total.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Naiques.	Privates.	Khalassies.	Total.	Naiques.	Privates.
Killed	..	7	7	11	1	..	1	..	1	1	17	1	20	..	10
Wounded	1	10	11	4	..	1	1	1	3	..	11	..	15	..	9

{ Killed :—1 Havildar, 2 Naiques, 34 Privates, 1 Khalassie, and 11 Horses.  
 TOTAL { Wounded :—1 Jemadar, 1 Duffadar, 3 Havildars, 36 Privates, and 4 Horses.

JOHN GRANT GERRARD, *Captain.*

No. 100.—*Captain Burn to Captain Wade.*

*Jellalabad, November 13, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of Major-General Sir R. Sale, K. C. B., commanding, the circumstances under which I was compelled to abandon the post of Gundamuck, on the afternoon of the 11th instant.

The Major-General is aware that the force left under my command consisted of the 3rd Regiment of Jan-Baz, the Khyber Rangers, and two 6-pounders, manned by the Shah's artillery men (Hindoostanees). This force was to be reinforced by a party of 200 of the Jezailchee Regiment, under Captain Gerrard, after the destruction of Meer Ufzul Khan's fort in Mamoo Khail.

Previous to the march of the troops under Sir R. Sale from Gundamuck, on the forenoon of the 11th, doubts were entertained of the fidelity of the men of the Jan-Baz Regiment, and those of the Khyber Rangers were not altogether without suspicion. These doubts were very soon verified by the desertions of the whole of the Jan-Baz and a very large portion of the Khyber Rangers. The desertion of the former was, I think, precipitated, and fortunately so, by my ordering a party of them, under Lieutenant Dowson, to Captain Gerrard's assistance in Mamoo Khail, he having been hotly attacked by the Kohgeenes in the neighbourhood of Meer Ufzul Khan's fort; so soon as the forces under the Major-General moved from Gundamuck, and while the destruction of the fort was still in progress. The Jan-Baz made a show of accompanying Lieu-

tenant Dowson to Mamoo Khail, but only to desert him, which they did to a man, and followed those who had remained with me towards Tootur, which lies on one of the roads leading to Cabool.

I detached with the Jan-Baz one company of the Khyber Rangers, with orders to push on and join Captain Gerrard in Mamoo Khail, and sent a second company half-way to Mamoo Khail, to act as a support. This second company returned without orders about 4 p.m., and shortly afterwards deserted, having plundered a portion of the baggage which was left in my charge on the march of the brigade from Gundamuck. The remainder of the men of the Khyber Rangers were extremely anxious to move off, and I perceived the hopelessness of any attempt to control them, and that our only chance of escape was in following where they led; we accordingly moved off with the guns, keeping as many of the men of the Khyber Rangers with them as possible, and as our progress was slow, the guns being drawn by bullocks, time was allowed for Captain Gerrard's party to join us, which they did about a mile off the cantonments.

Captain Gerrard's little band, consisting of a small party of the Shali's Sappers and Miners, a few of Captain Anderson's Horse, and the Jezailchees, formed our rear-guard, and to them we owe our safe escape from Gundamuck. We retreated without molestation, excepting in coming through the pass on the north side of the Neeemla Valley, where a few shots were fired at us; but, notwithstanding the absence of all opposition on the part of the enemy, I regret to report that I was forced to abandon both my guns. The wheels of one of them got locked amongst large stones in the first nullah we had to cross after leaving Gundamuck, and there I had to spike and abandon it. The second we brought as far as the brigade to the east of Gundamuck, but it, too, we were forced to abandon. The remainder of our march to Futtelhabad, where we joined the Major-General, was unattended with any circumstances deserving of notice. Of the Khyber Rangers not more than 250 marched into Futtelhabad with us, the remainder having taken the road to Kaja with the Jemadar who deserted.

I shall leave it to Captain Gerrard to detail his own operations in Mamoo Khail, and shall only remark that the manner in which he brought off his small detachment, ably assisted by Lieutenant Cunningham, of the Sappers and Miners, is deserving of the Major-General's highest praise. The conduct of their men, while under my eyes, was exemplary, in the extreme, not a murmur escaped them, but each did his duty cheerfully. The Hindoostan portion of the detachment, the Major-General is aware, was under arms from daylight in the morning till twelve at night, when we reached Futtelhabad, and, during a considerable part of that period, were warmly engaged with the enemy.

Captain Gerrard's loss, he will himself report; that of the company I detached to his assistance I am unable to state correctly, a number of the men having been reported missing on its return; but the Jemadar commanding informs me he lost ten killed and nine wounded, four of the latter he brought back with him, the rest were unable to get away.

I have, &c.,

H. W. BURN.

No. 101.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to the Officer Commanding at Peshawur.*

*Jellalabad, December 26, 1841.*

SIR,—I beg to forward to you copy of a communication from his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, date Mynporee, 27th ultimo, and have to direct therefore, that as soon as four native regiments shall be united at Peshawur, they may be moved forward to Jellalabad without a moment's delay. I have to request that you will for this purpose put yourself immediately in communication with Captain Mackeson, Political Agent, and avail yourself of his counsel, information, and aid, in organizing the means of this movement.

Should an officer senior to yourself be proceeding with the two regiments, which are to be expected to arrive at Peshawur after your own, you will be pleased to hand this over to him on his joining you, and in the mean time to send him a copy of it, and make him acquainted with the nature and state of the preparation for his immediate advance.

I have made known to the Political Agent by this day's dawk, the circumstance of these instructions having been sent to you, and I desire you distinctly to understand, that I regard it as a matter of the utmost moment as respects British interests in Affghanistan, that four native regiments should make their appearance, with the least possible delay, under the walls of this place.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

P. S.—You will be pleased to acknowledge the receipt of this communication by return of dawk, and at the same time inform me what steps you are taking.

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No. 102.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major Craigie.*

*Jellalabad, December 26, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to acknowledge the receipt, this day, of your letters of the 27th and 28th ultimo, and have immediately dispatched instructions to the senior officer commanding the British troops at Peshawur, to lose no time in joining me here (as soon as the first four regiments of Native Infantry are united), in communication with the Political Agent, as the presence of any reinforcements here will enable me to keep the neighbouring tribes quiet, and will, I hope, act as a powerful diversion in favor of our interests at Cabool.

I regret that I cannot furnish his Excellency with any authentic accounts of our situation at the capital, since my letter of the 19th instant, to his address. Native reports all indicate that some cessation of hostilities has taken place, but the exact nature of it is doubtful; no two accounts agreeing.

I have experienced no interruption since the 1st instant, and our fortifications are advancing rapidly. The hostile chiefs, I am informed, with their followers, are in the neighbourhood of Bala Bagh.

I have, &c.

R. SALE.

No. 103.—*Brigadier Wild to Major Craigie.**Camp, Peshawur, December 27, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to apprise you with my having joined here, this morning, the advanced portion of the troops under my command.

The first thing I found it necessary to do on arrival, was to shift the encampment, for which purpose I went, accompanied by General Avitabile, and Captain Mackeson, to select a spot on the west side of the town, in the direction of the Khyber Pass.

The last intelligence from Cabool, formed on native reports, is so uncertain and contradictory that nothing can be made out of it. Some allude to a capitulation ; others to a decisive victory on our part obtained on the 13th instant.

Some of the field pieces expected to have been obtained from General Avitabile, as a loan to us, on the part of the Lahore Government, proceed to-morrow under Sikh troops to Jamrood, their last frontier post towards Ali Musjid ; but it seems very doubtful whether we shall be able to obtain the use of them ; such is yet the insubordinate state of the Sikh troops, that although the officers will order their delivery, it is by no means certain, whether the men will comply, and the officers dare not enforce their orders. At the same time it is Captain Mackeson's opinion, that although the Khyber Pass might be gone through in safety, one corps to keep open the communication in the rear, if the Afreedees and Simonees were inclined to hostilities, would be inadequate ; whilst it would not be safe, after having gone through the Pass, and arrived on the plain in the neighbourhood of Lalpoora, to proceed onwards without guns to Jellalabad. Captain Mackeson is now in treaty with certain of the chiefs, and entertains hopes of obtaining hostages from them, their answer is shortly expected ; and in the mean time the rear detachment will also have arrived here, viz., on the 31st instant.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 104.—*Brigadier Wild to the Brigade-Major of Major-General Sale's Force.**Peshawur, December 27, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to state, for the information of Sir R. Sale, that I joined here to-day the advanced detachment of the troops under my command, consisting of two regiments of Native Infantry, a company of artillery, (without guns,) a company of Sappers and Miners, and a troop of Irregular Cavalry.

The rear detachment consisting of two regiments of Native Infantry, which I left on the 21st, will arrive here on the 31st instant. The Political Agent here has not yet succeeded in obtaining in a way that can be relied on, the assistance of field pieces, which were expected to be lent by the Lahore Government, and without which he considers no attempt to proceed beyond Lalpoora ought to be made.

May I request to be favored with Sir R. Sale's orders and sentiments, grounded, as they no doubt will be, on the best intelligence received from Cabool, which seems so uncertain, and in many instances contradictory, that one does not know what to make of it. The difficulty of communicating with Jellalabad, will plead my excuse for sending a letter of this size and shape.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 105.—*Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.*

*Peshawur, December 29, 1841.*

SIR,—I beg to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that since the letter which I had the honor to address to you the day before yesterday, on which I arrived here, no news of any importance has been received, and I regret to say, that no further progress has yet been made in obtaining guns from General Avitabile, who, on the most pressing remonstrance made to him by Captain Mackeson to-day, said he could not give them up without an express permission from the Lahore Government, having but nine pieces altogether, and that if he were required to keep a communication in our rear hereafter, he would be obliged to plead his inability to do so, for want of guns that had been lent us. He, however, agreed at last to refer the case to Raja Golab Sing, at Hazara, by letter to-day; and Captain Mackeson has addressed another letter to the Raja to the same effect; but it will take four days ere an answer be obtained.

Grain and some treasure have been sent on by Captain Mackeson to Lalpoora, which they reached in safety; but its friendly chief appears to be under some apprehension for the safety of his charge, and to be destitute of means to forward on the treasure to Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 106.—*Brigade-Major Wade to the Officer Commanding at Peshawur.*

*Jellalabad, December 29, 1841.*

SIR,—I am directed by Major-General Sir Robert Sale to furnish you with the accompanying copy of a letter this day addressed to Captain Mackeson, Political Agent at Peshawur, for your information.

I am further requested to add, that it is the Major-General's wish that the Irregular Cavalry, and the other detachments from India, should accompany the advance of the four regiments, Native Infantry to this place.

I have, &c.,

H. WADE.



No. 107.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to the Political Agent at Peshawur.*

*Jellalabad, December 29, 1841.*

SIR,—I have already made known to you my desire that as soon as four regiments Native Infantry are united at Peshawur, they should advance without delay upon this place. I have now to mention that if it should happen that the corps are unprovided with sufficient artillery, I should feel obliged if you would use your utmost influence with the Sikh Authorities to obtain from them a complete battery, of at least six pieces, with a full proportion of ammunition, to accompany them here. These guns can be sent back to Peshawur with the first British troops that return to our provinces. I have sent instructions to the senior officer, to the effect that any detachment of Irregular Cavalry which may have come up should also march with the Infantry.

As you possess an intimate knowledge of the whole line of the Khyber Pass, I rely upon your zeal and intelligence to give the most detailed and accurate information on the subject to the officer who may proceed in command of the troops, especially as to the points at which he may expect attack from the Ooloos, and the means of guarding against it.

We trust you will be able to send us treasure by this opportunity, and shall be happy to be supplied with attah to the utmost extent to which you can procure it up to the time when the troops march, as we have not been able to store our magazine in a manner adequate to the wants of a place and garrison of such magnitude.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

No.—108. *Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.*

*Peshawur, December 30, 1841.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the rear detachment of the force under my command reached Peshawur to-day, where I propose to allow it a few day's halt before its long march, but as in consequence of intelligence received last night from Ali Musjid, Captain Mackeson is desirous that some part of the force should occupy a position in advance of the city, I have directed the first convoy to move on to Kowulsur, to-morrow morning, a distance of about seven miles.

Last night, too, I was informed by General Avitabile that a mutinous spirit had shown itself among his artillery men, in consequence of his artillery officers having closely examined a couple of guns that were about to be ceded to us, with a view to put them in an efficient state of repair for the march, and that the Sikh artillery men positively refused to let them be removed. It is still hoped, however, that after this force shall have proceeded on to Jamrood, the Sikhs may be persuaded to allow the two field pieces to follow and be made over to us.

I cannot express how much I lament that no artillery of our own should have been allowed to accompany or at least to follow me, and to find ourselves reduced to sue, perhaps in vain, for the assistance of two

paltry field pieces. Had a troop of horse artillery been present, this force would have been in an efficient state for an immediate advance, whilst now it may not take place without imminent hazard. If I wait for the arrival of artillery from the rear, an irreparable loss of time may take place, and in the mean time the ardour of the troops, which are now in high and excellent spirits, may also cool down.

Captain Mackeson received a letter yesterday from Captain McGregor, at Jellalabad, telling him that all was quiet that they had not had any later accounts from the Envoy at Cabool that the 9th instant, but that native intelligence had been received of a peace having been concluded between Sir William Macnaghten and the Affghan tribes, and that provisions again found their way into cantonments.

Captain Macgregor also gave the pleasing information that 25,000 rupees, being one half of the treasure sent by Captain Mackeson through the Tatar Pass to Lalpoora along with grain, has reached him ; and that he hoped the chief of that place, when he should hear of the arrival of the first invoice, would also find means to forward the remainder.

The negotiations with the Afreedee chiefs appear to proceed in a slow and doubtful manner, and the Sikh troops promise by no means a cordial co-operation as far as my information goes.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

P.S.—I am sorry to add that a heavy and lasting rain appears to have set in.

No. 109.—*Major-General Lumley to Brigadier Wild.*

*Kurnaul, January 11, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to acknowledge your letters of the 27th, 29th, and 31st December.

His Excellency is happy to learn that the troops have arrived in good order and good spirits at Peshawur.

He is very sorry to find that our Sikh allies have demurred so long in providing four or six pieces of artillery for your use : his intelligence of the 2nd January, received through Mr. Clerk, leads him to hope that, the perwannah from Lahore and the orders of Rajah Golab Sing having arrived, the difficulties will be removed. Should this not be the case, you are carefully to act on the fifth article of your instructions.

The Commander-in-Chief considers Jellalabad to be in a state of security, and also that affairs at Cabool are much improved, by a supply of provisions having been obtained. There is no very pressing urgency for an advance attended with heavy risk ; for the practicability of relieving Cabool for two months and a half, is more than doubted.

His Excellency scarcely thinks it necessary to warn you of the propriety of keeping our troops separate from the Sikhs, which, as they are not inclined to advance, may not be difficult. The warning, however, may be useful ; for, when troops show an insubordinate spirit, they are inclined to involve the loyal and well-disposed in a participation of their crime.

The good feeling of the native regiments under your orders is not the least doubted ; but the Sikhs may be inclined to taunt or upbraid them and to provoke dissensions.

The third division crossed into the Punjab on the 4th instant.

I have, &c.

J. R. LUMLEY.

No. 110.—*Brigadier Wild to Major-General Sir R. Sale.*

*Peshawur, January 2, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 26th ultimo, on my way to the Political Agent, Captain Mackeson's, about an hour ago, half past one P.M., and beg to assure you that nothing coincides more with my anxious desires than to comply with your wish that I should move on towards Jellalabad without delay ; but this under the terms of the instructions, sent to me by the Adjutant-General of the Army, under date the 11th ultimo, which he informs me have also been communicated to you, I do not find it safe to undertake, without the presence of some artillery, in the present excited state of the Afreedi and Shinwari tribes.

No one can lament more sincerely than I do that the troop of horse artillery that was to have followed closely the rear detachment of the force under my command, should have been detained at Ferozepore, when almost in the act of crossing the Sutlej. Had it been present, I should have felt myself in an efficient state to advance, the moment Captain Mackeson's negotiations, which are still in progress with certain Afreedi chiefs, should have been concluded.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief adverted to an expectation entertained that General Avitabile, on the part of the Lahore Government, would be able to lend our Government four or six field-pieces : he has only nine altogether, and it appears that the insubordinate Sikh soldiery (artillery), are much inclined to prevent the removal of their guns, and that the only hope of our getting possession of two or perhaps four very indifferent field-pieces, is that they may follow us after our removal to Kalsar, which is half way between this place and Jumrood, and where the whole brigade will be encamped to-morrow.

You are no doubt aware that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has invested me with discretionary power to advance or not, according to circumstances.

The 10th Regiment of Light Cavalry, Her Majesty's 9th Regiment of Foot, and the 26th Regiment of Native Infantry, together with a camel battery and some other guns, as also some troops of Irregular Cavalry, were, it is understood, to have crossed the Sutlej on the 1st instant, but no certain accounts on the subject have yet been received.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 111.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to the Officer Commanding at Peshawur.*

Jellalabad, January 3, 1842.

SIR,—I have to direct that you will, on receipt of this, hasten on as much as possible your march on this place, circumstances urgently requiring the immediate presence here of the four Native regiments, and the other troops under your command.

This is sent by cossid ; and you will be pleased to acknowledge the receipt of it without delay.

I desire you distinctly to understand that it is of vital importance to our interests in this country that you should appear under these walls immediately.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

No. 112.—*Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.*

Peshawur, January 3, 1842.

SIR,—I have the honor to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the whole of the troops under my command will, in the course of the day, be encamped at Kowulsur, about seven miles in advance of the town, towards the Khyber Pass.

Captain Mackeson, the Political Agent, expects to hold a conference with some Afreedce Chiefs near Jumrood, to-day, when it will be ascertained how far it may be safe to attempt an advance, for which Major-General Sale appears extremely anxious, though he recommends that it should not be ventured on, without six field-pieces and some cavalry.

I hope four field-pieces are now in the course of being delivered over to Captain Mackeson, in consequence of a favorable answer having last night been received to the reference which, in a former letter I had the honor to mention, had been made to Raja Golab Sing.

Yesterday, also, native accounts were transmitted by Captain McGregor, Political Agent, at Jellalabad, to which some credence appears to be given, (in the absence of all official communication from the Envoy himself), that Shah Shooja had been playing a double part with his friends and our Government, and had been the secret instigator of much of the misfortunes that had befallen our arms at Cabool ; but that a change had taken place, that the Barukzai Chiefs, headed by Mahomed Akbar Khan, had concluded a peace with the Envoy ; that provisions were freely imported into his cantonment, to which all the British troops had retired from the Bala Hissar ; that the Barukzai and other chiefs had offered Shah Shooja a lac of rupees, if he would retire to any place most agreeable to himself, to which, however, he returned a decided negative, and said that he would assert his right to the crown to the last. It is impossible to say what part of this intelligence is true or not, but there is little doubt that a favorable turn to our interests at Cabool has taken place.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 113.—*Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.*

Camp, Kowulsur, January 6, 1842.

SIR,—My camp being at the distance of eight or nine miles from the Political Agent's residence, I had no definite information to communicate yesterday, which will, I trust, serve as my apology for not having done myself the honor of addressing you then, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Captain Mackeson succeeded in obtaining, on the 3rd instant, four field-pieces with a complement of horses, from General Avitabile, though not without a disposition to interrupt their progress by the Sikh soldiery, who were seen collecting and consulting together as the guns went past their cantonment; but it so happened that the 30th and 53rd Regiments came up at that time, on their way to this camp, from the ground they left at Peshawur, so the artillery fell in a-head of the column, and no hindrance was offered.

On the following day, the guns being tested, the limber of one of them gave way, so as to be required to be renewed. The repairs are now in progress, and will be completed in two or three days.

The hired Rewaree camels have given the greatest possible annoyance since the troops arrived here; the Sarwans declaring that neither threats or money would induce them to proceed onwards to Jellalabad, though Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, the Deputy-Commissary-General, had intimated to me, and to the commanding officer of every regiment in this brigade, that he had concluded an agreement with some person at Ferozepore to secure us the further services of these camels on to Jellalabad, on the payment in advance here of twelve rupees for each; but it now appears, after a reference on the subject, that the agreement was concluded by a person unauthorized by the real owners to do so, and without their concurrence.

Captain Mackeson, however, left me under the impression (this evening) that by great concessions, and promising a liberal indemnification for the cattle that perishes, he may yet prevail on them to proceed: but I never witnessed a more determined and perverse defiance than these camel owners have shown on this occasion.

Notwithstanding every precaution taken by means of guards sent out with the camels when they go to graze, and keeping watch over them in camp, some hundreds have contrived to abscond; a great proportion of which have been recovered.

An estimate was made of the number of camels that will be required for progress of the brigade through the Khyber Pass, for treasure, for ammunition, camp equipage, private baggage (reduced to the lowest scale, as one small tent is made to serve for the accommodation of three or four officers, who have also been limited to the fewest servants possible,) and for the carriage of one month's provisions on a road, where, in some parts, nothing in the world can be procured for either man or beast but what is carried along hence. The estimate amounted to upwards of 3,000 camels; and supposing that half a month's supplies would be sufficient the number would still amount to about 2,200, and must be reduced.

In the meantime Captain Mackeson exerts himself to form a dépôt of

grain at Lalpoora, by the Tattara Pass, conveyed thither on mules, ponies, and donkies ; but in small quantities at the time, so as to reduce the quantum that would have to be escorted by the troops from this place.

To-day the Afredee Chiefs were to have held a meeting to consult together on the terms that have been offered them. Their reply will probably be received the day after to-morrow, and contribute materially to the decision I shall come to regarding an advance upon Jellalabad, a consummation which I consider most desirable ; though, with the insufficient means at my disposal, if anything like an opposition of numerous bodies on different points is to take place, the sacrifice of lives may be enormous ; but if once attempted, I consider it must be carried into effect, and that to recede ever so little is not to be thought of in the face of so ruthless a foe. The immense string of camels, where only one can go a-breast, allowing about five yards to each, and which will extend to nearly nine miles, is of itself a very serious impediment.

The above intelligence\* having reached Jellalabad and Peshawur in comparatively so short a time, it is possible the Khyberees may not have become acquainted with it. Nevertheless, it can scarce be expected but that when once fully aware of the state of affairs, the fear of provoking the resentment of the Cabooles and their adherents will make them break off any treaty they may have contracted with us, in spite of the forbearance-money they receive for not molesting us, and which the dependents at all times scarcely consider to be binding on themselves, whatever their chiefs may do.

The road between our camp and Peshawur is not safe, from the Afreedees' attacks upon defenceless people. Three camp-followers were found murdered on the road two days ago, who had not time to reach camp before dusk.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No.—114. *Brigadier Wild to Major-General Sir R. Sale.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, half-way to Junrood,  
January 7, 1842,*

SIR,—I had the honor to address a letter for your information to your Brigade-Major on the 27th ultimo, the day on which I reached Peshawur.

On the 1st instant I acknowledged the receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo, and explained at the same time my reasons for not complying with your wish of proceeding to Jellalabad forthwith. Four guns have since been obtained from General Avitabile ; but one of them on being tested with an extra charge, smashed its limber, which is now in course of being replaced. Another great difficulty under which we labour is the obstruc-tious conduct of our hired camel men, a large proportion of which seem not inclined to yield to the influence of either threats or money, and without supplies it is almost impossible to proceed, where man and beast depend on the food that accompanies the force for their subsistence.

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\* The foregoing paragraph has reference to the reported murder of the Envoy.

In the third place, Captain Mackeson has offered terms to certain Afreedee chiefs for facilitating the passage through the Khyber Pass, to which the expected reply has not been received, and which so much affects the comparative security of our advance, as to deserve serious attention, for there is no doubt that if the brigade should meet the opposition of numerous bodies in many points, during its progress, a heavy sacrifice of life must ensue, for the attempt once made must be persevered in to its fulfilment. In the fourth instance, there is such an evident want of zealous co-operation on the part of the Sikh chiefs and soldiery, if not of their Government, though I suspect the feeling originates there, that I consider no reliance can be placed on them, for keeping open the communication in our rear, after we have once gone on.

I have now the honor of acknowledging the receipt to-day of your note of the 3rd instant, again calling on me to hasten my advance, though at the same time it would appear that within the walls of Jellalabad you consider yourself safe, and it therefore remains for me to weigh maturely, how far, with the inadequate means at my disposal, having no cavalry, except one troop of irregular horse, I would promote or hurt the interests of the service, if after pushing on I were to join you in a crippled state. But if you thought of retiring with your force upon Peshawur, I would not hesitate instantly to advance, and take up positions in the Khyber Pass at any cost, to assist in facilitating your retreat.

I beg at the same time to assure you, that I will not cease to watch for the first seasonable opportunity to advance with the force at my disposal, with a view to instantly avail myself of it.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 115.—*Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone, to Captain Macgregor.*

*Cabool, December 29, 1841.*

SIR,—It having been found necessary to conclude an agreement founded on that of the late Sir William Macnaghten, for the evacuation of Affghanistan by the troops, we have the honor to request that you will intimate to the officer commanding at Jellalabad, our wish that the troops now at that place should return to India, commencing their march immediately after the receipt of this letter, leaving all guns, the property of Dost Mahomed Khan, with the new Governor. As also such stores and baggage as there may not be the means of carrying away, and the provisions in store for our use, on arriving at Jellalabad.

Abdool Zhufoor Khan, who is the bearer of this letter, will render you all the assistance in his power. He has been appointed Governor of Jellalabad on the part of the existing Government.

We have, &c.,

ELDRED POTTINGER, AND W. K. ELPHINSTONE.

No. 116.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale and Captain Macgregor, to Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone.*

*Jellalabad, January 9, 1842.*

SIR,.—We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, which you therein state was to be delivered to us by Abdool Zhufoor Khan, appointed Governor of this place by the existing powers at Cabool. The communication was not handed to us by him, but by a messenger of his, and though dated 29th December, 1841, has only this moment reached us. We have, at the same time, positive information that Mahomed Akbar Khan has sent a proclamation to all the chiefs in the neighbourhood, urging them to raise thier followers, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying the force now at Jellalabad. Under these circumstances, we have deemed it our duty to await a further communication from you, which we desire may point out the security which is to be given for our safe march to Peshawur.

We have, &c.,

R. SALE, AND G. H. MACGREGOR.

No. 117.—*Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, January 7, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, to-day, of your letter of the 26th ultimo, and to state in reply that I did acknowledge the receipt of the original instructions which you sent me, from Masurkyala, on the 20th ultimo.

I shall, as desired, have his Excellency's orders conveyed to Captain Ponsonby, now residing at Peshawur, to await there the arrival of Major-General Pollock.

My former letters will have informed his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that I consider an advance through the Khyber Pass, with the means at my disposal, having no other cavalry but a troop of Irregular Cavalry, with some indifferent artillery, as somewhat hazardous, and likely to cost many lives ; but that I shall run the risk of it, if occasion requires it.

From the various information I have obtained, an advance through the Khyber Pass ought not to be attempted, except under favourable circumstances, with a less force than 6000 men, with six guns, besides cavalry, the want of which may be felt immediately after emerging from the western extremity of the Pass, beyond Lundee Khana, on approaching Dekka ; and that it would require a whole corps at Ali Musjid to maintain the command of water, which must be brought to the fort from some distance, and to assist in keeping open the communication, if the Afreedees were determined on opposing us ; and that it would require two corps more, with some guns, to be posted near Gurhee Lala Beg, Langee, and Lundee Khana, to maintain the communication open above, and to be sufficiently strong to resist the attacks of the Khyberees.

With reference to Captain Ferris's Jezailchee corps, I understand from him that when he left Pesh Bolak he had one wing on duty at Jellalabad, which is still there ; about 150 men are at Lalpoora, to which place they



escorted grain and treasure by the Tatara Pass, and the remainder, consisting, I believe, of about 40, is the only part of his corps that could accompany the brigade.

The Sikhs show such extreme lukewarmness, not to say reluctance, in the co-operation they are required to afford, that it is much to be apprehended their assistance in the field, or in keeping open the communication in the Khyber Pass, is in no way to be depended on.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 118.—*Brigadier Wild to General Sir*

*Camp, Nowulsur, January 8, 1842.*

SIR,—I was honored yesterday afternoon with your Excellency's letter of the 27th ultimo, regarding the advance, through the Khyber Pass, of the brigade under my command, and I have never felt so deeply impressed as on the occasion of its perusal, with the difference there is between simply obeying orders and acting on my own responsibility, in a case affecting the lives of thousands, and perhaps the vital interests of the state, though I trust, with the Almighty's help, I shall not be found wanting in firmness and perseverance, when the time for acting may arrive.

In replying yesterday to the Deputy Adjutant-General's official letter of the 26th December, I stated, that from the information I had obtained from various quarters, the general impression was, that an advance through the Khyber Pass, except under favorable circumstances, ought not to be attempted with a less force than 6,000 men, six guns, and some cavalry, and mine is wanting of that strength by a complement of one-third. The brigade under the orders of Major-General McCaskill will not probably reach Peshawur before the 8th or 10th of February, and will not be within reach to support mine, in the event of my advancing now. Should any disaster befall me that brigade would then be placed in a predicament worse even than what mine now stands in.

What the views of Government, as to our retaining possession of Jellalabad, may be, after our troops evacuate Cabool, which, by a letter received from Captain Pottinger, appears to have been decided upon there, I, of course, know not; but if no immediate danger threatens the force of Sir Robert Sale at Jellalabad, and he can maintain himself there in safety, until Major-General McCaskill's brigade arrive here, our united brigades advancing together would be able to afford Major-General Sir Robert Sale certain and effectual relief, and be prepared also to join his force in carrying on offensive operations, if required; whereas, if each brigade in succession were to reach Jellalabad in a crippled state, from having been unable singly to overpower the resistance opposed to its progress, both may arrive there so weakened as to reduce the whole to a state of inefficiency.

The Sikh soldiery, too, is in such a disorganized and insubordinate state that no confidence can be placed in any show of assistance on the part of the Lahore Government. The men, as well as their chiefs, are decidedly averse to contribute in any way to the success of our arms.

General Avitabile, who paid me a visit this evening, on his return from Jumrood, related the two following instances of insubordination, which occurred to-day. He ordered two battalions, which it was intended should co-operate with us, to move out to Jumrood, from their lines at Peshawur,—they flatly refused, and gave him to understand that they intended to return to Lahore. In the next place, he also ordered three guns to be taken to Jumrood ; but as these were in progress the same Sikh soldiers seized on one of them, as they passed in front of their lines, and let only the other two proceed. No reliance whatever can therefore be placed on their keeping the communication open in our rear, in the event of our advancing, and there is still less chance that they will move onwards with us, even so far as Ali Musjid.

Your Excellency alludes to the firm occupation of Ali Musjid, and Major Craigie, in the abovementioned official letter, says, that “it ought to be occupied by three companies of Native Infantry, well provisioned, and with a good store of ammunition.” Captain Ferris, who was left to garrison that fort, when first taken, and Captain Mackeson also, have assured me, that in case the Afreedees were decidedly hostile, nothing short of one complete regiment could maintain itself there, as the command of water, which had to be brought to the fort from a considerable distance, could not be secured without a strong garrison. Should I find this to be really the case, it would reduce my strength for ulterior progress very much.

Lundee Khana, near the upper or western extremity of the Khyber Pass, to which your Excellency also calls my attention, as a suitable position to be occupied, has been represented to me as the most contracted and formidable part of the whole Khyber Pass, and that it will be difficult to find in its neighbourhood a position that is not commanded by some near adjoining hill.

There is another position, which has likewise been pointed out to me, between Ali Musjid and Lundee Khana, in the vicinity of Ghurree Lalla Beg, and Luagee, as one that ought to be occupied, to keep the communication open, but these posts would require to be of such strength, to guard against attack, there would not be any troops left to advance with after getting through the pass, whilst the greatest difficulty would be to supply them with provisions, as it would, except in the most urgent case, be impossible for us to advance immediately, for want of cattle. We had been informed by the Commissariat, that the camels we brought with us from Ferozepore had been bound down by an agreement to proceed with us to Jellalabad, on payment of twelve rupees each in advance, a very high rate of hire. Our stores, ammunition, commissariat supplies, were all loaded on them, but to the great annoyance of the Political Agent, myself, and all concerned, the camel owners denied being a party in the agreement ; they could not be forced, and neither threats, nor the most liberal offers of remuneration, could induce above one-fourth of them to move on a step beyond this ; nay, these even repent, and are not to be depended upon.

Captain Mackeson is now trying to supply the place of camels, for the carriage of grain, &c., with bullocks and ponies, for there is no Commissariat officer either with me or at Peshawur, to arrange these matters.

I am told that on emerging from the pass beyond Lundee Khana, and thence on to Jellalabad, we are likely to feel the want of cavalry for the protection of the cattle.

The troops, I am happy to say, are healthy, though they felt fatigued after their long march; on arriving here, for when they came to the crossing of a river, the day that would otherwise have been a halt for them, was a harder working-day than any other, to unload and load the ferry boats with Commissariat stores, ammunition, baggage, &c. I shall, however, be obliged to leave behind me here thirty or forty sick, most of them men who were brought before the Invaliding Committee last year, but were not passed, because it was thought two or three years' work might still be got out of them.

General Avitabile has repeatedly expatiated on the danger of proceeding through the Khyber Pass with so small a force as the one under my command, and entreated me not to act rashly in the attempt. Major-General Sir Robert Sale, on the other hand, is rather peremptory in his desire that I should hasten on to Jellalabad, but I conceive he could not have been aware of the instructions I received by our Excellency's orders, nor of the hazardous nature of the attempt. I, however, wrote to him yesterday, that if he thought of retiring upon Peshawur, I could not then hesitate to advance, to take up position, at any cost, in the Khyber Pass, to facilitate his retreat.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 119.—*Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, January 9, 1842.*

SIR,—I have not yet received your letter, No. 2,482 of the 30th ultimo, but Captain Mackeson has communicated to me the copy of it which was sent to Mr. Clerk.

I had the honour of informing you in my last, of the present distribution of Captain Ferris's corps of Jezailchees, which would make known to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, how very few men belonging to it remain with him, and out of that number I find that there are about fifteen who have not yet recovered from the effects of their wounds, leaving in fact only twenty-five men fit for duty. Those that were detached as an escort with grain and treasure to Lalpoora, as mentioned by me in a former letter, amounting to about 170, have been recalled; their number is supposed to be considerably reduced since. Captain Ferris has promised me a statement of his corps when that detachment arrives. He has had many desertions of late, both among the men who were detached hence and those at Jellalabad, which he partly attributes to want of pay, they being four months' in arrears, and those who have gone have taken their jezails or rifles with them, which is a serious loss. Captain Ferris has been trying to recruit trustworthy men here, to fill up the vacancies in his corps, without success; he does not think the men to be had could be depended upon, or safely trusted with a jezail or ammunition for it; but there is another description of people to be had here, matchlockmen, named Arbabs, on whom some little dependance

can be placed. Captain Mackeson has already entertained about three or four of them ; they may prove useful, and as Captain Ferris with his adjutant Lieutenant Lukin, are both in camp, and understand the language and manners of those people well, I do not think that the Arbabs could be placed under a better superintendence than that of those two officers.

With reference to the arming of our troops for operation in mountain defiles with the weapon of the Affghan "soldiery," I will consult Captain Mackeson as to how and in what manner they may be obtained.

Captain Pottinger has written to Captain McGregor, Political Agent at Jellalabad, a short note dated Cabool 25th ultimo, confirming the melancholy intelligence of Sir William Macnaghten's murder, by Mahomed Akbar Khan, and saying that a treaty had been entered into with the Affghan chiefs, for the immediate evacuation of Cabool by the British troops, to retire upon Peshawur ; but he adds, as he was closing his letter, an attack was made upon our cantonments. In consequence of the death and imprisonment of all his seniors in the political department, Captain Pottinger was left at the head of affairs. Subsequent native reports received at Jellalabad say, that after Sir William Macnaghten's murder, provisions still continued to be carried to cantonments by the country people, and that it was again quiet. Nevertheless Captain Macgregor is most anxious that the force under my command should arrive at Jellalabad, taking it for granted, as it were, that it will do so in perfect safety, and be ready for any emergency, without considering that, as soon as we have entered the pass a door closes as it were upon our rear, there being no other force close at hand to support our advance, or to take advantage thereof for its own benefit ; so that if my brigade should have the misfortune to meet with a disaster, Major-General McCaskill's brigade would then stand in a worse predicament even than mine does now, so that the chances are that both brigades would reach Jellalabad in a crippled state one after the other ; for the co-operation of our Sikh allies is by no means to be depended upon. Their troops are in a thorough state of insubordination, they obey only when and as much as they please. Two battalions flatly refused to move out of their lines when ordered, two days ago, by General Avitabile, to proceed to Jumrood with a view eventually to co-operate with us, and intimated that it was their intention to return to Lahore ; they also laid hold on one out of three guns that were proceeding to Jumrood by the general's orders, and conveyed it back to their own lines. Under such circumstances it is evident that we neither can depend on their active co-operation in the field, nor on maintaining the communication open for us in the rear.

The security into which the whole brigade has been lulled by the official announcement that a contract had been entered into by which all the Rewarree camels, those in the employ of the Commissariat, for the conveyance of ammunition, stores, &c., as well as those hired by individuals, were to continue their services until the force should reach Jellalabad, on the further payment, in advance, of 12 rupees each, has been sadly disappointed by the most decided and obstinate refusal of the camel owners in camp to abide by the agreement, or to acknowledge the competency of those who are alleged to have contracted it in their names,

to do so. The consequence has been, that we have literally been left without carriage of any kind to proceed with, besides the few Company's camels that carry the Sepoy's camp equipage. Neither liberal promises nor threats could prevail on the camel owners to come to any terms, and after giving the greatest possible annoyance, Captain Mackeson, as a last expedient, offered to purchase them, but only about 300 were secured on those terms yesterday. The conviction that the agreement must hold good prevented both the Political Agent on the part of Government, and individuals on their private accounts, to make any arrangement to supply the want of carriage for the further progress of the troops towards Jellalabad after reaching Peshawur, so that an immediate advance, except in a case of extreme urgency and leaving almost every necessary article behind us, could not take place; though I hope with the active measures now on foot, this impediment will be removed in two or three days.

Captain Mackeson has not yet received a satisfactory answer from the Afreedee chiefs, to whom terms for allowing us to pass through the Khyber Pass have been offered. They plead divisions among themselves as the cause which renders it impossible for them to give a reply for some days.

The broken limber of the gun (by firing it off the other day) has been substantially repaired.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 120.—*Brigadier Wild to the Adjutant-General of the Army.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, January 10, 1842.*

SIR,—Since writing the accompanying letter, which was too late for dispatch yesterday, I find I have been misinformed with respect to the Arbabs, stated to have been entertained by Captain Mackeson. He says he could entertain that number; but he does not at this present moment, as they are all Mussulmans, whose feelings against Europeans are much excited, think they could much be trusted.

I was anxious ere dispatching this letter, to rectify a mis-statement that might have given rise to a wrong impression.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 121.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to the Officer Commanding at Peshawur.*

*Jellalabad, January 9, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, which has only this moment reached me. Captain Mackeson will be able to communicate to you the substance of the important intelligence sent to Captain Macgregor, from Cabool, under date 29th ultimo; with reference to which it is my opinion that you ought to lose no time in advancing on this place, which will enable us either

to hold it against any enemy, or in every event to retire in perfectly good order across the Khyber.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

P.S.—A letter from Captain Mackeson, of the 3rd instant, mentions that he has obtained four field-pieces from General Avitabile, which will be sufficient, I think, for your operations.

No. 122.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to Brigadier Willd.*

*Jellalabad, January 10, 1842.*

SIR,—I had the honor, late yesterday evening, to receive yours of the 2nd instant. The Postmaster at Peshawur will be best able to explain the delay in the transmission of both this and yours of the 27th ultimo, as well as of that of a private communication of the 16th December, from General Sir J. Nicolls, K.C.B., which also came to hand in the same day, and gave me the first intimation of the circumstances of a separate command being vested in you, which will not merge in mine until you reach Jellalabad.

I have to thank you for the co-operation which you have shown every disposition to afford me, and once more to beg to be permitted to press upon your attention the paramount importance, as respects British interests in Afghanistan at this moment, of your appearing with the least practicable delay under the walls of Jellalabad. I shall esteem it a favour to be informed of your progress by every available opportunity.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

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No. 123.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to Brigadier Willd.*

*Jellalabad, January 11, 1842.*

SIR,—Your letter of the 7th instant I have this moment received, and in reply I can only again repeat that I consider the appearance of your brigade under the walls of Jellalabad would have the effect of restoring confidence at this crisis, and tranquillizing the country on this side of Gundamuck, besides affording the only hope of extricating from a situation perilous in the extreme, our troops at Cabool.

I am of opinion that your deficiency in cavalry could not be materially felt in such a route as that of the passes of the Khyber. The circumstance of your delay beyond the time when your approach was expected has already produced the effect of inducing all the surrounding chiefs, who had hitherto been faithful, to manifest decided indications of an intention to desert our cause. It has also greatly depressed the spirits of our native soldiers in this garrison, who are anxiously looking for reinforcements, and are four months in arrears of pay, whilst we have not within these walls a single rupee; and our ammunition is not sufficient to enable us to fight our way from Jellalabad.

Having been entrusted with a separate command, you are of course

the best judge of your own operations, and alone responsible for them, but I must repeat that I consider that the fate and prospects of the British force at Cabool and this place chiefly depend on a speedy support of us.

Should any untoward circumstance occur that would compel me to retire on Peshawur, it would be, after this, impossible to communicate with you, so as to enable you to assist us in our retreat, as your present delay will probably close the route even for single cossids.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

No. 124.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to Major-General Lumely.*

*Jellalabad, January 12, 1842.*

SIR,—In order that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief may be in full possession of the exact state of affairs, I have the honor to forward copies of the whole of the correspondence between Brigadier Wild and myself, and have the honor to request you will submit them, together with this letter, to his Excellency for perusal.

You will perceive that I had opened this correspondence before I was made aware that Brigadier Wild's command was intended to be separate and independent of mine, up to the time of his arrival here.

With reference to the whole of those letters, but especially the last, I have only to remark, that if the Brigadier could have marched from Jumrood, even so late as the 7th instant, I cannot doubt that his advance would have kept all the Afghan sirdars around us, who have hitherto been friendly, still true to our interests, and it is probable that the Ghilzye sirdars from Lughman would have separated themselves from the confederacy. The very contrary effect has been produced by the indefinite delay which he unfortunately announces to me. The confidence in us of even the governor of this place and his adherents without, is evidently shaken. They doubt whether we shall ever be reinforced, and seemed prepared to leave us, and in case of the force at Cabool coming down in confusion to seek shelter within these walls, it is quite certain that the armed population would rise to a man to intercept them and us. Again, if the Brigadier had been able promptly to move on, he would have met with no opposition, excepting in the Khyber Pass, between Jumrood and Dakka, for we had positive information that the people from the latter place to Jellalabad had made arrangements to carry off their families and leave the road clear for the column; but when once the impulse of resistance is given to the armed peasantry, the Brigadier will only be able to appear here, after contesting every inch of both mountains and plains from Jumrood to this spot.

I regret this delay, which has produced a great depression of spirits amongst the soldiers of this garrison, and beg of you to understand, that I pass no judgement on the movements of Brigadier Wild, for which he is alone responsible.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

No.—125. *Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.**Camp, Kowulsur, January 12, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I learnt from Captain Mackeson, who has this moment called upon me, that Captain Macgregor, the political agent at Jellalabad, had received a letter from Captain Pottinger, dated Cabool, the 28th ultimo, written in French; that makes no mention of any engagement having, as supposed, taken place on the 25th ultimo, but he states that the strength of the cantonment had been considerably weakened by the late Sir William Macnaghten's surrender of some adjoining forts, that the troops had been desired to retire upon Jellalabad as soon as carriage for the sick and wounded should be sent, (which was expected in the course of the day,) by the Bungiah Pass, but that they would not consent to proceed by that route; that Captain Pottinger also warns Captain Macgregor not to obey an order sent to him by the late Envoy to surrender Jellalabad, and to retire upon Peshawur, unless it should be reiterated by himself.

Under such circumstances, it may be imperatively required to run the risk of forcing our way through the Khyber Pass, and to advance to the relief of the force at Jellalabad. No friendly forbearance on the part of the Afredee tribes can any longer be reckoned upon, and it becomes matter of most serious consideration how to proceed. The best plan, in my opinion, is to make our way through it as speedily as practicable before their vigilance be excited, so as to preclude, as well as frustrate, any serious resistance.

The proposed mode of proceeding, subject to such modification as circumstances at the moment may require, is to ascertain in the first instance, whether there is any hope of co-operation on the part of the Sikh troops, so as to get a couple of their corps to accompany the brigade to Ali Musjid, and to leave them there with a view to maintain the communication open to a certain extent by their occupation of that post. In which case, I would take up a new position with the brigade in the morning of the day, when it was intended to move about six miles in advance of the present camp, close to the entrance of the pass at Jumrood, and after the men shall have taken their meals comfortably during the day, I would order them in the evening to get under arms at as short a notice, and with as little noise as possible, and proceed at once to Ali Musjid, a distance of eight miles, in the dark, leaving, with a few exceptions of the most indispensable articles, all the tents and baggage behind them, and if successful so far, to push on forthwith to the end of the pass to Lalpoora, where it will be necessary to wait a day or two for the arrival of the camp equipage, which could be forwarded thither by the Tatar Pass, as the want of it would be much felt at this inclement season of the year, when much rain may be expected.

Part of the treasure, in the event of such a move, will have to be left behind, but I shall endeavour to take all the ammunition with me. Independent of the want of sufficient carriage, it will be impossible to take supplies of provision in any large quantity in a movement requiring celerity and secrecy, and which if delayed too long, may no longer be practicable. Nevertheless, Captain Mackeson, who entirely concurs in



the above measure, still holds a communication open with the Maliks, or Afreedee chiefs, and seems anxious to avoid any collision with them, until their definitive answer to the terms offered shall have been received.

Very few camels, and the strongest only, can be taken; their liability to fall and to obstruct a passage, and the slowness of their progress over stony roads, might defeat our object. For the same reason, Captain Mackeson will endeavour to secure the loan of some elephants from General Avitabile to carry the guns through the pass, lest the restiveness of the horses, or some other untoward obstacle, should cause some breakage, and delay in consequence.

If only Major-General McCaskill's brigade were near at hand, I should feel a confidence as to the maintenance of an open communication in the rear, which ten thousand Sikh troops could never inspire.

The disasters at Cabool are well known at Peshawur, with considerable exaggeration, and have much increased the insolence of its inhabitants towards us.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 126.—*Major-General Sir Robert Sale to Major-General Lumley.*

Jellalabad, January 13, 1842.

SIR,—I beg to acquaint you, for the information in his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that Assistant Surgeon Brydon, a few hours since, arrived at this place wounded, and has reported that, on the faith of a Treaty, our troops left Cabool on or about the 6th instant.

They were treacherously attacked on the road by overwhelming numbers, and from the nature of his recital there is reason to expect that he is the only one of the fugitives that we shall ever see alive.

Relying on his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's promise to relieve us as soon as possible, I have resolved on the most determined defence of this place; but if his Excellency will understand that the parapets are not ~~cannon~~-proof, and that as the Cabool force has abandoned all their guns, we may expect to be besieged immediately by the Affghans, aided by a considerable artillery, I feel that this short statement is the strongest appeal I can make for succour.

I have &c.,

R. SALE.

No. 127.—*Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.*

Camp Kowulsur, January 14, 1842.

SIR,—My Brigade Major is laid up with a fever since yesterday, and secrecy being required in all our proceedings, I have scarce time left to take the necessary copies myself, but will not delay the transmission of the inclosed dispatches for submission to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The situation of the troops at Jellalabad is becoming daily more criti-

cal, and with it the danger of our advance increases. Captain Mackeson has been engaged to-day in a conference with the Sikh commandants of corps, to endeavor to secure their co-operation. I have just received an express from him saying that nothing had been concluded; that another would be held at Jumrood to-morrow, at which I shall assist, to endeavour to obtain their co-operation, as far at least as the occupation of Ali Musjid is concerned.

We are still unprovided with the necessary carriage for an advance, and our store of ammunition is already sufficiently scanty not to leave any behind, when an interrupted communication is to be apprehended.

The guns, too, which we got here are miserable things; in firing them the day before yesterday to ascertain their range, the limbers of two again gave way, and the powder that was obtained with them is of so inferior a quality, the shot so far from round, that little precision can be expected.

I shall have the honor of addressing you again to-morrow.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 128.—*Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, January 15, 1842.*

SIR.—I have scarce time left to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that information received from Ali Musjid renders it imperative that relief should be immediately sent thither, for which purpose I shall detach to-night at 9 P.M. the 53rd and 64th regiments, as lightly equipped as possible.

The meeting at Jumrood was rendered unnecessary to day, by a consent and promise on the part of the Sikh commandants last night to co-operate with us and to occupy Ali Musjid. Some of them it is hoped will be induced to proceed to-night together with the above regiments.

The Afreedees have thrown off all reserve.

I beg also to inclose a letter from Major-General Sir R. Sale, in reply to one formerly written to him by me, when I considered the advance might without danger to his safety be deferred. As soon as I hear of the successful result of the detachment sent to Ali Musjid, I shall adopt measures for following up the advance, as the detachment is just now obliged to proceed without provisions, except what the men will carry in their knapsacks. I shall have to supply their wants as soon as possible.

Report from Jellalabad says, that Mahomed Akber Khan has fallen by the hand of another rival chief, but this has not yet been confirmed.

Letters have been received up to the 4th instant from Major Pottinger; I have no time for copying them, or this letter, now. Six officers had been taken as hostages; the troops were put off from day to day for their return. Intimation has been sent to General Sale to consider the order for evacuating Jellalabad cancelled.

The remainder of the money sent to Lalpoora, 25,000 rupees, had reached Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 129.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.*

January 8, 1842.

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that the brigade under the command of Major-General McCaskill, K.C.H., as per the subjoined statement, crossed the Sutlej on the 4th instant, at Ferozepore, on progress to Peshawur.

I have, &amp;c.,

G. CLERK.

	Officers.	Soldiers.	Syces and Grass Cutters.	Followers.	Horses.	Tattoos.	Camels.	Huckeries.
Her Majesty's 9th Foot . . . .	35	834	50	500	60	50	470	
Detachment of recruits, Her Majesty's 44th Regiment . .	10	235	...	276	30	..	2 0	..
10th Regiment Light Cavalry .	16	493	587	800	580	160	300	1
Det. 2d Comy. 2d Bat. Artillery	1	115	4	30	3	..	22	2
Detachment, 3d Irregular Cav..	1	200	200	150	297	100	40	..
36th Regiment Nat. Inf. . . .	17	1,011	...	570	30	30	420	..
Detachment, 60th Regt. Nat. Inf.	11	146	24	88	11	30	80	..
Commissariat Stores . . . .	..	..	..	1,100	..	..	2,000	..
Ordnance Stores . . . .	...	...	..	100	..	..	116	2
Total....	91	3,034	865	3,614	953	370	3,648	5

No. 130.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.*

January 12, 1842, 1 A.M.

SIR,—With the deepest regret I transmit to you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, a confirmation of the rumor which I this day forwarded by the regular post, of the murder of Sir William Macnaghten.

2. I have received only two of three Persian papers to which Captain Mackeson refers, and I send them as they reached me, to save time in the translation of them.

3. The Sikhs have furnished some guns to Brigadier Wild's force, and some more were expected with Mohtab Sing's Brigade; which I this morning heard from Captain Lawrence, at Peshawur, would arrive there on the 5th instant. I have called upon the Durbar to make every exertion to provide more cavalry than the 700 Patans which Captain Mackeson has reported to be in readiness.

4. Being uncertain whether more troops are soon to move forward from this frontier, I shall detain ten out of twenty-four lacs of rupees arrived here this morning in progress to Ferozepore, and I shall remit these ten lacs to Peshawur, without loss of time, through the Soucars. Four lacs were sent with the brigade which crossed the Sutlej on the 4th instant, and eight lacs with Brigadier Wild's force.

5. I have apprized Major Outram of these tidings by express, and have suggested to him the great importance of applying every possible means for the maintenance and the strengthening of our positions in and above the passes on that side.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE CLERK.

No. 131.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

Fort William, January 21, 1842.

SIR,—We have had under our consideration Mr. Clerk's despatch of the 12th instant, inclosing the reports which had then reached him of the melancholy events which have occurred at Cabool up to the 25th ultimo, and although, in the uncertainty which still hangs over the fate of our troops at that place, and the subsequent progress of events in Afghanistan, and in our ignorance whether the passage of the Khyber has been effected by the force under Brigadier Wild, we are precluded from coming to any immediate decision on our future plans of operation beyond the Sikh frontier, it seems to us highly expedient that another brigade should forthwith be formed, and held in readiness to move across the Punjab; and we would wish that, if possible, this brigade shall have as a part of it, one European regiment, a troop of horse artillery, and as large a body of cavalry as your Excellency can spare for this service; and, in order to facilitate your Excellency's disposition for providing this additional reinforcement to the troops in Afghanistan, we propose to direct the march of the troop of horse artillery at Dum-Dum to the north-west provinces, and would not object to your availing yourself of the services of two squadrons of one of the dragoon regiments in the Upper Provinces; and in case of your Excellency attaching one of Her Majesty's regiments of foot to the brigade, we will authorize your Excellency, if you deem the measure expedient, to move the Honorable Company's 2nd European Regiment from Ghazepore to Meerut. The arrangement for replacing this regiment, if moved, will be hereafter considered by us.

2. We may further state, that your Excellency will be immediately authorized, in the military department, to raise a corps of light cavalry, to replace the late 2nd regiment of that branch of the service.

3. Your Excellency will probably be near to the frontier when this despatch reaches you, and we would recommend that you summon Mr. Clerk to your head quarters, for the convenience of immediate reference to him on the existing exigency of affairs.

4. Mr. Clerk's opinions on the disposition and probable proceedings of the Sikh Durbar are entitled to the greatest weight.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W. W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, & PRINSEP.

No. 132.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*Fort William, February 19, No. 16, 1842.*

HONORABLE SIRS,—In continuing the narrative of events in Affghanistan since the date of our latest dispatch on that subject of the 22nd of last month, we have to deplore the occurrence of heavy calamity to the British arms, and at the same time to lament the great obscurity which still hangs over many of the most important circumstances connected with the causes and course of the disasters which have been suffered.

2. In our despatch of the 22nd ultimo, we stated, that the last date of our intelligence, then received from Cabool, was the 25th of December, when Major Pottinger reported the murder of Sir William Macnaghten, and the continuance of negotiation for the retirement of our troops from that place.

3. From the papers now sent, your Honorable Committee will learn, that on the 28th of December Major Pottinger wrote to Captain Macgregor at Jellalabad, stating the arrangement with the leaders at Cabool to be still incomplete. That on the 29th of December, Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone wrote officially to Captain Macgregor and Major-General Sir Robert Sale, directing them, in pursuance of stipulations made at Cabool, to retire from Jellalabad to Peshawur,—that on the 4th of January letters were received at Jellalabad from the cantonment at Cabool, announcing, that a march towards the former place was immediately intended, and that on the 6th of January the troops actually marched, devoid, as far as we learn, of all provision for food, for shelter, or for safety; and that thus exposed to the attacks of enemies in the mountain defiles, and in the worst severity of a winter season, they became, after two or three marches, dispirited and disorganized, and were, as a military body, ultimately wholly destroyed or dispersed.

4. We do not know the strength in effective men that marched from Cabool on this melancholy retreat, but the force there must have been greatly reduced by the casualties of a protracted contest; and we should believe that the retiring body could scarcely have exceeded 4000 men fit for service, and placed at much disadvantage by the loss of many officers killed or wounded.

5. The details of which we are in possession regarding this disastrous march, will be learned by your Honorable Committee, from the private letters of Captain Macgregor at Jellalabad, of the 13th January, and subsequent dates, and from a private letter from Capt. G. St. P. Lawrence, late Military Secretary to Sir William Macnaghten, to his brother, written from a fort in the Lughman country, near to Jellalabad, where he, with other British officers and some ladies, were prisoners, under the care of Mahomed Akbar Khan, the son of Dost Mahomed Khan, whose prominent participation in the struggle was stated in our dispatch of the 22nd ultimo; but your Honorable Committee will remember that these details proceeding from single parties, cannot in any degree be regarded as furnishing us with an authentic and complete narrative of events, and are not to be referred to as being of authority,

beyond the testimony given to events happening under the immediate observation of the writers.

6. We learn from the letter of Captain Lawrence, that Major-General Elphinstone, who commanded the Cabool force, was also a prisoner in the same fort at Lughman; but we have no communication from Major-General Elphinstone of any kind, nor have we received any since the disturbance at Cabool first commenced.

7. In a letter from Jellalabad, of the 25th of January, Captain Macgregor refers to the receipt of two long letters from Major Pottinger likewise a prisoner at Lughman, copies of which Captain Macgregor intended to send on to Peshawur on the next day; but these communications have not yet reached us, and we fear that the transit of letters between Jellalabad and Peshawur may have become interrupted.

8. We would point the attention of your Committee to a statement in the private letter of Captain Lawrence, which gives the first clear intimation of a division of the force at Cabool, that must most dangerously have impaired its strength. It appears, that immediately after the insurrection broke out, nearly two corps of infantry, with a troop of Horse Artillery, were thrown into the Bala Hissar, where the King resided, and which we understand to be a position that could not have been successfully assailed by an enemy unprovided with an efficient force in guns. The extensive works of the cantonments were thus left with only three regiments of infantry to guard them, and to be directed against an enemy without, and almost the only effective portion of the field artillery which was at that time at Cabool, was diverted from the service on which it could apparently have been most usefully employed.

9. We do not wish to prejudice proceedings of which we know so little, but it is at the same time right to mark such facts in the correspondence before us, as seem to be of obvious importance.

10. Your Honorable Committee will remember that the battery of Foot Artillery with horses, under the command of Captain Abbott, had left Cabool before the insurrection, and formed a portion of Sir Robert Sale's force proceeding to Jellalabad.

11. For the artillery that remained at Cabool, there were abundant supplies of ammunition of all kinds calculated for a year's use. It is to the absence of any sufficient force, in the different arms, held available for action beyond the line of our defensive works, and to the early loss of the unprotected Commissariat stores, that we must attribute, in a great measure, the ultimate triumph of the enemy.

12. The letter from Lieutenant Conolly at Cabool of the 17th of January, sent with Captain Macgregor's letter from Jellalabad, of the 24th January, gives the latest intelligence of the state of affairs at the capital after the departure of our troops. It will be perceived that Shah Shooja had been accepted as King by the chiefs of the insurgents generally, and that Mahomed Zemaun Khali Barukzye, a brother of Dost Mahomed Khan, who had been placed as leader of the insurrection, had resigned the name at least of the authority to which he had been raised, and been appointed to the post of Chief Minister under the Shah. There are conflicting parties of Burukzye and other Dooranee Chiefs at Cabool, and it is not probable that this compromise or union of interests, sup-

ported as it would seem to have been by an expenditure of money on the part of the Shah, can be of long continuance.

13. In a letter from Shah Shooja to Captain Macgregor, sent with a letter from the latter officer, of the 22nd January, your Honorable Committee will find a statement by the Shah with respect to his own position and views. It will be seen that he asks for pecuniary aid to enable him to maintain his authority.

14. From the 13th to the 25th of January, which is our last date from Jellalabad, no attack has been made on that post, which is stated to have been then supplied with two months' provisions for the troops, though only with one month's forage for the cattle. The spirit and fortitude with which the position at Jellalabad has been held and strengthened, for a period of two months, under circumstances of pressing difficulty and discouragement, have entitled our officers and troops there, under the command of Major-General Sir Robert Sale, and aided by the able and determined political management of Captain Macgregor, Assistant to the Cabool Mission, to our highest admiration.

15. Mahomed Akbar Khan had no strong force with him near to Jellalabad, and it is not known whether any effective means and materiel will be sent to him from Cabool; but we must regard the position of the gallant garrison of Jellalabad with very deep anxiety. It appeared to be the plan of Mahomed Akbar Khan to proceed to the Khyber defiles in order to prevent the approach of succour to Jellalabad by troops moving from Peshawur.

16. The efforts at first made by the detachment of British troops, consisting of four regiments of Native Infantry, with some details of Irregular Horse, and a Native company of Foot Artillery, using four inefficient guns, obtained from General Avitabile, at Peshawur, to advance through the Khyber Pass for the relief of Jellalabad, or to hold the pass in strength so as to cover the retirement of the Jellalabad garrison to Peshawur, have unhappily ended in failure.

The dispatches in the Political and Military Departments, connected with this subject, are sent as inclosures to this letter; and we will refer your Honorable Committee to them for all details. Two papers of remarks, by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in regard to no guns having been sent from Ferozepore, with either of the two detachments in which these regiments marched, are also amongst the inclosures, officers will engage the particular attention of your Honourable Committee.

5. Truly see much reason to regret that some guns were not attached to the second detachment of these regiments, and to the brigade of private letters, which marched with Major-General Pollock; with this last and subsequent 9-pounders were indeed sent, but we cannot feel confident that they will prove sufficient for the service required from them. We brother, will communicate a copy of this paragraph to his Excellency, where he, with the same time we think it right to add, that the instructions under the order of his Excellency to Brigadier Wild, commanding the four regiments of Native Infantry, in regard to the circumstances under which he was to march into the Khyber Pass, previously to the arrival of Major-General Pollock, with the strong reinforcement accompanying him, will be to us to have been in all respects suitable and judicious. These remarks are

instructions were forwarded to your Honorable Committee, with our dispatches of the 22nd ultimo.

18. Major-General Pollock, with a fresh brigade, will have reached Peshawur in the first week of this month, and we expect daily to hear from him respecting his first views and intentions.

19. Meanwhile we have to lament that the post of Ali Musjid has been for the present necessarily abandoned to the Khyberees, and that the difficulties of the garrison of Jellalabad have been much increased by the retirement of the friendly Mamund Chief Turabaz Khan, from Lalpoora, the other line of communication between Jellalabad and Peshawur, in consequence of apprehensions arising from the approach of Mahomed Akbar Khan.

20. There are circumstances represented in a letter from Captain Mackeson, of the 27th of January, regarding the absence of proper precautions for taking on with the two regiments, which penetrated to Ali Musjid, the supplies of grain prepared for their support there, which will be made a subject of separate and full inquiry in the military department. Most injurious consequences may arise from the retreat, which was unavoidable, when from their supplies not having arrived with the detachment, and from the subsequent failure of the two remaining corps to force their way to Ali Musjid with a convoy, the means of subsistence at that post no longer remained.

21. Our instructions for the guidance of Major-General Pollock and Sir Robert Sale have been adapted by us from time to time to the exigencies of circumstances, as these have gradually been disclosed. We entirely approve the answer of Sir Robert Sale and Captain Macgregor to the injunction sent to them from Cabool, for a retirement from Jellalabad, which answer was to the effect, that they must first learn what security could be given to them for the safety of that movement, for we felt that the chiefs with whom the engagements were formed at Cabool, were in no condition to stipulate for a state of things, or for the protection of our troops in other parts of the country. We have regarded the proceedings generally of Major-General Elphinstone, as far as we are aware of them, with the keenest disappointment and displeasure, and we have requested the Commander-in-Chief to institute, when circumstances may admit of it, a full military inquiry into the Major-General's conduct, and desired that the authority of the Major-General over the troops serving in or near Affghanistan should wholly cease.

22. The successive instructions which we have issued for the guidance of Major-General Pollock will be found in our letters of December 15, January 31, and February 10th and 16th.

23. The original direction to Major-General Pollock was, that the safety of the force under Sir Robert Sale should be the prominent object of his care, and that, otherwise, the situation of the force under his command was mainly that of strong demonstration on the Peshawur frontier; it resting in his military discretion to determine whether he could with safety hold the advanced post of Jellalabad, in dependence on a secure command of the Khyber, and other passes, between Jellalabad and Peshawur. We should have been glad, had it appeared likely to be in Major-General Pollock's power to maintain the post of Jellalabad for some period, as giving advantages in any communication with the adverse



chiefs in Affghanistan, or in any ulterior movement, or course of policy that might be thought proper by the Government here or in England. But on the 31st January, we expressly informed Major-General Pollock, that Jellalabad was not a place which we desired to retain at all hazards, and that after securing Sir Robert Sale's brigade there, and giving every practicable relief to parties from Cabool, we would wish him, rather than run extreme risks at Jellalabad, to arrange for withdrawal from it, and the assemblage of all his force at or near Peshawur.

24. Since we have heard of the misfortunes in the Khyber Pass, and have become convinced that with the difficulties at present opposed to us, and in the actual state of our preparations, we could not expect, at least in this year, to maintain a position in the Jellalabad districts for any effective purpose, we have made our directions in regard to withdrawal from Jellalabad clear and positive, and we shall rejoice to learn that Major-General Pollock will have anticipated these more express orders by confining his efforts to the same object.

25. We have attentively considered the question of remaining in force at or near Peshawur during the present year, and upon strengthening the division under Major-General Pollock, by the other complete brigade, which your Honorable Committee has before learned had been warned to march from Ferozepore, and we have given the full instructions, which will be found in our letters to the Commander-in-Chief and Mr. Clerk, of the 10th instant, upon these subjects.

26. While there may be a hope of contributing to the safety of the Jellalabad garrison, the advance of the fresh brigade will of course be most desirable and necessary, for the purpose also of supporting the division under Major-General Pollock, whether it remain for the year at Peshawur, or other place, in the Lahore territory, or be drawn back gradually to the British frontier. The advance of the brigade is likely to be of much advantage ; but there are questions of much delicacy and difficulty connected with the condition of the Sikh Government, and with the temper and feeling of the most powerful of the Sikh chiefs, and of the body of the Sikh soldiery, which may make the retention of a British force for a long period at any advanced point of the Sikh dominions, far from politic and safe. We have in our instructions to Mr. Clerk dwelt upon these considerations, and given to him a large discretion in respect to the position and movement of our forces in the Punjab. We trust that your Honorable Committee will be satisfied, that upon a matter of this nature, the proper determination of which depends so entirely upon local circumstances, we have adopted the best course in giving extensive powers to Mr. Clerk, who is an officer deserving of our high confidence. We have, it will be observed, given a general discretion to Mr. Clerk to act in unforeseen emergencies, as he may think best for the national interest and honor on the general principles, which have uniformly been prescribed to him in regard to our relations with the Sikh Government, and we have intimated to him that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the Commanders of the British forces within the Punjab, will be prepared to give attention to his wishes, as far as they may feel themselves able to do so, consistently with military considerations, and with the arrangements judged necessary by his Excellency for the protection of our own provinces.

27. We have been careful in our letters to the Commander-in-Chief, to advert to all those points, which have appeared indispensable for the due support and equipment, in all respects, of a British force, while employed within the Punjab.

28. The dispatch from Mr. Clerk, of the 15th ultimo, conveyed some general observations on the condition of the Sikh Government and troops, with reference to the altered and unsettled aspect of affairs in Afghanistan, and we stated to Mr. Clerk in reply, our continued desire to give strength to the existing administration in the Punjab. We have been happy to perceive, from the tenor of different communications from Mr. Clerk, which have extended to the 8th instant, that he appears to rest with some confidence upon the stability of that Government, and the prevention of any general disorder in the country or army, as a consequence of the more intimate intercourse, which has now been established between the Durbar and Mr. Clerk, as the agent and representative of the British Government.

29. On the 31st of January, upon receiving the intelligence of the disasters which had happened to our troops in the retreat from Cabool we thought it proper to issue a brief notification, which we caused also, to be officially communicated to the several Political Residents and Agents, expressed in very general terms with regard to the intentions of the Government ; but also, in a tone of confidence and firmness, such as is suitable to the power and resources of the British Empire in India, and was calculated to allay any impressions of apprehension or mistrust, which might possibly be created by so great a calamity as that which has now been sustained by a portion of the British Army. We are happy to state that we have no information, which would lead us to suppose that impressions of this kind have been any where diffused.

30. In our dispatch of the 22nd ultimo, we communicated the grounds upon which it appeared that Sir William Macnaghten had been murdered by Mahomed Akhar Khan. With a letter from Mr. Clerk, of 20th January, your Honorable Committee will find the translation of a letter, purporting to be from Mahomed Akbar to a chief near Jellalabad, named Meer Alfayed Khan, which, if it can be assumed as genuine, as there appeared at first to be no reason to doubt that it was, would show that Mahomed Akbar openly avowed and gloried in the horrible outrage. In the letter, however, from Mr. Clerk, of the 6th instant, and that of Captain Lawrence to his brother, which has been before referred to in this dispatch, there seem to be grounds for at least suspending an opinion upon this point. The entire uncertainty which at present attends the most important circumstances connected with the conduct and purposes of the principal actors in the scenes which have passed, and are passing at Cabool precludes us for the present from forming any clear view, or giving any defined instructions in regard to communications with any of those parties. We can, for the moment, do little else than await and watch the development of events and factions ; we hope to receive shortly the two letters from Major Pottinger, of which the arrival at Jellalabad has been announced to us. We may, however, state that it is not our intention, on such information as we yet have to authorize any advances of money to Shah Shooja, for we could have no confidence that such advances would not be employed by the individuals

who, in his name, exercise real authority at Cabool, in hostilities against ourselves.

31. We have to mention that bills upon our treasuries, drawn by Major Pottinger from Cabool, on the 28th of December, the day on which he appears to have made his final arrangement with the hostile chiefs, have been presented, some with, and others without letters of advice, to an amount of about 15 lacs of rupees. The authorities in the North-Western Provinces, after giving assurances to the shroffs who hold the bills, that their claims connected with them shall receive a full and just consideration, have referred the question of paying the bills to the Supreme Government. We have stated that such payment must be deferred until a distinct and satisfactory explanation shall be received from Major Pottinger of the circumstances under which they were drawn, and Mr. Clerk has been instructed to endeavour to obtain such explanation without delay.

32. We need not assure your Honorable Committee that the painful situation of the officers, families, and European and Native soldiers, who are prisoners in Afghanistan, engages our most anxious thought, and that any measures which we can adopt with fair and honourable prospect of advantage for their comfort or release, will be eagerly adopted by us.

33. With respect to the other posts in Afghanistan, it will be seen, that in the letter from Lieutenant Conolly of the 17th of January, it is stated that the garrison of Ghuznee still maintained possession of the citadel, though the town was in the occupation of the enemy.

34. From Kelat-i-Ghilzye we have no direct tidings, but it is believed that no disaster can have happened to that strongly fortified post.

35. The latest date of a private letter from Candahar is of the 9th of January, when Major Rawlinson reported that the Prince Suleiman-Jung, a son of Shah Shooja, who had at one time been Governor of that province, and who had been dispossessed in favour of the Shahsada Timor, had fled from the city, and joined the camp of the insurgents at a place some thirty or forty miles distant.

36. Collision appeared then, to Major Rawlinson, to be unavoidable, and from letters received from Lieutenant Hammersley, the Political Assistant at Quetta, it would appear probable that some engagement had actually occurred, in which the insurgents had been defeated, but the communication between Candahar and Quetta has, for some time, been effectually closed, and we are without any authentic information of events, of which, however, we trust that you may be apprized to a later period, through Bombay.

37. Major-General Nott had under his orders, and concentrated in strength at Candahar, a force of about 8,700 men, with at least eighteen pieces of artillery. This force is believed to be well supplied, and defective only in having but a small body of trust-worthy cavalry, and very scanty means of carriage for any distant movement.

38. Your Honorable Committee is already aware that upon first hearing of the serious difficulties which threatened our troops at Cabool, we sent instructions to Major Rawlinson and General Nott at Candahar, preparing them, in the event of extreme disaster at Cabool, for the ultimate result of a withdrawal from Afghanistan, with the least possible amount of discredit; but so also, as to make the union and

safety of our troops a paramount object of attention. These instructions, we know, reached Candahar towards the end of December. Upon learning the order given by Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone, for the evacuation of Jellalabad, and assuming that similar orders would also have been issued in regard to Candahar, we stated to the Commander-in-Chief, that we did not doubt that Major-General Nott would have rejected the authority of these orders, and we requested his Excellency to instruct the Major-General to act for himself, independently of such orders, upon his own distinct military responsibility.

39. We desired, also, that his Excellency would communicate to Major-General Nott, that it was of the highest importance, that he should maintain his position at Candahar, in concentrated strength, until he should receive the further instructions of the Government. This last intimation was made in the same view as that with which we have before said that we looked to the retention, if possible, of the post of Jellalabad, and it was dispatched to the Commander-in-Chief on the 28th of January.

But having on the 31st of January received information in regard to the actual state of affairs at Candahar, we addressed Major Outram, instructing him to communicate with Major-General Nott, and to arrange in concert with Brigadier England, and if the condition of the tracts under his immediate charge should admit of it, for having the disposable part of the troops under the orders of that officer moved above the Bolan Pass as early as possible, in order that if Major-General Nott should decide upon withdrawing from Candahar, the troops in question might be marched forwards to the foot of the Kojuck Pass on the Quetta side, so as to facilitate and support such withdrawal. We have since, on the 10th instant, issued the instructions to Major-General Nott, which your Honorable Committee will find in our Secretary's letter to him of that date. He has there been distinctly informed that it is our desire that he should act solely so as may best, in his judgment, secure the paramount object of the safety of his troops, and may uphold at the same time, the honor of the British arms. The Major-General will, of course, make to the utmost, every effort in order to relieve also the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye and that likewise of Ghuznee, should it be in any manner within the compass of his means to give succour to the last named post.

40. We learn that the post of Quetta has also been threatened with attack, but Major Outram writes with confidence of its strength and of the preparations made there, and we have not heard that any enemy has actually approached.

41. Tranquillity has not been interrupted in Beloochistan, or Scinde, and your Honorable Committee is separately addressed upon details connected with those countries.

42. The Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, and his family, have been placed under a strict surveillance and restraint at Saharunpore and Loodiana. On the 31st ultimo, we authorized and directed Mr. Clerk, unless he should be confident that the Ameer and his family could be kept in perfectly secure custody at those places, to take measures for sending him and his male relatives to the fortress of Allahabad.

43. If this removal should be carried into effect, it will be accompanied with every reasonable indulgence, consistent with safety, and a

with respect to the additional precautions which it has been found expedient to adopt for the security of Dost Mahomed Khan, and his family and attendants. We annex the copy of a letter which we have this day directed to be written to Mr. Clerk.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W. W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, & H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 136,—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Fort William, January 26, 1842.*

SIR,—Your dispatch of the 15th instant has been laid before the Governor-General in Council, and I am directed to inform you that his Lordship in Council entirely approves the measures which you have adopted, and intend to adopt, for a more intimate intercourse with the existing Government of Lahore, and for giving support generally to the Sikh authority within the territories subject to that state. The policy upon which these measures are founded is that upon which his Lordship in Council would wish you steadily to act, and which has, indeed, already been expressly prescribed to you by the instructions contained in the 6th paragraph of my letter to your address of the 3rd ultimo.

2. In respect to the military position to be held by us, under existing circumstances, towards Peshawur, and on our north-western frontier, I am desired to forward, for your information, the copy of a dispatch this day addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 137.—*The Governor-General in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, January 26, 1842.*

SIR,—Your Excellency will probably have received from Mr. Clerk a copy of his dispatch of the 15th instant, No. 6, but that it may be certainly in your Excellency's possession, we herewith append a copy of it, and of the reply which we have caused to be sent to it, of this day's date.

2. Your Excellency will be aware, from our former communications, that we have been very sensible of the necessity of giving strength, in the existing crisis, to the Sikh administration generally, and particularly, as regards the support of its authority on the Peshawur frontier, by the assemblage of a strong British force in that direction. With this view we have sanctioned the advance of the efficient division, of at least 7,000 men, under Major-General Pollock; and, in continuation of our dispatch of the 21st instant, we would now further request your Excellency to be prepared for a direction for immediately expediting the march of the third complete brigade, referred to in that dispatch, as a reinforcement to the troops of General Pollock's division.

3. We believe that, after the march of this third brigade, there will remain a force of at least 15,000 men available for concentration in the north-western provinces, with a view to the maintenance of the internal

tranquillity of our own territory ; and we consider this force, supported by the troops assigned to the several cantonments, to be undoubtedly adequate to its purpose ; although we do not think that it would be prudent in any greater degree to weaken the military strength which will remain at your Excellency's immediate disposal.

4. Your Excellency will of course issue to Major-General Pollock such instructions and advice as you may deem to be called for, for the subject of giving to the large force which will be under his command the most effective and advantageous direction. We need only observe, that the primary importance of keeping our men together in masses, in the most favourable positions, ought never to be lost sight of.

5. We anticipate that the Sikh Government will cordially concur in measures which will add in the greater degree to the stability of their dominion in their western territories ; but your Excellency will of course take all your measures, in the execution of the policy now prescribed, in communication with Mr. Clerk.

6. Your Excellency has been informed of the several measures which we have thought to be in the first instance expedient for increasing the military means available in Upper India.

7. We have now also to state to your Excellency that we have strongly recommended to the Home Authorities that (three regiments of Her Majesty's Foot, on the Indian Establishment, being engaged with the China Expedition) the same number of corps should be sent to this country from Europe ; two of these corps being supplied to Bengal, and the other to the Bombay Presidency,—the military means of the Bombay Government having been diminished to a greater degree than it would be expedient to admit for a length of time.

8. If other arrangements of military reinforcement should occur to us as being desirable, we shall duly address your Excellency in regard to them. In the meantime we would remark, that if your Excellency should think it of advantage to raise three more corps of recruits, at the stations of Meerut, Kurnaul, and Agra, similar to that which has been raised by Captain Taylor for the Shah's service, and has now been fixed at Cawnpore, we would request you at once to give effect to that opinion. These corps, each commanded by three officers to be selected by your Excellency, might within a few months be rendered quite efficient for station purposes and the support of internal order, and they would set free regular corps for more general service. We would invite, also, the opinion of your Excellency upon the expediency of raising the complement of the three Goorkha corps, and the Hurriana local battalion, to the present full complement of the regular regiments of Infantry.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W. W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT. & H. T. PRINSEP.

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No. 138.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, January 28, 1842.*

SIR,—We have received an express dispatch from Mr. Clerk of the 18th instant, with copies of the letter of Major Pottinger and Major-

General Elphinstone, to the address of Captain Macgregor of the 29th of December, and of the reply of that officer, and of Major-General Sale, of the 9th instant.

2. We request that your Excellency will instruct Major-General Pollock to inform Major-General Sale and Captain Macgregor that we highly approve the judgment and spirit shewn in their reply to the directions conveyed to them from Cabool; and it is our anxious hope that the fort of Jellalabad may have been maintained until it could be effectively succoured by the forces proceeding from India. We do not doubt that Major-General Nott will have rejected the authority of any directions which may have been sent to him by Major-General Elphinstone of a like tenor to those sent to Jellalabad; and we would request your Excellency expressly to instruct him to act for himself, independently of such directions, upon his own distinct military responsibility. Your Excellency will communicate to Major-General Nott that it is of the highest importance that he should maintain his position at Candahar, in concentrated strength, until he shall receive the further orders of the Government.

3. We have not received since the commencement of the insurrection at Cabool, any dispatch, either in the political or military department, from the British authorities at that place, and on our present information we are disposed to view the conduct of Major-General Elphinstone, in command of the force there, with the most severe displeasure and indignation. Your Excellency will, of course, cause a full military inquiry to be made into all the circumstances connected with the direction and conduct of our troops at Cabool, at the earliest period at which such an inquiry may be practicable. In the mean time we think it right to direct that Major-General Elphinstone shall not retain the command of the troops to the west of the Indus, but that the command of the force at and beyond Peshawur shall remain with Major-General Pollock. It is our direction also that the local command at Jellalabad should be vested in Major-General Sale, subject only to the direction of Major-General Pollock, and that the authority of Major-General Elphinstone should at once wholly cease.

4. We have to desire your Excellency to consider the resolution to send on another complete brigade as a reinforcement to the Peshawur frontier as definitively adopted, and to request that you will hasten all the arrangements for the march of that brigade, with such amount of treasure and equipments as may be indispensable to the maintenance and comfort of the troops in that quarter. Your Excellency will give the orders which you may think the most suitable, in respect to the return to India of any portion of the force which has served for the longest period in Afghanistan.

5. We shall communicate to your Excellency without an instant's delay, the views which we may be led to form, when more complete information of the melancholy events which have happened in Afghanistan and of the actual condition of affairs shall be before us.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND; W. W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, AND H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 139.—*Notification by the Government of India.**Fort William, January 31, 1842.*

Intelligence having been received which leaves no room to doubt that, after the British force, at Cabool, had maintained its position against overpowering numbers of insurgents for more than six weeks, the officer commanding had judged it necessary, in consequence of a failure of provisions, to agree to a convention of the enemy, and to retire, in reliance on the faith of that convention, towards Jellalabad, when the troops, exposed to the worst rigours of cold and privation in the mountain defiles, and harassed by treacherous attacks, suffered extreme disaster,—the Governor-General in Council deems it proper to notify, that the most active measures have been adopted, and will be steadfastly prosecuted, for expediting powerful reinforcements to the Afghan frontier, and for assisting such operations as may be required in that quarter for the maintenance of the honor and interests of the British Government.

The ample military means at the disposal of the British Government will be strenuously applied to these objects, so as at once to support external operations, and to ensure efficient protection to its subjects and allies.

A faithless enemy, stained by the foul crime of assassination, has, through a failure of supplies, followed by consummate treachery, been able to overcome a body of British troops, in a country removed, by distance and difficulties of season, from the possibility of succour. But the Governor-General in Council, while he most deeply laments the loss of the brave officers and men, regards this partial reverse, only as a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigor of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valor of the British Indian army.

By order of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India in Council.

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 140.—*Mr. Maddock to Major Outram.**Fort William, January 31, 1842.*

SIR,—In consequence of demi-official information received from you, under date the 14th instant, respecting the condition of things in the Candahar Province, I am desired by the Governor-General in Council to request that you will, in communication with Brigadier England, and if the condition of the tracts under your immediate charge will admit of it, arrange for having the disposable part of the troops under the orders of that officer moved above the Bolan Pass as early as practicable, in order that, in communication with Major-General Nott, if that officer should decide on withdrawing from Candahar, the troops in question may be marched forward to the foot of the Kojuck Pass on the Quetta side, so as to support and facilitate General Nott's movement.

2. You will send intimation to Major-General Nott of your receipt of this letter, and of the arrangements that may be made in consequence of it, so as to insure every possible certainty that the intimation will reach him.



3. All troops falling back to Quetta can, it is believed, be maintained at that place and Mustoong ; and it is desired that they should be posted at these places, or other convenient points near, until the return of the favorable season for descending to the plains, or the receipt of further orders. But the exact positions of the troops on this side of the Kojuck Pass, must be determined by the General Officer commanding, according to practicability of supply, and other local considerations.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 141.—*The Governor General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, January 31, 1842.*

SIR,—We received yesterday Mr. Clerk's dispatch of the 22nd instant, with the afflicting report, brought by Dr. Brydon, of the march of the British force from Cabool towards Jellalabad, and of its fatal consequence.

2. We have only at this moment, in addition to our former communications to refer your Excellency to the notifications in the Secret and Military Departments, copies of which will be forwarded to you with this dispatch, and to state to you the following opinion, in conformity with which we would desire that Major-General Pollock should be instructed by your Excellency.

3. Major-General Pollock will have under his command, upon reaching Peshawur, a force of about 7,500 men, in addition to the brigade, under Sir Robert Sale, which, independently of Afghan auxiliaries, may amount to a further force of about 2,000—and the brigade of which the advance has been directed, by our later dispatches, to proceed to Peshawur, but which cannot be expected to arrive there before the 16th or 28th of March, will add, at least, 3,000 more troops to General Pollock's force, thus raising it to an army of above 12,000 men.

4. This force, when assembled in concentrated strength and with due equipments and provisions, will be adequate to subdue all opposition to the movements which it may be directed to undertake, but we would wish your Excellency particularly to enjoin Major-General Pollock to be careful that the force is weakened as little as possible by separation and detachments.

5. Major-General Pollock will have a specially delicate decision to form, when he is in advance before the arrival of the last brigade ; beyond which brigade he should be made aware that he cannot look for additional reinforcements during this season.

6. In the instructions of the 15th ultimo, it was stated that the object of the division, as at first moved forward under Major-General Pollock's command, was mainly that of demonstration and strength on the Peshawur frontier, and that it would rest in his military discretion to determine whether he could with safety hold Jellalabad, in advance, in dependence on a secure command of the Khyber and other passes between Jellalabad and Peshawur.

7. If Major-General Pollock, arriving with only General McCaskill's brigade, can safely maintain the position of Jellalabad, with due regard to the security of the communications through the Khyber Pass, he will, until otherwise ordered, continue to do so—and it will be highly desirable that he should find an opportunity of asserting our military superiority in the open country in the Jellalabad neighbourhood. But Jellalabad is not a place which the Governor-General in Council desires to be kept at all hazards, and after succour shall have been given to R. Sale's brigade there, and relief shall have been given to parties arriving from Cabool, the Governor-General in Council would wish Major-General Pollock, rather than run extreme risks in that position, to arrange for withdrawal from it, and the assemblage of all his force at or near Peshawur.

8. When eventually the last brigade may reach Peshawur, Major-General Pollock will then have received further directions for his conduct, but, in the mean while, whether the bulk of his troops be at Jellalabad, or elsewhere, he will attend strictly to the direction given to him of holding them, to the utmost practicable degree, assembled together, and in the most favorable positions, not, of course, refraining from such detached or advanced operations near or beyond Jellalabad, as the state of the country may render obviously expedient and advantageous.

9. Your Excellency will, of course, cause an abundant depot of ammunition and all necessary equipments to be formed at Peshawur, and Major-General Pollock will understand that he is authorized to incur such reasonable expense as he may think necessary for sheltering the men of his force, and particularly the European portion of them, as the season advances. Wherever they may be placed, the British troops should be kept distinct from other forces, or any chances of collision with the subjects of a friendly power, in the most convenient and healthy site procurable—but upon this last point your Excellency will be further addressed hereafter, as events may appear to require.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W.W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, & H.T. PRINSEP.

No. 142.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to Major-Genl. Elphinstone.*

January 21, 1842.

SIR,—The letter of the 29th ultimo, written jointly by yourself and Major Pottinger to Captain McGregor, leaves me no reason to doubt that you have long ere this reached Jellalabad, and are contemplating a further retreat to India, if such condition should have been forced upon you, as is too probable, by the Afghan chiefs.

Major-General Sir R. Sale is very strongly inclined to think that he and his force should not be bound by your Cabool Agreement; of this, however, when you are at Jellalabad he will have no power or right to judge, far less to act upon it.

As the communication with Cabool has been so full of hazard, I have not ventured to write to you on such a subject in terms which might have influenced your judgement, but it is proper that I should make known to you the views of the Governor-General in Council, in anticipation of events, which have now occurred.

The intention and wishes therein expressed have never been altered or modified, and you will therefore be pleased to consider it your duty to conform to them.

In addition to camp equipage in store, for parts of your force, at Peshawur, I have directed that tents for 1,000 European and 2,000 native infantry or cavalry, may be despatched to that place to meet you.

The officers may probably ask for a few tents; if so, receipts must be carefully taken.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

**No. 143.—General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.**

*Camp, two marches north of Kurnaul, January 22, 1842.*

MY LORD.—I have the honor to lay before your Lordship in Council a copy of a letter addressed by me yesterday to Major-General Elphinstone, as the retreat of the Cabool force upon Jellalabad can be no longer doubtful.

2. After that force has been refreshed at the latter station by a few days' halt, I should hope that, collected, the two brigades will be able to force their way to the entrance of the Khyber, near Dakha; where, if not before, Brigadier Wild's helping hand will be held out to them.

3. At a late hour yesterday, an express from that officer, of the 15th instant, announced his intention of detaching two native regiments to the relief of Ali Musjid that night, and to follow with the other two corps, with supplies. A copy of the Brigadier's dispatch I have the honor to inclose for the information of your Lordship in Council.

4. At the same time I received a dispatch from Mr. Clerk; transmitting Mr. Reid's, of 15th January, to Mr. Clerk; Captain Lawrence's, of 15th January, to Mr. Clerk, with intelligence from Cabool to the 4th instant; contents of a letter, Mahomed Akbar Khan to Meer Afzul Khan; Captain Mackeson, 14th January, to Mr. Clerk; Captain Mackeson, 12th January, to Mr. Clerk.

5. I have felt it necessary to reply immediately to that part of Mr. Clerk's letter, and Captain Mackeson's, of the 14th, in which they ask for reinforcements of artillery and native infantry. These I have declined to send, for the following reasons, which I trust will be approved.

The force in Affghanistan, and proceeding thither, stands thus:—

	Guns.	Artillery and Sappers.	Cavalry.	European. Infantry.	Native.
With General Elphinstone	6	144	464	531	2770
With Sir R. Sale, .....	15	559	279	777	1119
With Brigadier Wild, ...	4	247	101	0	3979
With General Pollock, ...	3	176	693	887	1191
	<hr/> 28 <hr/>	<hr/> 1126 <hr/>	<hr/> 1537 <hr/>	<hr/> 2195 <hr/>	<hr/> 9059 <hr/>

Total of all ranks, 13,008, (and 5 guns, with their ammunition, with Major-General Pollock's Division from Delhi Magazine,) when 909 men have been deducted from the Cabool force to cover casualties, and sick and wounded men left behind.

These numbers ought, I think, to be able to extricate themselves, after the most critical movement, that from Cabool to Jellalabad, has been effected.

6. Were native infantry now ordered from Ferozepore, they might cross the river on the 29th, and be at Peshawur on the 5th of March, moving without a halt.

7. If Major-General Elphinstone left Cabool on the 5th of January, he was, probably, at Jellalabad on the 15th, and united with Sir R. Sale; after halting there eight or ten days, they could force their way to the Khyber, if not through the Pass, by the 1st of February.

8. Brigadier Wild was to enter the Khyber, with two corps, on the night of the 15th, and to be followed by the other two soon after.

9. Major-General Pollock was at Shabul on the 15th instant, and will be at Peshawur, without halting, on the 10th of February.

10. Under these circumstances I do not think that any force, now sent forward, could be of any use in supporting our troops during their retreat. It will be most unlooked-for, and probably most disastrous, if our corps should not have effected their passage through the Khyber before the 5th of March. Mr. Clerk has never hinted that the Sikh troops would venture to molest us; such a circumstance does not, therefore, enter into my calculation.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 141.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Camp, two marches north of Kurnaul, January 23, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I have the honor to inform your Lordship in Council that Mr. Clerk arrived here (Thanesur) yesterday evening.

We have had a long conversation upon the affairs of Afghanistan, including the statement of Assistant-Surgeon Brydon; and Mr. Clerk has, by various and repeated arguments, endeavored to convince me of the necessity for detaching another reinforcement to Peshawur, in order to support Jellalabad.

My instructions and my opinion (expressed in my letter of yesterday) being widely different, I have demurred giving my consent to the proposal; but as your Lordship was not aware, on the date of your last orders of 6th of January, of the murder of Sir William Macnaghten, and the probable fate of our troops, I have ordered the 6th and 55th Regiments of Native Infantry from Kurnaul to Ferozepore, which will enable me to detach two corps to Peshawur, should your Lordship in Council's views and orders have been altered or modified by that event, and your resolution be made known to me.

Being full aware of the confidence enjoyed by Mr. Clerk, I have taken this preparatory step; but, when he advised the addition of some portion of Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, I felt myself unable to give him any hope of such a recommendation being attended to.

We may expect your Lordship's orders, upon the reports contained in dispatches of the 12th instant, on the 2nd or 3rd of February, that is, before these regiments can reach Ferozepore.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 145.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

Fort William, February 2, 1842.

SIR,—We have received your Excellency's letter of the 23rd of January, and have to refer your Excellency, in reply, to our dispatches of the 20th, 26th, 28th, and 31st idem, by the instructions in which we would request you strictly to be guided.

2. We regard it as absolutely essential to the maintenance of our interests at this crisis, that a commanding force, of all arms, should be concentrated at or near Peshawur, in order to curb the violence of excitement which may be expected in that quarter, and to protect the Sikh territory from aggression.

3. It is particularly important that this force should be effective in cavalry and light artillery, and we are disposed strongly to adhere to our recommendation that two squadrons of European Dragoons should be employed on the service.

4. We have taken measures for summoning up Her Majesty's 50th Regiment to this Presidency from Moulmein, unless imperative reasons of defence should require its detention at that place. And we contemplate additional measures for the increase of our military strength of which your Excellency will be separately informed.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W.W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, & H.T. PRINSEP.

No. 146.—*Resolution by the Governor-General of India in Council.*

February 4, 1842

The Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council having resolved that it is expedient to add a tenth company to every regiment of Native Infantry of the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.

Ordered, that a communication to this effect be made to the governments of Madras and Bombay, and that a copy of this resolution be sent to the military departments of the Government of India for the issue of the necessary orders to give effect thereto in this Presidency.

No. 147.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

Camp, three marches from Kurnaul, Jan. 24, 1842.

MY LORD,—I had yesterday the honor to report that, at Mr. Clerk's very earnest request, I had ordered two more native regiments from Kurnaul to Ferozepore, to give further support to our troops at Jellalabad.

After I had dispatched my letter to your Lordship in Council, I received the note, of which I transmit a copy herewith, from the Adjutant-General, and I had a second discussion with Mr. Clerk on the subject of holding our ground at Jellalabad against any Affghan power or force, in view to retrieving our position at Cabool, by advancing upon it, at the fit season, simultaneously, from Candahar and Jellalabad. Having thus regained our position, and the influence which such proof of power must give, not only in Affghanistan, but amongst all the neighbouring States, we should then withdraw, with dignity, and undiminished honor.

Admitting the undeniable force of this argument, I am greatly inclined to doubt that we have, at present, either army, or funds, sufficient to renew this contest. Money may, perhaps, be obtainable, but soldiers are not, without leaving India bare.

Shortly before I left Calcutta, there were, at least, 33,000 men in our pay in Affghanistan and Sinde, including Shah Shooja's troops, but not the rabble attached to his person.

How insufficient that number has been to awe the barbarous, and at first disunited tribes of Affghanistan and Sinde, our numerous conflicts, our late reverses, and our heavy losses fully prove. I admit that a blind confidence in persons around the late Envoy,—a total want of forethought and foresight on his part,—unaccountable indecision, at first, followed by cessions which, day by day, rendered our force more helpless,—inactivity, perhaps, on some occasions—have led to these reverses, but we must not overlook the effects of climate, the difficulty of communication, the distance from our frontier, and the fanatical zeal of our opponents.

No doubt your Lordship can cause our army to force its way to Cabool, if you think our name and predominance in India cannot otherwise be supported; but our means are utterly insufficient to ensure our dominion over that country. If this be granted, the questions for your Lordship's decision are, whether we shall retake Cabool, to assert our paramount power; and whether, if subsequently retire, our subjects and neighbours will not attribute our withdrawal, even then, to conscious inability to hold the country.

Reading your Lordship's instructions literally, especially those of 3rd December and 6th January, I have not countenanced any preparation for a renewal of the contest. I thought the return of our twenty regiments of cavalry and infantry, a troop and four companies of artillery, and some irregular cavalry, together with the vast reduction of expenditure which would immediately follow the return of this large army, would place the Government in such a position of strength that it might summarily chastise any neighbouring Prince, or even two, who might dare to act upon a mistaken view of our weakness.

My opinions are of no great value, but encouraged and supported as I have been by your Lordship in Council, I think the time is come at which I should express them at some length.

Having done so, I beg to report to your Lordship in Council, that I have ordered Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons to move to Ferozepore, at which point they will scarcely have arrived, when I may hope to be honored by your Lordship's commands as to their advance.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

P.S.—I have just received your Lordship's letter in Council of the 10th instant.

No. 148.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.*

*Fort William, February 10, 1842.*

SIR,—Annexed are extracts from a letter to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, of the 28th ult., and copy of a letter to Major Outram, of the 31st ult., having reference to the intimation of the instructions of the Governor-General in Council for your guidance, conveyed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, of the 3rd December last, in anticipation of the event, which has unhappily occurred, of the military possession of Cabool and of the surrounding territory having, for the present, been entirely lost by the British authorities and troops. Intelligence of the receipt at Candahar, towards the end of December, of these paragraphs of the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, of the 3rd of that month, has reached the Government through a demi-official letter from Major Rawlinson.

2. The Governor-General in Council feels that events will, in every probability, have determined your course of proceeding long before the present letter, or any communication founded upon the letters of the 28th and 31st ult., can be in your possession. But he thinks it now right not to omit the chance of distinctly informing you that it is his desire that you should, without reference to the terms of the extract of the dispatch of the 28th ult., act solely so as may best, in your judgment, secure the paramount object of the safety of the troops placed under your orders, and may uphold, at the same time, the honour of the British arms.

3. Should you, with that object, resolve upon falling back from Candahar towards Quetta, you will, to the utmost, make every effort that may be in your power, in order also to relieve and bring off with you the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and that likewise of Ghuznee, if it should be within the compass of your means to give any succours to that post; and you will be aware that boldness, and an alacrity in attacking any enemy, will be the best means of obviating danger to retiring troops.

4. Brigadier England and Major Outram will apprize you of the means of co-operation with you which they may be able to arrange, under the orders of the 31st ult., upon the Quetta side of the Kojuck Pass.

5. This letter will be sent through Major Outram, who will be desired to use every possible means to ensure its reaching you.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 149.—*Mr. Maddock to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, February 10, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to transmit, for your Excellency's information, the inclosed copy of instructions this day addressed to Major-General Nott.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 150.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, February 10, 1842.*

SIR,—The intelligence received since the transmission to you of our dispatch of the 31st ultimo, has convinced us that, excepting under some very unforeseen change, no sufficient advantage would be derived from an attempt to retain possession of Jellalabad for any prolonged period during the present season.

2. The fate of the gallant garrison at that place will probably have been determined before the intimation of our opinion to the above effect can reach Major-General Pollock. But we would request your Excellency without delay to inform the Major-General, that the main inducement for the maintenance of a post at Jellalabad, namely, that of being a point of support to any of our troops escaping from Cabool, having now, it must be feared, unhappily passed away, it is the object of the Government that he should, unless any unforeseen contingency should give a decidedly favourable turn to affairs, confine himself to measures for withdrawing the Jellalabad garrison in safety to Peshawur, and there, for the present, holding together all the troops under his orders, in a secure position, removed from collision with the Sikh forces or subjects.

3. Your Excellency has been made aware privately, that, in consequence of the circumstances which had occurred at Peshawur, we had been led a little to hesitate on the march to that place of the further complete brigade from Ferozepore, the movement of which was directed by our dispatch of the 28th ultimo.

4. We have now, upon mature deliberation, resolved that the brigade in question shall be moved onward, in any of the three following cases:—

First—If there should appear to your Excellency any rational ground of hope whatever, that this brigade can be of use towards extricating Sir Robert Sale's garrison from Jellalabad.

Second—If your Excellency should be aware that the troops under Major-General Pollock's orders have suffered in action, or if the tenor of his correspondence with your Excellency shall have shown the advantage of his being joined by the brigade, with a view to the due support and efficiency of this force, already at Peshawur, regarded merely as an advanced British division on a distant frontier, where it is important that such a division should be of imposing strength, whether for the purpose of remaining in the locality, or retiring from it.

Third—If Mr. Clerk should apply for the march of the brigade, or of any part of it under the instructions of which a copy accompanies this dispatch, with regard to the maintenance and promotion of our interests in connexion with the Sikh Government and territory.

5. We would particularly request your Excellency to appoint an officer of character and efficiency to the command of the brigade; and we beg that the remaining half of the battery of guns, of which one half only was sent on with Major-General Pollock, may be attached to the brigade, in addition to the troop of horse artillery already ordered. Experience has shown the extreme importance of giving an efficient artillery, and an ample supply of ammunition of all arms and of general equipments, to every force ordered on such a service.



6. We are not unmindful of arrangements for the greater efficiency of the artillery in the Upper Provinces, and may have occasion again to address your Excellency separately on that subject.

7. An experienced engineer officer, with a supply of field intrenching tools, should also accompany the brigade, or rapidly follow it—a detachment of sappers and miners being already in advance; and a qualified officer of the commissariat department ought also to be attached to Major-General Pollock's division.

8. Your Excellency will give the necessary intimation, in furtherance of this dispatch and of the instructions to Mr. Clerk, to Major-General Pollock; and will desire the Major-General and the officer commanding the new brigade, if advanced, to conform, as far as they may think consistent with military considerations of safety, to Mr. Clerk's wishes in respect to their movements.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W. W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 151.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Fort William, February 10, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed to forward to you the annexed copy of a dispatch to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and to state that, as the Government now looks to a withdrawal from Jellalabad; and as the resolution has been formed, unless events take some unexpected turn, which would obviously require or encourage a forward move, not to attempt the prosecution of operations in advance of the Khyber Pass, during the present season, the Governor-General in Council would wish you to announce that resolution frankly to the Lahore Durbar, and to invite it to enter on an immediate consideration of the arrangements by which it may best provide for the security of its western territories.

2. As regards many considerations affecting the interests of the British Government, it would be highly desirable that, when Jellalabad shall no longer be held by us, our detachments, which have been moved forward in support to meet a present emergency, should be brought gradually back to their cantonments, in order that any ulterior operations that may be determined upon for another advance beyond the Indus, by whatever route (and that towards the Khyber and Jellalabad is probably not the one to which preference would be given), may be undertaken after full preparation, with a complete equipment, and in fresh and well-organized strength.

3. The Governor-General in Council had, however, intended that, as a support to the Sikh authority on its western frontier during the excitement which must be regarded as impending, an imposing British force should be kept at and near Peshawur for this year.

4. Such an arrangement would have entailed great sacrifices on the British Government, and have involved much hazard to the health and well-being of its troops, but the Governor-General in Council was prepared to make a very considerable exertion in aid of the tranquillity and safety of this part of the Sikh dominions.

5. The course of events at Peshawur has, however, appeared to show that the Sikh authorities there are either not disposed, or have it not in their power, to render any effective and cordial co-operation to a British force. And it is impossible that the British Government can allow its troops to be compromised by being retained in a distant position such as Peshawur, separated by several large and difficult rivers, and by a territory liable to confusion, from its support and resources ; and in a country which it does not control and govern ; where serious troubles may arise, and where the good-will and steadiness of the forces of the Sikh Durbar (however that Durbar may be, in itself, well disposed) are not to be depended upon.

6. It will be proper, therefore, that the Sikh Durbar should make its own arrangements for the protection of its country. And his Lordship in Council would recommend that Rajah Golab Sing should be allowed to assume the government and direction of affairs at Peshawur, by the aid of his own force, or in any other manner which the Durbar may think most expedient and effective.

7. It is even not improbable that the Durbar and the Rajahs may prefer such a course of proceeding to one which might lead to jealousies and dissensions between the British and Sikh troops, placed or acting near each other, and which might involve the Durbar, through unfortunate and uncontrollable accidents, in a serious responsibility to the British Government. The measures of the Sikh authorities for the preservation of their power at Peshawur might also be such as that the British Government, while it could not prevent, could not desire even to seem to sanction or permit them.

8. If, when you receive these instructions, you shall be aware that the Sikh troops now at Peshawur have really, notwithstanding their first inertness or mutinous desertion, afforded hearty and effective aid to the British force ; or in case of direct overtures from the Durbar for the maintenance of our position on that frontier, the tone of your observations will, of course, be modified. But you will still say that the collection of British troops in strength on the Sutlej, and a cordial understanding from that point with the Sikh administration at Lahore, are thought to be the most simple and sure means by which the alliance between the British and Sikh Governments can be made advantageous to both parties. And this concentration of troops will obviously be the best mode by which to obtain a ready reserve for the support of our interests, if required, along the lower line of the Indus.

9. Our being in strength, in advance between Lahore and the Affghan frontier, might doubtless be a very important aid to the continuance of tranquillity at the capital ; but, on the other hand, the presence of a large British detachment resting inactively in the centre of the Sikh dominions might give rise to extreme distrust, whilst a division of our forces, and the possible interruption of communication, might greatly weaken our means of acting with vigour and effect for the common interests of the two Governments, in the event of any general commotion.

10. Placing a high confidence in your discretion and ability, and in your intimate knowledge of the condition of affairs and parties within the Sikh State, the Governor-General in Council would wish you, bearing the considerations which have been stated carefully in mind, to regulate, as

you think best, without any further delays of reference, which would at this season be highly inexpedient, the time and manner of recalling the troops leisurely from Peshawur; and empowers you, if you think it desirable, to call for the advance (independently of the two first cases or contingencies referred to in the letter to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief) of the brigade under orders at Ferozepore, with the artillery now directed, for the purpose of a temporary approach to, or junction with, the troops already at Peshawur, so as to give support to those troops, to facilitate their march homewards (if such a measure should finally be decided upon), to ensure the more certain maintenance of order along their route in the Punjab, and to promote, generally, as far as practicable by this means, the common interests of the two States.

11. The political effect of an immediate forward movement, though only for a temporary object, would probably be beneficial.

12. The extreme disadvantage of any hazardous exposure of single detachments of our troops will be most carefully regarded by you.

13. All questions of a merely military nature, with regard to the convenience and safety of the troops, will, of course, be determined exclusively by the orders of Major-General Pollock, with whom you will be in constant and free communication.

14. You will remember that the earlier the date at which our troops can be brought back to their cantonments, if to return to the left bank of the Sutlej, the more desirable it will be for the preservation of their health and efficiency. It is not necessary to impress on you the most anxious attention to the health of the troops, whose movements are thus confided to your judgement.

15. You will communicate to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the date of any probable return of troops to the provinces, that his Excellency may direct the necessary arrangements for their reception.

16. If, at the same time, it should be your deliberate opinion that important and vital interests of the British Government in India, and the well-being of the British and Sikh States, urgently require that the measure of withdrawing our troops from Peshawur, or at least further eastward than some point on the left bank of the Indus, or a few marches from it, as at Rawil Pindie, should be suspended, his Lordship in Council authorizes you to postpone such withdrawal pending a report to Government, in which you will explain fully the grounds of that opinion, and the manner in which you think it possible that the political and military difficulties of national feeling, aversion, and disorganization of the Sikh troops, excited and uncertain temper of the population, isolated and remote position, and the hazard of disorders at the capital, and in the whole line of communication between the position of the force and the Sutlej, can, without the most serious imprudence, be encountered. You will, in that case, obtain also, and submit, a full report from Major-General Pollock of his sentiments on this question; and the final orders of the Government, in reply, may be in your possession about the 1st of April next. You will also immediately communicate these reports to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that his Excellency may state his views on them to the Government.

17. You will bear in mind the inexpediency of accustoming the Durbar to lean upon our presence at or near Peshawur, as a means of propping

up its power, and saving its own means and exertions in that quarter.

18. You have been authorized to establish the most friendly understanding with the existing Sikh Government. Should it at any time desire to arrange any new and definite terms for its own support, through a remodelling of its relations with the British Government, you will readily receive and report such overtures, avoiding, until further instructions, any express promises or stipulations. The Governor-General in Council does not wish to be forward in altering, in any manner, the independent character of the Sikh Administration.

19. Emergencies may arise in regard to the affairs of the Sikh State, and to the position of the British troops moving within its territory which it is impossible to foresee and to provide for by previous instruction. In such emergencies, if it should be clear to you that they do not admit of the delay of a reference to the Government, the Governor-General in Council empowers you to act as you may judge best for the national interest and honor, on the general principles which have now and heretofore been prescribed to you; and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the Commanders of the British forces within the Punjab, will be prepared to give attention to your wishes as far as they may feel themselves able to do so consistently with military considerations, and with the arrangements judged necessary by his Excellency for the protection of our own provinces.

I have, &c.,

T. II. MADDOCK.

No. 152.—*Major-General Lumley to Mr. Maddock.*

*Head-Quarters, Camp, Rujpoorah, Jan. 28, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor, by direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, copy of a dispatch from Brigadier C. F. Wild, commanding the troops at Peshawur, commenced on the 16th and closed on the 17th instant reporting the occupation of the fort of Ali Musjid by a portion of the force under his orders, together with the copy of a letter to the Brigadier's address, from Captain Mackeson, dated the 16th instant, at 8 P.M.

Copies of the letters adverted to by Brigadier Wild, and detailed below,\* from Jellalabad and Cabool, have already been forwarded for the information of the Government.

I have, &c.,

J. R. LUMLEY.

No. 153.—*Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, near Jumrood, Jan. 16, 1842.*

SIR,—I am happy to have it in my power to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the plan I adopted to

\* From Captain Macgregor to Captain Mackeson, dated Jallalabad, the 11th, inclosing a letter from Captain George Lawrence, of the 4th January; extract of letters from Lady Sale and Lieutenant Sturt; and one letter from Captain Macgregor to Captain Mackeson, dated Jellalabad, 13th January.

prevent the fort of Ali Musjid falling into the hands of the Afreedees has perfectly succeeded. Every attempt at resistance that might have been expected in the day-time was prevented by the unlooked-for advance of the 53rd and 64th Regiments Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, and the guidance of Captain Mackeson at night, unencumbered as they were by baggage of any kind. Only three shots were fired at them, which did no harm, and they arrived at Ali Musjid as the day dawned.

This unexpected call on our assistance has somewhat interfered with the proposed movement through the Khyber Pass with the whole brigade ; but it is as well, perhaps, that, under the existing deficiency of carriage, and the very inadequate means at our disposal for conveying stores, baggage, ammunition, treasure, and provisions, the attempt should not have been made ; for it was with the greatest difficulty that I removed, as a preparatory step, the camp from Kowulsur to this place to-day, leaving nearly one-third of the property behind, under a guard.

I was interrupted whilst writing what precedes, about 10 P.M. last night (17th January), by an alert in our camp, occasioned by several shots fired into it by some Afreedees, which brought on a general firing of the chain of the picquet sentries. Several other shots were fired into camp at later hours afterwards.

At 3 A. M. I got the note from Captain Mackeson, regarding the successful movement, mentioned at the beginning of this letter, on Ali Musjid. It was expected that the intelligence of that event would, when it reached the ears of the Afreedee tribes, render them more tractable ; but it has not : and I am apprehensive that, encumbered with all the cattle conveying the effects of the regiments that have preceded me, as well as those left with me, I shall meet with a resistance and loss that will contrast sadly with the good fortune of the former. The cattle here mentioned is scanty beyond measure for the exigency of the men and officers, but tells, in addition to camels and bullocks conveying treasure, ammunition, stores, &c. for the public service, in a pass where they can only pass one by one, and where the fall of a single animal may create serious delay and confusion.

In the midst of all my difficulties there is none which distresses me more, and causes more trouble and importunate references to me, than the commissariat department, at every instant of the day ; occasioned by the insufficiency of cattle, and the prospect that one-half of what may accompany us will probably die from sheer starvation, as food for animals, in advancing through the Khyber Pass, must be carried along, as well as for man. On no occasion that has ever come under my observation would it have been so desirable to have an experienced and efficient commissariat officer with a force, as at Peshawur ; and there is no European responsible person,—none but a parcel of Gomashitis, each bent on his own interested purposes, without any controlling authority. I have endeavoured to remedy this difficulty, by appointing, some days ago, temporarily, Ensign Montgomery ; but, after trying to do every thing in my power, he requested permission to resign ; and I have appointed, subsequently, at his recommendation, Captain Gwatkin, of the 60th Regiment, who offered to remain upon our staff, and who appears to possess the requisite qualifications for the commissariat department, but without experience in the department, or information,

other than what is to be obtained from the Gomashtis themselves, whom he is to control, and who are very unwilling to be so.

I also beg leave to inclose copies of the melancholy disasters of the Cabool force, numbered 1 and 2; the former received yesterday and the latter to-day: and of which I took a hasty copy in General Avitabile's tent this afternoon, where Captain Lawrence privately showed me the original.

Captain Mackeson's dispatch is numbered 3. I trust his Excellency will kindly excuse the somewhat blotted appearance of this letter, my small tent being a perfect pigeon-house of people entering and leaving it, each with some subject of reference of his own.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 154.—*Major-General Lumley to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Patarre, January 30, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor, by direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to annex, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, copy of a letter from the Deputy Commissary-General, dated the 25th instant, and its inclosures, detailing the nature of the agreement into which the owners of hired camels were supposed to have entered previous to their departure from Ferozepore, with the column commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch and Brigadier Wild, which his Lordship in Council will have learned from the inclosure transmitted with my dispatch, No. 39, of the 17th instant, they have failed to fulfil.

I have, &c.,

J. R. LUMLEY.

No. 155.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, Deputy Commissary-General, to Major-General Lumley.*

*January 25, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 135, and annexation, on the subject of the refusal of the owners of hired camels, who left this place with troops for Afghanistan, to proceed with the detachment from Peshawur to Jellalabad.

2. In reply, I beg to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that it has hitherto been most difficult to induce the owners of hired camels to engage to go even as far as Peshawur, but I have, by promises, encouragement, and obtaining a liberal remuneration from Government for them, succeeded in procuring their services to Peshawur.

3. From that place it has been customary for the carriage to be provided by Captain Mackeson, Political Agent on the spot, or by the chief Commissariat Officer in Afghanistan; but owing to the unfortunate state of affairs at Cabool, which only became known here after Brigadier Wild's detachment left, it was impossible to hope for any arrangements

*being effected by the Commissariat Department in Afghanistan, and barely probable that any could be made by the Political Agent at Peshawur.*

4. Under these circumstances, I by much persuasion, and allowing high remuneration, induced some of the Shokedars, and influential people of that class, who were present at this station, to enter into an agreement, that the camels of Brigadier Wild's detachment would proceed on to Jellalabad instead of to Peshawur, as the owners had at first agreed to do.

5. It appears now that the whole of the Shokedars (except one), on arriving at Peshawur, declined to ratify the engagement thus entered into, and this untoward circumstance I attribute to two causes: first, to the state of the country beyond Peshawur; and second, that the cattle employed with the 60th and 64th Regiments were harassed so much on the route to Peshawur by long marches, that the owners of them became alarmed, and dissatisfied; otherwise, I have not the least doubt but the people would have fulfilled the engagement to go on to Jellalabad. People have been dispatched to induce the dissatisfied Shokedars to go forward, and I have every hope that they have been successful.

6. I beg to inclose a copy of a communication from Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, commanding detachment, relative to the necessity he had for issuing an order for Government bhoosa being given to the hired camels of the force, consequent on the cattle not having had time to graze, and during the forced marches which were made, the men had not time to cook their food, and several of the female camels cast their young. Yet, in conclusion, I have the honor to state, for his Excellency's information, that I have but little doubt that the hired camels which have left this, subsequently to the departure of Brigadier Wild's troops, will proceed to Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,

J. PARSONS.

No. 156.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch to the Deputy-Commissary General.*

December 21, 1841.

Sir,—Having been obliged to increase the length of my marches towards Peshawur, and the nature of the roads preventing our marching except in daylight, great numbers of camels attached to the force have necessarily been up too late in the evening to allow of the owners grazing them sufficiently; under these circumstances, on the 18th instant, after several long marches, I took upon myself to order the Commissariat Gomashita to advance ten rupres for bhoosa to the camels in the rear, which had the effect of satisfying their owners, who had several times complained that their cattle would be injured if they remained without food in that way.

I have, &c.,

J. TULLOCH.

No. 157.—*Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.**Camp, Junrood, January 23, 1842.*

Sir,—For the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, I have the honor to state, that late last night Captain Lawrence entered my tent, and communicated to me the notes of which I inclose copies, the original, from Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, not having reached me.

The urgency of the request for assistance demanded immediate attention, and I accordingly ordered the two serviceable guns that remain to us, with all the efficient men of all arms in camp, except the guards and picquets left for its protection, to be held in readiness to proceed to the Shadee Bhagiar mouth of the pass, so as to arrive there by the first dawn of day, and by that means take the Afreedees by surprise, at a breastwork of thorns and stones which they had thrown across the pass. My wound preventing me from going myself, Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch took the command of the party, and I directed the 30th Regiment to lead.

The operation was successfully performed, the breastwork was gained and destroyed, and the troops appear on this occasion to have behaved with great steadiness and alacrity. For the details I beg to refer his Excellency to the accompanying letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, who commanded the party, and to the returns of killed and wounded, which I so much the more deeply lament, that the object for which the demonstration was made was not effected, in consequence of the many messengers sent to Ali Musjid to apprise Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley and Captain Mackeson, that their request for co-operation would be attended to, not reaching that place in time, though promised a reward of fifty rupees if it did, whilst they were afraid of hazarding a retreat, under the doubt of co-operation on our side.

A Sikh regiment was prevailed upon to combine in the demonstration made to-day, by entering another mouth of the pass at Jabaghee, and had also one Jemadar killed and two men wounded.

Whilst writing this, another letter is received from Captain Mackeson, at Ali Musjid, stating the garrison, it was determined, would march out at 4 A. M. to-morrow, and urging me and the Sikh regiment to make a similar demonstration, and attack at both mouths of the pass. I confess, that after the effort made to-day proving to no purpose I felt extreme reluctance in repeating the same to-morrow, but yielded to the claims of humanity, and extreme urgency of the occasion. I have accordingly ordered the same party to proceed to-morrow to the Shadee Bhagiar mouth of the pass, and General Avitabile has also ordered the same Sikh regiment that went to the Jabaghee mouth of it yesterday, to return thither.

I trust his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will make allowances in the situation of extreme difficulty in which I am placed; the inefficiency of my means, destitution of carriage, apprehension of every public servant (not being a soldier) and camp follower to go on, being surrounded by a population that murders every individual who moves insufficiently protected to any distance from camp; if the measures I have attempted to carry into effect did not meet with that success which would, I conscientiously believe, have attended them, had adequate



means been at my disposal, as to carriage and artillery, when I first reached Peshawur, and the Afreedees were still wavering in their acceptance of the proffered terms for their forbearance, to push on to Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

P. S. I inclose a note, in original, the last received from Captain Mackeson.

No. 158.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch to the Officiating  
Brigade-Major.*

*Camp, Jumrood, January 23, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report to you, for the information of Brigadier Wild, commanding the force, that agreeably to his instructions I proceeded with the 30th and 60th Native Infantry Regiments, the detail of Artillery, with two guns, a few Sappers and Miners, and the rissalah of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, at 4 A.M. to-day, for the purpose of assisting the return of the two regiments from Ali Musjid, through the Khyber Pass.

The entrance of the nullah leading to the pass was reached soon after day-break, and a passage effected to the barricade pointed out by Captain Lawrence, which, though only formed by brambles, was, by its size and construction, likely to be a serious obstacle to troops (in retreat particularly); the whole of this was destroyed by fire during the stay of the troops in its vicinity, and some adjacent breastworks levelled.

The infantry, with exception of about 100 men, were entirely employed in crowning the heights on either side of the entrance, up to, and beyond the position taken up by the reserve body mentioned above, and in securing a breastwork in front of, and commanding the barricade before mentioned, which duty was performed in the most efficient manner, and greatly to the credit of all concerned.

One gun, and the detachment of Sappers and Miners, and Irregular Horse, were kept with the reserve of the column, and the gun was occasionally useful in dispersing small parties of the enemy, who appeared occasionally pressing towards the flanking parties; the other gun was left in a position near the entrance of the nullah, for covering our return. The troops remained, from before sunrise till past 10 A.M., in possession of the works before mentioned; the whole behaved with remarkable steadiness, and after retaining them in position till further delay seemed useless for the object in view, no sounds proceeding from the front indicating any advance of troops from that quarter, and the enemy collected in some numbers, from our demonstration, which appeared likely to render hazardous our retreat, with the few men held in reserve, I deemed it prudent to call gradually in the flanking parties from either side, and returned to camp a little before noon.

Regretting, as all must do, that the object of our advance has been rendered null, by circumstances having apparently prevented the arrival of those for whose assistance it was intended, I have the honor to conclude by inclosing a return of killed and wounded, with the force, and

shall be happy to afford any further explanation that the Brigadier may require, on points which the hurry of my present writing, in the wish to give, as early as possible, an account of the day's proceedings, may have left obscure.

I have, &c.,

J. TULLOCH.

*Return of Killed and Wounded of the Force employed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Tulloch, at the entrance on the Khyber Pass on the 23rd of January, 1842.*

*Camp, Jumrood, January 24, 1842.*

	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>							
		<i>Sepoys.</i>	<i>Lieut. &amp; Brevet Capt.</i>	<i>Jemadars.</i>	<i>Havildars.</i>	<i>Naicks</i>	<i>Sepoys</i>	<i>Sowars</i>	<i>Horse.</i>
Detachment 3rd Irregular Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..	..	...	1	1
30th Regiment Native Infantry	2	..	1	..	..	..	.	9	..
60th Regiment Native Infantry	..	1	1	1	1	2	...	..	..
Total.....	2	1	2	1	1	2	10	1	
Grand Total...	2	18							

C. F. WILD, Brigadier.

No. 159.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley to Brigadier Wild.*

*Ali Musjid, January 22, 1842, 2 P.M.*

SIR,—Having determined to fall back upon Futteghur (alias Jumrood) to-morrow morning, I have to request that you will move up with your whole available force to form a junction with ours, inside of the pass of Shadee Bhagiar, as I am determined to give the Afreedees battle, if they oppose us, and the ground admit of our doing so with a chance of success. Your cavalry should be well to the front, as I am told the ground will admit of their acting. I propose to get away from this quietly before day-break. Your force should enter the mouth of the pass a little after daylight, and the Sikhs should move into the Jabaghee mouth of the pass at day-break. The safety of this detachment will depend on your prompt and determined demonstration, at both mouths of the pass, being executed as above pointed out.

I have to request that you will send several replies to this communication, so that they may reach us before we move down.

I have, &c.,

J. MOSELEY.

No. 160.—*Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.**Camp, Junrood, January 24, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that, with the assistance afforded them, and the help of God, the two regiments that were at Ali Musjid have returned thence in comparative safety, about 1 p.m., to this camp, having had to fight and cover their retreat the whole way. The official returns have not yet been sent to me, and there will not be time for it to-day, the dawk being about to close, but I fear the statement will exhibit a severe loss. Captains Wilson, of the 64th, and Lock, of the 5th Regiment, doing duty with the 60th, have been killed, and four or five officers of the 53rd, 60th, and 64th, have been wounded, whose names I have not yet all ascertained.

Being myself weak, and unable to quit my tent, my Brigade-Major incapacitated, by the wound he received, to afford me any assistance, and Brevet-Captain Ewart, whom I requested to act for Captain Loftie, temporarily, having in the present emergency his time taken up as Adjutant of his regiment, will, I trust, be a sufficient excuse for this hasty letter.

I have, &amp;c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 161.—*Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.**Camp, Junrood, January 25, 1842.*

SIR,—I had the honor, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to report to you yesterday, and in a very hasty manner, the dawk being about to close, the retreat from Ali Musjid, of the two regiments sent thither on the 15th instant, at the particular instance of Captain Mackeson, who accompanied the detachment, to prevent that important post falling into the possession of the Khyberees.

This movement being effected in the dark, by troops unincumbered by baggage or tents of any kind, and unexpected by the Khyberees, was successful beyond expectation. Unfortunately, however, out of 300 bullocks loaded with provisions, that left camp with the detachment, only sixty and odd reached that place, so that the men had soon to apprehend that want of food would be superadded to their destitution of baggage and camp equipage. These it was my intention to have conveyed to them with the remainder of the brigade, supported by the Sikh troops, and to have advanced, leaving the latter to occupy Ali Musjid, and maintain the communications open in the rear, according to their engagement, and to have then proceeded forward with my whole force towards Jellalabad, in compliance with the pressing appeal of Major-General Sir Robert Sale and Captain Macgregor, consequent on the disasters of Cabool for the contingency alluded to in one of the paragraphs of the instructions sent me by his Excellency's orders, seemed to have arrived. These instructions, I no longer possess : as reported in my letter to your address of the instant, they, and all other valuable papers, public and private, sketches, &c., that I had, fell, with a horse-load of my baggage, into the hands of the Khyberees, on the 19th instant ; and I thought it

my duty, contrary to my own opinion, to attend to the call of the Political Agent, of running the risk to push on, and carry relief to the Jellalabad force, or to facilitate its retreat, the time for it having now arrived.

General Avitabile having informed Captain Lawrence, the Assistant Political Agent, and myself, on the 17th instant, that four Sikh battalions, with the artillery attached to them, had agreed to co-operate and advance with me, and as no time was to be lost, I appointed the following day to commence the march.

I have already reported to you, in my letter of the 17th and 20th instant, how grievously I was disappointed by the almost treacherous abandonment of our cause by the soldiery of the Sikh battalion, at the critical moment when their co-operation was expected, within a few hours of that which had been ordered for commencing the march through the Khyber Pass. I have also informed you of the further difficulty experienced at the very moment when the march was to have begun, owing to the absence of a number of camels, and the abandoning of Sirwans, who dreaded to go on, and of the new arrangements which these untoward events necessitated, which protracted the departure of the troops till after sunrise, and also of the destitute situation of the regiments at Ali Musjid, which induced me, though forsaken by our faithless Sikh allies, and destitute of their support, nevertheless to make the attempt of carrying them relief and joining them, with a view to an immediate further advance.

However, the opposition we experienced far exceeded any thing I had anticipated, and with long strings of cattle to protect, extending together with the troops to a distance exceeding two miles, it became impossible to detach sufficient flanking and skirmishing parties to dislodge the enemy, scattered in parties on every ridge and knoll, behind stone breastworks, pouring down a destructive fire upon us. In this emergency, our advanced gun broke down at the second shot discharged, whilst one of the elephants that carried another gun, on being hit by a ball, turned round and threw the column into confusion, as did also some camels carrying treasure, and several horses. The Khyberees observing this, gained confidence, and redoubled their fire, by which I was wounded, as I was calling on our men to follow me and advance. No longer able, from the nature of my wound, to exert my voice, and becoming soon after faint from loss of blood, I was taken to the rear, when a retreat commenced before we had well entered the pass. Of several loads of treasure that were thrown, one was lost, the broken-down gun was forsaken and spiked, and baggage of various kinds, thrown by animals running away, was lost. In other respects, the retreat was covered, and Lieutenant Liptrott, with a party of his horse, dashing in among some Afradees that had already descended to plunder, cut up several.

The troops returned to Jumrood, after experiencing a heavy loss in killed and wounded, as stated in the returns I transmitted on the 20th instant; and worse than all, every hope of carrying relief to the garrison at Ali Musjid was lost. It now only remained for me to see how, in the precarious situation in which it was placed, I should be able to assist in facilitating its retreat, and the co-operation on the 23rd and 24th instant accordingly took place, as I have already had the honor to report.

Having, on the above recapitulation, endeavoured to connect the

events from the period of detaching the 53rd and 64th Regiments to secure the possession of Ali Musjid, until that of their abandoning it, I have now the melancholy task before me, to relate the occurrences of the latter day, for the minor details of which I beg to refer his Excellency to the reports of Lieutenant-Colonels Tulloch and Moseley, and to the heavy list of killed and wounded, which no less overwhelms me with grief now, than all the foregoing events had preyed upon my mind with distressing anxiety, the only soothing reflection being, that if the force detached had been less, or if the retreat had been delayed for a few days longer, the loss, heavy as it is, would have been considerably greater, as the Khyberes were daily increasing in numbers all along the pass.

Captain Mackeson informed me, that before the rear of the detachment had quitted Ali Musjid, it was attacked, and had both to fight its way down, and cover its retreat all the way ; the 64th Regiment being in the rear, performed that duty with great steadiness, and deserved every praise for their good conduct, which I am particularly desirous to bring to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's notice, after the report I was obliged to make some time since on the spirit of insubordination which had shown itself among them. The two regiments joined the party sent from camp to their assistance, at a later hour in the day than had been expected, and passed on with their sick and baggage, leaving their further retreat to be covered by the other ; and it appears, the heaviest loss which the latter sustained, occurred on this occasion. When the flanking parties descended from the heights that had been occupied by them to rejoin the column, the Khyberes reascended them with all the celerity which habit and constant practice has rendered so natural to them, and opened a destructive fire upon the retiring skirmishers. The retreat, however, was effected in good order ; but when the whole had retired, a body of the enemy collected and formed on a rising ground in extended order, equal to the front of a regiment 1,000 or 1,200 strong, and fired a couple of volleys.

The loss of two good officers, Captain Wilson and Captain Lock, I deeply lament.

I shall commence to fall back to-morrow morning upon Kowulsur, where the brigade was formerly encamped, to be further removed from the Sikh troops, with the advantage of having forage for our cattle, and being near Peshawur for supplies, besides not running the risk we do here of having the water cut off from the hills. But from the insufficiency of cattle to carry our camp equipage, &c., only one-half of the brigade will be able to move at a time, and the remainder will avail itself of its services on the following day. I hope, when an efficient Commissariat officer arrives with General Pollock, he may be able to do something to remedy this evil.

I beg to represent, that disproportionate to our eventual wants as the quantity of ammunition we brought with us originally was, it has been greatly reduced by these three last engagements, and that it would be most desirable to have a store to indent upon nearer at hand than Delhi, or even Ferozepore.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

P.S.—26th January. I regret to say, I can only transmit the return of killed and wounded, of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley's detachment. His report will follow to-morrow.

No. 162.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch to Captain Ewart.*

*Camp, Junrood, January 25, 1842.*

SIR,—Agreeably to instructions from Brigadier Wild, commanding, I proceeded with the corps and detachments mentioned in my report of yesterday, to the entrance of the Shadee Ghurree Pass, for the purpose of meeting and assisting the 53rd and 64th Regiments Native Infantry.

The column arrived at the appointed time (daybreak) ; but previous to entering the nullah, I dispatched Acting-Captain Ross, 30th Regiment, and Brevet-Captain Geils, 60th Regiment, with four companies from each regiment, the former to crown the heights on the right, the latter on the left of the nullah. The right hills in the line of ascent, taken (at the suggestion of some friendly mountaineers,) proved too abrupt, and were not crowned so far in advance as could have been wished ; but the position taken by the companies had the effect of preventing the ascent of a number of the enemy who were in a village, commanded by these companies. The hills to the left were completely in our possession in about an hour, reserves, &c., in order.

These arrangements being made, the column advanced ; and on reaching the barricade found it again blocked up with brushwood, but only one layer, (on the morning of the 23rd there were several,) which was beaten flatly down, and covered by large stones, sufficient to prevent a body of men passing until it was burnt away, which could not be effected so quickly as desirable, being wet ; drag ropes were laid on, and the barricade removed. The stockade on the hill in front being again occupied, these positions were held until information was received that the regiments were near, when another party was thrown forward to the right of the stockade, and fresh supports sent to the assistance of the party posted on the left hills, which ultimately proved of the greatest assistance, by enabling them to retire with comparative impunity, only one man of them having fallen.

Previous to the arrival of the two corps at this head of my column, I had detached Captain Payne, 30th, to draw off one or more of the companies from the right hills, to form a good reserve for our retreating upon. When the two regiments were sufficiently retired, with their sick and wounded, baggage, &c., in safety, the companies upon the right of the stockaded hill reformed at the barricade, and then proceeded to retire in extended order, keeping a brisk fire to the mouth of the pass, covered by the guns, which were placed in position with the reserve on the rising ground in our rear.

To my knowledge, the whole of the troops employed on this occasion, exerted themselves to the attainment of the object in view, with the greatest gallantry ; the loss, it appears, fell heaviest on the covering party of the 60th to the left, where the Khyberces were collected in great numbers. I have also to regret the loss of Brevet-Captain Lock, 5th

Native Infantry, doing duty with the 60th, who was killed on the heights to the right, where his company was detached from the reserve, consequent on those first detached for this point having failed, from the cause before mentioned, to reach it.

I request you will inform the Brigadier commanding, that I feel greatly indebted to yourself and Brevet-Captain Geils, 60th, for the very efficient aid rendered me by both during the retirement of the column.

I have the honour to annex a statement of killed and wounded on the occasion.

I have, &c.,

J. TULLOCH.

*Return of Killed and Wounded of the Force employed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Tulloch, at the Entrance of the Khyber Pass, on the 24th of January, 1842.*

*Camp, Jumrood, January 25, 1842.*

	Killed.			Wounded.							
	Brevet Captain.	Naicks.	Sepoys.	Lieutenant.	Ensign.	Subadar.	Harildars	Naicks.	Sepoys.	Privates.	Sowars.
Detachment 3rd Irregular Cavalry . . .	...	...	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
4th Company 60th Battalion Artillery . . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..
30th Regiment Nat. Inf. . .	..	...	..	...	..	..	1	..	6	...	..
60th ditto ditto . . .	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	5	45	..	..
Total . . .	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	5	51	2	1
Grand Total . . .	3			67							

*List of Officers killed and wounded.*

Killed :—Brevet-Captain Lock, 5th Native Infantry, doing duty with 60th Regiment.

Wounded slightly :—Lieutenant Phillips, 60th.

Ditto severely :—Ensign Halhed, 54th Native Infantry, doing duty with 60th.

J. TULLOCH, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

R. S. EWART, *Brevet-Captain.*

F. C. WILD, *Brigadier.*

*Return of Killed and Wounded of the Detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Moseley, on the return from Ali Musjid, on the 24th of January, 1842.*

*Camp, Junrood, January 25, 1842.*

	<i>Killed.</i>					<i>Wounded.</i>					
	<i>Captains.</i>	<i>Subadar.</i>	<i>Havildars.</i>	<i>Naicks.</i>	<i>Sepoys.</i>	<i>Ensigns.</i>	<i>Subadars.</i>	<i>Jemadars.</i>	<i>Havildars.</i>	<i>Naicks.</i>	<i>Sepoys.</i>
53d Regt. N. I. ....	..	2	..	1	7	1	2	..	5	3	19
64th ditto ditto.....	1	..	1	1	19	1	1	2	9	7	98
Total ....	1	2	2	2	26	2	3	3	14	10	117
Grand Total....	32					148					

*List of European Officers killed and wounded.*

Killed :—Captain A. Wilson, 64th Native Infantry,

Wounded :—Ensign Baron Von Meyern, 53d Native Infantry, severely.

Ditto :—Ensign Rattray, 64th Native Infantry, severely.

G. W. MOSELEY, Lieutenant-Colonel,

R. S. EWART, Brevet-Captain.

F. C. WILD, Brigadier.

*No. 163.—Brigadier Wild to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, January 28, 1842.*

SIR,—In continuation of my letter of the 25th instant, with a post-script of the 26th, I have the honor to inclose Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley's report of the occurrences which took place since the evening he was detached in command of the 53rd and 64th Regiment Native Infantry, to occupy Ali Musjid, until adverse circumstances compelled him to abandon that post on the morning of the 24th instant.

I suffer in mind more than I can express, that the urgent call for relief of the Jellalabad force, and the intervening necessity of securing Ali Musjid, has induced me to yield, against the dictates of my better judgment, (as previously reported by me for his Excellency's information,) to take a step that has had such a fatal result ; but when I resolved to yield to necessity, I was assured that I could depend on the co-operation of a part of the Sikh troops, after their arrears had been paid up to them by cash, which the Political Agent advanced to General Avitabile, who came out to Junrood on purpose to disburse it. I thought also, that the guns,



after having been tried and repaired, would not, in time of need, fail and prove worthless ; and however sensible of the danger of the undertaking, I considered I might, at a risk, succeed in getting, with a sufficient part of my force, through the pass to carry help to Jellalabad, or else facilitate Sir Robert Sale's retreat, agreeable to the tenor of a paragraph of my instructions, which enjoined me to run that risk in the event of such a contingency. But insufficiency of carriage, faithless allies, and worthless guns, together with inexperienced troops in hill warfare, and who have seen no service for upwards of twenty years, every circumstance seemed to combine to frustrate my attempt ; and I trust his Excellency will, in judging of my conduct, allow me the benefit of these considerations.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.

No. 164.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley to Captain Ewart.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, January 26, 1842.*

SIR,—In obedience to instructions communicated in your letter, bearing date the 15th instant, placing me in command of the 53rd and 64th Regiments Native Infantry for secret service, I began my march at 10 P.M. of the same day, in progress to Ali Musjid, and reached that place with little opposition at eight o'clock next morning.

As we approached Ali Musjid, and enemy appeared in considerable numbers to the front, and on either flank, and here a few of our men were wounded.

Detachments were immediately sent off to dislodge the enemy from the heights, a duty which was effected in good style, and without further casualty on our side.

I now proceeded with the main column round the base of the isolated hill on which the fortress stands, in order to make myself acquainted with its localities.

Ali Musjid consists of two small forts, which are connected by a weak and dilapidated wall. The low oblong rock on which it stands is commanded by two hills of considerable eminence, of which one is to its south, the other to its west.

These positions I found to be occupied by small parties of the Jezail-chee garrison, but I lost no time in detaching for their more secure retention, a complete company under an European officer, to each of them. I at the same time strengthened, with the assistance of the sappers and miners, the breastworks that had already been erected on them.

On the morning of the 17th, the enemy appeared in strength on all sides of the fort, and apparently designed to cut off our water, and to drive us from the two heights.

To frustrate the first of these designs, a party was sent down to the side of the stream which supplied the garrison\*, and assisted by some Jezailchees of the original garrison, whose large rifles carry twice as far as our muskets, it succeeded in maintaining a safe communication between the water and the fort.

\* This water-guard was afterwards relieved daily.

Meantime the companies on the southern and the western points were actively engaged in repelling the attacks of the enemy, who (without themselves incurring much exposure) fired on our men from a distance, and with a precision of aim which neither the weapon, nor the skill of our sepoys, could equal.

In these affairs many of Captain Mackeson's Jezailchees behaved admirably, and using, as they did, with equal aptitude, the same weapons employed by the enemy, their services were of much assistance to us on the present, and on all similar occasions.

I regret to say that Ensign Swinton, of the 53rd Regiment, was on that day (the 17th) severely wounded, while heading his men in charging a party of the enemy from the immediate neighbourhood of the southern height, where this is united with a ridge of table-land.

Other casualties also occurred on that day, as will be seen by the inclosed letters from Major Hoggan, commanding the 53rd Regiment, and the late Captain Wilson, commanding the 64th Regiment.

From this date the enemy, attracted (no doubt) to the mouth of the Pass, by Brigadier Wild's demonstration in that quarter, gradually diminished in force, and we were for some days almost wholly unmolested, and were busily employed in completing the defences of the fort, but on the morning of the 23rd, they again appeared in considerable numbers, and we were again engaged all day in checking them.

The continued occupation of the fortress would, however, have been a work of no difficulty, and we might have defied the efforts of any number of such an enemy as were opposed to us, had we been adequately supplied with provisions; but through some mismanagement, only eighty bullock-loads of grain had been brought up by the rear-guard from Jumrood, on the night of the 15th, whereas I had been led to expect, that three hundred would have accompanied me.

On the morning of the 23rd, finding the remnant of our stores to be only five maunds of atta for the subsistence of 2,500 men; men who had already been five or six days on half rations, and who had been exposed for eight days without bedding, and without tents, to an inclement climate, and who were daily thronging into hospital, I reluctantly obeyed an inevitable necessity, and arranged for evacuating the post and cutting my way to Jumrood.

The importance of retaining possession of the post of Ali Musjid was, however, so strongly impressed upon me by Captain Mackeson, the Political Agent, that when about this time my detachment staff, Brevet-Captain Thomas, gallantly came forward and volunteered to hold it (with only four or five days' scanty provision) with 150 of the original Jezailchee garrison, I felt it my duty not to oppose the proposition, dangerous as the experiment doubtless would have been, and on the night of the 23rd, arrangements were completed by the Political Agent for making over the command of the higher and smaller of the two forts to Captain Thomas.

But on the morning of the 24th, Captain Mackeson represented to me that his Jezailchees had changed their minds, and had resolved not to remain, after the departure of the two regiments under my command.

The evacuation of the fortress had now become inevitable, and the collective force marched on the morning of the 24th, about day-break.

Our return was accomplished in the face of a wary and active foe,

whose numbers always considerable, were invariably found to be greatest above the narrower and more difficult defiles.

Among the precipitous heights that skirt the Shadee Buguar and Kafir Jungce Passes, they were especially numerous, and here, in spite of our best exertions in crowning the heights, and checking their attacks on the rear-guard, they directed against us from beneath the shelter of their steep and scarcely perceptible "sungahs," a galling fire, which inflicted on us a heavy loss in killed and wounded.

It was here that able and gallant officer, Captain Alexander Wilson, fell at the head of the 64th Regiment.

About this time, finding that the cattle, from having been almost starved during the preceding six days, were too feeble to carry their burdens, I sent orders to Lieutenant Corsar, the officer commanding the rear-guard, to relinquish all such cattle as had a tendency to delay his movements, and to come up and join the main body. This he accordingly did, and after four hours' hard fighting we succeeded in reaching Jumrood.

I have deeply to deplore the numerous casualties that have befallen the detachment under my command, although it is some satisfaction to know, that the loss on the part of the enemy was likewise considerable.

Inclosed is a copy of my order on the occasion, in which are enumerated the names of those officers who particularly attracted my attention during the engagement. I also inclose a list of killed and wounded.

Finally, I cannot abstain from an expression of my regret, I should have been unaccompanied by either cavalry or guns; a detachment of the former arm would have been most useful in cutting up the enemy between Ali Musjid and the Kafir Jungce Pass, where the baggage was chiefly plundered, and where the ground was good for cavalry to act upon.

I have, &c.,

G. W. MOSELEY.

No. 165.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Camp, Sirhind, January 13, 1842.*

MY LORD,—At a late hour yesterday, I had the honor to receive the dispatch of your Lordship in Council, of the 21st instant.

2. To enable me to form, and hold in readiness, another brigade to move across the Punjab, I ordered Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, by express, to move to Kurnaul, where further orders will await the corps. There will be little delay, as their marching establishment was retained.

3. When the 3rd Dragoons and 31st arrive at Ferozepore, I shall have ample means of forming such a force as your orders, now acknowledged, prescribe; leaving at that station as many troops as present circumstances seem to require, viz. :—

Artillery—A troop, a company and a half, the field-battery of the former drawn by camels.

Cavalry—Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, 1st Light Cavalry.

Infantry—Her Majesty's 31st Foot, 6th, 19th, 33rd, 55th Regiments

of Native Infantry, 1st Light Infantry Battalion, 244 recruits of Her Majesty's 13th and 44th Regiments.

4. From these corps I shall be able to select the most serviceable, but as your Lordship does not order their advance, I presume that I am expected to exercise my judgment as to the necessity of increasing the force at Peshawur, either in view to the security of Sir Robert Sale's force, or of the Sikh territory, west of the Indus.

5. We yesterday received accounts of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley's retreat from Ali Musjid with the 53rd and 64th Regiments, in which some loss was sustained ; but the official report has not been received. Of course the difficulty of forcing the Khyber Pass, especially with such a convoy as could supply Jellalabad for a month, is greatly increased.

6. Major-General Pollock will, I believe, reach Attock about the 2nd of February, and will, I trust, be in possession of intelligence, by which beneficially and safely to guide his ulterior proceedings.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 166.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*February 1, 1842.*

MY LORD,—In order to keep Major-General Pollock informed of your Lordship's views and orders, I have transmitted to him an extract from the official letter from Government of the 21st ultimo.

2. I have added thereto the following paragraph, which I trust your Lordship will approve :—

“ You may deem it perfectly certain that Government will not do more than detach this brigade, and this in view to support Major-General Sale either at Jellalabad for a few weeks, or to aid his retreat ; very probably also to strengthen the Sikhs at Peshawur for some time. It is not intended to collect a force for the reconquest of Cabool.

“ You will convey the preceding paragraph, if you safely can, to the Major-General.”

3. I am not at all anxious to weaken the Nepaul frontier, by calling up the 2nd European Regiment. On the contrary, as soon as the 31st Foot was directed to march to Kurnaul, I ordered Her Majesty's 3rd Foot to be moved by an easy march, two halts in each week, *via* Delhi, to Cawnpore, there to incorporate a large body of recruits, and to benefit by change of air and scene, which they still require.

4. By this arrangement the barracks at Kurnaul and Meerut will accommodate the infantry which it may be practicable to withdraw in March and April from the westward. The Buffs would probably have suffered much had they marched so late in the season.

5. Your Lordship's orders for raising a corps of light cavalry shall be followed up, without the least delay, when received.

5. Mr. Clerk has been with us since his return from Saharanpore.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 167.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, February 12, 1842.*

SIR,—In reply to your Excellency's dispatch of the 1st instant, we beg to apprise your Excellency that, considering it most expedient that the complement of European regiments in the north-western provinces shall be fully kept up, we have judged it necessary to issue orders, through the Military Department, for the immediate march of the 2nd European Regiment from Gazeepore to Meerut, or such other station as your Excellency may direct in those provinces. Your Excellency is aware that the return of Her Majesty's 50th Regiment, from Moulmein, may shortly be expected, and that while we gather from the reports of the Resident at Nepaul no prospect of hostility on the part of the Goorkhas, the approaching season when malaria prevails in the Terai may remove all apprehension of any immediate danger from that quarter.

2. We are of opinion that temporary barracks should be constructed without delay, under your Excellency's orders, at Loodianah, Ferozepore, or some other situation near the Sutlej, for the accommodation of European troops, unless your Excellency should from the communications of Mr. Clerk, see reason to believe that Major-General Pollock's force will not fall back this season on our own frontier, under the instructions which we issued on the 10th instant.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W.W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, & H.T. PRINSEP.

No. 168.—*Mr. Maddock to the Military Board.*

*Fort William, February 14, 1842.*

GENTLEMEN,—The Governor-General in Council having received information that guns intended for the Cabool magazine were placed under convoy of the brigade which marched from the Sutledge towards Peshawur, on the 4th ultimo, and sent forward without any supply of ammunition, desires me to request from your Board, at the earliest possible date, full details and explanation on the subject.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

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No. 169.—*The Military Board to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Ordnance Department,  
Fort William, February 15, 1842.*

MY LORD,—We do ourselves the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Maddock's letter of the 14th instant, and in reply, to mention that the guns, therein alluded to, formed part of a consignment of ordnance stores sent by order of Government, as conveyed in Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart's letter of the 31st of March, 1841, from the Delhi magazine to that of Cabool, to complete the proportion of stores assigned to the Cabool magazine.

2. It will be evident to your Lordship that such consignments are necessarily made up of unconnected fragments, which would, on reaching the destination, be most valuable ; but while separate from the depôt of which they are intended to form a part, must, from the very nature of the consignment, be useless for immediate service.

3. Military authorities would, in fact, be more warranted in expecting that a fleet of store-boats proceeding from the Presidency to Allahabad, should at once be convertible into a serviceable siege equipment, than in expecting that guns or carriages, proceeding under convoy from Ferozepore to Cabool, should at once be available for field service.

4. Under such circumstances, the stores referred to might, doubtless, be turned to good account by a little previous arrangement ; and, in this particular instance, we are fully satisfied that the Commissary of Ordnance at Delhi or at Ferozepore would, if so ordered, have very speedily arranged for the dispatch of any necessary quantity of ammunition ; but we trust that your Lordship in Council will perceive that instructions to this effect could not have emanated from us, ignorant, as we necessarily were, of there being any intention of so employing them.

5. We may, moreover, state that, although the guns above referred to were necessarily incomplete as regards limbers, ammunition-waggon, and stores of every description, there were, at the time of their quitting Ferozepore, four spare 9-pounders and two spare 6-pounder guns completely equipped in every respect, and available for immediate service in the depôt at that station.

No. 170.—*Captain Macheson to Mr. Maddock.*

*Futtyghur, January 27, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report to you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, the events that have occurred on this frontier since the arrival here of the force under Brigadier Wild's command.

2. Had this force been sent up in an efficient state as to ammunition and carriage, and with cavalry and artillery, it might, at the time of its arrival here, have advanced through the Khyber Pass to the support of Major-General Sale's force at Jellalabad. The Afreedee tribes had not, up to that time, heard of our troops having evacuated Cabool ; and they would have allowed Brigadier Wild's force to pass through Khyber unmolested for a sum of money ; neither had they at the time organized any opposition, for they had no hope of seeing any leader from the existing Government of Cabool appear in the plains of Ningrahar, and such was the eagerness of our Sepoys to meet the enemy at that time, that we could have forced our way through, if necessary, with little loss. Unfortunately, days and weeks elapsed in making arrangements for our carriage, and in obtaining from the Sikhs the loan of artillery, whose inefficiency has been a main cause of our subsequent disaster, while the delay at Peshawur, as it threw our Sepoys into close intercourse with the mutinous and disaffected Sikh troops, destroyed their confidence in themselves, and imbued them for a time with a spirit of insubordination.

3. I need not here advert to General Sale's frequent and pressing requisitions on Brigadier Wild to appear with his force under the

walls of Jellalabad. It was Brigadier Wild's earnest wish to comply with these requisitions, provided he could make the movement with a chance of success ; but without cavalry and artillery, and without co-operation from the Sikh troops to keep open the Khyber Pass, the movement could not well be attempted. Every endeavour was made on my part to induce the Sikh authorities to co-operate, and at length, on the 13th instant, General Avitabile and the other Sikh officers here pledged themselves to support our troops, and charged themselves with guarding Ali Musjid, and the road from Peshawur to it, while our troops should advance with some guns and Patan horse of the Sikh Government as far as Jellalabad. All that was wanting for the completing of this arrangement was a lac and 40,000 rupees to pay the Sikh battalions ; and, under the pressing exigencies of the occasion, I incurred the responsibility of advancing that sum as a loan to the Sikh from the British Government. Meanwhile, the delay that occurred in effecting the above arrangements made it more difficult to come to any terms with the Afreedee tribes. They had heard of Mahomed Akbar's defiance of us in his brutal and treacherous murder of the Envoy and Minister, and they had also heard that our troops at Cabool had ceased to struggle with the enemy, and were preparing to evacuate their quarters on the faith of treaties. They also knew, at the same time, that Mahomed Akbar had no intention of keeping these treaties, as he had written to them and to the tribes in Ningrahar to exterminate all the Feringees in their quarter, and to let none escape or pass up or down through Khyber. The Maliks of the Afreedees put me off with promises, while the tribes daily made desultory attacks on our garrison at Ali Musjid. On the 13th the Maliks promised me a final answer in three days, and on the 15th they sent me their reply. it was decisive, "that they would not barter their religion for gold, nor incur the odium and contempt of their brother Mussulmans, by allowing our troops to pass"—that I was at liberty to act as I pleased. In a letter to Mr. Mackeson (who held the fort of Ali Musjid with a Mussulman garrison of 150 men, chiefly Eusofzyes), dated 10th instant, they had warned him to look to his own safety. From that date to the 15th, Ali Musjid was subject to frequent attacks from the tribes during the day, but they left the post unmolested at night. On the 15th instant it was attacked by about 1,500 men, and Mr. Mackeson wrote to me that the interior of the fort being commanded from the surrounding hills, and the fire kept up on him all day being very galling, he did not expect, in the disaffected state of the garrison, to be able to hold his post twelve hours longer. I had also information that the tribes intended to attack Ali Musjid with all their force on the following day, and also to barricade and guard the road to Ali Musjid in several places.

4. The objects which Brigadier Wild and myself had proposed to effect with his force were, first, to move on to the support of General Sale, provided the Sikhs could be induced to co-operate so far as to keep the road open from Peshawur to Ali Musjid, and assist the garrison of irregulars in keeping that post. We were also prepared at any time that General Sale should require it of us, in order to cover his retreat, to advance, lightly equipped, into the pass, and occupy in it the two strong positions of Ali Musjid and Lundikhana. A third movement which we were aware might be demanded of us was, an advance of part of the

force to Ali Musjid, should it be hotly attacked, to prevent that important post falling into the hands of the enemy. Once in strong possession of Ali Musjid, we were available either for General Sale's retreat, or for General Pollock's advance to his support, while any objection to dividing the force was in a great measure obviated, owing to the short distance—eight miles—from our camp in front of Jumrood to Ali Musjid, which admitted of musketry firing being heard from either detachment.

5. On the 15th, as I have before stated, Ali Musjid was fiercely attacked, and the post in danger. On that day also I had received the final answer of the Afreedees; and on the same day, the Sikh auxiliary force, who were encamped at Jumrood, were to be paid to enable them to advance with us on the following morning. I left Peshawur at four p. m., and our camp at Kowalsar in the evening, and went to Futti Ghur to call on General Avitabile, and ask him to send one corps of the Sikh auxiliaries in rear of the two regiments who, it had been determined, should advance to Ali Musjid immediately, under cover of the night. The Sikh commanders were sent for, and the movement was proposed to them, but they pleaded that their pay had not yet been entirely distributed, and that their men would willingly march on the following morning. From what I saw of the disposition of these officers, I had little hope of receiving any aid from the Sikh troops; it was, however, necessary to secure the post of Ali Musjid, and we started with the two regiments, prepared, in case the Sikhs should not advance with the remainder of our force, to hold the post with two regiments until General Pollock's arrival. Five hundred and odd bullocks, laden with atta, ghee, &c., had been sent on to Futti Ghur a day previously, and while our troops were advancing at night from Kowalsar to Futti Ghur, I had these bullocks laden and drawn up by the road-side. After this I separated 350 bullocks to accompany the column, and allowed the rest to return to their former standing-places. When the column arrived at Futti Ghur, it was halted for some time to wait for ammunition. During this interval I reported to the commanding-officer, Colonel Moseley, that the provision bullocks were all collected on the left of the column, and begged he would give orders for their being taken charge of by the officers commanding the rear guard or some other. He gave the order to some mounted officer standing by to convey. After another interval of some minutes, and seeing that no arrangement had yet been made for placing the bullocks anywhere in the column, I again drew Colonel Moseley's attention to the subject, telling him that the guarding of the bullocks was of vital importance to us. He again issued some orders about their being placed between the column and rear guard, and I went myself to the rear of the column to ask for the rear guard, but could find none. I believe that, up to that time, it had not been formed. The head of the column was now advancing; I passed up to the front, and on my way, seeing the bullocks still standing together apart from the column, I applied to the nearest officer, Captain Leadbeater, and begged he would see that they were taken care of, as their coming with us was of vital importance. As far as I recollect, he ordered a paik and four to see the bullocks put between the column and the rear guard. I went on the front. The head of the column had arrived opposite the post of Shina Khan Afreedee, and it was most important that we should pass this point



without observation, but the column was halted there waiting for the rear. I then once more asked Colonel Moseley if he had satisfied himself that the bullocks had been put in charge in their proper place. To the best of my recollection he sent Captain Thomas back, or it was another mounted officer, to ascertain that they were coming on. I remained at the head of the advanced guard after this till day dawned on us below Ali Musjid, as the utmost caution was required to prevent any confusion in case of a rush or surprise in front.

6. My information had led me to believe that our movement at night would be a complete surprise, and it was so. Our march to Ali Musjid was effected without loss, either of men or baggage, or useless expenditure of ammunition; but instead of 350 bullocks laden with supplies, with those in the garrison, would have enabled us to hold out a month, the officer in command of the rear guard brought up with him to Ali Musjid between fifty and sixty bullocks only. This unfortunate oversight entirely defeated our plans. We were but little molested at Ali Musjid; we remained there eight days on half rations until our supplies were quite exhausted; we had not more than for one day at quarter rations when we left the post.

7. The Sikh regiments, who were to have co-operated and accompanied the remainder of Brigadier Wild's force, mutinied on the night of the 16th. Brigadier Wild made an attempt to join us with the remainder of the force without the Sikhs, but met with a reverse in the attempt, owing, in a great measure, to the breaking down of the Sikh guns at the outset. On the day he marched, we were under arms at Ali Musjid, prepared to move to his support; but we had not received positive information that he intended coming, and therefore feared to risk uselessly the expenditure of ammunition. The wind was excessively high and contrary, and prevented firing being heard. On the 23rd we were again under arms, ready to join him and bring up supplies: but the positive information that he had moved to make a demonstration did not reach us till late in the day. We heard firing, but did not consider that we should be justified in moving and wasting our ammunition on an uncertainty, and when the firing was heard, it was too late for us to have reached the ground in time to form a junction with him. On the 25th, after trying in vain to get supplies in by a by-road from Lalpoora and Tatara, we came to the determination of cutting our way out of the pass. We left Ali Musjid at day-break, and our rear and front were both attacked before we got clear of the fort, and some loss there occurred. Our whole loss, including sick men cut up, has been about 40 killed, 130 wounded, during our stay and our retreat. We were met by Colonel Tulloch's force at the mouth of the pass. I tried every means to induce the garrison of irregulars to continue to hold the post for five days, for which period there were provisions for them and an ample supply of water, but they refused. Captain Burt volunteered to remain with a party of regulars, no Sepoys would volunteer. Captain Thomas volunteered to remain with the irregular garrison, as did Mr. Mackeson, but the men would not remain. The loss of Ali Musjid will most likely bring with it the loss of the post at Lalpoora, and the ejection of Turabaz Khan from the chiefship of that place. It has also considerably increased the difficulty of forcing the Khyber Pass. A party of Door-

ancee horsemen belonging to Akbar Khan, who were said to be at Peshbulak, on hearing of our having evacuated Ali Musjid, came and encamped below it. It would not appear that the fort itself has been occupied, and the Afredees are debating among themselves whether or not to destroy it.

I have, &c.,

F. MACKESON.

No. 171.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, February 15, 1842.*

SIR,—We have received, from Mr. Clerk and Mr. Melville, two express dispatches, of the 4th and 6th instant, and the letter from Captain Mackeson at Peshawur, dated the 27th ultimo.

2. We reserve any particular remarks or instructions on the communications made by Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk and Mahomed Akbar Khan, through Captain Macgregor and Major Pottinger respectively till we shall have received the two letters from Major Pottinger, referred to in the postscript to Captain Macgregor's letter of the 25th ultimo. But, in the mean while, we lose no time, in continuation of our last dispatch, of the same purport, in desiring your Excellency expressly to instruct Major-General Pollock to direct all his efforts and measures to the withdrawal of Sir Robert Sale's force from Jellalabad to Peshawur, with the least possible delay, the Major-General having a full discretion, if he finds it proper, in aid of his own military proceedings, to make such arrangements with the Khyberes, or other tribes, as may seem most likely to facilitate the easy attainment of that object.

3. We think that the rapid advance of the complete efficient brigade ordered from Ferozepore, according to our recent instructions, will be highly conducive to the support of Major-General Pollock in his measures for recalling Sir Robert Sale's force, or generally for holding a strong position while in front of the enemy on the Afghan frontier; and we take it for granted that your Excellency will have placed that brigade in march, immediately on the receipt of our last letter, under date the 10th instant.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W.W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, & H.T. PRINSEP.

No. 172.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Loodiana, February 6, 1842.*

MY LORD,—There is a passage in Captain Mackeson's report to Mr. Maddock, dated 27th January, on which I feel it necessary to make some comments. It is the following:—

“Had this force been sent up in an efficient state with ammunition and carriage, and with cavalry and artillery, it might at the time of its

arrival here have advanced through the Khyber Pass to the support of Major-General Sale's force at Jellalabad."

Now, my dear Lord, the reasons why the four first regiments went so provided as this officer describes, are these :—Captain Mackeson to Captain Lawrence, 9th November.

"I request you will urge on the military authorities at Ferozepore the necessity of hastening by every means in their power the dispatch of the brigade named for the Cabool relief."

*Idem.* "It is highly desirable that the brigade destined for Affghanistan should arrive here as expeditiously as possible."

In consequence, on the 16th November, Mr. Clerk ordered the 64th and 60th Native Infantry to cross as soon as the latter was ready, and they did pass into the Punjab on the 18th and 20th November, that is, in 9 and 11 days after Captain Mackeson's requisition. He also ordered the 53rd from this place to Ferozepore.

There is no mention of ammunition, carriage, cavalry, or artillery. The essence of the demand was, "Send hither Native Infantry most quickly," and it was very promptly attended to. I claim no credit here, for I received Mr. Clerk's notification of the demand when two marches south of Futtyghur on the 22nd November, that is, two days after the last corps had crossed the Sutlej.

Acting upon the foregoing, Captain Lawrence, on the 14th, recommends Lieutenant-Colonel Wild to hold the 10th Cavalry in immediate readiness to move with the two infantry regiments, pending instructions from Mr. Clerk, who thus wrote to me on the 17th : "Your Excellency will have observed that I have limited the requisition which I have presumed to make upon the commanding officers at Lahore and Ferozepore, to the three infantry regiments which were preparing to march to Affghanistan. I consider that this is what Captain Mackeson means in his urgent request for the dispatch of the brigade named for the Cabool relief. I therefore have not followed up the intimation made by Captain Lawrence to the commanding officer at Ferozepore regarding artillery and cavalry, by requesting that a detachment of either should move forward." Mr. Clerk wished these regiments to move lightly, and directed eight lacs of rupees to be left, "that nothing may retard the arrival at Peshawur of the first regiment moving up."

Mr. Clerk, in the same letter, 17th November, leaves the decision regarding cavalry and artillery to me ; all which I received at Futtyghur on the 24th November ; and a reference to reports and dates shows, that the 30th and 53rd, under Brigadier Wild's command, crossed over on the 26th, (known to me 3rd December,) my timely interference was therefore impossible.

Captain Lawrence writes, 14th November, to Colonel Wild : "The commanding officer should not be hampered with any extra stores, or by the charge of ladies, but have under his care simply the treasure, and such magazine stores as are deemed absolutely necessary, for supplying the immediate wants of our troops in Affghanistan."

On the same day Captain Lawrence tells Mr. Clerk, "If four guns can be made effective, they also shall be ready." This alludes to the field-battery guns, of which three are now with Major-General Pollock.

Before the 30th and 53rd had left Ferozepore, the outbreak of the 2nd

November was known to Mr. Clerk, who, on the 22nd, requested Major-General Boyd to prepare another brigade, of which he requested Sir R. Arbuthnot to send the 9th Foot to form a part.

It is an extraordinary coincidence that, on the same day, the 22nd November, I ordered the 9th to be moved to Kurnaul, and eventually to Ferozepore, in order to relieve the 13th Light Infantry, and I informed your Lordship on the 20th, of my intention, thus : "I propose that Her Majesty's 9th should proceed with the second convoy."

Captain Mackeson to Mr. Clerk, 16th November. "P.S.—Unless troops arrive quickly from Ferozepore, the most disastrous consequences must follow."

I should first have quoted Captain Mackeson's letter of the 15th, to Mr. Clerk :—

"The force that moves from Ferozepore should consist of two brigades, with one, if not two, regiments of Europeans, and the brigades should follow each other as quickly as possible."

Here, again, Captain Mackeson's requisition is confined to troops. Sir R. Sale, it is true, on the 13th November, received at the same time, asks for a siege-train, but it was "to enable them to retrieve things by active operations at the conclusion of the winter."

When Captain Mackeson penned his paragraph now replied to, he seems to me to have forgotten that there is no magazine at Ferozepore ; and, when he expected every one to forward his views instantly, that the seat of Government is 1180 miles from Ferozepore. I was then 456 miles from that place. Major-General Boyd was 203 miles distant. The Delhi magazine 281 ditto.

Mr. Clerk was the only authority on the spot ; and he evinced great decision, increased by promptitude.

To return to the artillery question, Mr. Clerk, on the 27th November, the day after the 30th and 53rd crossed the Sutlej, referred this subject to Major General Boyd, stating, at the same time, "I believe the Ferozepore artillery (the field-battery) is, for want of horses, incapable of moving." This involved the troublesome discussion of horses and bullocks ; and General Boyd therefore ordered a troop of horse artillery to be prepared.

I received these notifications on the 1st December and subsequent days ; and, considering that the dispatch of horse artillery with infantry, was only to obtain horse draft, I directed the substitution of three guns of the field-battery. The great utility of artillery in the pass we have yet to learn, and as an artillery officer, General Pollock will, probably, attach the full weight to that arm. To me it seems, that a gun unlimbered and fired two or three times at an enemy perched on the side of an adjoining mountain, within musket range, would run a great chance of being dismounted or overturned, or its carriage much shaken, by its own recoil, and that, whilst thus delayed, two or three men and a horse or two would be struck, thus adding to the delay of the column under fire.

As to cavalry, they can make no return at all, except upon open spaces.

The only mode of clearing the Khyber Pass appears to be by having bodies of well-armed, active, and daring troops acting as light infantry, on either hand, under whose protection the main body may pass. It was thus that Sir R. Sale effected the passage of the Khoord Cabool, the Huft

Kothul, the Sutterbund, the Puri-durra, and the Jugdulluck Passes ; and, though artillery accompanied his advance-guard, he lays no great stress upon their services\*, except that they were useful in reaching the Jezail-chees, whose arms carried so much further than our muskets ; and upon the last occasion they took the enemy's breast-works and defences in reverse.

I shall not weary your Lordship with further remarks ; the hurried manner in which Captain Mackeson made his requisitions has been the chief cause that the supplies and stores of all kinds were not more ample. There was no time given even to consider what might make the reinforcement more complete, far less to draw the ammunition and stores from Delhi.

Your Lordship will remember that it was for many days doubted by Government whether the 2nd Brigade (Her Majesty's 9th and the 26th Native Infantry) should be sent forward or not ; and that its advance was only ordered when Akbar Khan's having joined the rebels, and the action of the 23rd November at Cabool, were reported.

I beg that your Lordship will be pleased to permit this letter to be attached to Captain Mackeson's report of the 27th ultimo.

I shall address Major-General Pollock upon the subject of the bullock loads of supplies left behind upon the advance of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley's detachment.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 173.—*Brigadier England, commanding in Sind, to Mr. Maddock.*

*Head-Quarters, Sind Force,  
Camp, near Dadur, January 29, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the 6th instant inclosing an extract from a resolution of the Government of India in the Secret Department of the same date, and I beg to assure the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council that I shall pay implicit attention to the paragraphs which relate to the conduct of Military proceedings in Upper Sind.

2. As the shortest means of explaining our military position here, I beg to inclose a statement which will show the present distribution of the force in this part of the country, and I do not see, in the uncertainty which prevails of the point at which insurrection may first show itself, that it can be improved, for our numbers will not now admit of a large appui any where, at the same time it will be seen that the force can be easily collected, in any direction which may suddenly demand its display. Our magazines at this place, and at Sukkur, are plentiful, and I am happy to say that there is an abundance of provision at Quetta, even sufficient to supply the troops at Candahar, if they were, by any emergency, forced to retire in this direction.

\* Sale's artillery was drawn by yabhoos, which are greatly preferred to our horses for services there.

3. I have no doubt but that Major Outram, Political Agent for this country, will have informed Lord Auckland of the strong reasons we have to suppose that there has been an action with the insurgents near Candahar, and that the loss sustained by the enemy on that occasion has probably prevented their meditated descent upon Quetta, and I beg you will assure his Lordship that my knowledge of the constant communications made by Major Outram from hence has alone prevented my troubling his Lordship or the Government with reports, which would probably contain mere repetitions of the information conveyed by the Political Department. Regarding Quetta, however, every military defensive precaution has been adopted, and, although the cantonment is unconnected, and unfortunately placed, its locality offering no good position, I cannot but contemplate that the best results will follow any efforts which the enemy may make in that quarter.

4. As soon as the 12th and 15th Regiments Bombay Native Infantry reach Upper Sind, I propose to occupy Bagh and to strengthen Shikarpore, and if matters rendered such a step expedient, and that, with a due consideration for the safety of our rear, prudence would sanction it, I should not hesitate to ascend the Bolan Pass with a reinforcement, even now if also such a step was dictated by the state of affairs generally; at this moment, however, I do not view such a movement as essential or beneficial, for although the authorities at Candahar evidently regard some diversion from hence as highly desirable, yet it must not be forgotten that we have a large extent of doubtful country to watch, leaving a very small body disposable to march out of it. This season, I may remark, appears to be one of unusual severity.

5. I request to draw the early attention of the Right Honorable the Governor-General to the expediency which will exist of a total change in the distribution of the troops in the middle of March, owing to the alteration of the climate of this country at that period, when all the European troops should be placed above the passes if the Government adopts a forward movement, or in the other case fall back to the line of the Indus. Timely preparations for either of these movements should be made accordingly, and it is not necessary that I should explain the variety of arrangements belonging to such operations in a denuded country such as this, or the advantage in point of economy of my obtaining the earliest practicable decision thereupon.

6. In the first-named instance I would propose to place all the European and all other troops which could at that season be safely extracted from Cutchee and Upper Sind in the country adjacent to Quetta, but if we fall back it will be expedient to send the Europeans to Curachee for the hot season, and to concentrate the remainder of the force at Shikarpore and Sukkur. In the event, however, of a strong emergency existing for the detention of the European troops at Sukkur during summer, it might be practicable to obtain some cover for them at that place. Lord Auckland will have perceived from the medical statistical reports transmitted by me from hence, that with pre-arrangement of this kind there is no reason to conclude that Sukkur would be more fatal to European troops than Quetta has proved to be.

7. It is, however, quite unnecessary that I should at present say more on a question, the decision of which can but be determined by the course

of passing events and the political arrangements consequent on such events, and I will merely take the liberty, in conclusion, of again assuring Lord Auckland that in every matter confided to my discretion relating to the care and management of the troops under my command, and in the execution of any of the commands of Government, I shall employ my best ability and judgment, and act in due communication with the Political Agent with whom I am associated in this country.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

*Distribution of the Sinde Field Force.*

<i>Stations.</i>	<i>No. of Battalions</i>	<i>No. of Guns.</i>	<i>Corps.</i>
Sukkur . . . .	2	Three 6-pounders, 1st Grenadiers; 12th N. I. Golundauz. (not arrived).	
Shikarpore . . . .	..	Two 6-pounders, 8th N. I. and the 15th N. I. A. I. (when it arrives); one squadron 3rd L. C.	
Bagh . . . . .	..	.. ..	Intended to be occupied by a wing.
Sebec . . . . .	1	One 6-pounder, 21st Native Infantry. Golundauz.	
Dadur . . . . .	1½	Two 6-pounders, One troop 3rd L. C; four Golundauz; four companies H.M. 41st 6th; guns, H. A. N. I.	
Quetta . . . . .	2	Two 9-pounders, One company H. M. 41st; European Foot 20th N. I.; 25th N. I.; Artillery. and a company of European Artillery of the Bengal Army halted there when en route to Candahar.	
En route to join this Force . . . . .	1½	Camel battery, six 9-pounders.	Four companies H. M.'s 41st, and the 15th N. I.

NOTE.—630 irregular cavalry, divided into parties at each station, and a company of Madras Sappers, are stationed at Sebec and elsewhere.

R. ENGLAND.

No. 174.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee.*

*Fort William, March 22, No. 25, 1842.*

HONORABLE SIRS,—Although the events that have occurred in Afghanistan since the date of our last dispatch on this subject have been less important, and have not been marked by circumstances of great and heavy calamity, such as we had then the melancholy duty of reporting, we consider that it may be convenient if we refer briefly to the intelligence which we have received from that quarter, the detailed particulars of which may be gathered from the inclosures of this dispatch, before we proceed to explain our present views as to the policy to be

pursued in that country, and the measures which have been adopted to give them effect.

2. The latest accounts which we have received from Cabool are contained in a letter of Lieutenant J. P. Conolly, dated the 24th January, addressed to Mr. Clerk in which that officer states, that although Shah Shooja had found himself compelled to appear hostile to the British Government, and to talk of equipping an army to oppose us at the Khyber Pass, he secretly assured Lieutenant Conolly of his friendly feeling towards us. The King had been acknowledged by Nawab Zeman Khan, and the rebel chiefs, on the payment of two lacs of rupees to the Nawab, and Ameenollah Khan, of whom the former had been appointed Vizier, and the latter his deputy. Great praise is given in this letter to the conduct and good intentions towards the British Government of Zeman Khan, who is said not to have shared in the treachery of the other chiefs. Great excitement is said still to prevail at Cabool, where the feeling against us continued very strong; and it is added, all will unite to oppose our re-entering the country, unless our force is so large as to preclude the hope of successful opposition.

3. We have no accounts direct from Ghuznee, but it is believed, alike at Candahar, and at Jellalabad, and Peshawur, that the garrison under Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer still holds the citadel, which is well provisioned, and that the town is in the hands of the Affghans.

4. The accounts from Jellalabad extend down to the 24th ultimo. Up to that time the place had been threatened by Mahomed Akbar Khan, but he had not been able to collect a sufficient force to attempt a serious attack. His endeavours to raise the neighbouring chiefs and tribes against us had not been attended with any marked success, and he had failed in inducing the Khyber Maliks to espouse his cause, or to allow him to occupy Ali Musjid in the pass. Mahomed Akbar Khan was, at the same time, anxious to impress upon the officers who are his prisoners at Buddcabad, as well those at Jellalabad, that he is well disposed to them, and when the army expected from Cabool to operate against that place shall arrive in the neighbourhood he will assist them. The accounts received from Buddcabad continue to speak of the prisoners there being well treated; and they have been allowed to receive from Jellalabad such supplies of clothes and other necessities as their friends could send to them. Captain Macgregor has, however, received another letter from Shah Shooja, denouncing Mahomed Akbar, and warning that officer against him; and, whatever may be the professions of that leader, his acts serve to show that he is actuated by a determined spirit of hostility, modified only, perhaps, by considerations connected with the position of his own family in Hindostan.

5. Major-General R. Sale had, through the unwearied exertions of the troops and camp followers, succeeded in strengthening the fortifications to a degree that made him feel secure, as long as his supplies and ammunition lasted, against any attack that could be made against him, unsupported by siege artillery, but though he had provision for the troops enough to enable him to hold out for six weeks or two months, he was very scantily supplied with provender for his cattle, and had no money to purchase any description of supplies. This was on the 14th ultimo. On the 19th Sir Robert Sale reported also the deficiency of his means of



carriage for bringing off the troops, stores, and ammunition, if he should be compelled to evacuate Jellalabad, and attempt a retreat through the Khyber. On the same day he reports the occurrence of a severe shock of an earthquake, from which some of the bastions of the place had been greatly injured, and the parapet walls had been in many places thrown down. From a letter of Captain Macgregor, dated two days afterwards, it appears that the damage caused by the earthquake was not so serious as has been at first supposed, and that it would be soon repaired.

6. Sir Robert Sale and Captain Macgregor continued to press upon Major-General Pollock the expediency of advancing to their relief, and have been informed by that officer that, although he is reluctant to attempt an advance through the Khyber till he shall be joined by the reinforcements which are on their way to him from India, if, after a full consideration of the objections which he has explained to making such a move, Sir Robert Sale feels compelled to call upon him to advance, he will feel it his duty to comply with their requisition.

7. The Maliks of the Afreedees, and other Khyber tribes, being dissatisfied with the terms offered to them by Mahomed Akbar Khan, have been negotiating with General Pollock through Captain Mackeson, and hopes are entertained that they may yet be prevailed upon to allow us the undisturbed passage of the Khyber.

8. The troops of Brigadier Wild's Brigade have suffered severely from sickness, there being at one time upwards of 1,800 men in hospital. The disease, however, was not of a dangerous type, and, by the last accounts, the number of sick had diminished to 868.

9. The insurgents in the neighbourhood of Candahar, under Atta Mahomed and Prince Sufter Jung, having approached to within eight miles of that place, Major-General Nott determined to attack them, and went out for this purpose, with the greater part of his disposable force, on the morning of the 12th January. The enemy had taken up a strong position, with a morass on their front, which made the approach of our troops difficult, and enabled the enemy, who gave way almost as soon as our guns could approach near enough to open upon them, to effect their retreat with comparatively trifling loss, and our force in cavalry was too small to enable the General to act with great effect on their line of retreat. The Janbaz, and other cavalry of Shah Shooja, had previously deserted in great numbers, which is one cause of the General's weakness in this arm. General Nott had subsequently resolved to march out again to attack the enemy, but the severity of the weather had, up to the last accounts from Candahar, rendered such a measure impracticable. The General and the Political Agent anticipated a deficiency of funds in the Treasury in the month of March, and were considering the practicability of treasure being brought up by an escort from Quetta.

10. The force at Kelat-i-Ghilzye has hitherto remained unmolested and is considered strong and secure.

11. The attempts of Mohummud Sadik to rise a force in Pesheen for his contemplated attack on Quetta have proved abortive, and that position has been reinforced, and remains strong.

12. Brigadier England, commanding the troops in Sindh, had before the receipt of our instructions of the 31st January to that effect, made preparations for moving above the passes a portion of the force under his

command. He proposes to form a brigade, composed of the troops noted in the margin\*, and expected to be able to commence his march about the 20th of this month.

13. The young Khan of Kelat and his chiefs remain firm in their allegiance, and none of the tribes of Cutch, and near the Bolan Pass, have yet shewn symptoms of hostility consequent on the intelligence of our disasters at Cabool, and the combination of chiefs against us in the Candahar provinces. But Major Outram does not appear satisfied of the fidelity of the Ameers of Sind, and apprehensions have been felt of some serious exhibitions of a hostile spirit in that country. Brigadier England will, however, leave a strong force in Upper Sind when he moves above the Bolan Pass, and the post of Kurachee has lately been reinforced by Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment of Foot; and whatever may be the disposition of the Ameers, the force assembled at the two extremities of the territory is sufficient to overawe them, and to subdue any partial attempts that may be made to cause embarrassment.

14. We now proceed to state the measures which have been adopted in consequence of our instructions of the 10th ultimo, which we communicated to your Honorable Committee, in our dispatch of the 19th ultimo.

15. His excellency the Commander-in-Chief, on the receipt of our letter of the 10th ultimo, determined to dispatch, in two divisions, the troops noted in the margin†, for the reinforcement of Major-General Pollock. The first of these divisions was to commence its march immediately, but its progress was much impeded by the swollen state of the Ravee, and it cannot be expected to reach Peshawar before the first or second week in April; and the second division did not cross the Sutlej till the 8th instant.

16. On the 24th ultimo, we thought it proper to issue a letter of instructions to Major-General Pollock, in order to put that officer in possession of our views in certain contingencies which might occur. With respect to the application which had been made to Captain Macgregor by Shah Shooja for pecuniary aid, we thought that none should be afforded, while we have no assurance that such aid would not be employed in hostilities against ourselves, while our subjects are detained as captives in his country, and we declared our opinion, that since the Shah, however he might have been influenced to the measure, had accepted a position as head of the Government at Cabool, with the direct support of those principally concerned in the attacks on our force, the strict obligations of our treaty with him must be considered to have ceased.

17. Though doubts might still exist whether Mahomed Akbar Khan is guilty of the crime and treachery laid to his charge, we discouraged all thoughts of negotiating with him, unless through some indirect channel, for the release of the British captives in his hands. We recommended to Major-General Pollock the greatest caution in avoiding any positive plan

\* H. M. 41st Foot; Troop of Horse Artillery, 6 Guns; Company of European Foot Artillery; 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry; and 2 Regiments Bombay N. I. with about 22 lacs of rupees for Candahar.

† 1st Division: H. M.'s 3rd Dragoons; 3rd Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery; 1st Light Cavalry; 33rd N. I. a Rissalah 3rd Irregular Cavalry. 2nd Division: H. M.'s 31st Foot; 6th N. I.; Recruits of H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry; 3 Field Battery Guns; 3 Rissalahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

or course of policy which had not already received our sanction ; and we informed him that we should not consider it prudent, except for very special reasons, to disclose in any manner our probable eventual purposes with regard to Afghanistan.

18. Major-General Pollock was told that we should look to him for as clear an exposition as possible of past facts, as they affected the conduct and character of all parties in Afghanistan. We cautioned him as to his mode of proceeding to secure the release of the prisoners, and instructed him that if their liberation in exchange for Dost Mahomed Khan and his family should be brought forward, he might hold out very distant hopes of the possibility of such event, though he himself must regard it as a measure of important state policy, to be deliberately determined by Government, upon considerations affecting only the general well-being and advantage of the empire.

19. We explained to the Major-General, that the present object of his proceedings, next to securing the safe withdrawal of the force from Jellalabad, will be that of watching events, and collecting the most accurate information of the state of parties for report to us. For every matter relative to the Lahore Government and its officers, we assured General Pollock that he might always rely on the judicious advice of Mr. Clerk. We enjoined him to repress all disposition to encourage among the Sikhs a violent tone of national and religious animosity against the Affghans, and lead the former to look to making conquests from the latter. We directed the Major-General's particular attention to the condition of the garrison of Ghuznee, and told him that we could not relinquish the hope, that on the return of spring, efforts may be made for its support or relief from Candadar ; but that we would not, on that account, desist from urging the Sikhs to assist us by a demonstration on the side of the Juleree Pass, for communication with Colonel Palmer, and and if ultimately necessary, his retirement by that route.

20. We have recently judged it expedient to enter again upon an exposition of our views regarding the line of policy which it may be proper for us to pursue in relation to Afghanistan. To our dispatch of the 15th instant on this subject, addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, we would solicit the particular attention of your Honorable Committee. It contains our deliberate sentiments on the present position of affairs in that country, and the course we should pursue towards the retrieval of our late military disgrace, and our final withdrawal of our army from Afghanistan. It points out the conditions on which we can sanction the continuance during the coming season of Major-General Pollock's force in the valley of Jellalabad, after he shall have penetrated by force or by negociation the Khyber Pass. It discourages the expectation that Major-General Nott's force, through reinforced by that of Brigadier England, will, in consequence of the inefficiency of its field equipments, be able to effect much more than the relief of the posts of Kelat-i-Ghilzye and of Ghuznee, and the security of its own retirement to the Indus. To this letter is annexed a statement showing the strength and distribution of the British forces beyond the Indus and the Sutlej.

21. Major Rawlinson has suggested the expediency of a plan for retaining our influence in Afghanistan even after our army is withdrawn from the country, which consists in the separation of the Cabool and

Candahar divisions of Shah Shooja's dominions, and annexing the latter division to the possessions of Shah Kamran of Herát, but we have entirely discouraged this proposition ; and, indeed, we have no certain information that the Shah Kamran has emancipated himself from the thralldom in which he was lately held by his minister, Yar Mahomed, a decided enemy of the British Government.

22. We have judged it expedient and necessary to confer on Major-General Nott, or other senior officer serving with our armies in those countries, the command of all the troops in Lower Afghanistan and Sind, and the control of the Political officers employed in those countries and we have authorised him to take all such steps as he shall deem necessary for the perfect equipment of his army.

23. Mr. Clerk has announced his arrival at Amritsir, whither he proceeded to confer with Maharajah Shere Sing, on the state of the relations between the two countries, and the disposition and power of the Maharajah to afford us useful military co-operation, and Mr. Clerk's report, when received, will probably enable us to decide on the maintenance of any force in the neighbourhood of Peshawur during the ensuing season, in case Major-General Pollock determines on not occupying the valley of Jellalabad.

24. Dost Mahomed Khan has been removed from Saharunpore to Deyra Doon, where he is securely guarded.

25. By the inclosure No. 82 of this dispatch, your Committee will perceive that Mr. Clerk now entertains little doubt of the treachery and hostility of Shah Shooja, and thinks, that in consequence there are grounds for considering the policy of the release of Dost Mahomed, with our countenance to his recovery of his former power in Afghanistan.

26. Having received information that the guns intended for the Cabool magazine, which had been placed under convoy of the brigade which marched from Ferozepore towards Peshawur on the 4th of January last, were sent on without ammunition, we called on the Military Board to submit an early and full explanation on this subject.

27. In reply the Board stated, that the guns in question were sent in obedience to orders of the 31st March, 1841, to supply deficiencies in the Cabool magazine, and that consequently, they could not have expected to be immediately available for field service, unless orders had been given to make them so, and such orders the Board remarked, could not have emanated from them, ignorant as they necessarily were of there being any intention of so employing the guns in question. The Board further remarked, that although the guns referred to were necessarily incomplete, there were at the time of their quitting Ferozepore, four spare 9-pounders, and two spare 6-pounder guns completely equipped in every respect, and available for immediate service in the dépôt at that station.

28. We caused a copy of the above correspondence with the Military Board to be communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, for his Excellency's information, with reference to the observations contained in the 16th paragraph of our letter to your Honorable Committee of the 19th ultimo (No. 16,) a copy of this paragraph having been communicated to his Excellency.

We have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH, W. W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, & H. T. PRINSEP.

## POSTSCRIPT.

Since the conclusion of this letter, we have received a dispatch from Major-General Pollock, dated 6th instant, copies of which, and its inclosures, we transmit for your Committee's information.

The Major-General is looking anxiously for the arrival of the first division of the reinforcement on its way from India, considering the presence of Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, which forms part of that division, calculated to inspire confidence into the Sepoys. The negotiations with the Khyberes were in progress, but Major-General Pollock did not anticipate from them any beneficial results.

Among the inclosures of the Major-General's letters, are a copy and translation of a letter from Shah Shooja to the Governor-General, which we shall notice more fully hereafter, and copies of two letters from Major-General Sir Robert Sale, dated Jellalabad, March 1st, from which it will be seen that the desultory attacks of the force under Mahomed Akbar had been harmless to the garrison, that forage was still with difficulty procurable beyond the walls, and that there were only thirty-five days' rations of meat for the European portion of the garrison, that the force under Mahomed Akbar was computed at 1,500 horse, and 500 foot, and that they had suffered some loss from the fire of our guns.

Among the inclosures of the Major-General's dispatch, will be found letters from Captain Macgregor, at Jellalabad, and Lieutenant J. Conolly, at Cabool. The former officer advises Lieutenant Conolly to keep aloof from all party politics at Cabool, and to recommend to Colonel Palmer to hold his post at Ghuznee as long as it is possible to do so. From Lieutenant Conolly's letter it would appear, that dissension prevails among the chiefs at Cabool, and that the Shah was forming a party against the Barukzye faction, and had among his own partisans the chief conspirators in the late insurrection. It was generally asserted and believed at Cabool, that the Shah instigated the insurrection; and Lieutenant Conolly observes,—“I have never been able to prove the accusation, though I cannot but think that His Majesty was directly or indirectly the cause of the revolution.” Accounts from Ghuznee are alluded to, from which it would appear that Colonel Palmer is besieged in the citadel.

We have this day received letters from the Commander-in-Chief, and from Mr. Clerk, copies of which are inclosed.

The Commander-in-Chief's letter, of the 9th instant, gives cover to a copy of one addressed to his Excellency by Major-General Pollock, and dated the 3rd instant, in which that officer alludes to circumstances of a painful nature, regarding the aversion evinced by some of the Native troops to going beyond the Khyber, that may have an influence in determining the course which he will pursue. Major-General Pollock's intention of waiting for his reinforcements before attempting a forward movement, unless pressed by Sir Robert Sale to do so, remained unaltered.

Mr. Clerk writes from Amritsir, on the 6th instant, that he had held a conference with the Maharajah, regarding the mode of co-operation of the Sikh and British forces assembled near Peshawur. The Durbar urges the necessity of slow and cautious proceeding, and that General Pollock should wait the arrival of his reinforcements, in which case the

force under Golaub Sing will certainly co-operate, and orders to this effect have been addressed to Golaub Sing. Mr. Clerk had not thought it expedient yet to communicate to the Durbar the determination of the British Government to evacuate Afghanistan.

No. 175.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

Loodiana, February 5, 1842.

MY LORD,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt yesterday evening of the express dispatch of the 26th ultimo from your Lordship in Council, and the inclosures therein mentioned.

2. I shall be fully prepared, when Her Majesty's 31st Regiment reaches Ferozepore, to detach a brigade of three corps of infantry, a troop of artillery, and such cavalry as your Lordship may direct, before the end of this month.

3. Your Lordship having warned me of the imprudence of weakening our force too much in this quarter, I have directed that Her Majesty's 3rd Foot shall proceed to Meerut, instead of Cawnpore, to be joined at the former by the recruits. I am confident that this will contribute much to the restoration of this fine corps.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 176.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

Loodiana, February 5, 1842.

MY LORD,—On the night of the 6th instant I had the honor to receive your Lordship's dispatch of the 28th ultimo, directing me to inform Major-General Pollock and Nott, that they were not to receive any orders in future from Major-General Elphinstone, even if he should be released from his present confinement.

2. The communication to Major-General Nott was sent in triplicate, in this paper, to Major Outram, and it contained the concluding part of the second paragraph for his guidance.

3. Two days since I directed the Adjutant-General to transmit for the information of your Lordship in Council a return of the force at Candahar on the 15th of December, which will be very nearly its present strength.

4. At Mr. Clerk's request I propose to send the Peshawur reinforcement in two divisions, the first of which may, I think, cross over on the 19th or 20th instant.

5. The senior officers will conduct them very well to Peshawur, I have no doubt, and when a junction may be effected, Colonel Dennie, of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, will fall into the command of a brigade, which he so well deserves.

6. I have ordered Captain Codrington, of the Quarter-master-General's department, to proceed with the troops collecting at Ferozepore.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 177.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Loodiana, February 8, 1842.*

MY LORD,—Referring to the last passage of your Lordship in Council's letter of the 26th ultimo, I beg to state that I think the raising the complement of the three Ghoorka corps, and the Hurrana local battalion, to the present full complement of the regular regiments of infantry, is strongly to be recommended, the former in view to their assistance in the plains, but more especially to prepare us for the possible consequences of the late conflict between the Sikhs and Chinese upon our northern frontier.

I have directed the three levies authorized by the same dispatch to be raised, trusting, however, to your Lordship's indulgence to remove them to stations nearer to Oude, if the ranks should not fill speedily.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 178.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Loodiana, February 10, 1842.*

MY LORD,—The reports dated 25th and 28th of January from Brigadier Wild, were transmitted to Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, Secretary to Government, by the Adjutant-General, on the 7th instant, for submission to your Lordship in Council.

Supposing that copies have been made for the Political Department, and with reference to them, I beg to inform your Lordship that I have directed Major-General Pollock to assemble a court composed of three field officers, if circumstances will conveniently permit, to ascertain and report to what causes the deviation from the plan of advance (by which 350 bullocks laden with supplies were to accompany the column) may be set down, and upon whom the blame should be laid. I hope this inquiry may not interrupt the harmony which should prevail, and have warned Major-General Pollock accordingly.

Brigadier Wild has not availed himself of the freedom from control with which I invested him, but considering the urgent orders at first, and appeals afterwards transmitted by Sir Robert Sale, and the opinions and advice of the Political Authorities at Peshawur, I am not disposed to censure an attempt to reinforce and retain Ali Musjid in view to an early advance upon Jellalabad.

I am now apprehensive that that part of my instructions which recommended the establishment of two posts within the pass, and the employment of one native regiment for that purpose, is wholly impracticable; and further that Sikh co-operation for that object will not be afforded.

I regret exceedingly the loss of officers and heavy loss of men experienced in these nine days; cattle, ammunition, and baggage have also been abandoned most untowardly, for the thirst for plunder on the part of the Khyberrees will inevitably increase from such successes.

Major-General Pollock was passing his guns over at Attock on the 3rd instant, and proposed to precede the brigade, as soon as it had passed the corps encamped near the road, under the command of Rajah Golab Singh.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 179.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Loodiana, February 12, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, this morning of dispatch No. 227, of the 2nd instant, referring to your Lordship's former orders, and repeating them.

2. My letters of the 31st January, 5th and 8th instant, will have fully assured your Lordship in Council of the arrangements now in progress to comply with these orders.

3. Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons will arrive at Ferozepore on the 17th instant.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 180.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, February 24, 1842.*

SIR,—We transmit herewith, for your Excellency's information, a copy of the instructions this day addressed to Major-General Pollock ; and as we may have to retain for an indefinite period a large force in the Punjab, we rely upon your Excellency's exercising a close and constant vigilance, and issuing such injunctions to all the subordinate authorities on whom your measures may depend, that this force wants for nothing, whether in the strength of its artillery, and the ammunitions of war, or in what regards the efficient direction of all its parts, or its health, its comfort, its shelter, and its supplies.

2. We avail ourselves of this opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letters to the 31st January, 5th February, 8th (two), 10th, 11th, and 12th February. These do not generally require any present notice from us ; but with respect to the succession of Colonel Dennie to the command of a brigade, we would express our satisfaction at his promotion, as we have a high opinion of him as an able officer ; but as circumstances may for some time preclude him from assuming this command, we would suggest to your Excellency the expediency of a provisional arrangement, by the nomination of an officer who may be deserving of confidence, for the purpose.

We have, &c.,

AUCKLAND, W.W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, H.T. PRINSEP.



No. 181.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.**Fort William, February 24, 1842.*

SIR,—The great uncertainty which must attend all speculations formed at a distance from the scene of action on the probable course of events, military and political, with which you will have to deal, precludes the possibility of Government providing, by previous precise instructions, for many contingencies which may arise in your intercourse with parties within Afghanistan. The consideration of many important points may well be deferred till they come before Government with such illustration and suggestions as you, and the political officers acting in concert and under you, may see reason to submit. There are others on which it would be satisfactory to you to be in possession of the general sentiments of Government as to the principles on which it would act, even though it may not be easy to lay down very precise rules for your guidance, and it is to provide you with such general instructions that I am now directed to address you.

2. The Governor-General in Council has for some days, in order that he might be enabled to prepare these instructions with greater certainty, awaited the receipt of the two despatches from Major Pottinger, the transmission of which was announced in Captain Macgregor's letter of the 24th of January, but these papers have not been received, and his Lordship in Council does not deem it proper to admit of further delay in communicating his views to you.

3. You will of course have been put in possession of the correspondence which has passed between Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, and Captain Macgregor, and which was communicated to Government by Captain Mackeson in his letter to my address of the 27th ultimo. Captain Macgregor has promised to reply to the Shah's application for pecuniary aid as soon as he may have received the orders of Government on the subject.

4. On this point you will instruct Captain Macgregor to reply to the application, that the British Government, while it is yet disposed to wish well to the Shah personally, can afford no pecuniary aid to him, when there is no assurance that such aid would not be employed in hostilities against ourselves, and when our subjects are detained as captives in his country.

5. As to the past and present conduct of Shah Shooja, and as to our future relations with him, the Governor-General in Council is not in possession of sufficient facts to enable him now to decide, though he holds it to be clear, that having accepted a position as head of the Government at Cabool, with the direct support and assistance of the parties principally concerned in the attacks on the British force, the strict obligations of the treaty by which the British Government was connected with the Shah, must be considered to have ceased.

6. It appears probable that overtures may also be made to you by Mahomed Akbar Khan, in which case you will bear in mind that this person is the reputed murderer of Sir William Macnaghten, and a prominent member of the league against the British ascendancy. Doubts have indeed been raised of the fact of Mahomed Akbar having assassinated

the Envoy, and till his Lordship in Council can learn more of the facts of the case, he can form no final judgment on that head.

7. But whatever doubts may exist on that point, it is believed that there can be none of Mahomed Khan's having pursued a course of continued treachery, and the prosecution of measures which had for their object the destruction of our troops and the captivity of our officers, whose lives have probably only been saved in order to afford him an advantage in his future negotiations with us : and the whole of his conduct is thought to have been such as to discourage you by all means from entering into any negotiation with him if it can be avoided.

8. Respecting the past conduct both of Shah Shooja and Mahomed Akbar Khan, and the objects and proceedings of all parties principally concerned in the late transactions, you will turn your immediate attention to the necessity of obtaining a clear view of facts, not more for your own immediate guidance than for the information of Government. You may be compelled by circumstances to act on some points on your own judgment, without waiting for instructions. In such case you will be careful not to commit your Government to any positive course or plan of policy, on which its sentiments have not been communicated to you.

9. You are aware that the Governor-General in Council does not contemplate any great effort in the present season for the re-occupation of Afghanistan. It is for you to consider how far it may be prudent to allow a resolution to this effect to become more generally known. It may be of importance, with a view to the objects which we should seek to attain, that our policy in this respect should be kept most secret. On the other hand, the knowledge that we do not propose to return as principals to Afghanistan, might disarm some of the opposition which would otherwise be made to those objects. His Lordship in Council would lean to the opinion that it may not be prudent at present to disclose in any manner our probable eventual purposes ; but this is a matter for the exercise of your judgment.

10. You will consider it one of the first objects of your solicitude to procure the release of British officers and soldiers, and their families and private servants and followers, who are held in captivity, and their delivery to you or to other British officers, at Peshawur, or other certain place of safety. The means of effecting this object must be left a good deal to your own discretion ; your efforts will be cordially seconded by Mr. Clerk, and all other British functionaries, and your success may probably be best secured rather by reserve and delay than by apparent eagerness and ready expenditure, as any such eagerness would be likely to increase the difficulty, by encouraging extravagance in the demands of those who hold these unfortunate persons in confinement.

11. Mr. Clerk will be instructed to state to you without delay, his view as to the most proper and prudent means for pursuing this end, and you are authorised at once to give effect to the recommendations which he may offer to you, if they should meet with your concurrence. It appears to his Lordship in Council that arrangements for the purpose would most expediently be made, not through your direct official agency, but through private channels, such as Hindoo bankers and merchants, and other classes among the Affghans ; and that all consideration for the release of any parties should be given only after these parties had been

brought in security to British posts at Peshawur, or elsewhere on this side of the mountains.

12. His Lordship in Council is aware of the likelihood of private agency and pecuniary means being applied directly or indirectly to this end for the release of particular individuals. Mr. Clerk and yourself, and the officers subordinate to you, will do well to watch such proceedings with care, so as to further them with judgment, and without augmenting the difficulty of procuring a general release of the prisoners, by the natural anxiety of parties to obtain the enlargement of their own friends by expending very large sums for that purpose.

13. The release of the widow of the late Envoy will be an object of prominent care and interest, though his Lordship in Council must look rather to the ultimate possibility of some general arrangement, than to any partial release of individuals; and with respect to the rescue of the prisoners generally, the discouragement to negotiation with Mahomed Akbar Khan might be so far modified as to admit of some competent officer treating with him, or with an agent on his part, for their delivery, if this can be effected without stipulation for the surrender of Dost Mahomed Khan; for that, you must be aware, is a proposition which you could not entertain as a part of a scheme for the exchange of persons held in detention, though if the state of things should appear to justify and require it, you would be authorised to speak of his release as an event which, under various contingencies of circumstances, might not be altogether impossible. Such a measure must be regarded as one of important state policy, and to be deliberately determined by the Government upon considerations affecting only the general well-being and advantage of the empire.

14. On the whole, you will understand that the great present object of your proceedings in Peshawur, is beyond the safe withdrawal of the force at Jellalabad, that of watching events, of keeping up such communications as may be admissible with the several parties who may acquire power in the northern portion of Afghanistan, of committing yourself permanently with none of these parties, but also of declaring positively against none of them, while you are collecting the most accurate information of their relative strength and purposes for report to the Government, and pursuing the measures which you may find in your power, for procuring the safe return of our troops and people detained beyond the Khyber Pass.

15. In your intercourse with Rajah Golab Sing, and other Sikh officers at Peshawur, you should on all occasions observe a tone as conciliatory as possible, giving to them the consideration due to their rank and independent authority; but you will not require or rely upon the aid of the Sikhs, excepting on occasions when you may deem them perfectly trust-worthy, and for purposes towards the accomplishment of which you may consider such aid essential. On this head, as on all points connected with parties and proceedings within the Lahore dominions, you may always rely on the judicious advice of Mr. Clerk.

16. You will be particularly cautious to avoid, and yet more to repress in others, any indication which may lead to the adoption of a violent tone of national and religious animosity against the Afghans, such as in some of the correspondence of Captain Mackeson, his Lordship in

Council has seen with regret to have been very injudiciously adopted ; and with reference to allusions which have been made to the transfer of Jellalabad to the Sikhs. I am desirous to inform you that the British Government could not be parties, actively co-operating in that measure. Such a scheme would be of doubtful expediency, even if we withdraw our own force from Peshawur, and his Lordship in Council apprehends that none of the Sikh leaders would be found in any haste to adopt it. Should we withdraw from Peshawur, his Lordship in Council would not, however, interfere in any way to prevent the Sikh Government from following the course which it might think the best for itself in the maintenance, or the extension, of its boundaries in that quarter.

17. The Governor-General in Council continues to regard with very great anxiety the position of the British garrison of Ghuznee. He will not relinquish the hope that on the opening of the season efforts may possibly be made from Candahar, either for the support of Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer and his troops in the maintenance of their post, or facilitate their retirement in that direction. But unless there should be an early dissolution of the confederacy of the hostile chiefs, this does not appear probable, and you should on your side omit no exertion to open a communication with Colonel Palmer. In this respect the Sikh Government and officers might afford us the greatest assistance, by the conveyance of our letters through the Gahree Pass, and even by demonstrations, and the advance of a body of their own troops to support the retreat of Colonel Palmer, if he is enabled to hold out till the return of Spring, and resolves to attempt retiring by that route. Mr. Clerk will not have failed to take advantage of the return of some of the Lohanee merchants from Hindoostan, to open through them a communication with Colonel Palmer.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 182.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Peshawur, February 11, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward a letter from Captain Ferris, commanding the corps of Jezailchees, to the address of Captain Mackeson, also one from the latter officer to my address. The fidelity of the men of this corps has been severely tried, and their devotion to the British interests, under very peculiar and trying circumstances, has been fully proved. I therefore trust that Government will sanction the measure which I have authorized, of granting a donation equivalent to one month's pay, and which has been strongly recommended by Captains Mackeson and Ferris.

I hope to derive good service from these men in going through the Khyber Pass ; their arms are on an equality with those of the enemy, while the musket is less sure in its aim, and does not carry so far. As there are now only 187 men, I have authorized Captain Ferris to entertain men who can be depended upon by the Native Commandant, to complete the corps to 300 men. This is, of course, only a temporary arrangement, and has reference solely to the prospect of an advance

through the Khyber Pass. I shall, therefore, be glad, with reference thereto, to be favoured with the intentions of Government towards this corps.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 183.—*Captain Mackeson to Major-General Pollock.*

*Peshawur, February 9, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit for your consideration a letter to my address, of this date, from Captain Ferris, relative to the disposal of the detachment of Jezailchees remaining under his command.

I had the honor of stating to you in conversation, a few days ago, the meritorious manner in which the detachments of Jezailchees, whether with our troops at Cabool, or with our troops at Jellalabad, or when escorting Captain Ferris and his party from Peshbulak into Peshawur, had conducted themselves, and I expressed my opinion, with reference to them, that it would be for the interest of Government to reward these men for their past services, in order to attach them to the service, and induce others of the same class to serve us. Captain Ferris's request that all arrears due to the detachment with him should be immediately paid up, and a month's gratuity be further allowed to each grade, appears to me reasonable. There is no doubt, also, that a body of 300 Jezailchees would be of great use to our force in passing through Khyber.

An order from you would be necessary to enable me to advance to Captain Ferris the sums due for arrears to his men, and the gratuity, on his furnishing abstracts and receipts.

I have, &c.,

F. MACKESON.

No. 184.—*Captain Ferris to Captain Mackeson.*

*February 9, 1842.*

SIR,—As you are acquainted with the services in which different detachments of the Regiment of Jezailchees, under my command, have lately been engaged, and can speak as to the manner in which these detachments have done their duty, I shall esteem it a favor if you will take the wishes of Major-General Pollock, C.B., with regard to the future disposal of the detachment that now remains under my command.

2. This detachment consists of 1 Native Commandant, 1 Native Captain, 6 Jemadars, 6 Naib Jemadars, 22 Havildars, 15 Naicks, 5 Buglers, 5 Bheestees, 5 Ferashes, and 187 Sepoys. I have jezails for 280 men, including those you have made up, and which have not yet been issued to the regiment. I propose with General Pollock's sanction, to increase the detachment to 300 strong, with a view of making use of their service in advancing through Khyber.

3. I would also suggest, with reference to the services performed by the detachment at present with me that all arrears due to them should be at once paid up, and, further, that, in order to show that their fidelity and services are appreciated by our Government, and to encourage a

continuance of the same devotion to our service in this class of men, that a gratuity of one month's pay should be allowed to each grade.

4. Lieutenant Lukin, my former Adjutant, having tendered his resignation, and Captain Gerrard, my second in command, being absent at Jellalabad, it will be necessary, in the event of the detachment being increased, that an officer should be appointed under me.

5. The men will require to be distinguished by some dress, and I would suggest that a brown-coloured shirt of cotton, and a skull-cap, should be supplied at the expense of Government, the cost of which would probably be about 2s. 8d. per man.

6. I shall also require powder and lead, to make up ammunition, together with native pouches, and about 4000 flints.

I have, &c.,

J. FERRIS.

No. 185.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Peshawur, February 12, 1842.*

SIR,—I hoped by this date to have been able to report, for the information of Government, my intention of moving forward immediately, but unforeseen circumstances have occurred, and which are likely to delay any active operations, though I hope not long.

I left General McCaskill's brigade three marches on the other side of the Attock, in the expectation of reaching Peshawur the following day, but on my arrival at Indus, I found the Sikh troops encamped on the left bank under Rajah Golab Sing, accompanied by the prince, and the road on the right bank was occupied by the four Nujeeb battalions, who had so shamefully retired on the occasion of Brigadier Wild's advance. I was thus compelled to remain at Attock until the Sikh troops moved away, which was effected after many urgent messages from Captain Lawrence, who had joined the Sikh camp with the view of hastening their advance to Peshawur. As the British troops arrived on the day the Sikh troops marched, I remained with the former to hasten them across the Indus. We unfortunately had very heavy rain, but I crossed the whole and marched to Akora on the 4th. The next morning (the 5th) I again left the camp, and proceeded to Peshawur with Captain Lawrence, who returned again to the Sikh camp on the 6th. The day after my arrival, I was much concerned to hear from Brigadier Wild that the number of sick in his brigade amounted to about 1,000 men. I proceeded the next morning to camp, visited all the hospitals, to endeavour to ascertain from the surgeons the probable cause: several were suggested, such as the snow water, the attah, the inclemency of the weather, and the effects of the late exposure at Ali Musjid. I attribute it chiefly to the weather at this season, which is cold, with constant rain. I have ordered a special medical committee to assemble and report on the subject, for I regret to say that the number of cases now amounts to more than 1,800; the disease, dysentery and diarrhoea. It is, however, satisfactory to know that no case has been fatal, and that almost the whole of them are slight, and I have little doubt of the complaint disappearing

almost entirely when the weather becomes less severe. In the meantime I have requested of Captain Mackeson to endeavour to procure for all the men the worsted gloves and stockings which I understand from Captain Ponsonby were granted to the other troops arriving here. I consider it the more desirable that these articles should be given to the men, as the late affairs in which they have been engaged, have from some mismanagement or want of proper arrangement after Brigadier Wild was wounded, proved severe and trying. I shall visit their hospitals frequently, and by adding in any way to their comforts, show that I feel an interest in them. There has been some unpleasant feeling among them, which I hope has entirely subsided.

The Sikh troops, under Rajah Golab Sing, have not yet arrived, and I fear from the very unnecessary delay which has been made since I first met them at Attock, that I can expect little, indeed no aid, from them ; it is unfortunate that it should be so, but it is better that I should expect no aid rather than depend upon receiving it and afterwards be disappointed. The number of troops which I have now fit for duty, exclusive of cavalry, is scarcely equal to the strength of Brigadier Wild's brigade before I arrived. I could not therefore hope to advance and keep open my communication with Peshawur. This is quite evident from the circumstance of the communication being entirely cut off between Ali Musjid and Peshawur, while two regiments held possession of the former place, and the other two regiments were at the mouth of the pass. If, as I am led to expect from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, another brigade, including the 31st Queen's, and the 3rd Dragoons, is now on its march to join me, I shall have no difficulty in advancing, for I fully expect that the sickness which now exists will cease as the weather becomes milder. I have every reason to believe that with a force of about 10,000 men (which they would be if the expected brigade joins in time), I should be able to reach Jellalabad almost without opposition. The chiefs of Lalpoora and Ghoosta are willing to and desirous of aiding us, if we advance with a force sufficient to command respect, and the same may perhaps be said of the Sikhs ; but unless the force is formidable, and we are able to make our way and keep open the communication, the tribes between this and Jellalabad will not only not aid us, but will feel compelled to act offensively, to save themselves from the vengeance of the Cabool authorities whenever we may withdraw from the country. The chief of Ghoosta has written a letter, a translation of which I inclose ; he has hitherto been friendly, and will no doubt continue so while we are in force. The late Lalpoora chief is still here, and feels fully confident of being able to regain his authority whenever we advance in sufficient numbers. In the event of Sir R. Sale requiring aid before any reinforcement joins me, I should not hesitate to make every exertion to join him ; but as we are in communication, I do not expect any sudden or unexpected call from him : he is, by the last accounts, well supplied for a month. Ali Musjid is still in possession of the enemy. I have made particular inquiry about it, and as I find it is commanded by two hills, I anticipate no difficulty in retaking it, which I propose doing whenever I advance.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 186.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.**Fort William, March 1, 1842.*

SIR,—Your dispatch of the 12th ultimo, dated from Peshawur, has this day been received and submitted, together with its inclosures, to the Governor-General in Council.

2. Your statement of the extent of sickness prevailing in Brigadier Wild's camp, has been perused with deep regret by his Lordship in Council. His Lordship trusts, however, that the disease is owing to the causes to which you chiefly attribute it, and entirely approves of the judicious measures adopted by you of directing a special medical committee to report upon the subject, and indulges the hope you have intimated, that the prevalent complaint will disappear when the weather becomes less severe.

3. Your conduct is likewise entirely approved, in requesting Captain Mackeson to procure for the men worsted gloves and stockings. I am directed to express the most anxious desire, on the part of his Lordship in Council, that every measure should at all times be taken for securing the efficiency and comfort of the troops, whose gallantry and perseverance, under much difficulty, have caused their admiration, and command their confidence; and this you will not fail to make known to them.

4. I am directed to impress upon you the necessity of acting with concentrated forces, and of avoiding the risk of failure from attempting any important operation with inadequate means. The Governor-General in Council is happy to perceive that you proposed to act on this principle, and that you rely on the effect of an advance with overpowering forces as likely to diminish, very greatly, the opposition which might otherwise be offered to your progress; and his Lordship in Council looks forward to the junction of the reinforcements now on their way to join you, as placing you in a posture of strength which would insure the success of your operations.

5. You will be aware of the great importance of leaving no effort untried to keep open your communication with Major-General Sir R. Sale, by which that officer may become aware of your intentions and movements.

6. I am directed to add, that nothing in this dispatch is intended to vary the tenor of your former instructions, as far as relates to the ulterior objects of your advance.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 187.—*Major-General Pollock to Lieut.-Colonel Inard,  
Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief.**Peshawur, February 13, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 5th instant, containing copies of two paragraphs of a dispatch from the Governor-General in Council.

I have already informed his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief how desirable it is that I should be reinforced, before I attempt the



passage of the Khyber ; with the additional troops mentioned in your letter, I should expect little or no opposition : if, therefore, I can wait for their arrival, I certainly will do so, but it is of the very utmost importance that there should not be a day's delay, as the Norooz will be in less than forty days, and that is the time at which troops may be expected to collect. There is also another important consideration with regard to Sir R. Sale's force, which is, that they are without money. I have spoken to Captain Mackeson just now on this subject, and he (most zealous in the cause) will endeavour to effect a remittance, though the chances are much against its success.

If Sir R. Sale can hold out till I reach him with the reinforcement, I shall not move till it arrives ; but if, on the other hand, his supplies fail him, and he is compelled to retreat, I shall consider that I act in conformity to the wishes of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and of the Government in moving forward to afford him all the aid in my power. I hope this latter course may not be necessary, for in that case we shall be strongly opposed.

I mention these particulars, in order that his Excellency may know how I understand the instructions I have received : also that he may be fully aware of the urgent necessity of pushing on the troops now in progress without a day's delay.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE POLLOCK.

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No. 188.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Peshawar, February 16, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward herewith copy of a letter received by Captain Mackeson, from Captain Macgregor, dated 7th instant, from which it will appear that at Jellalabad they had three months' supply of atta, and bloosa for about one month. Since the receipt of Captain Macgregor's letter I have seen a letter from Captain Cunningham, at Jellalabad, dated 11th instant, who says they have four months' atta. Captain Macgregor's information is, perhaps the most correct of the two. He (the latter) speaks with confidence of their being able to defend themselves against the whole of the Affghan force—so long as their ammunition and food lasts. Captain Cunningham's letter mentions that the ammunition amounts to 200 rounds per man, which is more than we at present have with this force. We are now endeavouring to send money to Captain Macgregor, and I have reason to believe that, through Captain Mackeson's exertions, the scheme will succeed. If so, Captain Macgregor will be able to purchase food for the cattle, and thus render it unnecessary for me to advance until reinforced.

I wrote yesterday again to Sir Robert Sale, to say that, in the event of his considering my immediate advance imperatively called for to aid him, I will do so, though I know that every foot of ground will be contested ; but that, if he can hold out with safety till the reinforcements in progress arrive, I will wait for them. I have already, in my letter dated 12th instant, informed you that the sick and wounded amount to 1,800, reducing thereby my numbers much below what was contemplated by Government, when, in their dispatch, dated 31st ultimo, to his Excellency

the Commander-in-Chief, they allude to my advancing with the force now here.

The unfortunate affairs at Ali Musjid, where four regiments were employed, show the impracticability of keeping open the pass with a small force, even for the short distance of eight or ten miles. Were I to advance now, with the force I have disposable, I conclude I should be able to force the pass, and reach Sir Robert Sale; but I require 271,542 rounds, to complete the force here to 200 rounds per man. As I advanced, the communication with my rear would be entirely closed. I should also be advancing with a very limited quantity of ammunition for small arms, which Sir Robert Sale would be in want of.

That I could force my way to Sir Robert Sale with the force I at present have available I have no doubt, though it must be attended with loss, and a considerable expenditure of ammunition, which I can ill afford; for I shall not be able to complete the force here to 200 rounds per man until the arrival of Captain Todd's detachment, which may be expected on or about the 2nd proximo. I cannot say when the next brigade may arrive, but whenever they do, if I shall have advanced, and they follow, they will in like manner have to force the pass, thus causing a double loss and a double expenditure of ammunition; indeed, with only three regiments of Infantry, they would find it difficult to make their way. It therefore appears to me that, unless called upon by Sir Robert Sale, I shall act up to the spirit of the Government instructions, and those of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in not dividing the force. When the whole force is assembled, and I reach Jellalabad, I cannot doubt that, should an opportunity offer, our military superiority would enable me to meet any number of the enemy; but, unless I am enabled, through negotiation, or by means of the Sikh troops, to keep open the Khyber Pass, after I have advanced, my position at Jellalabad would not be judicious.

I do not anticipate such a dilemma, for some negotiations are already going on with the Auruckzye tribe, who have on our behalf already attacked the Afreedees, and taken some of their strongholds. I cannot at present say how the feuds between the two tribes may terminate; but it holds out a prospect that before very long the passage of the Khyber may be open to us.

The Rajah Golaub Sing, accompanied by the Prince, reached Peshawur the day before yesterday. I expected to have had an interview with the Rajah yesterday, also to-day; but it has rained incessantly, and no hour could be fixed.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 189.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Muldock.*

*Peshawur, February 18, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to inclose a letter from Captain Mackeson to my address, forwarding a translation of a letter from his Majesty Shah Shooja to Captain Macgregor.

2. It may be necessary at some future time to prove the innocence, or otherwise, of the Shah, and with reference to Captain Mackeson's

letter I would observe, that the fact of Major<sup>s</sup> Pottinger still considering (after the murder of Sir William Macnaghten) that the Bala Hissar was open to our troops, is strongly in favor of the Shah's innocence.

3. I have also the honor to inclose a translation of a letter from the Maliks of the Afreedees ; their object in sending this letter is to endeavour to ascertain out ultimate intentions. In answer to it, I propose sending a copy of the notification made by the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, when the disastrous fate of the Cabool troops was received.

4. If the Afreedees, or indeed any other tribe, suppose that we go to Jellalabad only to relieve the force there, or to strike one blow and retire, they will lose no time in closing an alliance with Mahomed Akbar Khan, whose vengeance they would know must fall on them immediately we gave up all connexion with the country.

5. The more I reflect on the means at my disposal, and on the natural difficulties of the ground, the more I am convinced of the necessity of entering into arrangements with some of the tribes occupying the Khyber Pass. Even with posts of my own troops, I could not consider my communication through the Pass as secure, unless some such arrangement is made ; without it I might find myself at or in advance of Jellalabad, entirely dependent on the country round me, for money, ammunition, and supplies.

6. A negotiation is now on foot with the Aurukzyes, and I earnestly hope that it will end in a satisfactory understanding between us and the tribes, who have the greatest influence in the Khyber.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 190.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Peshawar, February 18, 1842.*

SIR,—With reference to my letter dated 11th instant, on the subject of the corps of Jezailchees under the command of Captain Ferris, I have considered it desirable to authorize Captain Ferris to recruit till his corps is 400 strong. Had I been aware that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief had already authorized Brigadier Wild to recruit for this corps, I should in my former letter have proposed 400 as the strength of the corps, and I trust the Government will sanction this additional increase, as I hope to derive great assistance from them in passing through the Khyber.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 191.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Fort William, March 7, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 18th ultimo, reporting that you had authorized Captain Ferris to recruit his Jezailchee corps to the strength of 400 men, and in reply to inform

you that your proceedings on this occasion have been approved by his Lordship in Council.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 192.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Peshawar, February 21, 1842.*

SIR,—The letters from Captain Macgregor advocate my advance, but I have already stated to Government my reasons for deeming such a measure unadvisable at the present moment, and I do not see sufficient cause to make me change that opinion from the arguments brought forward by Captain Macgregor in the second of the inclosed letters.

There is no one chief at Cabool or near Jellalabad, who appears to possess supreme power, and all parties are at variance. A well-organized advance from Cabool is therefore very unlikely, and I consider that the declaration of Mahomed Akbar Khan's intention of attacking Jellalabad is made merely to keep the eyes of the tribes fixed on him.

He requires some such declaration to prevent his sinking into insignificance, and is (to use Captain Macgregor's words) "without influence, means, or character to assemble a force strong enough" to attack us.

2. My ammunition is, I have already stated, deficient, and the supply which is *en route*, cannot arrive here until the 2nd proximo; an advance without it would be hazardous in the extreme, and in the mean time, I shall have answers from Captain Macgregor to letters which I have sent to him, in which I clearly explain the causes of my detention.

My sick are daily decreasing; to-day the number is 1289, and this is a very important point.

The Afreedees have made overtures, and the negotiation with them and the Aurukzyes promises to end in a satisfactory adjustment, which I have stated to be in my opinion necessary, even if I now had all my reinforcements and supplies, and ammunition.

For these reasons I have decided to halt until my ammunition arrives, unless the safety of Jellalabad calls for my advance.

3. From General Sir R. Sale's memorandum I have made an abstract of the present state of his force on the 14th of February, and entered it here.

	Effective.	Sick.
Cavalry . . . . .	241	21
Artillery . . . . .	171	11
Sappers . . . . .	304	45
European Infantry . . . . .	719	30
Native Infantry . . . . .	838	48
Total . . . . .	2,273	155
	Days.	
Provisions for European soldiers . . . . .	70	
Half rations for natives and sepahis . . . . .	76	
Barley for cavalry and artillery . . . . .	25*	
Forage for all animals . . . . .	30	

\* Sir Robert Sale reports that he is short of ammunition and lead.

It will be observed in this officer's letter, that he says he could not add to the resources detailed, "even if he had money :—" this is a most unfortunate circumstance. I have within the last three days sent them in coin 3,000 rupees (three thousand).

I earnestly hope that this sum will enable them to lay in forage for their cattle, for Captain Macgregor, who must be better able to judge, does not confirm Sir R. Sale's assertion, and urges us to send money.

4. If after the arrival of the detachment of the 33rd Native Infantry with my ammunition, (about the 2nd proximo,) the letters from Captain Macgregor and Sir R. Sale should still urge me to advance as imperative for their safety, I shall not be able to refuse compliance, though I see plainly the many strong objections to my doing so under other circumstances, until I have all my reinforcements.

These objections are to me so numerous and important, that nothing but the fear of losing the fort and garrison of Jellalabad could induce me to overcome them.

5. I had a long interview with Rajah Golab Sing yesterday; nothing was decided; the particulars shall be forwarded to you to-morrow.

I have, &c.

GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 193.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Peshawur, February 23, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward an abstract of a conversation which took place with Rajah Golab Sing on the 20th instant, and which is by no means satisfactory. I confess I have no expectation of any assistance from the Sikh troops.

The number of sick, which at one time amounted in Brigadier Wild's force to 1,800, is now I am happy to say reduced to 1,289. The weather lately has become more moderate, and the men are recovering fast.

I herewith transmit also copy of a letter from Captain Macgregor, dated 16th instant; also translation of a French letter from Major-General Sir R. Sale of the same date.

I regret to state Captain Tibbs, with the 4,00,000 rounds of ammunition, has made four halts on account of rain. I did hope that I might have been able to advance with the brigade lately ordered, but from Sir R. Sale's last letter, and the several delays that have taken place in the advance of the brigade, I now consider it almost hopeless, though it would have a most beneficial effect.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 194.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Peshawur, February 24, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to inclose a copy and translation of a letter from Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., dated Jellalabad, February 19. The original of this letter is also forwarded, as there are some words in it which it is impossible to decipher with certainty.

I have also the honor to forward copy of a letter from Captain Macgregor, of the same date. The cossids who brought these letters assert that the damage done to the town and fortifications of Jellalabad was trifling as compared to that in Mahomed Akbar's camp at Chanbagh and in all the district of Ningrahar, and I therefore hope that the enemy will be employed in repairing his own losses, and thereby prevented from taking advantage of ours.

2. In all my late letters to your address I have dwelt on the numerous and strong objections which exist to my advancing without my reinforcements ; but it is impossible for me to withstand these repeated calls for assistance from Jellalabad, and should they now be continued, I must advance so soon as I can make arrangements, after I have received my ammunition from the detachment of the 33rd Native Infantry, whose arrival here may be now considered as nearly certain on either the 3rd or 4th proximo.

3. The negotiation with the Afrcedees and Aurukzyes is still in progress, and there is a hope that by it I may be able to secure a safe passage through the Khyber ; but should it fail, or should it be unnecessarily delayed by the tribes, I must advance and force a passage to the relief of the Jellalabad garrison : in which case it is absolutely necessary for me to curtail the baggage which usually accompanies an Indian army, and I shall therefore be compelled to deprive officers and men of many comforts, which under other circumstances might be considered necessities ; and should our communication be closed with the brigades in the rear, my force will have to look forward for an indefinite period to more than usual privations.

4. I have therefore deemed it advisable to address them in Orders on this occasion, and I have preferred appealing to the troops to make the sacrifice themselves, to issuing an order fixing the amount of carriage for each officer and each regiment.

5. With reference to the postscript to Major-General Sir R. Sale's letter, I have informed him that, in the event of Government allowing an interpreter, it will afford me pleasure if Captain Havelock is nominated.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 195.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Peshawur, February 24, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to inclose copies of letters from Captain Macgregor, of date the 21st instant.

I am much pleased to find him write in such good spirits, and to hear that the money (3000 rupees, three thousand) has reached him, and also that the damage done to the works by the earthquake has been so speedily repaired.

Captain Macgregor, in the letters now forwarded, admits that he has food for his cattle for one month, that is, up to the 21st of March. By sending money to him, I hope he may be enabled to lay in supplies for a longer period for his animals. Sir R. Sale's letter on this occasion has

not yet been received by me, but in his former letters he has reported that he has supplies for seventy days for his men.

The negotiation with the tribes in the pass is still in progress, and Captain Macgregor reports favourably regarding it; but it is as well to be prepared to act without expecting good faith or assistance from the Afreedees.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 196.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Camp, 3 marches west of Loodiana, Feb. 20, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I had the honor to receive your Lordship in Council's dispatch of the 10th instant, this morning.

2. I am of opinion that the first and second cases require that the force shall advance forthwith to Peshawur. A reference to Major-General Pollock's reports, transmitted by the Adjutant-General to the Secretary in the Military Department, will show how heavily the native corps which proceeded with Brigadier Wild are suffering.

3. Orders were dispatched at eleven A.M. by camel dawk, previously laid, to detach immediately (to-morrow evening, if possible) Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, the 3rd troop 2nd brigade Horse Artillery, 1st Light Cavalry, 33rd Native Infantry, a rissalah of 3rd Irregular Cavalry, six laas of musket ammunition, and ordnance and musket powder.

Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons has been desired to send a large proportion of other stores, and if the service requires it, two companies of the 6th Native Infantry are to be added.

4. This will leave Her Majesty's 31st Foot; 6th Native Infantry recruits; Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; three field battery guns; three rissalahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry; for the second division, the departure of which will immediately follow the arrival of Her Majesty's 31st Regiments, perhaps on the 8th of March.

5. I have again departed from my own plan of reinforcement, by adding the 3rd Dragoons, instead of two squadrons, at the instance of Mr. Clerk, who thinks the effect on the Sikhs will be very beneficial. As to their being much employed in relieving Jellalabad, which is the main object of this second exertion, I do not expect it, neither does Mr. Clerk; and I dread the effects of the excessive heat of April and May upon them.

6. The orders and suggestions in the 5th, 7th, and 8th paragraphs have been in several respects anticipated, and in all will be duly attended to.

7. I have the honor to transmit a report, dated Feb. 13, received this morning from Major-General Pollock. His intention to assist Sir Robert Sale, in retreat from Jellalabad, be resolved upon, even before the arrival of the troops, now preparing, has been approved of. I have, however, a strong hope that Jellalabad may and will be held till they are prepared to enter the pass in full force for its relief.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 197.—*Major-General Nott to the Officer Commanding at Quetta and in Sind.*

*Candahar, February 14, 1842.*

SIR,—In the event of troops moving towards Candahar I beg you will have the goodness to bear in mind that we have no medicine here ; it is also very desirable that you should send as much musket ammunition as you can spare, as there is very little at Candahar. I know not what troops there may be in Sind, but I am very much in want of cavalry. As I have not received letters from Calcutta since the 3rd of December, I am without instructions from Government, and know not their intentions regarding this country, whether reinforcements are to be sent here from Sind or not. Prince Sufter Jung, Atta Mahomed, and the chiefs, have assembled an army, and are in position about thirty miles south-west of this city. I should have moved against them four days ago, but heavy rains have completely inundated the country ; however, I hope to attack them in a few days. To-day, we have a heavy fall of snow. No late news from Ghuznee or Cabool.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 198.—*Brigadier England to Major Outram.*

*Head-Quarters, Sind Field Force, Dadur, February 18, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you that, under the circumstances of the determination of the Government to maintain Candahar, and with a view to give support to that important measure, I propose, at the earliest practicable period in next month, to move the head-quarters of this force up the Bolan Pass to Quetta, with the following detachment of the troops now in the low country :—

One troop horse artillery, two squadrons 3rd Light Cavalry, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, 6th Regiment Native Infantry, 150 Poona horse.

This movement will render the experiment of keeping European troops at Sukkur during the hot weather almost wholly inexpedient.

2. The corps left for the protection of the line of communication to the Indus, and of our several magazines on that line and depôt at Sukkur will in such case be as follows :—

European company of artillery, camel battery, one company of Golumdauze artillery, one squadron of 3rd Light Cavalry, (not yet arrived,) four and a half battalions of Native Infantry, the whole of the Sind horse, and part of the Poona horse.

3. This portion of the Sind field force I propose to station thus :—

At Sukkur—Two battalions, two guns ; 170 rank and file of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment.

Shikarpore—One squadron 3rd Light Cavalry ; one battalion, two guns.

Janeedehra—Two companies.

Chuttin—Two companies.



Bagh—Two companies.

Sebee—Three companies, one gun.

Dadur—Three companies, two guns.

With detachments of Irregular Horse at each post.

4. Thus the force which will be assembled at Quetta very early, I trust, in April, will consist of two squadrons, four battalions, and fourteen guns ; and leaving a sufficient body of troops to protect that place, amounting, in fact, to almost its present garrison. I am of opinion that the following detachment may be at once most advantageously employed in opening the communication with Candahar, or in effecting such other operation in aid of that post as circumstances at the moment may suggest :—

One troop horse artillery, two squadrons 3rd Light Cavalry, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, one battalion Native Infantry, a small battalion of light companies drawn from the corps nearest to Quetta, as per margin\*, and about 150 Poona horse. The total probable strength of this moveable column being 2,500 men.

5. You are probably aware that, independent of the expediency of forcing the communication with Candahar, the troops at that place are much in want of carriage, treasure, medicines, and other stores ; also that several officers, as well as a company of Bengal artillery, destined for Candahar, have been for some time prevented from reaching it, owing to the interruption of the road by the insurgents. The movement, however, which I contemplate, will at once remedy these evils, and thus place the corps of Major-General Nott in increased efficiency.

6. I shall be very glad to hear that you see no political objection, or risk to the peace of the country between this and the Indus, by the arrangement of the troops which I have set forth for your information, and, indeed, that you concur with me in the propriety of my making this diversion in favor of my operations to the northward.

7. You are aware of the numerous arrangements which are essential to even the smallest military operations in this country, and I need offer no other reason for desiring that the measures I have now detailed should beconsidered as finally decided upon thus early.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

No. 199.—*Brigadier England to Mr. Maddock.*

*Head-Quarters, Camp, near Dadur, February 20, 1842.*

SIR,—I beg to acquaint you that, after leaving sufficient troops on the line of communication between this and the Indus, and providing, as amply as our means will admit, for the tranquillity of Sukkur and Shikarpore, and after leaving a garrison at Quetta of two battalions, I propose, in accordance with the instructions of the Government of India, which

\* Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, 6th Native Infantry, 8th ditto, 20th ditto, 21st ditto, and 25th ditto.

I have yesterday received through Major Outram, and which are dated the 31st ultimo, to push forward to the southern extremity of the Kojuck Pass, and open a communication with Candahar, or support any movement made by the force now occupying that city.

2. I had anticipated this measure on hearing that Major-General Nott had been directed to hold his post, and on also finding, by the chance transmission of a dispatch from Major Rawlinson, dated the 1st instant, that, although he had not then received these directions, there was no intention on the part of the garrison to evacuate that place, notwithstanding they had been called upon to do so by virtue of a treaty entered into with the enemy at Cabool.

3. I beg that you will acquaint his Lordship the Governor-General in Council, that I am the more desirous to force the road to Candahar, because I am aware that the troops now there are in want of stores, treasure, and various supplies which I intend to convey thither if practicable; but as it is impossible, owing to the season, that cattle could survive the march in any numbers through the Bolan Pass, and be effective for further movement, till the end of next month, I shall have an opportunity of being made acquainted with any further wishes which the Government may have to express for my guidance. I presume that, whatever ultimate arrangements may be decided on, there cannot be a doubt of the political advantage of making as powerful a demonstration as possible in the direction in question.

4. The moveable force to be pushed beyond Quetta, after the various deductions which are above referred to, will consist of one troop horse artillery, two squadrons 3rd Bombay Cavalry, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, one battalion Native Infantry, the flank companies of the battalions left at Quetta, and about 100 Poona horse.

5. I take this occasion to submit our extreme deficiency in cavalry, for this or any other operation, and to suggest that such deficiency should, if possible, be still supplied, because some accession of that arm would appear to be equally wanted by Major-General Nott, in the event of his retiring, as by me, in the protection of the large convoy of about 2,500 camels with which I advance.

6. I am aware that the Political Agent of Sind and Beloochistan has represented this defect to the Supreme Government, and I am merely desirous of adding my testimony as to the triumphant effect which would be produced to the southward of Candahar, by the presence of even two squadrons of European cavalry. If their arrival at Sukkur could be accomplished by the middle of March, it would be quite practicable that they reached this place before any intensity of heat; and they would overtake me at Quetta, where commissariat arrangements may oblige me to halt a few days.

7. I shall transmit this dispatch under a flying seal to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

No. 200.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, March 15, 1842.*

SIR,—It appears to us that it would be convenient at this period to lay fully before your Excellency the deliberate views we entertain with respect to the measures now to be pursued in Afghanistan; and we, therefore, transmit to your Excellency this letter, in continuation of those already addressed to your Excellency upon this subject.

2. The insurrection which has existed in parts of Afghanistan almost from the time of our obtaining possession of Cabool; which, in the summer of last year, led to more than one serious conflict with considerable bodies of men in the vicinity of Candahar; and, extending itself in October to the vicinity of Cabool, impeded the march of Major-General Sir Robert Sale's brigade to Jellalabad; still more the revolution, rather than insurrection, which commenced at Cabool on the 2nd of November, and which, after many disastrous and lamentable events, led to the ultimate destruction of a numerous division of the British army, a calamity wholly without parallel in our history in India; all these circumstances, followed as they have been by the universal hostility of the whole people of Afghanistan, united at the present moment against us in a war which has assumed a religious, as well as national character, compel us to adopt the conclusion, that the possession of Afghanistan, could we recover it, would be a source of weakness, rather than of strength, in resisting the invasion of any army from the West, and, therefore, that the ground upon which the policy of the advance of our troops to that country mainly rested, has altogether ceased to exist.

3. The information received with respect to the conduct of Shah Shooja during the late transactions, is necessarily imperfect, and moreover, of a somewhat contradictory character. It is not probable that the insurrection against our troops should have originated with him. It is most probable, and it is almost proved, that he has adopted it, and, powerless in himself, is prepared to side with either party by which he may hope to be maintained upon his precarious throne.

4. Certainly, as we are at present informed, the conduct of Shah Shooja has not been such as to compel the British Government, in blind and solitary observance of the Tripartite Treaty, of which the ground has ceased to exist, to peril its armies, and, with its armies, its Indian Empire, in his support.

5. Whatever course we may hereafter take, must rest solely upon military considerations, and have, in the first instance, regard to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at Ghuznee, at Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and Candahar, to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary risk, and, finally, to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which may make it appear to them, to our own subjects, and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities, and violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Afghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that the King we

have set up, has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed.

6. But, while the facts before us justify the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan, and the refusal of all further assistance to Shah Shooja, they are yet not such as to make it consistent with our reputation, to give our future support, as is suggested by Major Rawlinson, to Shah Kamran, and to make over Candahar to that nominal ruler of Herat, even were it consistent with prudence to engage in a new speculative enterprize beyond the Indus, which might render it necessary for us to retain, at an enormous cost, a large body of troops in the difficult country, between that river and Candahar, for the purpose of maintaining in the country so made over to him, a Sovereign personally incapable, and for many years unknown to its inhabitants, otherwise than by the fame of his degrading vices.

7. We are of opinion that it would be erroneous to suppose that a forward position in Upper Afghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Sikhs, or that a forward position above the passes of Lower Afghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Beloochees, and the Sindians, by the appearance of confidence and of strength. That which will really, and will alone control the Sikhs, the Beloochees, and the Sindians, and all the other nations beyond and within the Indus, is the knowledge that we possess an army, perfect in its equipment, possessed of all the means of movement, and so secure in its communications with the country from which its supplies and its reinforcements are drawn, as to be able at any time to act with vigour and effect against any enemy.

8. In war, reputation is strength ; but reputation is lost by the rash exposure of the most gallant troops under circumstances which render defeat more probable than victory ; and a succession of reverses will dishearten any soldiers, and, most of all, those whose courage and devotion have been mainly the result of their confidence that they were always led to certain success. We would, therefore, strongly impress upon the commanders of the forces employed in Afghanistan and Sindh the importance of incurring no unnecessary risk, and of bringing their troops into action under circumstances which may afford full scope to the superiority they derive from their discipline. At the same time, we are aware that no great object can be accomplished without incurring some risk ; and we should consider that the object of striking a decisive blow at the Affghans, more especially if such blow could be struck in combination with measures for the relief of Ghuznee,—a blow which might re-establish our military character beyond the Indus, and leave a deep impression of our power, and of the vigor with which it would be applied to punish an atrocious enemy,—would be one for which risk might be justifiably incurred, all due and possible precaution being taken to diminish such necessary risk, and to secure decisive success.

9. The Commanders of the forces in Upper and Lower Afghanistan will, in all the operations they may design, bear in mind these general views and opinions of the Government of India. They will, in the first instance, endeavour to relieve all the garrisons in Afghanistan, which are now surrounded by the enemy. The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military character of the army, and deeply interesting to the feelings of their country ; but to make a rash attempt to effect such

relief, in any case, without a reasonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose preservation is equally dear to the Government they serve. To effect the release of the prisoners taken at Cabool, is an object likewise deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honor. That object can, probably, only be accomplished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be in, or may come into, our possession ; and, with reference to this object, and to that of the relief of Ghuznee, it may possibly become a question, in the event of Major-General Pollock's effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward position near Jellalabad, or even advance to Cabool.

10. We are fully sensible of the advantages which would be derived from the re-occupation of Cabool, the scene of our great disaster and of so much crime, even for a week, of the means which it might afford of recovering the prisoners, of the gratification which it would give to the army, and of the effect which it would have upon our enemies. Our withdrawal might then be made to rest upon an official declaration of the grounds upon which we retired as solemn as that which accompanied our advance ; and we should retire as a conquering, not as a defeated, Power ; but we cannot sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-General Pollock, unless that General should be satisfied that he can,—without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the pass, which, obtained only by purchase, must, under all circumstances, be precarious, and without depending upon the fidelity of the Sikh chiefs, or upon the power of those chiefs to restrain their troops, upon neither of which can any reliance be safely placed,—feel assured that he can, by his own strength, overawe and overcome all who dispute the pass, and keep up at all times his communication with Peshawur and the Indus ; and we would caution Major-General Pollock, and all the officers commanding the troops in the field, not to place reliance upon, or to be biassed by, the representations of native chiefs who may have been expelled from their country, in consequence of their adherence to us, and who will naturally be ready to lead us into any danger by operations which may have the possible effect of restoring them to their former possessions.

11. We have been informed that Major-General Pollock does not consider himself strong enough to force, and to keep, the Khyber Pass, without the first reserve brigade, which was not known to have crossed the Ravee on the 2nd of this month, and which can hardly join him before the second week in April ; and being informed likewise that Major-General Sir Robert Sale had, on the 21st of last month, only forage sufficient to last about thirty days, we cannot but expect that those officers will have endeavoured to effect their junction before the arrival of the first reserve brigade, and that they will, when that junction shall have been effected, occupy a secure position near the Khyber.

12. In such a position they will, under all circumstances, be better enabled to assist any operations of Major-General Nott on the side of Ghuznee, by the moral effect of their concentrated strength, than they would be in a more advanced position of extreme hazard to the troops under their command.

13. We look, further, to the effect which the concentration of a large force under your Excellency's command upon the Sutlej would have upon the policy of the Sikhs, and of all Indian States, exhibiting the British Government in an attitude of imposing strength, and giving confidence to its army and to its subjects.

14. The operations of the large force under Major-General Nott and Brigadier England,—a force numerous enough to overcome all resistance whenever it might march, if its numbers comprised a due proportion of cavalry, and if it possessed the perfect equipment and ample means of movement, without which numbers of the bravest and best disciplined men have not the character of an army,—are necessarily so crippled by the want of cavalry and of animals of burden and draught, that we cannot safely rely upon those officers being able to effect any object beyond that of withdrawing the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and securing their own retreat at the proper season, and their communications, in the mean time, with the Indus.

15. We cannot review all the circumstances of the present crisis without being deeply impressed with a sense of the danger arising from the dissemination of troops in an enemy's country, having difficult communication, and of the further danger of leaving any force intended for operations in the field, and at any time liable to be called into action, so composed in the several arms of infantry, cavalry and artillery, and so supplied with ammunition, provisions, and the means of movement, as to be in fact incapable of executing with promptitude and effect, and even of attempting, without peril to itself, any important operations with which it may be entrusted.

16. We subjoin, for the convenience of reference, a memorandum, showing the position and strength of the several corps of the army beyond the Indus, and moving towards that river at the latest period up to which we have information.

17. We have, by this post, transmitted a copy of this letter to Major-Generals Pollock and Nott, for their information and guidance. Copies will also be forwarded to the Lieutenant-Governor and Mr. Clerk; and the dispatch to Major-General Nott will pass under a flying seal through the hands of Major Outram and Brigadier England.

ELLENBOROUGH, W.W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, & H.T. PRINSEP.

No. 201.—*Memorandum of the Troops employed beyond the Sutlej and in Sind, according to the latest information in the possession of Government.*

From the Commander-in-Chief's letter of the 2nd instant, to Mr. Maddock, it appears that at that date no information had reached his Excellency of the first division\* of the reserve brigade having crossed the Ravee, and it appears, from his Excellency's letter of the 20th ultimo, that he expected the second reserve brigade†, consisting of the troops

\* Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, 3rd troop 2nd brigade Horse Artillery, 1st Light Cavalry, 33rd Regiment of Native Infantry, and a Rissalah 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

† Her Majesty's 31st Foot, recruits of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 6th Regiment of Native Infantry, three field-battery guns, and three Rissalahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

detailed in the margin, would cross the Sutlej on, or about, the 8th instant.

The first of these brigades can hardly, therefore, be expected to reach Peshawur before the first or second week in April; and the second brigade, which will be yet more impeded by the heat, not before the end of that month.

On the 27th ultimo, the date of the last report from Major-General Pollock, that officer was at, or near, Peshawur, with three brigades, according to the following statement:—

Her Majesty's 9th Foot.	3d comp. 2d batt. Foot Artillery.
26th Regiment of Native Infantry.	4th comp. 6th batt. ditto.
30th Ditto.	10th Regiment of Light Cavalry.
53d Ditto.	Detachment 3d Irregular Cavalry.
60th Ditto.	5th comp. Sappers and Miners.
64th Ditto.	

Of the two brigades which were originally commanded by Brigadier Wild, 368 were sick in hospital; more than 1,800 had been in hospital ten days before, of whom 236 were wounded; but the sick are said to be rapidly recovering.

At Peshawur was stationed Rajah Golab Sing; and, according to Mr. Clerk's letter of the 17th ultimo, the Rajah's force consisted of the troops and each corps of the strength detailed as follows:—

*Khalsa Troops now at or about Peshawur.*

Four battalions of General Metab Sing . . . . .	2,700
Four battalions of Mahomedans and Nujeebs . . . . .	3,000
One battalion Subja Sing's . . . . .	800
One battalion under Koolkey Sing Goorkha . . . . .	600
Sowars under Dewan Mote Ram, in the Eusofzyes . . . . .	2,000
Miscellaneous Rissalahs . . . . .	110
One regiment Sowars, under Geean Sing, Commander . . . . .	500
Two brigades, Bangall, &c., under General Avitabile . . . . .	1,300
Jageerdar Sowars . . . . .	500
Sirdar Nehal Sing of Allowata, contingent with two guns under Hyder Ali Khan . . . . .	500
Under the personal command of Rajah Golab Sing, . . . . .	
the best and chosen troops, with blower or long-barrelled muskets . . . . .	3,000
Koonwur Pertab Sing's escort . . . . .	500
General Avitabile's escort . . . . .	500
Eight Pieces of Guns.	
Charyarees under Race Kisnee Sing . . . . .	1,500
Nursing regiment under ditto . . . . .	800
Hill Peasantry under ditto . . . . .	200
Four battalions and one regiment under General Court . . . . .	5,000
Twelve Guns under ditto.	
Two battalions under John Homer . . . . .	1,000

125 Tumbrucks and some miscellaneous Sowars.

At Jellalabad, on the 21st ultimo, the force detained there, under the command of Major-General Sir Robert Sale, amounted, of all arms, as

per margin\*, to 2,273 effective troops, and 155 sick. The Major-General has provisions for the Europeans, and half rations for the native troops, for seventy days; but he was ill supplied with grain and forage for his cattle, not having a stock that would last more than twenty-five or thirty days; and he was apprehensive that, even if he had money to purchase fodder he would be unable to procure any. He has since received a small remittance of cash—3,000 rupees; and 1,500 more had been dispatched to him.

Major-General Pollock appeared to entertain a hope that the Khyber tribes would be induced to open the pass, if he consented to pay them for their neutrality.

The force under Major-General Nott, at Candahar, consisted, by the last accounts, of the following troops:—

General Staff . . . . .	7
All other Staff . . . . .	76
Regimental Officers . . . . .	83
Native Officers . . . . .	168
All other ranks—fighting men . . . . .	8,390
	<hr/>
	8,724

1,425 Horses, 265 Camels, 148 Bullocks.

The Major-General's force is strong in infantry and artillery, but is deficient in cavalry; and has not carriage equal to the wants of his force.

Brigadier England's force, above and below the passes, consisted, on the 27th January, of the detachments of the strength noted as follows:—

No. of Battns.	No. of Guns.	Corps.
Sukkur 2	three 6-pounders (Golundauze)	1st Grenadiers.
Shikarpore... 1	two 6-pounders Horse Artillery.	12th Native Infantry, (not arrived.) 8th Native Infantry and 15th Native Infantry, (when it arrives.) 1 Squadron 3rd Light Cavalry.
Bagh .....		Intended to be occupied by a wing.
Sebee..... 1	6-pounders (Golundauze.)	21st Native Infantry.
Dadur ..... 1½	two 6-pounders (Golundauze) Horse Artillery.	1 Troop 3rd Light Cavalry. 4 Comp. Her Majesty's 41st Regt. 6th Regiment Native Infantry.
Quetta..... 2	two 9-pounders European Foot Artillery.	1 Comp. Her Majesty's 41st Regt. 20th Regiment Native Infantry. 25th ditto ditto.
		And a Company of European Artillery of the Bengal Army.
En route to join this force 1½	six 9-pounders	4 Comps. Her Majesty's 41st Regt. And 15th Native Infantry.

	Effective.	Sick
* One Squadron 5th Bengal Cavalry .....	241	21
Artillery .....	171	11
Sappers and Miners .....	304	45
Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry .....	719	30
35th Regiment Native Infantry .....	838	48
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	2,273	155



N.B. 630—irregular cavalry divided into parties at each station, and a company of Madras Sappers and Miners are stationed at Sebee and elsewhere.

The Brigadier proposes to move off above the passes about the 5th, or 20th of March, the troops noted in the margin\*, for the purpose of opening the communication with Candahar, and reinforcing Major-General Nott, or covering his retreat, if that officer should resolve on retiring southward. Some difficulty appears to exist in providing carriage for the troops, and the convoy about to proceed, under Brigadier England, above the passes. The exact quantity of carriage required, and of that deficient, has not been stated. The Brigadier speaks of having 2,500 camels and escort, and as we see that considerable purchases of camels have been made for this force in the States of Rajpootana, we may hope that no serious distress on this account will be experienced. The brigade under Brigadier England will take up treasure, about 22 lacs, with medicines and other necessary stores for the force at Candahar.

The last returns of the force at Kurachee exhibit the following number of troops.

EUROPEANS.		NATIVES.	
Artillery .....	94	Left wing—15th Regt.....	493
13th Light Infantry .....	20	„ 23rd ditto ...	434
41st Foot .....	194	Absent on command.....	190
40th ditto .....	40	—	244
—	343	Recruits, 1st Gren. Regt.....	150
			887
			343
			1,230

The force will subsequently have been augmented by the arrival of Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment from Bombay.

And on the advance of Brigadier England through the Bolan Pass, the following will be the disposition which he proposes to make of the troops remaining in the plains of upper and lower Sindh:—

For the protection of the line of communication, the several magazines and depôts at Sukkur :

- One company of European Artillery—Camel Battery.
- One ditto Golundauze Artillery.
- One squadron, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.
- Four and a half battalions of Native Infantry.
- The whole of the Sindh horse and part of the Poona horse.
- At Sukkur†—Two battalions, two guns ; 170 rank and file of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment.
- Shikarpore—One squadron 3rd Light Cavalry one battalion, two guns.
- Janeedehra—Two companies.

\* One troop of Horse Artillery, two squadrons 3rd Bombay Cavalry, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, one battalion of Native Infantry. The flank companies of the battalions left at Quetta, and about 100 Poona horse.

† Mountain Train of Artillery expected from Bombay.

Chuttin—Two companies.

Bagh—Two companies.

Sebee—Two companies.

Dadur—Two companies.

Detachment of Irregular Horse at each post.

No. 202.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Camp, Loodiana, March 4, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter received to-day from Major-General Pollock, dated 27th ultimo. This letter was in acknowledgment of one addressed to the Major-General, in which I conveyed to him the two first paragraphs of your Lordship in Council's letter of the 10th of February to my address.

The dispatch of the 15th of February, conveying your Lordship's orders of that date, was forwarded to Peshawur in duplicate, on the 25th and 27th, and will remove all the Major-General's doubts.

I am not at all inclined to believe that any arrangements made with the Khyberees will give us permanent security for communication with any troops advanced to Jellalabad, although the prospect and arguments of some of the chiefs appear to tempt the Major-General to venture into Ningrahar for the ensuing summer.

The concluding paragraph of the Major-General's letter contains matter for grave reflection, but, from the tenor of several of your Lordship's late dispatches, the subject has already received your serious attention.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 203.—*Major-General Pollock to Lieut.-Colonel Luard.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, February 27, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 20th instant, by order of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, conveying his approval of my intentions relative to the relief of Sir R. Sale's party. I regret that the copies of my letters to the address of his Excellency and to Mr. Maddock, up to the 13th instant inclusive, have, I fear, been buried in the ruins occasioned by the earthquake. The roof of the room which was for the time my office fell in a few seconds after I left it ; I can, therefore, only guess at the intentions I expressed to his Excellency.

On the occasion of the earthquake, which took place on the 19th instant, considerable damage was supposed to have been done to the walls of the fortifications of Jellalabad, and Sir R. Sale thought it probable an attack would be made by Mahomed Akbar ; such, however, has not been the case ; and instead of the extensive injury which was at first reported, his Excellency will observe that, in Captain Macgregor's letter, dated 21st instant, which I forwarded express, it was expected that in a couple of days the defences would again be strong, and that "the parapet was

rising like magic." He had received 3,000 rupees which I had sent him, and which I presume will enable him to purchase food for his cattle. I shall send him more to-day, if Captain Mackeson (who is indefatigable in aiding me) can complete the arrangements; and I fervently hope that the gallant garrison will be enabled to hold out in safety till my reinforcements arrive. On this point I have not lately been sanguine, from their want of money, and being uncertain as to the movements of the 3rd Brigade.

In all my communications with Sir R. Sale and Captain Macgregor, although I have advocated the expediency of waiting for the 3rd Brigade, I have explicitly stated to both, that if in the interim they should consider my advance absolutely necessary, I would at once obey the call.

I have already, I believe more than once, expressed my opinion on the bad policy of moving my force through the Pass in two columns, so long as the Pass is closed to us, thereby entailing a double loss of life and a double expenditure of ammunition.

I have carefully perused and deeply considered the two paragraphs forwarded by the Governor-General in Council to his Excellency, and which you were directed to transcribe. One part adverts to "a decided turn" admitting of a deviation from the avowed purpose for which this force was mainly formed, viz., "the withdrawing of the Jellalabad garrison in safety to Peshawur;" and his Excellency's orders are that I should carefully and implicitly obey these instructions.

While holding the responsible and confidential situation which it has pleased the Government to confer on me, I consider that I should ill fulfil my trust if I did not respectfully offer my opinion on any points when I may have objections to propose to the course pointed out for me to pursue; I therefore beg to submit the following observations:—

Uninformed as I am of the ultimate intentions of Government relating to Afghanistan, I may perhaps offer opinions which, as regards their views, may be unimportant; but I apprehend that at the date at which the resolutions of Government were made, it was not known that I have a fair prospect of opening the Pass to our troops; that the Ex-Chief of Lalpoora is not only with us, but has been the means of conveying the money to Captain Macgregor; the Kama Chief, until the fall of Ali Musjid, aided Captain Macgregor, and would no doubt return to our interest on my advancing in force.

The-Goshta Chief has proved himself friendly, by having secreted the horsemen who took money to Captain Macgregor a whole night at Goshta. These I consider very favourable circumstances for our advance, and I submit them for the consideration of Government.

It is the opinion of Toorabaz Khan and Snyeed Ayaudeen, that our force, if sufficiently strong to command the resources of the country in Ningrahar, will not be straitened for supplies for twelve months, supposing the Pass to be closed upon us; and Captain Mackeson confirms this opinion, and the Syeed and Toorabaz Khan guarantee on their part to provide the supplies.

The troops remaining at Peshawur would suffer severely in the unhealthy months, whereas at Gundamuck, or on the plain of Ashphan, the climate is favorable to European constitutions, and would admit of Jella-

labad being frequently relieved. Such a position would, I conceive, be justifiable only if the Khyber Pass be open ; in which case the resources of the Punjab and of Peshawur would also be open to me. I should be too strong to apprehend risk from any attack of the enemy ; on the contrary, it would be desirable if I could meet them on a plain, and give them another instance of our superiority. My advanced position would further enable me, I hope, to effect the liberation of the prisoners now with the enemy. If, however, I found that any unforeseen obstacles rendered it necessary for me to retire on Peshawur, I should not hesitate to do so.

If I were to advance with the intention of merely withdrawing the garrison of Jellalabad, my success in advancing must chiefly depend on concealing my intentions ; for although (if I succeed in any negotiation to open the Pass) every precaution will be taken by me to secure a safe retreat, I must expect that every man will rise to molest our return, as they would be left to the mercy of the Afghan rulers ; and I must confess, I sincerely believe that our return here, unless I have first an opportunity of inflicting some signal punishment on the enemy, would have a very bad effect both far and near.

Our connexion with the Sikh Government is professedly friendly, and the chiefs are, as far as I have observed, courteous, and perhaps well disposed towards us ; but the bearing of the soldiery, one and all, is insolent, and they scruple not to express their wish that we may meet with reverses. They are a disorganized rabble, but dangerous as neighbours. Our officers require escorts between the camp and Peshawur, and our sepoy or camp-followers dare not move beyond the pickets after dark.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 204.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp. Kowlsur, February 28, 1812.*

SIR,—It is with regret I report that two officers were yesterday severely wounded in an attack on some of the hill tribes, who came down to carry off camels a few miles from camp. It was reported to me that about sixty-six men were carrying off the camels to the hills, and I ordered out a troop of cavalry to recover them. Major Anderson, of the 64th Native Infantry, having reported the circumstance, and knowing the direction, offered to conduct the party. It appeared that, before the troops reached the spot, the villagers in the vicinity had driven off the party, and secured the camels, which was not known to the Major, who advanced to the foot of the hills and skirted them for some distance ; some of the enemy were overtaken, who defended themselves well ; four of them were killed, and those from the hills fired on our party. I beg to inclose a list of killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

D D

No.	Rank and Names.	Killed.	Wounded.	Remarks.
CORNET.				
1	T. E. Vibart .....	..	1	5th Light Cavalry, doing duty, severely.
TROOPERS.				
1	Ramzaun Khan .....	1	..	} Severely. Slightly.
2	Chundun Sing .....	..	1	
3	Buldeo Sing .....	..	1	
4	Usman Khan .....	..	1	
5	Mankun Khan .....	.	1	
ENSIGN.				
1	T. M. B. Fraser Tytler, 37th Native Infantry, doing duty with 26th Native Infantry .....	} ..	..	Severely.

No. 205.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

Fort William, March 19, 1842.

SIR,—Having taken into consideration the expediency of placing the command of all the troops in Lower Afghanistan and Sinde, in the hands of one officer, with a view to their being directed with uniformity of plan to the accomplishment of the objects detailed in our letter to your Excellency of 15th instant, we have determined to place all those troops under the command of Major-General Nott, and in the event of casualty, under that of Brigadier England, or the officer next to Major-General Nott in rank who may be there employed.

2. We have likewise decided upon entrusting to Major-General Nott, and to such his successor, entire control over the several Political Agents there employed.

3. Major-General Nott, or such his successor, will take such measures and give such orders as he may think fit for equipping the whole force under his command in the most efficient manner, so that it may be capable of executing every movement and enterprise which can be required from an army in the field.

4. Major General Nott will rely upon our constant support, and upon our placing the most favorable interpretation upon all the measures he may deem it necessary to adopt in the execution of our orders.

We have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH, W. W. BIRD, W. CASEMENT, AND H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 206.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to Mr. Clerk.*

Camp, Loodiana, March 5, 1842.

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant, from Amritsir, transmitting two demi-official letters from Major Outram, dated 17th and 19th ultimo.

2. As Major Outram has fully explained his opinion, and made known his wants to the Governor-General, through his Lordship's private secretary, and as you have duly supported them, by transmitting a copy of your letter above-mentioned, I cannot venture to anticipate his Lordship's orders upon the requisitions therein made.

3. The 9th Light Cavalry is now moving from Kurnaul to Ferozepore, and there are three Native Infantry regiments at the latter station. All these, Major Outram would desire to have, and in addition the 16th Lancers, and Irregular Cavalry.

4. Whence Major Outram has drawn grounds for his opinion that an advance against Cabool is intended by Government, I know not. The dispatch of the 15th of February, is of a decidedly opposite character, as to Major-General Pollock's force—and, I think, Mr. Maddock's instructions to Major-General Nott, of the 10th of February, rather look to the rescue or relief of Kelat-i-Ghilzie and of Ghuznee, than to any advance upon Cabool.

5. You may very well remember that the authorities at Candahar, Quetta, and Sukkur, similarly anticipated and partly prepared for an advance upon Herat last year, which Government entirely disapproved, and which cost the Bombay Government an exertion from which it has never yet recovered.

6. I agree with Major Outram, when he says, "We have to pause for a season before commencing our advance against Cabool." Undoubtedly, it would require the greatest part of 1842 to re-equip General Nott's force, which had but 265 camels, and 148 bullocks, on the 1st of December, for 9,000 men, without followers, at Candahar.

7. What the Government may resolve to do in the present state of affairs beyond the Indus, especially in Candahar, we have yet to learn. The orders of the Governor-General in Council to Major Outram, of the 31st of January, on which the advance of Brigadier England to the Kojuck Pass is founded, make no mention of any movement being intended beyond the southern side of that Pass.

8. If you feel certain that Government will authorize an advance upon Cabool from Candahar this year, I think Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons should be sent to the southward, to join in the enterprise; but on this as on all other points, it is our duty to await the authority and orders of the Governor-General in Council.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 207.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Loodiana, March 6, 1842.*

MY LORD,—Having received intimation from Mr. Clerk, your Lordship's Agent on this frontier, that he had transmitted a copy of his dispatch to me, dated the 3rd instant, to the Secretary to Government, I have the honor to submit, for the information of your Lordship in Council, a copy of my letter of yesterday, in reply thereto.

2. Brigadier England states in his letter to Mr. Maddock, of the 29th of January, that the troops should be above the Bolan Pass in March; no troops could, therefore, arrive in time to join him; but if your Lordship chooses to send either the 19th, 1st Light Infantry Battalion, or 55th, to reinforce Sind, your instructions, through Major-General Fast, will reach Ferozepore nearly as soon, perhaps, as boats can be collected. I have put the 55th last, because it has not a field officer present.

3. Major Delafosse's troop of Artillery will march from Loodiana to-morrow evening, if possible, and will easily join Her Majesty's 31st and the second division ere it can cross the river.

4. The 9th Cavalry will reach Ferozepore about the 20th instant.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 203.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Konwulsur, March 3, 1842.*

SIR,—It is to me most painful that notwithstanding all my hopes about the state of the men, I am sorry to say there have been several desertions of late, and there is a feeling among many of the Hindoos of four Regiments of Brigadier Wild's force, which is most lamentable.

A number of the unfortunate creatures from Cabool have come down here, and have exaggerated their sufferings, stating among other things, that although they were Brahmins, food was thrust down their throats by Mussulmans, and they were spit upon. Some men have also shown mutilated hands and feet, having been frost-bitten; these things are said to have operated to cause a backwardness.

I sent for Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, who admitted that there was a bad feeling, which he had just heard of; he seemed to say that the men would not hesitate to go to Jellalabad to the relief of Sir R. Sale, but that they had a dread of proceeding to Cabool. I went to each of the other commanding officers, viz., of the 30th, 53rd, and 61th, and instructed them to endeavor to find out what the real state of the case was. Each of these latter officers seemed to consider his own regiment free from any taint, but I had reason to think otherwise, and I further believe that the causes I have mentioned were brought forward by the men to screen them from a suspicion of fear, which, in my opinion, was the real cause.

The affairs which have already taken place in this quarter, and in which those corps are concerned, were so disastrous, that they have, in my opinion, produced the feeling which now unhappily exists. In consequence of what I have stated, his Excellency and Government will suppose that I am doubly anxious to open the Khyber Pass, which those regiments evidently dread.

The vicinity of the Sikh troops is perplexing, for they would not only delight in the feeling I have mentioned, but have I am told, endeavoured to encourage it. I have, therefore, been obliged to prevent them coming into our camp.

I feel, at such a crisis, the want of more European troops, for their presence would give confidence to the native soldiers.

Captain Napleton and other officers of the 60th have been doing their utmost to bring their men to a proper feeling, and expect a successful result; the 53rd are equally implicated, but I have just heard, from both Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch and Major Hoggan, that considerable reaction has taken place, and they hope to report all right before to-morrow evening.

I cannot help remarking here, that this is the second instance of misconduct on the part of the 60th since they have arrived here, from which I feel inclined to believe their internal economy is not such as it should be. I inspected them a few days ago, in marching order, and have never seen a finer-looking regiment. At Cawnpore I recollect them in excellent order.

Were I differently situated I might attempt coercive measures, but surrounded as I am by the Sikhs, and within hearing of the Pass, I think such a measure should on all accounts be avoided; it might risk the safety of the force, which I consider of the utmost importance. The feeling to which I have alluded was reported to me the day before yesterday by Lieutenant Verner, who very properly considered it right that I should immediately be informed, and I should have reported the circumstance yesterday, but that I had strong hopes from the measures I took, that I should be able to suppress it, and was unwilling to give unnecessary alarm, although my anxiety as to the result has been greater than I can express.

I shall address you daily on this subject by express, until I feel confident that all are willing to go on; they all profess their willingness to die in action in the plains, but they dread Cabool when approached through these passes.

I have sent express to Lieutenant-Colonel White, to hasten his advance as much as possible, as the presence of his force is urgently required: at the same time I have told him that he must not overwork his cattle. I am sorry to say that Captain Tibbs has not arrived yet, and I fear he will not till the 8th instant.

I have not received any direct accounts from Jellalabad for the last three or four days, but the ex-Chief of Lalpoora received a letter from Lalpoora to-day, mentioning that all was well at Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 204.—*Major-General Lumley to Mr. Maddock.*

*Loodiana, March 9, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor, by direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council, copy of a dispatch from Major-General G. Pollock, C.B. commanding the troops at Peshawur, dated the 3rd instant, reporting the existence of an unsoldier-like feeling in some of the native corps of his force.

I have, &c.,

J. R. LUMLEY.



No. 205.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Loodiana, March 9, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I have the honor to submit to your Lordship, in Council a copy of a letter, this day received from Major-General Pollock, in the first paragraph of which he acknowledges his receipt of the orders conveyed to me in your Lordship's dispatch of the 15th of February, regarding the withdrawal of Sir R. Sale's force to Peshawur, with the least possible delay.

2. The Adjutant-General will transmit by this post, a copy of the dispatch to his address alluded to by the Major-General, in paragraph 4.

3. On the 4th instant, I had the honor to transmit, for your Lordship's information, a copy of Major-General Pollock's letter, of the 27th ultimo, now mentioned in the third paragraph.

4. Yesterday I received, and forwarded to Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, a report of Brigadier White's brigade having reached Dhinga, on the 5th instant. The great detention upon the Ravee will interfere much with the Major-General's calculations; but I am confident that time will not be thrown away by the Brigadier.

5. The orders which the Major-General was so desirous to receive, touching the prisoners at Cabool and elsewhere, will be in his hands to-morrow or next day. The copy of Mr. Secretary Maddock's dispatch, of the 24th of February, to the Major-General, was received by me three days ago.

I have, &c.,  
J. NICOLLS.

No. 206.—*Major-General Pollock to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Camp, near Peshawur, March 3, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 25th ultimo, inclosing a copy of a dispatch from the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, of date the 15th ultimo.

My letters since my arrival here will have informed you of the measures which I have taken to effect the relief of the Jellalabad garrison, and the causes which have detained me here; also of the steps which have been taken with a view to bring about a negotiation with the Khyberree; this negotiation is still in progress, and I trust there is reason to hope that, by it, my advance through the Khyber will be unopposed.

3. In my letter of the 27th ultimo, to the address of Colonel J. Luard, Military Secretary, I have enumerated certain favorable circumstances which I have submitted for the consideration of Government, as justifying my maintaining a position near Jellalabad, but I have subsequently heard, with the deepest sorrow, of circumstances which would, I apprehend, render such a proceeding objectionable, if not attended with risk. I however hope that I may not have difficulty in persuading the Native regiments to enter the Khyber, if I advance merely for the purpose of withdrawing Sir R. Sale's force.

4 I have this day forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army, a detail of the painful circumstances above alluded to; they have caused

me the greatest grief, and it is very distressing to me to be obliged to report conduct so disgraceful to the regiments concerned.

5. My communications with Jellalabad have been closed for the last three days, and should this continue I shall feel myself compelled to advance to Sir R. Sale's relief as soon as possible; on the other hand, should I receive letters from him by which I find that he can hold his post so long, I shall of course halt here until the arrival of the 1st Brigade of my reinforcements, viz., about the 22nd instant.

6. I have written to-day "express," to expedite the march of Colonel White's brigade.

7. Supposing the negotiation to which I have already alluded is completed, I shall not have difficulty in reaching Jellalabad; but the first march which I make with Sir R. Sale's force towards Peshawur, will convince the Affghan nation that the British Government no longer intend to keep a permanent footing in that country, and this belief will have the effect of closing the Khyber Pass in my rear; but we shall advance with the least possible baggage, and I do not feel any doubt as to our being able to force our passage and to crush any force which may be brought against us.

8. The above is the only plan which it is in my power to effect for the relief of the garrison of Jellalabad, as late events have too plainly proved that a negotiation for its retreat could not be depended on for a moment.

9. I attach the greatest importance to its being generally believed that we advance towards Cabool, and not only on Jellalabad.

10. The Government have not yet given any powers, that I am aware of, to negotiate concerning the many British subject who are now prisoners at Cabool: on my arrival at Jellalabad I shall do all that will be in my power to obtain their release, but I am anxious that minute instructions may be sent on this point.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 207.—*The Quarter-Master General of the Army to Mr. Maddock.*

*Loodiana, March 9, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor, by desire of the Commander-in-Chief, to report, for the information of Government, that his Excellency has this day ordered the 3rd Light Infantry battalion to march from Meerut to Kurnaul, and the 6th Irregular Cavalry from Barrilly to Umballa, where they are to be respectively stationed for the present.

I have, &c.,

W. GARDEN.

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No. 208.—*Major-General Lumley to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Doarke-ke-Serai, March 10, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor, by direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to annex, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, copy of a dispatch from

Major-General G. Pollock, C.B., dated the 4th instant, on the state of feeling in some of the corps under his command, with copies of letters from the officers commanding the 53rd and 64th Regiments, on the same subject.

I have, &c.,

J. R. LUMLEY.

No. 209.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, March 4, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward a letter this day received from Major Hoggan, Commanding the 53rd Regiment of Native Infantry. I have understood that there are certain men in the regiments who have encouraged the feeling which has prevailed, and whose discharge from the service would be desirable; I shall hereafter forward their names. If I had had the power to discharge them I would have done so, but although they may have returned to a sense of duty on the present occasion, some of them are considered spokesmen. The treaty with the Aurukzyes for a free passage of the pass, will, I hope, be concluded in five or six days, when I hope to move forward. My force is too small to divide, otherwise I would leave a regiment at Ali Musjid. If I can make any arrangement for our passage through on our return I will do so, but such a thing is highly improbable. I have not yet received a satisfactory report from Lieutenant-Colonel Tullock, commanding 60th Regiment.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 210.—*Major Hoggan to Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SIR,—I have the honor to state, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., Commanding, that all those Hindoo Sepoys of the 53rd Regiment Native Infantry, who had a few days ago allowed themselves, in an unguarded moment, to evince feelings so immediately opposed to those of soldiers, have now unanimously expressed their contrition, and have the most satisfactory assurances, through their respective commanding officers, that I shall never again have occasion to be displeased with them, and that they will strive in future to deserve the favourable opinion of the Major-General.

I have, &c.,

I. HOGGAN.

No. 211.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, March 2, 1842.*

SIR,—Having instituted an inquiry into the feeling at present existing in the 64th Regiment Native Infantry, under my command, I have the satisfaction to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., Commanding, that the order to advance, whenever received, will be

obeyed with the greatest cheerfulness by both officers and men of the Regiment.

In proof of what I have before stated, not many days ago several of the men of the 7th company came to the captain of that company, requesting that in the event of an advance movement, and they happened to be killed, that the proceeds of their several estates might be sent to the individuals there mentioned.

I have, &c.,

C. W. MOSELEY.

No. 212.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, March 6, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit herewith an original letter from His Majesty Shah Shooja to the Governor-General; also a free translation thereof. I also inclose copies of letters from Sir R. Sale, Captain Macgregor, and Captain J. Conolly. The former bring down accounts from Jellalabad to the 1st instant. It is satisfactory to know that on the 1st the grass-cutters still continued to bring in forage.

Mr. Clerk, in a late letter, mentions that the dragoons may be here on the 16th, though I almost fear I cannot expect them before the 20th. I consider it of the utmost importance that they and the Horse Artillery should accompany me: their presence will give confidence, I hope, to the Sepoys. The feeling among them, which has lately been smothered, has not, I fear, been wholly extinguished. The example of some may stimulate others to advance, but nothing is so likely to do it as the presence of more European troops. The presence of the Cavalry when I clear the Pass is very desirable, to meet those now with Mahomed Akbar on more equal terms. Negotiations continue with the Aurukzyes, but I cannot say that I am very sanguine that our difficulties will be lessened by their exertions.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 213.—*General Sir R. Sale to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Jellalabad, February 27, 1842.*

SIR,—Since the 21st we have been unable to obtain grass for our horses, excepting by supporting our foraging parties in force, and risking an engagement; and have once sacrificed our forage in part rather than compromise our troops and camp followers. All hope of our retaining the uninterrupted command of this supply has been nearly precluded for the present by the events of yesterday.

Mahomed Akbar moved his camp, in the course of the morning, from Umr Khail to a line of forts within two thousand yards of us, formerly occupied by the Ghilzie chiefs, Uzecz Khan and Gool Mahomed Khan.

About half-past 10, A. M., he invested this place to the southward and westward, showing a force of about fifteen hundred horse and not fewer than five hundred Ooloose and other foot. The latter availed themselves of all the old walls yet left standing, and every inequality of ground

within eight hundred yards, and partially occupied the rocky mounds so often referred to in my dispatches. They thus sustained a continued fire of jezails for about seven hours holding their horse in reserve on the hills. The height of our restored parapets secured us from a single casualty on our side ; and though I prohibited any general fire of musketry from the walls, the enemy lost men from the round shot, shells, and spherical case of our batteries, and the practice of a few selected marksmen with rifles and wall pieces.

I wish you, however, to make Major-General Pollock fully aware that our serious difficulties on the score of forage are hourly increasing.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

No. 214.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Benares, April 20, No. 1, 1842.*

HONORABLE SIRS,—In a despatch from Major-General Pollock, dated the 19th ultimo, and received in Calcutta on the 2nd instant, arrived a copy of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, Commandant at Ghuznee, to the officer commanding at Jellalabad, dated March 1st, 1842, in which that officer reports that he had entered into terms to evacuate the citadel and fort of Ghuznee, in six days.

Your Honorable Committee will perceive from the Gazette, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer's report was published, that it appeared necessary to the Government to submit the officer's conduct, in so surrendering the citadel of Ghuznee, to the judgment of Court-Martial.

It appeared at the same time to the Government, to be right formally to declare, that the conduct of Major-General Elphinstone should be submitted to the judgment of a Court-Martial, and to announce the intention of the Government to institute, at the earliest possible period, a full inquiry into the conduct of the political functionaries at Cabool.

I have the honor to inclose a copy of a letter which on the same date was addressed to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on this subject.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 215.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, March 19, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit herewith, copies of letters from Sir Robert R. Sale, dated 11th instant, Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, dated 1st instant, and from Captain McGregor, dated 12th instant. From the latter it will appear that they are not urgent for my arrival till the 6th or 7th proximo, under the belief that the reinforcement will reach me.

Brigadier White has, I am glad to say, answered to my several "expresses," by coming on with the cavalry and horse artillery ; and by letter received to-day, I hope he will reach my camp by the 28th. I fear the negotiations about the Khyber are not likely to terminate favourably ;

I should therefore be glad to have another infantry regiment ; but the unaccountable delay which has been taken place, makes it, I fear, hopeless.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 216.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer to the Officer Commanding at Jellalabad.*

*Ghuznee, March 1, 1842.*

SIR,—It is with much concern I acquaint you that, from want of water, and by an overpowering force under cover, and within fifty yards of us in the city, I have been compelled to enter into terms to evacuate the citadel and fort, within six days. The garrison is to occupy the north-east corner of the town. The garrison is exhausted by fatigue and constant duty, and the men have suffered greatly from cold, the thermometer having been 14 degrees below zero. The terms are, honorable treatment and safety whilst here and on the march to Cabool, solemnly sworn to by the chiefs. In capitulating, I have only acted up to the orders of Major Pottinger and General Elphinstone, who directed me, in an official letter, to evacuate the citadel and city on the arrival of Rohilla Khan, son of Amcenoolah Khan, Sirdar of Logur. This chief arrived, and promised to escort us in safety to Cabool. Ameer Shumsodeen Khan, nephew of Dost Mahomed Khan, has also arrived as Governor of Ghuznee, and as Political Agent. I received instructions to march, immediately on his arrival, for Cabool, from the late Sir W. Macnaghten, Bart. Abandoned as this garrison has been, in the very centre of the enemy's country, cut off from all communication with any quarter, and without a sufficiency of water, even at this season, with two hundred men detached to hold an out-post, which is destitute of water, and must have fallen in forty-eight hours, nothing but capitulation remained. From the out-post falling into the hands of the enemy, they would command our only well, and, commanding the fort, the whole garrison would have been destroyed in a few days. The bearer has received only subsistence on the road, and is to receive a handsome reward on delivering this letter. We have upwards of 100 sick and wounded, and 137 casualties. The officers, including Captain Burnett, 54th, and Lieutenant Crawford, Shah Shooja's force, are all well.

I have, &c.,

T. PALMER.

P.S.—There is great reason to fear for our safety, as there are thousands of Ghazees in the city whom the chiefs cannot disperse. The snow is still deep. No tidings from the southward, but report says the troops hold the city of Candahar, and are daily fighting.

No. 217.—*Notification by order of the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Fort William, April 4, 1842.*

The following copy of a dispatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, Commanding at Ghuznee, to the address of the Officer Commanding at

Jellalabad, dated the 1st March 1842, is published for general information by order of the Governor-General in Council.

The Governor-General in Council has directed that the Commander-in-chief will submit the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, in surrendering the citadel of Ghuznee, to the judgment of a Court-martial, at the earliest period which such court can be duly assembled.

The Governor-General in Council has already (on the 28th of January last) directed that a full military inquiry shall be made into all the circumstances connected with the direction and conduct of the troops at Cabool, at the earliest period at which such an inquiry may be practicable.

The Governor-General in Council has now directed that the conduct of Major-General Elphinstone in Afghanistan, shall be submitted to the judgment of a Court-Martial, at the earliest period at which such court can be duly assembled.

The Governor-General in Council will further direct that a full inquiry shall likewise be made into the conduct of all the political functionaries employed at Cabool, at the earliest possible period after he shall be in possession of certain material documents, of which he has already ordered the immediate transmission to Government.

By order of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council.

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 218.—*Mr. Maddock to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, April 4, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General in Council has had under consideration, the letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, dated Ghuznee, the 1st March, 1842, addressed to the Officer commanding at Jellalabad, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, reports his having entered into terms of capitulation of the citadel of Ghuznee.

2. The Governor-General directs that your Excellency will submit the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, in so surrendering the citadel of Ghuznee, to the judgment of a Court-Martial at the earliest period at which such court can be duly assembled.

3. The Governor-General in Council has, already (on the 28th of January last) directed that your Excellency will cause a full military inquiry to be made into the circumstances connected with the direction and conduct of the troops at Cabool, at the earliest period at which such an inquiry may be practicable.

4. The Governor-General in Council now directs that your Excellency will submit the conduct of Major-General Elphinstone, in Afghanistan, to the judgment of a Court-Martial at the earliest period at which such court can be duly assembled.

5. The Governor-General in Council will on his part cause a full inquiry to be made into the conduct of all the political functionaries employed at Cabool, at the earliest possible period after he shall be in possession of certain material documents, of which he has already ordered the immediate transmission to Government.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 219.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.**Benares, April 21, No. 3, 1842.*

HONORABLE SIRS,—I have already addressed a letter, from this place, to the Honorable the Court of Directors, to announce my departure from the Presidency to the North-West Provinces, and my progress to this station, *en route* to Allahabad, where I shall for a time fix my headquarters.

2. The impediments to correspondence attendant on a journey by dak, more particularly at this season of the year, will preclude me from entering into a full and complete detail of all the important proceedings of the Government, during the last month, in the Secret and Political Department; but I will endeavour, during my short stay at this place, to arrange for the information of your Honorable Committee, a *précis* of the most interesting events which have occurred, and have been reported to me, since the date of the last dispatches from the Governor-General in Council, transmitted to the Home authorities by the last mail.

3. Confining myself chiefly in this dispatch to the correspondence relative to the progress of events in Afghanistan, I have to refer your Honorable Committee to the inclosures of this dispatch.

4. From these you will learn that the garrison of Jellalabad, under the command of Major-General Sir R. Sale, has continued to uphold the honor and reputation of the British arms, by maintaining its position against a large besieging force of the enemy, headed by Mahomed Akbar Khan, under great privations from a scarcity of provisions for the men, and forage for the cattle, with a degree of spirit and devotion that has gained for the officers and men composing Sir R. Sale's small force, the sympathy and admiration of their countrymen in India, and has entitled them to the gratitude and applause of the Indian Government.

5. Your Honorable Committee is aware that the fortifications of Jellalabad, raised principally by the zeal and assiduity of the garrison, had sustained considerable injury by the violent earthquake which occurred in that vicinity on the 19th February. The damages were speedily repaired by the unwearied exertions of the garrison, and the troops have since continued to maintain their post with little loss, availing themselves of every opportunity to make sorties against the besiegers, which have been invariably attended with success to our arms, and with discomfiture and serious loss to the enemy. Major-General Sir R. Sale, without ever hazarding the safety of his garrison and post, has, on many of these occasions, inflicted severe injury on the besieging army, and has, by the promptness and vigour of his sallies, secured for himself the forage grounds of the immediate neighbourhood, and, on a late occasion, in an affair of great brilliancy, succeeded in capturing a large flock of sheep, led out to pasture within 800 yards of the walls, in the face of Mahomed Akbar's army. And it should be recorded to the credit of this gallant band, that its spirit and energy have not relaxed even after the repeated disappointment of its expectations of early relief, and under the discouraging circumstances of the failure of Brigadier Wild's attempt to force the Khyber Pass, and of the whole of the troops, both European and native, being straightened for provisions, with a deficiency of ammunition, and apparently dependent entirely on their own resources alone.



6. I feel it to be a pleasing duty to dwell on the gallant and loyal services of the small force under Sir R. Sale, placed in circumstances of so much difficulty and peril, with an active and inveterate enemy in their front and the Khyber Pass closed upon them in their rear, and I have now the satisfaction of informing you, that their enduring and persevering resistance to the enemy has probably ere this been brought to a happy close by the flight of Mahomed Akbar, and the appearance of Major-General Pollock's army in the plains of Jellalabad.

7. Your Honorable Committee is aware that the Major-General, on his arrival in the camp before Peshawur, found the four infantry regiments under Brigadier Wild, dispirited from their recent failure before Ali Musjid, enfeebled by an epidemic which had thrown a large portion of the force into hospital, and looking forward to another advance into the Khyber with so much horror, that even the arrival of Her Majesty's 9th Regiment of Foot failed to inspire the native troops with their usual confidence, and it thence became an object with the Major-General to defer his advance for the relief of Jellalabad till he should be joined by that portion of the reinforcing troops which was still in the rear. This consisted of one troop of Horse Artillery, Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, the 1st Regiment Light Cavalry, and Her Majesty's 31st Foot, besides details. This communication between Jellalabad and Peshawur was, at this time, very irregular : but Major-General Pollock succeeded, with some difficulty in informing Sir Robert Sale of the state of affairs in his camp, and the clear expediency of his waiting, if possible, for the junction of the whole of his force, before he attempted a movement, adding, however, that whenever Sir R. Sale should feel himself reduced to such straits that he had no prospect of holding out longer unless relieved, the attempt should at all hazards be made.

8. The scarcity of provisions at Jellalabad, particularly of meat for the European soldiers, and the great difficulty of longer feeding the cattle, convinced Major-General Pollock that he could not prudently defer his advance till he should be joined by Her Majesty's 31st Foot, which was not expected to cross the Indus before the middle of the present month, and he had consequently resolved to wait only for the arrival of the cavalry and guns, which were expected to join him by the end of March. After the arrival of these troops, however, further delay became unavoidable, in consequence, first, of heavy rain, and, secondly, of the arrangements necessary to be made with Rajah Golab Sing, and the other generals of the Sikh army of co-operation, as to the particular service which they were to perform in forcing the passes, and the force could not therefore commence its march till the 5th instant.

9. Major-General Pollock's dispatch, a copy of which forms the inclosure No. 17, will fully inform your Committee of the successful commencement of this operation ; and the Notification which I have published on the occasion will show how highly I appreciate the services of Her Majesty's and the Honorable Company's troops, and the zealous co-operation afforded by the Sikh army. After the favourable commencement of the advance on Jellalabad, I trust that we need not anticipate any further opposition which cannot be easily overcome in the only remaining strong points of the defile, a short distance from Dakka, where we are likely to meet with opposition. And I hope, before the dispatch

of this letter, to have it in my power to congratulate your Committee on the safe arrival of the army before Jellalabad.

10. Your Committee will gather from Major-General Pollock's previous dispatches, and his correspondence with Captain Mackeson, that negotiations had for some time been in progress with Maliks of the Khyber tribes for a free passage through the defile. I am not clearly informed of the precise point at which these negotiations had arrived at the date of Major-General Pollock's advance; but it appears generally, that the Maliks had evinced a willingness to treat, but could not entirely overcome the bigotry of the tribes, or depend on their forbearance and submission to the terms to which the chiefs would have themselves agreed. Opposition, though feeble, was made to our advance, and a portion of the money promised to the Maliks had been actually paid to them. Mahomed Akbar Khan appears to have sent a portion of his own force as far as Ali Musjid, to co-operate in the opposition to our advance; but his troops retired from the position which they had taken up, on the night of the 5th instant, and the fort of Ali Musjid was found evacuated, and was immediately occupied by a British detachment.

11. I have said that the Sikh army co-operated efficiently with Major-General Pollock's force, in the storming of the approaches to Ali Musjid, and when the disorganized state of that army, and the compulsion placed on Rajah Golab Sing, in ordering him on this service, with the most trustworthy of the whole Sikh army, when his own interests called loudly for his presence in another and distant quarter of the Sikh dominions, are fairly considered, your Honorable Committee will regard these services as a very strong proof of the fidelity of the Lahore Durbar, and of its steady friendship to the British Government; and I am anxious to mark, in the strongest manner, the sense which I entertain of the steady attachment to our interests which has been on this occasion displayed by the Government of Maharajah Shere Sing.

12. I have referred, in a separate letter, to the lamentable convention entered into on the 1st ultimo, by Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, commanding the fortress of Ghuznee, by which that officer stipulated to evacuate the citadel in six days, on an engagement, on the part of the hostile troops, to convey the garrison in safety to Peshawur. No authentic accounts have been received from Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer since the date of his letter announcing this convention; but, from the concurrence of native reports received through different channels, there remains little doubt of the evacuation having actually taken place, and of the garrison having fallen victims to the fury of fanatic Ghazees, who were numerous in the town.

13. Party dissension appears, from the letters of Lieutenant Conolly, to have been carried to such a height at Cabool, as effectually to have prevented the chiefs from combining in any efforts often threatened, to equip a force for the reduction of Jellalabad; and Mahomed Akbar has in consequence been left to prosecute with little or no aid from the capital the siege of that place.

14. The British prisoners at Cabool appear to owe their safety to the friendly protection of Nawab Zeman Khan, to whom Shah Shooja is

represented as hostile, and from whom he has frequently demanded the delivery of the prisoners.

15. A constant correspondence has been maintained between Shah Shooja and Captain Macgregor at Jellalabad, in which the former labours to prove his uninterrupted devotion to British interests, and to induce this Government to grant him pecuniary aid. He has also addressed letters to me, and to my Agent on the north-west frontier, in which he offers an explanation of the origin of the insurrection at Cabool in November last; and represents the manner in which, if his advice had been taken, it might have been suppressed, and the safety of our troops might at all events have been secured. I have not thought it proper to notice these letters, and I wait for fuller particulars of all the incidents which preceded and followed the tragedy at Cabool, before I can venture to form a judgment of the degree of culpability attaching to the several actors in those lamentable transactions. I have not yet received the statements of Major Pottinger, which are known to have reached Captain Macgregor in the month of January last; but I may expect these documents, or other means of ascertaining facts now doubtful, from Major-General Pollock, soon after his arrival at Jellalabad.

16. The post of Kelat-i-Ghilzye appears to have continued unmolested since the date of the last report to your Committee. But the army under Atta Mahomed has been kept together, notwithstanding his defeat by Major-General Nott; and assumed an attitude which gave that General hopes, more than once, of being able to bring it to action. For some time the state of the weather prevented his undertaking operations in the field, but at length he marched out of Candahar, about the 7th ultimo, with the greater part of the force to attack the enemy; and when he had been led in the pursuit to a distance of nearly thirty miles from Candahar, a strong detachment from the enemy's army, passing his flank, made a sudden and rapid movement on Candahar, and, arriving before the city, commenced a desperate assault, in which they succeeded in obtaining possession of one of the gates, but were ultimately, after a severe struggle, repulsed with heavy loss. This occurred on the 11th ultimo, and I have not heard of any subsequent engagements in that quarter.

17. In consequence of the scarcity of funds in the treasure chest at Candahar, and the difficulty thence arising of negotiating bills on Shikarpore and other places, but at heavy loss, and in consequence also of a deficiency in some essential articles of medicine for the use of the hospitals, much anxiety had been expressed by the authorities at Candahar for the early transmission of an escort from Upper Sind through Quetta in charge of supplies of cash and medicines. Major-General England, commanding in Upper Sind, had been preparing to advance with a complete brigade to Shawl, in support of Major-General Nott, whether with a view to cover his retreat, if he decided on retrograding, or to keep up the communication with him if he resolved to maintain himself at Candahar. The Major-General did not expect to be able to commence his march from the valley of the Indus before the latter end of March, and he was averse to move his troops forward in detachments, but intended to carry up through the Bolan Pass a complete

with or not. We were disposed to consider the measure unnecessary, as the requisition of Major Outram appeared to have originated in an unfounded apprehension of an impending insurrection in Sind, and as the amount of force, which Brigadier England proposed to leave for the protection of the country below the Bolan Pass, seemed to us to be fully adequate to that end. We were, besides, convinced that the corps required could not be put in motion in time to produce the effect desired.

3. From the correspondence before us, we are unable to ascertain on what grounds, or by what authority, Brigadier Webber has taken upon himself to order the 19th Regiment to Sind, but the entire responsibility of the measure would appear to rest with that officer. He had not, as far as we can gather from the correspondence, received any instructions from your Excellency to that effect; and the only intimation we have of the measure originating in any communication from Mr. Clerk is to be found in his letter to your Excellency of the 8th instant, in the last paragraph of which he says, "I have taken the liberty to prepare Lieutenant-Colonel Eckford, commanding at Ferozepore, for the receipt of your Excellency's orders for the immediate dispatch of a regiment, in compliance with Major Outram's requisition."

4. But here we see no authority to justify the officer commanding at Ferozepore in detaching the 19th Regiment to Sukkur, without the express sanction of the head of the Army; and we shall not be satisfied that Brigadier Webber has not acted precipitately and improperly, till we receive such an explanation of his conduct as your Excellency will no doubt have called for.

5. As far as we are at present informed, we cannot but regret the dispatch of the 19th Regiment Native Infantry from Ferozepore to Sind, and that the more particularly, as we fear that the season will be too far advanced for its return, even if its recall at this moment should not on political grounds, be expedient.

We have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH, W. CASEMENT, W. W. BIRD, & H. T. PRINSEP.

No. 222.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Peshawar, March 7, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward copy of letter received this morning from Jellalabad, of date the 22nd ultimo.

I yesterday forwarded one from that place, of date the 1st instant, and it is therefore unnecessary to make any remarks upon the present inclosure.

I regret to say, that during yesterday twenty-two men of the 53rd Regiment Native Infantry have deserted.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have received a report that one havildar and nineteen sepoys of the 60th Regiment Native Infantry, have also deserted.

No. 223.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Ponsonby.**Jellalabad, February 22, 1842.*

SIR,—Our troops having laboured incessantly in the works since the great earthquake, the circumstances of which I have communicated to Major General Pollock, C. B., the extent to which our men have rebuilt the parapets, repaired the principal breach, cleared out the ditch, and restored the defences of the towers, really excites my surprise and admiration. We have had a succession of shocks by night and day since the terrific phenomenon of the morning of the 19th instant, but they have done no damage. Yesterday about half-past 10, A. M., a force of not fewer than 300 of the enemy's horse made a sudden attack upon our foraging party; it was commanded by Jemadar Deena Sing, of the 5th Light Cavalry, who had forty-eight troopers of the two corps under his orders. His videttes were well posted, and with most praiseworthy coolness, he called in his grass-cutters, gradually withdrew his detached men, and formed up to receive the charge of the advancing Affghans. His bold attitude kept them in check, until he was reinforced by sixty Sowars of Shah Shooja's cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne. A few round shots were directed at the horse from the ramparts, and, on the appearance of the Shah's troops, the enemy, though very well mounted and so superior in numbers, went off over the hill, and returned to their camp at Ameer Khail without further attempt; they cut down, indeed, some, and carried off others, of our unfortunate grass-cutters, who had wandered too far to be able to retire under the protection of the Jemadar's party, but the demonstration appeared to me not very creditable to their enterprize or resolution. The supply of 3,000 rupees by Toorabaz Khan's people has been very acceptable.

This morning the enemy's skirmishers again attacked our foragers on the hills to the southward of the place. These foragers were escorted by Lieutenant Mayne, of Shah Shooja's cavalry, with ninety Sowars; at the very commencement of the affair, I sent him positive orders to retire within the fort, and not to risk an engagement; he was falling back very slowly, securing his grass-cutters, when large bodies of the enemy were seen stealing in loose order across the plain from Ameer Khail.

When united, they formed a body of not fewer than 1,000 men. Lieutenant Mayne was now so pressed in his retreat, that determining not to be taken in flank, he fronted, charged the Affghan skirmishers and the head of their column, and drove them back towards the hills on which they had originally appeared. Their overpowering numbers again compelled him to retire, and the skirmish which I had desired entirely to avoid, now continued on the plain. Perceiving the numerical superiority of the enemy, I sent out to Lieutenant Mayne's assistance, first, bodies of infantry and sappers under Colonel Dennie, to occupy the rocky mounds and old walls on his flank, and then the whole of our cavalry, and two 9-pounders under Captains Abbott and Oldfield. The enemy's horse were pressing on, but upon Captain Oldfield's advancing against them, hastily and in confusion refused the combat, and retired to the distant heights. Our guns did some mischief amongst them, and the whole force

brigade, and to convey to Candahar or to the Kojuck Pass, about twenty lacs of treasure, besides various supplies of medicines and stores. At the pressing instances of the Political Agent, Major Outram, backed by the requisition of Major-General Nott, Major-General England at length consented to commence his advance with the troops detailed in the margin\*, leaving the remainder of the troops to follow when their commissariat and other arrangements should be completed.

He accordingly commenced his march on the 7th ultimo, and arrived at Quetta without difficulty on the 16th ultimo.

18. The state of affairs at Candahar, as then known at Quetta, was not such as to have made an immediate effort to push on a portion of the treasure and supplies indispensably necessary; and Major-General Nott had declared his intention not to detach a party from his force to meet and relieve the escort on the road between Quetta and Candahar, and there was accordingly no obvious object of importance to induce Major-General England to advance beyond Quetta, before he was strengthened by the arrival of his reinforcements from Sind.

19. He, however, moved out from Quetta on the 26th ultimo, and met with slight opposition till his approach to Hykulzye, where he found Mahomed Sadik's force strongly posted in a position difficult of approach, on the defences of which much previous labour has been spent. The General's dispatch of the 1st instant from Quetta, will give your Honourable Committee all the details of the failure of his attempt to force the enemy's position; the subsequent abandonment of the effort, and his retreat, without further loss or serious molestation from the enemy, to the post of Quetta. Some excitement is said to have prevailed among the tribes about the Bolan Pass, and the feeling in parts of Cutchee and Sind appears to be hostile, but no actual disturbances of any serious nature have taken place, and the Brahooes and all under the influence of the Khan of Kelat maintain an attitude of friendship and confident reliance on the British power.

20. Mr. Clerk, the Agent to the Governor-General on the north-western frontier, has been for some time at the Court of Maharajah Shere Sing, employed in discussions with the Maharajah, and his minister Rajah Dhyen Sing, on the arrangements for the co-operation of the Sikh army with the British forces under the command of Major-General Pollock, and on the general state of Sikh affairs. His advice and exhortations have met with ready attention from the Durbar, his intercourse with which appears to have been very satisfactory.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have received, through Major-General Pollock, Major-General Sir Robert Sale's report of the brilliant result of an attack which he directed against the camp of Mahomed Akbar Khan, on the morning of the 7th inst. Nearly the whole of the troops compos-

\* Four guns Horse Artillery; wing of her Majesty's 41st Foot; troop of 3rd Light Cavalry; wing of 6th Native Infantry; a detachment of 100 Poona Horse.

ing the garrison of Jellalabad shared in this bold and gallant exploit, and your Committee will not fail justly to appreciate the last and memorable proof of the zeal, gallantry, and devotion with which Major-General Sir Robert Sale, and the brave troops under his command, have, under every privation and difficulty, maintained their post, and displayed in repeated conflicts, the undaunted spirit of British soldiers, in attacking, or repelling the attacks of an enemy infinitely superior to them in numbers.

No. 220.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, March 23, 1842.*

SIR,—We have received your Excellency's letter of the 6th instant, on the subject of Major Outram's requisition for a native regiment to be sent down the Sutlej from Ferozepore, as a reinforcement to the troops in Sinde; and we have had under our consideration the letters from Major Outram of 25th of February, and from Mr. Clerk of 3rd and 8th of March, relative to the necessity of reinforcements for Sinde; but we feel disposed to concur in the opinion your Excellency has expressed with reference to that requisition. It appears that Brigadier England intended to commence his movement through the Bolan Pass about the 20th instant, that is, before any troops could have reached Sukkur from Ferozepore, if your Excellency had thought fit to comply with the requisition; and further, that Brigadier England had arranged that three battalions with four guns should remain at Sukkur and Shikarpore on his advance, a force which seemed to us amply sufficient to protect those points, according to the view we have been accustomed to take of the valor and discipline of our native regiments, and of the spirit and ability of the officers by whom they have been commanded.

We were satisfied that, if the requisition had seemed to your Excellency to be one with which it was fit to comply, your Excellency would have so informed us, and would have placed the regiments in march. It was evidently impossible for us to give any useful instruction upon the subject, to your Excellency, as we only received the letter on the 16th and 17th instant, a few days before the intended advance of Brigadier England from Dadur, which the detachment of a regiment from Ferozepore was said to be necessary to protect.

We have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH, W. CASEMENT, W.W. BIRD, & H.T. PRINSEP.

No. 221.—*The Governor-General of India in Council to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Fort William, March 30, 1842.*

SIR,—The correspondence relative to the requisition of Major Outram for a corps of Native Infantry to be sent down from Ferozepore to Sinde, and the actual dispatch of the 19th Regiment by Brigadier Webber, has been this day under the consideration of Government.

2. We had already, in our letter of the 23rd instant, left it to the decision of your Excellency whether this requisition should be complied

me, and one from me to Captain Macgregor. My letter was written with rice water, otherwise I could not have ventured to inform him of the state of the Sepoys.

The delay of the 3rd Brigade has caused me much anxiety, but I know the cavalry and artillery are now hastening on.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 227.—*Major-General Pollock to Captain Macgregor.*

*Camp, Peshawur, March 12, 1842.*

MY DEAR MACGREGOR,—I will write you a very short note with reference to yours and Sale's of the 8th.

It must, no doubt, appear to you and Sale most extraordinary that, with the force I have here, I do not at once move on ; God knows it has been my anxious wish to do so, but I have been helpless. I came on a-head to Peshawur to arrange for an advance, but was saluted with a report of 1,900 sick, and a bad feeling among the Sepoys. I visited the hospitals, and endeavoured to encourage by talking to them ; but they had *no heart*.

I hoped that when the time came they would go.

On the 1st instant the feeling on the part of the Sepoys broke out, and I had the mortification of knowing that the Hindoos, of four out of five native corps, refused to advance. I immediately took measures to sift the evil, and gradually a re-action has taken place in the belief that I will wait for the reinforcement ; this has caused me the utmost anxiety on your account ; your situation is never out of my thoughts ; but having told you what I have, you and Sale will at once see that necessity has kept me here.

I have sent five expresses to hurry on the 1st Division of the next Brigade ; it consists of 3rd Dragoons, a troop of Horse Artillery, 1st Light Cavalry, the 33rd Native Infantry, and two companies of 6th Native Infantry, all fresh and without *taint*. I verily believe if I were to attempt to move on *now* without the reinforcement, that the four regiments implicated would, as far as the Hindoos are concerned, stand fast.

Pray, therefore, tell me without the least reserve the latest day you can hold out. If I could, I would tell you the day when I expect the reinforcements, but I cannot. I may, however, I believe with safety, say, that they will arrive by the end of this month.

The case, therefore, now stands thus :—whether I am to *attempt*, with my present materials, to advance, and risk the appearance of disaffection or cowardice, which, in such a case, could not again be got over, or wait the arrival of a reinforcement, which will make all sure—this is the real state of the case ; if I attempted now, I might risk you altogether ; but if you can hold out, the reinforcements would make your relief as certain as any earthly thing can be.

Our only object in going to Jellalabad is to release you and bring you back with us to this ; but it is necessary that this should be kept a profound secret.

Believe me, &c.

GEO. POLLOCK.



No. 228.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Kowalsur, March 15, 1842.*

SIR,—Yesterday I did myself the honor to forward copies of letters from Captain Mackeson and Captain Conolly, but I did not like to delay these very interesting letters for any remarks from me.

The fall of Ghuznee is a dreadful blow to our interests, and will much encourage Mahomed Akbar's troops in their attack on Jellalabad. The only hope I entertain for Ghuznee consists in the circumstance of Major Outram having written to Colonel Palmer, on the 24th ultimo, urging and encouraging him to hold his post. This letter was dispatched from Dadur on the 24th, and the bearer promised to convey it to Ghuznee in ten days, in which case it might reach Colonel Palmer before he had concluded his negotiation with the Affghans.

The sad example of Cabool has proved to us the utter inutility of forming treaties with Affghans on such occasions. Should Colonel Palmer have unhappily been induced to trust to the good faith of his opponents, I fear that he and his party will be annihilated. From what I have heard of the late occurrences at Cabool, and from the information which I have obtained of the state of Affghanistan generally, I should say that, apart from the natural treachery of the Affghan character, the country is now so divided by the different contending parties, and the spirit of fanaticism is so strong, that none of the chiefs have the power, even supposing them to have the inclination, to give our troops the protection for which Colonel Palmer has negotiated.

Captain Mackeson has complied with Captain Conolly's request, by giving out that all bills will be dishonoured bearing the signature of the Envoy and Minister, Major Pottinger, or Captain Conolly. Captain Conolly, by crying down the credit of the bills held by the chiefs for twelve lacs of rupees, has done the Government most essential service, as the want of money at Cabool will I trust put it out of the power of any party there to despatch troops to Jellalabad.

I cannot help thinking that Captain Conolly must have been misinformed regarding the letter which he states was written by Rajah Golab Sing. I have already stated, in former letters, that I do not give the Rajah credit for cordially assisting us, but I think him too cautious to commit himself by an expression such as "that the Sikhs would join against us."

I have written to Captain Conolly to say, that the Newab's kindness to the British subjects should be brought to the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, and that I felt certain that such service would not be forgotten.

With reference to the eighth paragraph of Captain Mackeson's letter, I regret that I cannot spare the services of an officer to remain at the Attock; but we have there a Ressaldar and 20 irregular horse, and I have given directions to the Ressaldar to be on the watch regarding the bridge.

Captain Lawrence, with the zeal which has so frequently induced him to undergo many hardships and annoyances, when he thinks he can be of service, has volunteered to ride over to the Attock a day or two before

retired within the walls with the regularity of a day of exercise. Our loss has been trifling, which the underneath return will show.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Foraging Party under the command of Lieutenant Mayne, February 21 and 22, 1842.*

	Killed.				Wounded.					
	Troopers.	Grass Cutters.	Horses.	Total.	Havildars.	Troopers.	Grass Cutters.	Horses.	Total.	Missing.
5th Light Cavalry .....	2	2	1	5	..	1	3	4	9	1
2nd Regt. S. S. Cy. ...	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	4	5	..
Total.....	2	2	1	5	1	2	3	8	14	1

Lieut. Mayne's horse severely wounded.

H. WADE.

No. 224.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Peshawur, March 11, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 24th ultimo, containing the instructions of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council for my guidance.

I had, previous to their receipt, addressed Captain Macgregor on the subject of the prisoners, asking whether any overtures had been proposed or demanded. I have again addressed him, but I suspect no letters I now send to him are likely to reach him.

You will have seen Sir R. Sale's letter, as also Captain Macgregor's, dated the 1st. In the former it is stated that there were rations for the Europeans for thirty-five days, or until the 4th of April, and the fort was again strong.

The unfortunate panic among the Hindoo Sepoys, already reported, has, in a measure, been overcome, but they still dread an advance to Cabool by this road. I hope I may calculate on their advance to Jellalabad; but I am most anxious to add the dragoons and the horse artillery to my present force; their presence will give additional confidence to my own troops, and operate favourably on the hill tribes in the pass, and enable me to drive Mahomed Akbar Khan before me.

I herewith inclose a report from Captain Mackeson of the progress of our negotiations with the Auruzyes, and, on this point, I confess I am most anxious; it may in the abstract be considered the more glorious course to force the pass when joined by the horse artillery and the cavalry; but it becomes me to consider all I have to do. The object of my advance is to relieve Sir R. Sale and bring him back. The means at my disposal for the conveyance of the sick and wounded is necessarily limited.

ted. If I am unfortunately compelled to force the pass, I must carry on my sick and wounded. At Jellalabad I must receive the sick and wounded of Sir R. Sale's force, and our return will, in all probability, very greatly increase the number. My object, therefore, is, if possible, to reach Jellalabad without wounded men. It would give encouragement to those who still dread the pass, and sure I am that we shall have no easy passage on our return. For these reasons I have halted here. I have written express to Lieutenant-Colonel White to leave his detachment with the dragoons and horse artillery (if the infantry impede him), and to advance by forced marches. If he should arrive about the 25th, I can wait till then. I hope to hear from him to-day or to-morrow : his detention at the Ravee was most unfortunate, for he would otherwise certainly arrive in time. I have to-day addressed Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, and have requested him to communicate his views and wishes. I have called his attention to the Guhree Pass, and have told him to let me know if I can in any way aid him. The latest news from Jellalabad is conveyed in a native letter of doubtful authority ; by it, there appear to have been engagements both on Thursday and Friday last week, and on last Tuesday, the 8th instant. Our force is described as holding its own against Mahomed Akbar, who is said to have completely invested the place, but to have been unsuccessful in all the attacks which he has made. Suspicions are thrown out in this letter, of Mahomed Akbar and the Shah Shooja acting in concert.

Syud Azooddeen was sent by me with 5,000 repees in gold, and 10,000 in silver, to Jellalabad ; he writes, that he was attacked on the road and pursued to his village of Misr Chenee, in which he is shut up ; the village is fourteen coss from Jellalabad, but I fear that there is little chance of this money arriving.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 225.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Fort William, March 30, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch, dated 11th instant, submitting a report of Captain Mackeson on his negotiations with the Khybercees, acknowledging the receipt of the instructions of the 24th ultimo, and adverting to the state of your views respecting an advance ; and in reply, to observe, that as you must now be in possession of the views and wishes of Government with respect to the movements of the force under your command, the Governor-General in Council does not think it necessary to give you any further instructions in reply to this communication.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 226.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Kowulsur, March 13, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of letters as follow :—One from Sir R. Sale to me, one from Captain Macgregor to

the arrival of Brigadier White's force, and see that every assistance is given in crossing the troops over the river.

Syud Azodeen, whose departure for Jellalabad with money was reported in my letter to your address dated the 11th instant, has returned. He reports that finding it impossible to reach Jellalabad himself, he sent three Sowars with the gold (amounting to 12,000 Rs.) which two of the Sowars carried into the fort, although closely pursued by the enemy, while the third returned to the Syud with the intelligence.

The Syud's return here with the silver (3,000 Rs.) is a sufficient proof of his having acted honestly himself on this occasion ; and he assures me that there is not the slightest doubt of the truth of the Sower's report. He states that Mahomed Akbar Khan has 12,000 of the Ooloos collected round Jellalabad, to whom he is enabled to give the daily half seer of attah customary on such occasions, by having secured three lacs of rupees from the property plundered from our officers near Khoord Cabool.

This account of the force surrounding Jellalabad makes me the more desirous to advance ; and therefore anxious for the speedy arrival of the dragoons and horse artillery.

In my letter to your address of the 13th inst., I have stated, " I know the cavalry and horse artillery are advancing." This was written in consequence of my having previously directed Brigadier White to leave the treasure, &c. with the infantry, and to move on with the cavalry and horse artillery ; but I regret exceedingly that, by order, Brigadier White has been prohibited from adopting this course ; and I much dread the detention which will ensue at each river from crossing so many camels and troops at one time, may greatly endanger Sir R. Sale's safety.

The feeling amongst the Sepoys of four of the native regiments here against an advance has been frequently reported by me. Of late we have had no desertions : I attribute this to a report which has been generally credited in camp, of 20 deserters having been murdered before they reached the Attock ; but I anticipate more desertions, and much bad feeling, if I attempt to advance before the arrival of more Europeans and reinforcements, *i. e.* the dragoons and horse artillery.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 229.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Simla, March 28, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I have the honor to transmit, for the information of your Lordship in Council, a copy of a report made by the Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, of the marches lately made by the column under the orders of Brigadier White.

2. Your Lordship will be happy to observe that the Horse Artillery and Cavalry would probably arrive at Peshawur the 27th instant, and in a state of efficiency.

3. Your Lordship in Council will not fail to observe, that the difficulties of passing through the Punjab in haste, are even more considerable

and formidable than they are described to be in the 5th paragraph of Mr. Maddock's instructions to Mr. Clerk, of the 10th ultimo.

4. With the certain conviction that, under adverse circumstances, a corps at Peshawur might be as completely compromised as a force at Jellalabad, I had intended to address your Lordship on that point. I hold it now to be unnecessary to do so, as, in the 7th paragraph of your Lordship's dispatch of the 15th instant, I find a similar opinion recorded, which, by your order, has been sent to all the political authorities beyond the Indus, and to your Lordship's agent on this frontier.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

P.S.—The prohibition alluded to in the 2nd paragraph of the inclosure, was given by me, to prevent Brigadier White from sending his regiments separately, as he was disposed to do, and which, in our own provinces, it would have been very judicious to have done.

No. 230.—*Captain Codrington, Assistant Quarter-Master General to Lieutenant-Colonel Garden.*

*Mula, near Pucka Serai, March 19, 1842.*

SIR,—In continuation of my report of the 7th instant, I have the honor to inform you that the head-quarters of the force under Brigadier White arrived at Porewala on the 8th, by the stages as were made by the 1st Cavalry, and on the 9th crossed to the left bank of the Chenab, a distance of seventeen miles. The 3rd Dragoons crossed the river by the ferry on the same day : the continued rise of the river making it impossible to pass even camels by the ford, which I had examined. The Horse Artillery, 33rd Native Infantry, treasure, and stores, followed on the 10th, when no less than thirty-five boats had been collected, and on the 11th moved on with the 3rd Dragoons to Porewala,  $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

2. The 1st Cavalry had continued its march to Porewala on the 9th, and to Dhenga on the 10th, but in consequence of an order from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief prohibiting the separation of the force, the regiment was directed to halt at Dhenga on the 11th, to enable the head-quarter of the force to overtake it ; and on the 12th the whole moved to Korce, eighteen miles from Porewala, and six from Dhenga. The stage on the following day was to Malloo, thirteen and a quarter miles, which, being within six miles of the ferry opposite Jhylum, it was hoped that the 1st Cavalry might get across the river on the same day ; no more than eight boats, however, had been collected, and there being a strong adverse wind and current which drove back almost every boat that attempted to cross, very little progress could be made.

3. On the 14th, the remainder of the force encamped on the bank of the river, and in the course of the day, the wind having subsided, the passage of the 1st Cavalry was nearly completed. As the river appeared to be falling, the offer of a reward of 100 rupees induced the boatmen to try some difficult fords, about six miles higher up the river, between the villages of Maydapoor on the left bank, and Kiree on the right. Here there are five distinct streams, separated from each other by considerable

tracts of highly cultivated land, containing several villages. The depth of these fords was found to be about four feet ; the breadth varying from 150 to 600 yards ; the current very rapid, and the bottom composed of large pebbles, in which no marks could be fixed to shew the direction. I reported them practicable only for unladen camels and horses, and on the 15th, five troops of the 3rd Dragoons in watering order, and many hundred camels, passed through them ; many men and horses, and some of the camels, were carried into deep water by the strength of the current, but the villagers, provided with inflated goat-skins, rescued them all, with the exception of one of the Syces, who was unfortunately drowned, and a camel.

4. On the 16th, the guns, and all the mounted troops reached the right bank of the river, and, in compliance with an order from Major-General Pollock, pushed on as rapidly as possible, leaving the stores and treasure on the left bank of the Jhylum to follow under escort of the 33rd Native Infantry, and rissalah of Irregular Cavalry.

5. The stages made by the 3rd Dragoons, 1st Cavalry, and Horse Artillery from the right bank of the Jhylum, are as follows :—

On the 17th, Oudenana,	2 $\frac{1}{4}$ miles.
„ 18th, Tumuk,	17 $\frac{1}{2}$ „
„ 19th, Mala,	15 „
(near Puck Serai.)	

6. The only heavy and difficult road between Oudenana and Tumuk, made it a severe march for the Horse Artillery, which did not reach camp till four in the afternoon, and the guns had to be dragged up the steep, rocky ascent near Tumuk, by a fatigue party from the 3rd Dragoons. It is to be feared that the artillery horses will suffer much more than the cavalry ; but, nevertheless, if no unforeseen impediment occurs, the whole may be expected to reach Peshawur on the 27th instant, in a perfectly efficient state.

I have, &c.,

R. CODRINGTON.

No. 231.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Simla, March 28, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I have long since had the honor to receive Mr. Maddock's letter of the 28th ultimo, transmitting, by your Lordship's orders, a letter from the Military Board, (not the correspondence in full,) on the unequipped state of certain guns sent from Ferozepore to Peshawur, under charge of Major-General McCaskill.

2. The Board's explanation is very correct. The guns were ordered as part of a Cabool indent, and even their dispatch was a matter between the Delhi magazine and the Deputy Commissary of Ordnance in Afghanistan. When I knew that they were under Major-General McCaskill's charge, I desired General Pollock to use them, of course, and the annexed statement of ammunition will show that they were not so unprovided as was supposed.

3. As to 6-pounder ammunition, it is the commonest class in use. No doubt General Avitabile could have supplied the two guns of that calibre with 200 or 300 rounds each, with great ease; and I do not yet know that he was unable or unwilling to grant the supply.

4. The Military Board is not so very correct in apprizing your Lordship that there are six spare guns in the fort at Ferozepore. I wish I could say that they were in any depôt; they are not now under shelter, but exposed to the atmosphere, and, until the fort is nearly rebuilt, they cannot be fired with safety.

5. Any part of this battery might have been sent forward with the four Native Infantry regiments: but it was not so ordered. In the excessive haste with which the requisitions were made, all such equipment was forgotten.

6. I presume that the two papers of remarks alluded to in the dispatch of the 19th February last to the Secret Committee, were extracted from my explanatory letters to Lord Auckland, dated 10th January, and 6th February.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

*List of Ammunition for Mountain Train under command of Captain Buckhouse, which proceeded with Major-General McCaskill.*

Cartridges fitted for 3-pounders .....	330
Cartridges fitted for 4½ howitzer .....	330
Shells, common, for ditto.....	111
Spherical case for (fitted and fixed).....	350
Canister for 3-pounders .....	60
Canister for 4½ howitzer .....	39
Round shot for 3-pounders .....	240

No. 232.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Simla, March 30, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I had the honor to receive, upon the 26th instant, the dispatch addressed to me on the 15th by your Lordship in Council, copies of which have been transmitted to the General Officers Commanding in Upper and Lower Affghanistan, and to the Political Officers, for their information and guidance.

2. I should have confined myself to a mere acknowledgment of this dispatch, but that I am anxious to point out to your Lordship in Council, the embarrassment which Major-General Pollock may feel, when called upon to decide upon the measures to be taken after he reaches Jellalabad. By the orders of Government, dated 15th February, the Major-General was “to direct all his efforts and measures to the withdrawal of Sir R. Sale’s force from Jellalabad to Peshawur, with the least possible delay.”

In accordance with the late instructions (fifth paragraph), the Major-General will feel called upon to strike “some signal and decisive blow upon the Affghans” in view “to the re-establishment of our military reputation.” And, by the ninth paragraph, he will understand that he is at

liberty to choose the place and time at which such effort is to be made, even to an advance upon Cabool.

3. Whilst Major-General Pollock is hesitating between these two orders, he will, no doubt, receive from Mr. Clerk, your Lordship's Agent on this frontier, a copy of Major Outram's letter to Mr. Clerk, dated Dadur, March 13, 1842. Of this Mr. Clerk has transmitted to me an abstract which contains the following passages :

"Deprecates in the strongest manner the withdrawal of the Jellalabad Garrison, and does not conceive a mode more injurious to our interest in Affghanistan, or one more likely to endanger our position there, and in India, could be devised by our bitterest enemy."

"Trusts, that as discretionary power is invested with him (Mr. Clerk), he will see the expediency of holding Jellalabad, even should we be compelled to defer the invasion of the country till another," &c. Of Mr. Clerk's power to control Major-General Pollock, when 500 miles distant from him, I was not aware.

4. It is not desirable that I should add to the Major-General's difficulties, by attempting to define his course, but your Lordship would, possibly have been surprised if I had overlooked them.

5. If Major-General Pollock could have carried up stores of all descriptions, and spare cattle for Sir R. Sale's force, I should have thought it practicable for these united bodies of troops to have moved next month up on Cabool, to have left some marks of our power and displeasure there, and to have retired by Candahar, carrying away the garrisons of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, Giriskh, and the 27th Native Infantry. The want of cattle and of followers is not, I fear, to be overcome.

6. Should your Lordship in Council be pleased to adopt the opinions of Major Outram and Mr. Clerk, and to hold Candahar and Jallalabad as defensive positions for this year, I earnestly recommend that a large augmentation of the Bombay and Bengal Armies may be previously authorized to enable them to effect in 1843 whatever your Lordship may please to order.

7. It is my duty to solicit your Lordship's attention, however, to the danger of having an insulated force at Jellalabad, cut off from Hindoostan by the formidable Khyber Pass, and by the Powers of the Punjab.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 233.—*The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Tadlunga, April 12, 1842.*

SIR,—I received here this morning, your Excellency's letter to me in Council, dated Simla, the 30th of March.

2. In reply thereto, I have the honor to observe, that the instructions contained in the letter from me in Council, dated the 15th of March, to which your Excellency refers, necessarily supersede the previous instructions of the 15th February, wherein those instructions may be deemed to conflict.

3. On what authority Major Outram, in the letter from him to Mr.



Clerk, dated the 13th of March, to which your Excellency adverts, intimates "that a discretionary power is vested in Mr. Clerk of holding Jellalabad," I am altogether ignorant. I have not concurred in giving any such discretionary power to that political agent; nor am I aware that any such power was ever entrusted to him.

4. Your Excellency has been already informed, that authority over all political agents in Lower Afghanistan and Sind. has by my letters in Council dated the 19th of March, been given to the Major-General commanding at Candahar, and to his successor in command.

5. I am so far on my way to Allahabad, where I trust I shall arrive on the 21st. I shall there have the means of more easy communication with your Excellency, and I look forward with anxiety to the time when we may be together, being convinced that our being together, or very near each other, will obviate many evils.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 234.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Peshawar, March 28, 1842.*

SIR,—Sir Robert Sale has not, I believe, provision sufficient to last until I could reach him if I wait for the 31st Foot, and as he appears most anxious that he should be reinforced without delay, I shall move forward as soon after the arrival of the dragoons and horse artillery as practicable. Negotiations still continue with the Maliks, on which I hope to report to-morrow or the next day. I may, however, say the appearances are more favourable than they have yet been. If we succeed, it will give encouragement to the Sepoys, and the taking of Ali Musjid will, I hope, fully restore confidence. It is, perhaps, premature to speculate on our position at Jellalabad, when I shall have joined Sir R. Sale; but I consider it advisable to the possibility of my being in a commanding situation at Jellalabad with the Khyber Pass open.

If closed, the position would not be judicious.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 235.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Kowlusur, March 29, 1842.*

SIR,—I beg to report that the troop of horse artillery, the 3rd Dragoons, and 1st Light Cavalry, reached Peshawar this morning: they will move on to this camp to-morrow morning, and I hope to be able to move forward on the following day. I will keep you regularly informed of my movements when in advance.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 236.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.**Tope Chonee, April 12, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General being on his way to Allalhabad by dawk, has not at present the best opportunities of replying regularly to your dispatches, but with respect to those which have been submitted to him from you, of dates between the 23rd and 29th ultimo, his Lordship has desired me to convey to you the following instructions.

2. You are authorized to advance to Newab Zaman Khan, who is described by Lieutenant Conolly, as having evinced great kindness to the British prisoners at Cabool, and as having expended much money on account of their protection and sustenance, such sums as under the circumstances, you may deem fitting.

3. Your authorizing the payment of the small bills for 3000 and 4000 rupees, respectively, drawn by Lieutenant Conolly at Cabool, and your leaving unpaid for the present that officer's bill for 21,000 rupees, are approved by the Governor-General.

4. The Governor-General expects to arrive to-morrow at the staging Bungalow from which this letter is dated, and to be at Benares on the 19th, and at Allalhabad on the 21st instant.

I have, &amp;c..

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 237.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.**Jumrood, March 31, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward copies and translations of the following letters:—

From Colonel Palmer to the English gentlemen at Cabool.

From Lieutenant Conolly to Major-General Sir R. Sale and Captain Macgregor.

From Major-General Sir R. Sale and Captain Macgregor to me.

I have also the honor to send a copy of Captain Lawrence's letter to Captain Mackeson, forwarding the above-mentioned papers; there can be no doubt of their being genuine, as Lieutenant Conolly's letter to Captain Macgregor (a copy of which was forwarded by me to you on the 28th instant) was written in rice-water on the back of his Persian letter.

I shall, of course, in the event of the conditions for which Colonel Palmer stipulated, being fulfilled, cash the bond for 40,000 rupees.

I have, &amp;c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 238.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.**Camp, Jumrood, April 2, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, of date 15th ultimo, with accompanying documents, viz., copy of instruction by his Lordship in Council to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and a memorandum of the troops employed beyond the Sutlej and in Siude.

2. I arrived here on the 31st ultimo, in the expectation of moving into the Pass the following morning, but the desertion of camels, and very heavy rain, have alone been sufficient to prevent my moving. I have also been much disappointed by the delay of the Rajah Golab Sing in not sooner having moved up his troops. The force which is to act in concert with me, has not yet all arrived at the ground, from whence it will enter the Jubhagi entrance of the Pass, to meet us at Ali Musjid. Although I have never expected any very active operations from them, I feel that the circumstance of our moving at the same time and for the same object, will have a good moral effect on all parties.

3. I shall, to-morrow morning, advance to the Pass, and hope to reach Ali Musjid during the day; but the heavy rain which has just fallen will so much increase the weight of the carriage, that I may be compelled to halt at the first stream of water which is about one mile and a half on this side.

4. The result of the negotiations with the Afredees is contained in the copy of a letter (which I will this day send express to your address) from Captain Mackeson, whose patience and exertions on this occasion have been incessant. As I cannot place much confidence in any treaties entered into with any of the tribes, I shall go prepared for resistance, and I hope to report favourably of the morrow's march. The Sikhs have engaged to hold Ali Musjid for one month, after which period I shall have no means of keeping open a free communication with Peshawur but through the forbearance of the tribes in the Khyber, which cannot be depended on. I therefore fully expect that, if I remain beyond the period which the Sikhs engaged to hold Ali Musjid, I shall be opposed the whole distance, and even by those who now profess to act with me.

5. I shall endeavour to report daily until I clear the Pass; but as the Sikhs hold it only as far as Ali Musjid, it may not be in my power after leaving that post. I don't think (and my opinion is formed on the statement of Captain Mackeson, who has eight times passed through), that the whole of the Pass, from the entrance near this spot, to Dakka, a distance of twenty-six miles, could be kept open with a less force than 8,000 men.

6. I consider it my duty to place on record, that the present system of supplying hired camels is most ruinous as regards efficiency, and that no force beyond the Indus ought to be dependent for carriage upon the owners of camels. As an example, I would draw your attention to the following particulars connected with the carriage of the force now here. The cattle are hired for the journey from Ferozepore to Jellalabad, and the owners receive an advance of twenty rupees for each camel. Desertions even before we reached Peshawur were numerous; and on several occasions I have been obliged to send spare camels to bring on stores, &c. The three companies of Native Infantry which last arrived here have no camels; they brought their loads to Peshawur, and deserted; two of these companies, under Captain Tebbs, brought 600,000 rounds of musket ammunition; but the whole of the Surwans, with these camels, having deserted, I have the greatest difficulty in moving the men, and can only take a portion of the ammunition. The evil is a very serious one. I am unable to point out any remedy but that of employing only purchased camels, and Surwans whose houses are in our provinces.

The greater number of Surwans who have been sent with this force, are natives of the Punjab, and have therefore greater facilities in deserting; indeed, it is hardly possible to prevent their doing so.

7. I trust that I may consider the feeling of the native troops averse to an advance, has, in a considerable degree, subsided; and I earnestly hope, that by carrying the first position with promptness and spirit, I shall be able to give them confidence in themselves.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 239.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Junrood, April 2, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward copy of a letter from Captain Mackeson, detailing the progress of a negotiation which has been for some days going on with the Afreedees.

2. I have also the honor to inclose copies of letters from Captain Macgregor and Major-General Sir R. Sale, C. B., of the 29th and 30th ultimo. The very favourable report of affairs at Jellalabad, makes me think it less urgent for me to advance immediately, and has induced me to accede to the wishes of the Sikhs, who have begged of me to delay another day, in consequence of the heavy rain which has this day fallen. I have decided on halting here to-morrow and on the next day moving into the Khyber. I have been desirous that the move of the Sikhs should be simultaneous with ours, as the knowledge of our moving at the same time, and for the same object, will operate greatly in favour of the cause in all quarters.

I have given the Rajab Golab Sing distinctly to understand that I cannot delay a day longer.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 240.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Junrood, April 3, 1842.*

SIR,—I have heard this moment that the 33rd Regiment cannot possibly join my camp from Peshawur, before 9 A.M., and that the state of their cattle is such as to preclude the possibility of their accompanying us to Ali Musjid to-morrow. I have therefore been compelled to halt another day.

I regret exceedingly that I have to report more desertions from the regiments which were formerly under Brigadier Wildt, with the exception of the 60th Regiment Native Infantry.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 241.—*Notification by the Governor-General of India.**Head-Quarters, Benares, April 19, 1842.*

The Governor-General has much satisfaction in communicating to the Army the following dispatch from Major-General Pollock, C. B., announcing the successful advance of the troops, under the Major-General's command, into the Khyber Pass, and the evacuation by the enemy of the fort of Ali Musjid.

The Governor-General has been much gratified by the uniform testimony borne by all the officers engaged, to the zeal, the gallantry, and the perseverance of all the troops of Her Majesty, and of the Government of India, which had the good fortune to have this opportunity of distinguishing themselves before the Afghan enemy; and his Lordship doubts not that the continued exercise of these, the accustomed military qualities of the Indian Army, will produce their accustomed results, in the achievement of new honour, and of new victories.

The Governor-General deems it to be due to the troops of the Maharajah Shere Sing, to express his entire satisfaction with their conduct, as reported to him, and to inform the Army, that the loss sustained by the Sikhs in the assault of the Pass which was forced by them, is understood to have been equal to that sustained by the troops of Her Majesty and of the Government of India.

The Governor-General has instructed his agent at the Court of the Maharajah, to offer his congratulations to his Highness on this occasion so honorable to the Sikh name.

By order of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India.

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 242.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.**Sulla Chancee, near Ali Musjid, April 16, 1842.*

SIR,—It is with feelings of much gratification I have the Honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, the following detail of operations undertaken and carried into effect against the Afreedees.

2. Yesterday morning, at half-past three, the troops were under arms, the camp struck, and, according to arrangements previously made, the treasure, ammunition and baggage placed on the road leading from Jumrood towards the entrance of the Khyber Pass. The enemy had for some days appeared in great numbers at the mouth of the pass, which they had fortified with a strong breast-work of stones and bushes. The hills on the right and left were rocky and precipitous, presenting great natural obstacles to the ascent of troops. To gain the summit of these heights, defended as they were by a numerous body of the enemy, was an undertaking of considerable difficulty.

3. The columns destined to accomplish this most important object, moved off simultaneously with the main column intended to assault the entrance, but were compelled to make a considerable detour to the right and left, to enable them to commence the ascent.

4. The right column consisted of the troops detailed in the margin\*, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and Major Anderson, 64th Regiment Native Infantry.

5. The left column †, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley and Major Huish, commenced the ascent, led by Captain Ferris' regiment of Jezailchees. Both columns, after considerable opposition, which they overcame in a most gallant style, succeeded in routing the enemy, and gaining possession of the crest of the hills on either side. While the flanking columns were in progress on the heights, I ordered Captain Alexander, in command of the Artillery, to place the guns in position, and to throw shrapnell among the enemy when opportunity offered, which assisted much in their discomfiture. As Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, from the opposition he had met with, and the extremely difficult nature of the ground, was some time in reaching the summit of the hill on the right, I detached a party ‡ under the command of Brigadier Wild, to assault it in front; it was however so extremely steep near the top, that, notwithstanding the undaunted gallantry of the officers and men, they were unable to gain a footing on the summit, and I regret to say, the enemy were enable to throw stones with fatal effect upon some of the leading Grenadiers of the 9th Foot. Finding the heights in our possession, I now advanced the main column to the mouth of the pass, and commenced destroying the barrier which the enemy had evacuated on perceiving their position was turned; a portion of the right and left columns being left to keep the heights, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, and Major Anderson, respectively. Major Huish and Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor continued their advance to crown the hills in front and on each side, which were covered with the enemy, who appeared determined to contest every inch of ground, but nothing could resist the gallantry of our troops, who carried everything before them. A position of considerable strength above the brigade now remained to be carried, and again the Jezailchees were conspicuous in forcing the enemy to relinquish their strongholds. Crowning parties having taken possession of their heights, all opposition on the part of the enemy may be said to have ceased, as no large body of them has since come in sight. The nature of the arrangements made for the protection of the baggage, will be best understood when I state that not a single baggage animal has fallen into the hands of the enemy.

6. It now remains for me to perform the pleasing duty of stating how much I feel indebted to the officers and men comprising the force under my command, for their zeal, devotion, and unflinching valour, in performance of the very arduous duty which they have so nobly executed.

7. From Major-General McCaskill, K. H., commanding the infantry division, and who was on this occasion commanding the rear guard, I have received every assistance; as likewise from Brigadier Wild:—to Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, K. H., my warmest acknowledgements are

\* Four companies of Her Majesty's 9th Foot; four companies of 26th Native Infantry; four companies of 64th Native Infantry.

† Four companies of Her Majesty's 9th foot; four companies of 26th Native Infantry; four companies of 64th Native Infantry; 400 Jezailchees.

‡ Gr. Her Majesty's 9th Foot; six companies of the 53rd Native Infantry.

due for the spirit, coolness and judgement with which he discharged the duties entrusted to him. Where officers and men, European and Native, have all so gallantly performed their duty, it is difficult to select the names of particular individuals, but I can not omit the names of those who so admirably led the troops to storm the heights, viz. : Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, 64th Native Infantry, Major Huish, 26th Native Infantry, Major Anderson, 64th Native Infantry, and Captain Ferris, commanding the Jezailchees, whose conduct excited the delight and admiration of all who beheld them ; indeed I consider much of the success of the day to be attributed to their gallantry, skill and perseverance in this most difficult description of warfare. I have also to express my satisfaction with the manner in which the artillery was served, by Captain Alexander commanding ; the precision with which shrapnell was thrown, caused considerable loss to the enemy. To Captain Ponsonby, my Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Codrington, Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Captain Macadam, Deputy-Judge-Advocate-General, and to Lieutenant Pollock, A. D. C., I am much indebted for communicating my orders at different times during the day.

8. I cannot conclude this dispatch without requesting that you will bring to the particular notice of the Governor-General in Council, the very great assistance I have received from Captains Mackeson and Lawrence ; Captain Mackeson's knowledge of the localities was invaluable to me by enabling him to point out those heights which required to be crowned. Both these officers came on to the ground which I now occupy. Captain Lawrence returned to Peshawur yesterday, and Captain Mackeson proceeds with the force. Captain Sir Richmond Shakespear volunteered his services to accompany Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, as his aide-de-camp, and took command of the men lately composing the garrison of Ali Musjid ; his exertions throughout the day were most conspicuous and unceasing.

9. I must here observe that, from the character of the operations, and the very great numbers of the enemy, estimated at about 10,000, I found the force under my command numerically deficient, and in consequence the troops suffered severely from excessive fatigue.

10. There were some of the enemy's horse in the vicinity of Ali Musjid, but I regret they did not wait for Brigadier White, and his brigade, to make an example of them.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

P. S.—I herewith forward reports from officers commanding detached parties, but have not yet received the return of casualties, which shall be sent to-morrow. I am happy to say, our loss has been much below what could possibly have been expected.

No. 243.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Ali Musjid, April 6, 1842.*

SIR,—I have to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., commanding the force in Afghanistan, that, agreeably to his instructions, the columns intrusted to my command (as detailed in the

margin\*) for the capture of the heights on the right entrance to the Khyber Pass, were formed at daybreak on the 5th instant, in three divisions of four companies each, protected on the right flank by a squadron of H. M. 3rd Light Dragoons under Lieutenant Unett, and, in this order, with skirmishers and supports in front, advanced, driving a considerable body of the enemy up the hills, which were scaled and crowned in spite of a determined opposition. This effected, the troops moved to their left to clear the redoubts commanding the entrance to the pass, which were abandoned on our approach, the enemy suffering severely in their retreat. Major Anderson, as directed, remained on the heights with his column, reinforced by one company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and two companies of the 26th Native Infantry, under Captain Gahan, of the latter corps, whilst I descended, with the remainder, to carry into effect the ulterior plan of operations of the Major-General in clearing off the enemy from their positions on the right of the road to Ali Musjid, which was finally accomplished, though obstinate resistance was offered on several points, especially over the bridge, where the enemy had concentrated in force.

Having been reinforced by one company of the 33rd Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Watson, I directed Captain Lushington, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, to move with that company, and the light company of the 9th Foot, to the right, to take the enemy's position in reverse, whilst I attacked in front. This had the desired effect of forcing their immediate retreat, and clearing the bridge. No further opposition was offered by the enemy, who retreated on Ali Musjid, whilst I pushed on, and occupied the tower and hill to the left, within about a mile of that place.

It afforded me the greatest gratification to witness the gallant and persevering conduct of all the troops under my command, engaged, during the day, in a series of operations, requiring great energy and patient endurance of fatigue; and I beg to mention the able assistance and support rendered me by Major Anderson, 64th Native Infantry (second in command), Captain Gahan, 26th Native Infantry, commanding a division, Captain Lushington, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, commanding the companies of that regiment, Captain Sir Richmond Shakespear, who volunteered his services in charge of the Jezailchees, as well as the conduct and praiseworthy zeal of all the officers and men engaged.

It is with regret I have to report the death of Lieutenant Cumming, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, a very promising officer, who was killed on the heights above the pass, whilst in command of No. 6 company.

Returns of the killed and wounded will be sent as soon as the companies with the rear column come up.

I have, &c.,

A. B. TAYLOR.

\* Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor's right advance column, two companies of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, four companies of the 26th Native Infantry; Major Anderson's rear right flank column; 13 company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot; four and a half companies of the 64th Native Infantry. 100 Jezailchees (Mackeson's).



No. 244.—*Major George Huish to Captain Ponsonby.**Ali Musjid, April 6, 1842.*

SIR,—Having been honored with the command of the party, as per margin,\* intended for the capture of the hills on the left of the Khyber Pass, I have the honor to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., commanding the troops west of the Indus, that the party was formed for that purpose at daybreak on the 5th instant, and advanced to the attack in skirmishing order: The height on the left was speedily carried, in the most gallant and determined manner, the summit of which having been attained, the smaller hill, at the entrance of the pass, was cleared by the fire of my party.

This being effected, agreeably to the instructions of the Major-General, the post was made over to Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, commanding the rear crowning column; and the troops, with the exception of two companies of the 26th Native Infantry, descended, for the purpose of continuing to scale and clear the heights on the left of the road leading to Ali Musjid.

At several points very considerable opposition was made by the enemy; especially at one of the hills in advance of the smaller hill before alluded to, and at the heights commanding the bridge, where the enemy were in great force, but they were driven from their posts in the most spirited style, and with considerable loss while retreating.

Having occupied the last height adjacent to the intended encamping ground, I took position thereon with my party, occupying it during the night, until relieved this morning by a party of the 33rd Native Infantry, under Major Hewitt.

It gives me great pleasure to be able to report that this duty, though of the most fatiguing description, scaling heights the whole day, under the hot sun, and in the face of an enemy, was cheerfully performed by all the troops, European and Native, the Sepoys vying with their European comrades), whose perseverance and good spirit could not be surpassed, and were most gratifying to me: and here I cannot omit to make mention of the Jezailchees, under that able officer, Captain Ferris, who afforded me most material aid, as also the ready assistance of Captain Tritton, second in command, and the zeal and gallantry of every officer and man engaged.

I do myself the honor to inclose a return of the killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE HUISH.

No. 245.—*Major-General McCaskill to Captain Ponsonby.**Ali Musjid, April 6, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., commanding the forces, that, agreeably to his orders, I marched yesterday morning from Jumrood, in command of the rear-

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\* Two companies of Her Majesty's 9th Foot; four ditto 26th Native Infantry; 53 Ferris' Jezailchees.

guard of the column for the attack of the Khyber Pass, composed of the troops detailed in the margin\*.

The complete success of the attacks made by the force in advance, rendered unnecessary any active operations on my part. At nightfall, I took the necessary precautions for security, and the troops bivouacked at a spot about two miles within the pass, without any molestation from the enemy.

The rear-guard arrived in camp 2 p. m. this day, no part of the baggage having been plundered, nor any loss sustained.

I have reason to be highly satisfied with the exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, second in command, of Captain Smith, Officiating Deputy Assistant-General, and of every officer placed under my orders, in performance of the duties assigned to them.

I have, &c.,

JOHN MCCASKILL.

No. 246.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Ghurree Lalla Beg, April 8, 1842.*

SIR,—In continuation of my dispatch of the 6th instant, I have now the honor to inclose a return of casualties which took place on the 5th and 6th; those of the latter date occurred in taking possession of Ali Musjid. I am happy to say, the amount of our loss is trifling, considering the very great opposition we experienced from the enemy.

In my last communication I inadvertently omitted to mention the name of Lieutenant John Becher, Acting Field Engineer, and have to request you to bring to the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, the very essential services rendered by that officer in clearing the Pass of the impediments constructed by the enemy, which he did with a degree of celerity, notwithstanding their strength and difficulty of removal, that elicited my warmest satisfaction.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Troops under the command of Major-General Pollock, C.B., on the 5th April, in forcing the Khyber Pass.*

Staff.—1 wounded.

Her Majesty's 9th Foot.—1 European commissioned officer, 1 colour serjeant, 6 privates, killed; 1 European commissioned officer, 1 drummer, 31 privates wounded; total killed and wounded, 41.

26th Regiment Native Infantry.—2 sepoy killed; 1 sife major, 2 havildars, 17 sepoy wounded; 1 bugler missing; total killed, wounded, and missing, 23.

30th Regiment Native Infantry.—2 sepoy killed; 1 havildar, 12 sepoy wounded; 1 sepoy missing; total killed, wounded, and missing, 16.

33rd Regiment Native Infantry.—1 sepoy wounded; 1 sepoy missing; total wounded and missing, 2.

53rd Regiment Native Infantry.—1 sepoy killed; 1 sepoy wounded; 3 sepoy missing; total killed, wounded, and missing, 2.

\* Two guns Horse Artillery; 3 guns Foot Artillery; 2 squadrons of Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons; 10th Light Cavalry; 2 rissalahs Irregular Cavalry; 1 company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot; 1 company 6th Native Infantry; 3 companies 60th Native Infantry.

64th Regiment Native Infantry.—1 European commissioned officer, 3 havildars, 4 sepoy wounded; 1 sepoy missing; total wounded and missing, 9.

Jezailchee Regiment.—1 sepoy killed; 2 jemadars, 4 havildars, 2 naicks, 18 sepoy wounded; 10 sepoy missing; total killed, wounded, and missing, 37.

Total.—1 European commissioned officer, 1 colour serjeant, 12 sepoy and privates, killed; 1 staff, 2 European commissioned officers, 1 fife major, 2 jemadars, 10 havildars, 2 naicks, 1 drummer, 85 sepoy and privates, wounded; 1 bugler, 16 sepoy and privates, missing.

Grand total of killed, wounded and missing, 135.

G. PONSONBY.

*Name of Officer killed.*

Lieutenant Cumming, Her Majesty's 9th Foot.

*Names of Officers wounded.*

Staff.—Brigadier Wild, slightly.

Captain Ogle, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, slightly.

Lieut. Mulcaster, 64th Native Infantry, severely.

#### No. 247.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

Jellalabad, May 21, 1842.

SIR,—As I am doubtful if the originals, of which the inclosed are copies, ever reached you, I am induced to forward the copies, and take this opportunity of stating, that on the 5th April the 30th Regiment ascended the height at the entrance of the Pass, and reached the summit, under Brigadier Wild. I was obliged to advance before the party did reach the summit, and was not aware that they had done so, till informed of it two or three days ago by Brigadier Wild.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

#### No. 248.—*Notification by the Governor-General of India.*

Benares, April 21, 1842.

The Governor-General feels assured that every subject of the British Government will peruse with the deepest interest and satisfaction the report he now communicates, of the entire defeat of the Affghan troops under Mahomed Akbar Khan by the garrison of Jellalabad.

That illustrious garrison, which, by its constancy in enduring privation, and by its valour in action, has already obtained for itself the sympathy and respect of every true soldier, has now, sallying forth from its walls, under the command of its gallant leader, Major-General Sir Robert Sale, thoroughly beaten in open field an enemy of more than three times its numbers, taken the standards of their boasted cavalry, destroyed their camp, and recaptured four guns, which, under circumstances which can never again occur, had during the last winter fallen into their hands.

The Governor-General cordially congratulates the Army upon the return of victory to its ranks.

He is convinced that there, as in all former times, it will be found, while, as at Jellalabad, the European and Native troops mutually supporting each other, and evincing equal discipline and valour, are led into action by officers in whom they justly confide.

The Governor-General directs that the substance of this Notification,

and of Major-General Sir Robert Sale's report, be carefully made known to all the troops, and that a salute of twenty-one guns be fired at every principal station of the Army.

By order, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 249.—*Major-General Sir R. Sale to Captain Ponsonby.*

Jellalabad, April 7, 1842.

SIR,—Information was, on the evening of the 5th instant, brought into this place, in the most positive and circumstantial terms, by spies from the enemy's camp, to the effect that the force under Major-General Pollock, C.B., had met with reverses in the Khyber, and retraced its steps towards Peshawur; and about ten o'clock A.M. on the 6th, a feu-de joie and salute of artillery were fired by Mahomed Akbar, which were said to be in honor of the same event. It was on the same day, and through similar channels, announced to me, that the Affghans were sending additional reinforcements to aid in defending their frontier passes. Although I could not wholly depend on these statements, which were improbable in themselves, and accompanied by counter reports, of a new revolution at Cabool, which was assigned by some as the cause of the rejoicing; and of the defeat of the Ghazees in Khyber; and by an account of the intended, and even actual, retreat of the Sirdar into Lughman,—I adopted, on a full consideration of various circumstances and rumours, the resolution of anticipating the last mentioned event, if it had not come to pass, by a general attack on the Affghian camp, in the hope of relieving this place from blockade, and facilitating General Pollock's advance to our succour. I accordingly gave directions to form three columns of infantry, the central consisting of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry (mustered 500 bayonets), under Colonel Dennie, C.B.; the left, of the 35th Native Infantry (also 500 strong), under Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, C.B.; and the right, composed of one company of the 13th Light Infantry, and one of the 35th Regiment Native Infantry, and the detachment of Sappers under the command of Lieutenant Orr (the severity of Captain Broadfoot's wound still rendering him non-effective,) amounting to 360 men, commanded by Captain Havelock, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; these were to be supported by the fire of the guns of No. 6, field-battery under Captain Abbott, to which Captain Backhouse, Shah Shooja's artillery, was also attached, and by the whole of my small cavalry force under Captain Oldfield and Lieutenant Mayne.

The troops issued from the Cabool and Peshawur gates at daylight this morning. So far from the Sirdar having made any dispositions to avoid the encounter, his whole force, (not falling short in all of 6,000 men,) was formed in order of battle, for the defence of his camp; its right resting on a fort, and its left on the Cabool river; and even the ruined works within eight hundred yards of the place, recently repaired, were filled with Ghilzye marksmen, evidently prepared for a stout resistance. The attack was led by the skirmishers and column under Captain Havelock, which drove the enemy in the most satisfactory manner from the extreme left of his advanced line of works, which it pierced at once, and proceeded to advance into the plain; whilst the central column directed

its efforts against a square fort, upon the same base, the defence of which was obstinately maintained. With the deepest regret, I have to record that, whilst nobly leading his regiment to the assault, Colonel Dennie, C. B., of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, received a shot through his body, which shortly after proved fatal. The rear of the work having been finally gained by passing to its left, I gave orders for a combined attack upon the enemy's camp. It was in every way brilliant and successful. The artillery advanced at the gallop, and directed a heavy fire upon the Affghan centre, whilst two of the columns of infantry penetrated his line near the same point, and the third forced back his left from its support on the river, into the stream of which some of his horse and foot were driven. The Affghans made repeated attempts to check our advance, by a smart fire of musquetry, by throwing forward heavy bodies of horse, which twice threatened in force the detachments of foot under Captain Havelock, and by opening on us three guns screened by a garden wall, and said to have been served under the personal superintendence of the Sirdar—but, in a short time, they were dislodged from every point of their positions,—their cannon taken, and their camp involved in a general conflagration. The battle was over, and the enemy in full retreat in the direction of Lughman by about seven, A. M. We have made ourselves masters of two cavalry standards, recaptured four guns, lost by the Cabool army and Gundamuck forces, the restoration of which to our Government is matter of much honest exultation among our troops; seized and destroyed a great quantity of matériel and ordnance stores, and burnt the whole of the enemy's tents. In short the defeat of Mahomed Akbar, in open field, by the troops whom he had boasted of blockading, has been complete and signal.

The fall of an officer so distinguished as Colonel Dennie will be felt as a public calamity; lamenting it on every account, I must yet share with his country, his regiment, and his friends, in the consolation afforded by the reflection, that he was killed whilst most gallantly performing his duty. I have to express my entire satisfaction with the conduct, in this action, of Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, C. B., commanding one of the two infantry columns under my own eye, and of Captain Wilkinson, 13th Light Infantry, on whom the charge of the other devolved on the death of his Lieutenant-Colonel; of Captain Okfield and Lieutenant Mayne, who led the cavalry, and of Captains Abbott and Backhouse, and Lieutenant Dawes, Artillery.

The able and judicious manner in which Captain Havelock moved the force under his command, which acted on a line sufficiently distant to render the manœuvres independent of my immediate control, demands my particular and separate commendation.

My acknowledgments are also especially due to my Brigade-Major, Captain Hamlet Wade, whose exertions were on this day, as they have ever been, most meritorious; to Major Frazer of the Light Cavalry, who acted as my Aide-de-Camp; and to Captain Mainwaring, Commissariat Officer with the Force, who was present and active in the field. Captain Macgregor, Political Agent, handsomely offered his services with No. 6, light field-battery, and was most useful in serving the guns.

I inclose returns of killed and wounded, and of ordnance and stores captured.

Lieutenant and Adjutant Wood, Her Majesty's 13th light infantry, made a dash at one of the enemy, and in cutting him down, his charger was so severely injured as to have been since destroyed. Captain Havelock reports in the most favorable manner the gallant conduct, throughout the day, of Lieutenant Cox, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and he was the first, of the party which captured them, to seize two of the enemy's cannon.

It will be seen from the preceding details, that the force employed in this successful enterprise amounted to about 1,800 men of all arms. The safety of the place was entrusted, during the action, to the ordinary guards of its gates, and one provisional battalion of followers of every description, armed with pikes and other weapons, who manned the curtains, and made a respectable show of defence, as they have done on all occasions of attack on the walls. Captain Pattison, 12th Light Infantry, was left in command of this diminished garrison;—a sally was made from the Cabool gate by Lieutenant Wade, of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, towards the conclusion of the engagement, into the fort before which Colonel Dennie had fallen, when it was observed that the enemy were abandoning it; all that it contained was set on fire, and some of its defenders were bayoneted.

The enemy's loss during the day must have been severe, the field of battle was strewn with the bodies of men and horses, and the richness of the trappings of some of the cattle seemed to attest that persons of rank had fallen.

Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath has mentioned to me, in high terms, the gallant behaviour of Captain Seaton, of the 35th Regiment Native Infantry, when in command of the skirmishers of that corps, and the fact of his having been the captor of a howitzer from the enemy.

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

P.S.—We have information to the fact, that the following Chiefs were present and took part in the action, viz. :—

Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan, in person.

Ameer Khan, Chief of Bajore.

Nuzceez Khan,

Gool Mahomed Khan,

Mahomed Shah Khan,

Burnkut Khan,

Azad Khan,

Thukoor Khan,

Syud Odsman,

Oonerah Khan,

Syud Mahomed, Son of the King of Konar.

Syud Hoskyim, Ex-King of Kooner.

Mecah Hyder, Chief of Koorat.

Mahomed Yan Khan, Chief of Sungar Serai.

Abdool Guffoor Khan, Barukzye.

Abdool Guffoor Khan, Nephew of Abdoolah Khan, Chief of the Atchukzyes.

Meer Abdool Ruhman, Chief of Kama.

} Ghilzye Chiefs.

} Mobmund Chiefs.

Khalid Khan, Chief of Goshta.

Meer Uzul Khan, Chief of Gundaghur.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Force under the Command of Major-General Sir R. Sale, K. C. B., Jellalabad, April 7, 1842.*

No. 6 Light Field Battery—1 native officer, 2 havildars, 1 naick, 2 sepoy, 1 'naib, 4 drivers, wounded.

Mountain Train—1 havildar, 2 sepoy, wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—1 officer, 8 privates, killed; 1 officer, 2 corporals, 29 privates, wounded.

35th Native Infantry—2 sepoy killed; 1 officer, 1 native officer, 1 havildar, 2 naicks, 11 sepoy, wounded.

Sappers and Miners—2 havildars, 1 naick, 1 bugler, 5 sepoy, wounded.

1 Tindal and 1 bearer, 35 native infantry, wounded.

5 Horses wounded.

Total—1 officer, 10 privates and sepoy, killed; 2 officers, 2 native officers, 6 serjeants and havildars, 6 corporals and naicks, 1 bugler, 49 privates and sepoy, 1 'naib, 4 drivers, wounded.

*Names of Officers.*

*Killed.*

Colonel Dennie, C. B., Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.

*Wounded.*

Captain Moorhouse, 35th Native Infantry, severely.

Lieutenant Jennings, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, slightly.

Assistant-Surgeon Barnes, M.D., Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, slightly.

HAMLET WADE.

*Return of Ordnance captured by the Forces under Major-General Sir R. Sale, April 7, 1842.*

1 six-pounder, 1 twelve-pounder howitzer, that belonged to 1st brigade Horse Artillery, 1 howitzer, that belonged to the Mountain Train, 1 six-pounder dismantled, that was left at Gundamuck by the Khyber corps.

An inconsiderable quantity of ammunition was found with this ordnance, also some half wrought matériel.

A. ABBOTT.

No. 250.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Ghuree Lala Beg, April 8, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward copies of two letters received yesterday from Jellalabad, of the 4th instant. The very satisfactory account which they contain of the state of their supplies, removes the anxiety which I have so long entertained regarding that garrison.

My report of the operations of the 5th instant has already been forwarded to you. On the 6th I was detained south of Ali Musjid, by finding that the Sikh Government had not completed its arrangements for guarding the road from Ali Musjid to Peshawur. On that morning I sent the regiment of Jezailchees to take possession of the fort of Ali Musjid, which was effected. On the 7th I marched to this place, and met with very trifling opposition; but owing to the narrowness of the road, the whole of the baggage of this force did not arrive here until 1 P. M. to-day.

The men and cattle are much fatigued, and Captain Mackeson has urged me to halt here to-morrow, in order to complete the arrangements, for guarding the road from this to Dakka, which there appears to be a prospect of affecting by an amicable arrangement with the tribes.

At Ali Musjid I propose leaving a garrison of six companies of Native Infantry, until the arrival of the 6th Native Infantry, and Her Majesty's 31st, when I shall direct the former corps to occupy that post. The Sikhs have moved up their troops close to the fort.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have decided on moving the force to-morrow morning a short distance in advance.

*Camp, Ludi Khana, April 9, 1842.*

The arrangements for opening the road not having been completed, it was not deemed advisable to send the above yesterday; and to-day letters have been received from Jellalabad, of date the 7th instant. I lose no time in forwarding copies of these highly interesting documents.

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 251.—*Major Rawlinson to Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, March 6, 1842.*

SIR,—I had the honor to receive yesterday at this place copy of your letter to my address, under date December 24th, 1841. In explanation of my apparent neglect in not communicating direct with Calcutta on the affairs of Candahar, I have the honor to observe that, up to the 12th of November, I had no reason to believe the communication between Cabool and Jellalabad to be otherwise than partially interrupted; that, subsequent to this date, I had the honor to forward to you direct duplicates of all despatches of importance; that during the month of November, I also regularly corresponded demi-officially with Major Outram, with a view to the information of that officer, and the transmission of all intelligence of importance to Calcutta; that from the commencement of December, until the southern road became finally closed, I likewise addressed letters repeatedly to the Private Secretary to the Right Honorable the Governor-General, as the least intrusive way of communicating with Government, and that since that period, December 17th, debarred from the possibility of transmitting any bulky papers, and obliged to depend on the secret conveyance of foot messengers, I have still exerted myself to the utmost to keep Government duly informed of all affairs of consequence at this place through Lieutenant Hammersley, in political charge at Quetta, and through Major Outram, Political Agent in Sindh and Beloochistan. The difficulty of communicating still continues, and I have thus no alternative but to adhere for a time to my demi-official correspondence with Major Outram; but immediately that any safe channel is opened for the transmission of our dawks, I shall avail myself of it, to forward to Government duplicates of all my official letters, and to send a copy of the detailed political diary which I have kept since the commencement of our difficulties at Candahar in the end



of last December. In the meantime, I have the honor to submit, in as concise and portable a form as possible, an abstract of all matters of consequence that have occurred at this place since the breaking out of the Cabool insurrection in the beginning of November.

At that period affairs wore a more tranquil and promising appearance in the Candahar province than I had ever witnessed since my assumption of the charge of the agency. Akram Khan, the leader of the Dehrawat rebellion, captured by Lieutenant Conolly, had been executed at this place by His Majesty's orders. Eight of the most influential of his colleagues in rebellion had been sent by me, according to the orders of the Envoy, under charge of Lieutenant Crawford, to Cabool, that officer having my written instructions to destroy his prisoners in the event of an attempt at rescue. The Hazareh and Belooch tribes had been effectually conciliated; the Dooranee of the Northern and Western districts had been humbled and overawed.

On the 7th of November, Colonel McLaren's Brigade marched for India; and, upon the same evening, we heard of the disaster which had befallen Captain Woodburn and his detachment, between Ghuznee and Cabool. I immediately applied to Major-General Nott to halt the Brigade. Upon the 14th letters from the Envoy and Major-General Elphinstone arrived, announcing the Cabool insurrection, and calling on General Nott to reinforce the capital with the Brigade under orders for India. Colonel McLaren accordingly returned to Candahar, and strengthened with a troop of Horse Artillery, started for Cabool upon the 17th. In the meantime, Captain Hart's corps of Jaunbaz had been called in from Tircen, agreeably to the Envoy's wishes, and followed in the rear of Colonel McLaren's Brigade, en route to Cabool. Two of the Shah's corps that had been left in Neesh and Dehrawat, after the return of the regular troops, were likewise summoned to Candahar, and nothing remained out but the 1st corps of Jaunbaz, the 1st Shah's regiment, and two guns in Zamin Dawur.

Having experienced much embarrassment from the presence of two Princes in this province during the summer and autumn, who regarded each other with the greatest jealousy, I judged the present to be a favourable opportunity for deputing Sufter Jung to Cabool, thus leaving Prince Timour in the immediate exercise of supreme authority in the Candahar Government. Prince Sufter Jung accordingly returned from Zamin Dawur, and prepared to accompany the Jaunbaz to Cabool; but, previous to the departure of the corps, I had reason to suspect the fidelity of the Afghan Horse; and having come to an explanation with the Prince upon the subject, he signified to me that he would prefer remaining at Candahar during the winter, without employment, to running the risk of being disgraced by any treacherous conduct on the part of the Horse to which he was attached. About the same time we learnt that Lieutenant Crawford had been attacked near Ghuznee, and had allowed the Dooranee prisoners under his charge to escape; and this intelligence was followed by an account of the Ghilzyes' attack upon Guddoo Khan, on his return from Ghuznee, in which that gallant Afghan officer, whose services to us throughout had been of such extreme value, was overpowered by numbers and slain, with 17 of his best men, losing at the same time 45 horses, and all the arms and baggage of the Rissulah. The Province of

Candahar itself, however, still continued tranquil ; and it was not until we learnt, upon the 3rd of December, that Colonel McLaren had been forced by the inclemency of the weather to give up his advance on Cabool, that we were led to anticipate disturbances in this Government. General Nott then judged it advisable to concentrate all his troops at Candahar, and accordingly ordered in the regiment and guns from Zamin Dawur. I wished to keep the Jaumbaz at Giriskh, as the best chance of obliging them to adhere to us, from their enmity to the surrounding tribes, but my letters miscarried, and, unfortunately, the Afghan Horse returned to Candahar with the infantry. Colonel McLaren reached Candahar upon the 8th of December, and the Zamin Dawur detachment came in the following day. Lieutenant Hammersley was at this time about to dispatch treasure to Candahar from Quetta, but judging that the temptation of securing this booty would induce the tribes about the Kojuck to rise, I suggested its detention till a more favorable opportunity offered. It is fortunate that this detention occurred, or the treasure would certainly have been sacrificed ; for intelligence having reached the Candahar frontier of the dispatch of Mahomed Atta Khan from Cabool to excite the rebellion in this province, the tribes to the south-east, who are particularly under the influence of that chief, assembled and came down upon the Quetta road, with the hope of plundering the convoy. Disappointed of their booty they returned to their homes ; but an impetus had been given to insurrection by their movement, which led to many further evils. Lieutenant Bosanquet, on the 17th of December, reported to me that all was quiet in the neighbourhood of Killa Abdoolla ; but on the following day he received orders from Quetta to evacuate his post, and this abandonment taking place immediately after the émeute north of the Kojuck, was construed into an admission of weakness, and was the signal for the Atchukzye tribe to rise, cutting off at once our communication with the south. I had no resource in this emergency but to send Saloo Khan, the Atchukzye Chief, with the Candahar Jaumbaz, to re-occupy Killa Abdoolla, taking the precaution at the same time to withdraw the European Superintendent of the corps. The men on approaching the Kojuck were infected with the rebellion of the Atchukzye tribe, and the greater part of them deserted. Saloo Khan, however, remained firm, and has from that time to the present steadily adhered to our interests, and has exerted himself to the utmost in our service, thus justifying, in the most satisfactory manner, the selection I had made of him for the important post of Sirdar of Jaumbaz, and proving, moreover, that I employed the best means at my disposal for preserving the communication with India.

I must now note a few particulars regarding affairs in the city of Candahar. When I became aware of the names of the leaders who headed the Cabool insurrection, and found that they were principally Dorrancee noblemen of rank, I could not but be suspicious of the chiefs of Candahar, who are all of the same tribe. I temporized with them, however, during the whole month of November, keeping them in good humour, and leading them to believe that the Cabool rebellion was nothing more than a partial and temporary disturbance. When Colonel McLaren's retirement, however, became known, and Mahomed Atta Khan also approached the Candahar frontier as the champion of Islam, it was no longer

possible to treat the Dooranee chiefs with the sort of half confidence that I had hitherto shown them. I had but three courses open to me : 1st, arresting the chiefs and expelling their followers from the city ; 2nd, obliging them to leave the city, which was equivalent to throwing them into the arms of Mahomed Atta Khan ; and 3rd, affecting to trust them with the execution and direction of a popular movement in favor of His Majesty the Shah, and against Mahomed Atta Khan, who approached Candahar as the representative of the Baruckzye Sirdars,—the acknowledged enemies of the Dooranee power ; either of the two former courses appeared to me calculated to increase and precipitate our difficulties, whilst the latter secured a comparative safety to the city, and, in the event of the restoration of order at Cabool, to which I confidently looked forward, promised to relieve the Candahar province altogether of the troubles or the expenses of war. After the most mature deliberation, I accordingly adopted the latter course, persuaded his Royal Highness Prince Timour to depute his eldest son with the Dooranee chiefs, and advanced on account of the local Government the sum of one lac of rupees to Meerza Ahmed, the revenue manager, to maintain the Dooranee troops in the field. I also obtained a *Futwa* from the priesthood of Candahar, declaring the Cabool conspirators, and their adherents, rebels and traitors, and deserving of punishment in this world and the next. The Dooranees quitted Candahar in the middle of December, delayed for a considerable time the advance of Atta Khan, prevented to the utmost of their power the spread of religious fanaticism among the tribes, and acted in apparent good faith until their accounts from Cabool impressed them with a conviction that His Majesty the Shah had ranged himself in the ranks of our enemies. I am induced, therefore, to hope that Government will not consider me to have acted inconsiderately or prejudicially to our interests in the game which I have played with the Dooranees. The expenditure of the lac of rupees answered the temporizing purpose at which it was chiefly aimed, and the funds have been exhausted long ere this when we are about to be brought into collision with the Dooranees. To return, however, to the occurrences of the month of December. After the deputation of Prince Secunder with the Dooranee chiefs, my attention was chiefly directed to the disposition of the Jaumbaz. A part of them accompanied the prince, the remainder I judged it best to endeavour to station upon the Helmund, as well with a view to the protection of the fort of Giriskh, as to place them in a situation where they would be cut off from communication with Cabool, and surrounded with their blood enemies. They were to have started for Giriskh accordingly upon the 27th of December ; but, on the previous night, supposing from a mere accident that their intention to desert had been discovered, they broke into open mutiny, murdered Lieutenant Golding, wounded Lieutenant Patterson so severely that he now lies in danger of his life, and took the field, hoping to raise the country. It is worthy of remark, that they did not attempt to join the Dooranee camp, proving thereby that the chiefs were then understood to be friendly to us. Captain Leeson's cavalry, and a party of the Parsewan Jaumbaz, who remained firm under Lieutenant Wilson, although in the same camp with the mutineers, were immediately detached in pursuit, and coming up with the Jaumbaz in the afternoon, at a village about twelve miles distant

from Candahar, they attacked and dispersed them, killing the ring-leader of the mutiny, and inflicting a severe loss on the whole body. It had been my wish, with General Nott's concurrence, to send out two of the guns belonging to the local Government, for the better protection of the fortress of Girishk. No escort, however, could be now spared, and I had no better means therefore of providing for the safety of that important post than by authorizing Bulwunt Sing, the Hindostanee Kildadar, to increase his garrison to 400 men ; and by obtaining from his Royal Highness Prince Timour the nomination to the Government of the Helmund of a Baruckzye chief, the son of the famous Vizier Futteh Khan, who is possessed of an extensive influence in the tribe, and who is equally at enmity with the members of his own family, and with the other Dooranee chiefs who put his father to death.

An important occurrence took place on the 29th of December, two days subsequent to the Jaunbaz mutiny. Prince Sufter Jung, jealous of his brother, and disgusted at his own removal from authority, was won over by the persuasions of a dissolute and intriguing chief, the son of Shah Pussund, Khan of Laush, to fly from the city, and place himself at the head of the insurgents whom Mahomed Atta Khan was assembling on our eastern frontier. As the prince was subjected to no restraint, it was impossible to have provided against this flight. As soon, however, as he took the field, the rebel cause rapidly gained strength. The Jaunbaz, who had fled from Candahar and from Saloo Khan, collected round the standard of Mahomed Atta Khan, and the sirdar fixed his head-quarters at Dehla, distant about forty miles from the city. General Nott was deterred by the unfavourable state of the season from attacking the rebels at that place ; and our inactivity being considered a proof of weakness, Mahomed Atta, with about 3,000 horse and foot, proceeded leisurely down the valley of the Arghundab to the vicinity of the town of Candahar ; and having been joined by a considerable number of people from the surrounding villages, upon the 12th of January he took post, on the river, distant five miles west of the city. General Nott attacked the enemy in this position, and dispersed them after a brief skirmish. The Dooranees, up to this time, had avoided committing themselves in any open hostility with us, though, I believe, that the Cabool advices, describing the increasing difficulties of our position, and affording a prospect of the Shah's being able, subsequently to our departure, to supersede the authority of the Baruckzyes, had rendered them ripe for declaring against us. Be this, however, as it may, when the Dooranees found that we were engaged with Mahomed Atta, their camp broke up tumultuously, and the entire force marched apparently to the support of their countrymen. They did not arrive in our vicinity, however, till the evening, when Mahomed Atta's followers were scattered in flight and disorder, and they then prudently retired to a sufficient distance to escape the risk of being exposed to any immediate collision with us. From this time the Dooranee camp became the nucleus for rebellion. Sufter Jung, Mahomed Atta Khan, and the other fugitives from the field of the 12th, sought the protection of the Dooranees, and were honorably received. Prince Sekunder had been carried away by the Dooranee chiefs ; but we succeeded in releasing him from their hands, and bringing him back into the city before Sufter Jung arrived in their camp.

During all this period I had kept up an uninterrupted correspondence with Sufter Jung, with Meerza Ahmed, and with the Dooranees. The prince, I believe, regretted the step he had taken, and would have returned to Candahar before the affair of the 12th, had I considered myself authorized to guarantee to him a definite reward for so doing ; but, besides the inexpediency of thus putting a premium upon rebellion, it was altogether out of my power to promise him what he required, namely, the future Government of Candahar. That I have been deceived with regard to Meerza Ahmed I candidly admit, as he is a man of first-rate talent for an Affghan, and must, I supposed, appreciate the difference between the power of his countrymen and that of the British Government. I judged that from motives of self-interest he would adhere cordially to our cause. He appears, however, from the breaking out of the Cabool insurrection, to have guessed that the contest would terminate in our compulsory abandonment of the country ; and, thus while he honestly played for a season the temporizing game that I enjoined upon him, he still took care so to strengthen his position with his own party, that, in the event of our adversity, he might keep the lead in the Affghan cause which had been entrusted to him whilst acting under our own auspices. I was so sensible of the danger of this man as an enemy, that long after I had evidence of his duplicity, I affected to trust him, in the hope of his reclamation, and I might possibly, to the present day, have retained some hold upon him, had I not been necessitated, in order to carry on the business of local administration and to consolidate some party in the state as a counterpoise to the weight of the Dooranees, to bring his rival Meerza Wulce Mahomed into power, as revenue manager of Candahar. This arrangement took place, with his Royal Highness Prince Timour's approval, upon the 18th of January ; and since that time, Meerza Ahmed has been actively employed as minister to Sufter Jung, in directing the councils of the Dooranees, and concerting measures to place them out of the danger of a surprise, and yet sufficiently near to have an appearance of menacing Candahar ; and in this camp they remained from the 20th of January to the last day of February. Meerza Ahmed alone could have so long preserved union among the discordant elements of which this camp was composed ; he alone could have managed, by the most careful revenue arrangements, to have supported the concourse which was assembled round the standard of Sufter Jung ; he alone, perhaps, could have prevented the Dooranees from risking an action in which they were certain to have been defeated—his measures throughout have been most skilful and well sustained. The chiefs were, in the first place, sent to recruit in the different districts where their influence chiefly prevailed ; revenue was raised in the usual forms, for the support of the troops, in anticipation of the coming harvest, the ryots receiving an acquittance from Meerza Ahmed, in case the management should continue in his hands, and being assured that, if our power prevailed, we were too just to subject the cultivators to a double exaction. Statements of the Shah's connivance in the Cabool revolution were industriously circulated ; incessant attempts were made to tamper with our Hindostanee troops (not altogether without success), and letters were designedly thrown into our hands to render us suspicious of such few chiefs as adhered to us, whilst the most stringent measures

were adopted to deter the villagers around the city from bringing supplies into Candahar. Such was the line of policy pursued by Meerza Ahmed from the 20th of January to the 20th of February. In this interim General Nott had laid in five months' supplies for the troops; he had repaired the fortifications to a certain extent; and, intending on the 12th of February to march out and attack the enemy, he had concurred with me in the advisability of disarming the population preparatory to the movement of our troops. Severe weather, however, rendered a march impracticable at the time he meditated; and before it became sufficiently mild to enable him to take the field, the tactics of the enemy had undergone a total alteration, in consequence of advices from Cabool.

It may be as well here to notice our receipt of intelligence from Cabool and Calcutta; the Government letter of the 3rd of December, reached us on the 28th idem; and on the 30th of January we heard of the assassination of the Envoy and the intended evacuation of Cabool. On the 1st of February I addressed General Nott on the subject of the Government letter of the 3rd of December, stating that although the contingency contemplated by Government appeared to have arrived, yet it was attended with circumstances which could not have been contemplated, and which seemed to render it advisable that we should await further instructions. In this view General Nott cordially concurred. Upon the 21st of February a letter signed by Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone reached us, of the same tenor as that addressed by those officers to the authorities at Jellalabad, and in submitting the document to General Nott, I distinctly stated my opinion that the Cabool convention was in no way binding on us at Candahar. In this view also, General Nott fully coincided, expressing his resolve to enter into negotiations with no one pending the receipt of definitive instructions from Calcutta. Two days subsequently, the resolutions of Government of the 6th of January reached Candahar, and from that date I have conducted my political duties in cordial communication with, but still in direct subordination to Major-General Nott's authority.

The Cabool messenger who brought us Major-General Elphinstone's letter of the 25th of December, left the capital as late as the 22nd of January, and was the bearer of a number of important documents from His Majesty the Shah, and from the Cabool leaders of the Dooranee Chiefs of Candahar. His Majesty's acceptance of the crown subsequent to our evacuation of Cabool was most gratifying to the Candahar insurgents, and was generally interpreted by them into a tacit approval of the progress and result of the revolution. They were not, however, I understand, perfectly satisfied on this score, and dispatched another messenger to Cabool, requiring the direct orders of his Majesty to attack us. In the mean time, the Dooranee Chief addressed a formal letter to me, of which I have sent duplicate copies through Major Outram, calling on us to evacuate Candahar in peace, lest we should experience the same fate as our countrymen at Cabool; and remarking further, that the coalition of the Shah with the insurgent party at Cabool had deprived us of any further pretext for maintaining our troops in the country. In reply to this letter, I wrote, with Major-General Nott's approval, that we still remained at Candahar in support of the Shah's authority, believing His

Majesty to desire our presence, and that we had, moreover, an ample force at our disposal for the defence of our position.

Upon the 27th of February we received the Government letter of the 28th of January, and General Nott then drew up a proclamation stating more explicitly the identity of our interests with those of Shah Shoojaool-Moolk and our determination to treat as enemies to His Majesty all those assembled in arms under Prince Sufter Jung. I obtained his Royal Highness Prince Timour's consent to this proclamation, and copies of it have been generally distributed through the country. Having further received on the 4th instant a copy of the Government Notification of January 31st, a translation of this has also been prepared, and all possible publicity has been given to the document. General Nott, also, in support of the determination which we have thus evinced to hold Candahar, has now made all his arrangements to take the field, and during the last few days I have been employed under his directions in expelling the Affghan population from the town preparatory to the movement. This extreme measure has been forced upon us by the paramount consideration of safety. There were, at least, 6,000 Affghans within the walls, who in the present state of affairs, could not but be considered inimical to us, who had been generally, moreover, in active communication with the Dooranee camp, and to control whom, such a garrison was necessary for the protection of the city as threatened to cripple our movements in the field. Under such circumstances, expulsion was indispensable, and although we have, no doubt, by the measure, increased the national exasperation against us, still we have secured a position in which we may resolutely and confidently meet it. A distinction has been made in this clearing of the town, which it would have been as well to have avoided, had there been a prospect of accommodation with our Affghan enemies, but which has been forced upon us by circumstances, and from which, if the war (as is not improbable) should assume a character of inveteracy, we shall certainly derive beneficial results. The Sheehs of Candahar have always been at enmity with the Dooranees, and in the disturbances which have from time to time occurred in this province, they have evinced a general disposition to side with us. This feeling has been latterly still more directly manifested, and we have, in return, shown our confidence in them by permitting them to retain occupation of their dwellings. They must consider themselves for the future fully committed in our quarrel, and will, I think, be found of great value, if our contest with the Affghans proceeds to extremities.

I have now to detail the movements of the Dooranees since the 20th ultimo, when they received their advice from Cabool, announcing the Shah's restoration to power. Active measures of annoyance were at once adopted, a demonstration of force being considered likely to induce us more readily to an evacuation of the country. Large detachments of horse were thrown out from the Dooranee camp to the vicinity of the city, with a view of plundering our camels, cutting off stragglers, and preventing us from foraging. On the 21st, one of our foraging parties sustained a severe loss from the enemy's horse, 150 camp followers having been cut up, and nearly 300, camels carried off. On the 25th again, the Dooranee horse, nearly 2,000 in number, came down upon another party, but

the escort of three regiments which had been sent for the protection of the camels, was too strong for the enemy to attack, and nothing occurred beyond a little skirmishing. On the 27th, a third party went out to the eastward to procure forage, and returned unmolested : and on the 2nd a fourth detachment of two regiments and four guns proceeded in the same direction, and brought in bhoosa, without falling in with any of the enemy's horse. This brigade, however, remained out during one night and a report having in consequence arisen that it had marched for Kelati-Ghilzye to withdraw the garrison of that place, large bodies of the Dooranee horse proceeded up the Turmuk valley to harass the force. Discovering their mistake, they have since returned, and have encamped for several nights a few miles to the south of the city, and yesterday they cut up some of our camp-followers close under the walls of the city. During this interval, the Dooranee head-quarters have been moved to the left bank of the Arghundab river, and the number and spirits of the party have been daily on the increase. It has been the object of the Dooranees to show themselves at all points, and to keep us in a state of perpetual alarm. They have destroyed the villages of those chiefs who were supposed to be friendly to us, have greatly impeded the conveyance of supplies to the city, and have even threatened the cantonments. The numbers of horse and foot at present in arms amount, I believe, to about 4,000 of the former, and 5,000 of the latter. It is said that they will, if possible, decline an engagement, and content themselves with harassing General Nott's force, which is known to be sadly deficient in cavalry, but they are aware that an irregular army, like their own, becomes altogether unmanageable when pressed upon by an active foe, and if the dangers therefore of dissolution becomes imminent, it is thought that they may try their fortune in a battle. Should an action of this sort occur, I may confidently predict that tranquillity will for a time be restored to Candahar. The Cabool Jaunbaz who are with the enemy will fly to the northward ; the different chiefs will take refuge among the tribe in the remote districts ; and some of those who consider themselves the least committed, may possibly be induced to come in.

The future prospects of Candahar will most entirely depend upon the real feelings of the Shah, and the decision of the British Government with respect to him. Should we remain in the country as his supporters, we need not anticipate any very formidable opposition. Should Shah Shooja on the other hand be regarded as our enemy, I submit, with deference, that in regard to local feelings, His Majesty Shah Kamran will prove the most eligible rival to supplant him. Under any other arrangements, the war will become one of great inveteracy, and we can only expect to restore order by an overwhelming force, which shall suffice to crush altogether the power of the Dooranees. If we decide upon a measure of this sort, the attachment to us of the Sheeah population will be a most valuable auxiliary, and the Hazareh mountaineers, who are of the same faith, will gladly co-operate with us in the work of complete coercion.

I now do myself the honor to report various other measures, to which I have been compelled to give effect during the long period that has elapsed since an opportunity offered for reference to superior authority. I am still without any instructions on the subject of Herat, but I



retain Sirdar Sultan Mahomed Khan at Candahar, as a pledge for the sincerity of his brother, and as a means for arranging any relations that we may possibly desire to enter into with Shah Kamran, in the event of His Majesty's succeeding in the contest which he has precipitated with Yar Mahomed Khan, and which, after a continuance of two months, now promises to terminate in His Majesty's favor. Sirdar Sultan Mahomed Khan has been of the utmost service at Candahar in exerting his powerful influence with the Alekozye tribe, to detach it from the Dooranee confederacy, and, assisted with money which I have advanced to him for the purpose, he has so far succeeded, that the Alekozye chief in the Dooranee camp, one of the first nobles of Candahar, has been arrested and threatened with death by Prince Sufter Jung, for the lukewarmness his tribe has displayed in the Dooranee cause, and for being suspected of a personal attachment to us. Sirdar Sultan Mahomed Khan has been in the receipt of his allowance of 2000 rupees per mensem, recommended in my dispatch of the 20th of November, since his arrival here, and acting on demi-official permission granted by the Envoy some months back, I have also advanced the sum of 10,000 rupees to Sirdar Deen Mahomed Khan, in consideration of his brother's services.

At the commencement of the Candahar disturbances, fearing that the outlaw Attar Khan would attempt to return through the Tymmunee country, to the Helmund, I made another disbursement (sanctioned by the Envoy on a former occasion,) of 10,000 rupees to Ibrahim Khan, Sirdar of the Tymmunees, to induce him to close the passes against our enemy. This disbursement has brought us into very friendly relations with the Tymmunees, and an agent of the Sirdar still continues to reside in Candahar. Deputations from the chiefs of Seistan, and from the Beloochees and Brahees of Gurmusel, who arrived at Candahar before the Cabool revolution broke out, have been obliged to remain here ever since at the Government's expense. The latter chiefs have been very useful in holding the Dooranees of Gurmusel in check, and thus preventing them from sending any considerable reinforcements to Sufter Jung's camp. The Hazareh and Belooch tribes, who returned with Lieutenant Elliot from Tireen and Dehrawut, have also resided in Candahar during the winter, and their entertainment here has pledged the tribes over whom their influence extends, to support the Jaunbaz detachment, that, up to the present time, has held its ground in Tireen, and paralyzed the movements of the Dooranees in that quarter, where the influence of Mahomed Atta Khan is paramount, and the tribes are notoriously strong and turbulent.

The Persian refugee, Agha Khan, is still a guest at Candahar, and General Nott, in consideration of our deficiency of cavalry, has expressed a wish that this chief, who is possessed of much military experience, and whose attachment to our interests is certain, should be intrusted with the temporary direction of such Parseewan horse as have remained true to us since the disorganization of the Jaunbaz. Agha Khan has at present about 300 of these horse under his orders, and will accompany General Nott in his projected attack upon the enemy. Were we not threatened with a deficiency of funds for our necessary expence, I should venture to recommend that the Parseewan horse were considerably increased, as well with a view of relieving our own cavalry of the harass-

ing duty of patrolling, as to give further confidence to the Sheeah party, and to show that we can still command the services of a not unimportant class of the Candahar population.

I have also the honor to bring to the notice of Government, that, during the late disturbances, when the sources of local revenue have been closed against the Government which we support, I have been compelled to advance funds for the maintenance of Prince Timour, of Abbas Khan, Sirdar of Candahar, and other chiefs who are entitled to salaries from the crown, and remain attached to the court of His Royal Highness. I have taken upon myself also to grant compensation for the losses sustained by Gaddoo Khan's Rissalah in November; and it has further appeared to me on several occasions desirable to expend sums upon chiefs who have supplied us with valuable information, or who have laboured to preserve tranquillity among their respective tribes. The total sum which I have disbursed for contingent expenses of this nature, inclusive of the original advance to Meerza Ahmed Khan, reported in a former part of my letter, amounts during the five last months to two lacs eleven thousand and sixty six rupees, ten annas and eight pice; and I shall take the earliest opportunity of submitting a detailed explanation of the numerous items included in this account. I presume that henceforward I must be guided in my political expenditure entirely by General Nott's view of expediency.

I have only further to report, that within the last fortnight the fortress of Girishk has been attacked by the Baruckzyes, but that Bulwant Sing, the Hindoostanee Killadar, has repulsed the assailants, and is confident of holding his post whilst his ammunition and provisions last. We are altogether without intelligence from Ghuznee, but the post of Kelat-i-Ghilzye is safe, and General Nott has directed the officer commanding to make every preparation for the sustained defence of his position.

I have, &c.,

H. C. RAWLINSON.

P. S.—General Nott has marched out of the town this morning with five and half regiments of infantry, sixteen guns, and about 1000 horse. The Dooranees have advanced to meet him, leaving their heavy baggage in the rear, and it is not unlikely that, either to-day or to-morrow, an action will take place between our troops and the enemy. I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of His Royal Highness Prince Timour, throughout the whole of the trying circumstances in which he has been placed. He has witnessed our reverses at Cabool, he has been addressed by his father in a manner which leads him to believe His Majesty to be inimical to us; his brother has absconded from Candahar, to head the Dooranee rising, and he has been himself repeatedly solicited to make common cause with the insurgents, but he has continued firm to us to the present time, and I see no reason whatever to doubt his real attachment to our interests.

No. 252.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, March 12, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, that during the month

of February, considerable numbers of the rebel forces, under the command of Prince Sufter Jung and other Affghani chiefs, assembled in the vicinity of Candahar, plundering the villages, and by every possible means urging the inhabitants to join in an attack upon the British troops. In the beginning of the present month the enemy approached close to the city of Candahar ; I made the necessary arrangements for the safety of the city, and leaving the garrison of about 2,600 men in it, I, on the 7th instant, moved with the remainder of my force against the enemy ; they retired as I advanced, they were driven first across the Turnuck, and then across the Arghundab. They would not allow the infantry to come in contact with them. On the 9th I got near enough to open our guns upon them with great effect. They were soon broken and fled ; my want of good cavalry saved them from being totally destroyed. They were dispersed in every direction. During a march of five days opposed to 12,000 of the enemy, who had upwards of 6,000 well mounted cavalry, not a camel was taken or a particle of baggage lost. The troops marched without tents, both officers and men, and the conduct of my artillery and infantry was excellent. I think this dispersion of the rebel force will have the best effect, as it will convince the inhabitants that the chiefs cannot face us in the field with any chance of success. I am now doing all in my power to conciliate the villagers, and to induce them to return to the cultivation of their lands, and to live in peace, under the assurance of protection. During my absence a strong detachment of the enemy made an attempt on the city, and succeeded in burning one of the gates, but they were repulsed with great loss by the gallantry of the troops in garrison, under the command of Major Lane, of the 2nd Regiment of Native Infantry, whose report shall be forwarded for the information of Government, by the first opportunity.

I have, &c.,

W. NORT.

No. 253.—*Brigadier England to Mr. Mudlock.*

*Camp, near Quetta, March 22, 1842.*

SIR,—I beg to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, and in continuation of my letter of the 3rd, that I arrived at this place with the troops mentioned in the margin of that communication, on the 16th instant.

2. In advancing through the Bolan Pass, I succeeded in turning the most dangerous part of that defile, by detaching a flanking party to the right of the zig-zag, its extremity in this direction, but there was no appearance of any intention on the part of the people of that region to dispute our progress.

3. The weather below the Passes was soon found to be no criterion as to the temperature above, for the thermometer at 7 in the morning stands in this camp usually at 40°.

4. Nevertheless, the influence of our advance has occurred happily at a moment when the successes of the 9th and 10th at Candahar were producing similar effects in that quarter ; and I cannot but consider, that

owing to these combined causes, the insurrection is now but languidly sustained southward of that city.

5. I apprehend that the second division of troops, which I had allotted to follow me to this place, when withdrawn from Shikarpore and other stations, where their presence had been required by the political agent of Sind and Beloochistan, will not arrive here for ten days from this date, for the disappointments in carriage set aside all accuracy of calculation in military movements in this country; and the uncertainty of the weather is still a serious impediment.

6. I have found little or no aid in camels prepared for me here, but I rely much on the political effect of our arrival, and that our presence will give the people some confidence in bringing to our camp these animals for sale; and as I am led to suppose that the resources of the whole Pisheen Valley will be better secured by a movement in that direction, its climate also being much milder than this, and the very fact of advancing being at all times important, our numbers as usual being much magnified, I propose to make one or two marches in the direction of Killa Abdoolah in a few days, and there await the reinforcement I expect from Dadur.

7. It will then become my duty to consider how I can best aid the garrison of Candahar, in conveying to it the treasure, musket-ammunition, &c. which I have brought thus far for that purpose, and of which it has been often stated to me that they are in need; and I shall not fail to do my utmost to give facility and effect to these desirable measures, though it is evident by Major-General Nott's communication to me of the 14th instant, and from various other letters from Major Rawlinson, that the possibility of their detaching a brigade to receive these supplies at the Kojuck, as I had suggested, is not contemplated; on the other hand, it is clear that I am expected to convey them the whole distance to Candahar.

8. By present circumstances I think it very probable that I may be enabled to accomplish the relief in question by the end of next month, without risk or injury to the tranquillity of Sind or Beloochistan; but I am perfectly impressed with the prudential considerations attached to all parts of this question.

9. It is my intention to maintain a garrison of 1500 men at Quetta, and to improve in some measure the defences of that place.

10. I cannot, however, too much lament the paucity of troops with me, the slender means of carriage, and the especial deficiency, both here and at Candahar, of cavalry, for I should not doubt it somewhat more formidably equipped in these respects, that our supremacy in these countries and to the northward, would be at once placed in a true and rapid progress of re-establishment.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

No. 254—*Brigadier England to Lieutenant-Colonel Powell.*

*Camp, at Koochlack, March 25, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that a body of the insurgent horse,

L. L.

amounting apparently to about 100, having shown themselves this morning on the hills near this camp and in the direction of Hyderzee, I caused them to be attacked by a detachment of Captain Leslie's troop of the horse brigade, supported by a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry.

The officers immediately engaged in this affair, in which Captain Christie, of the 3rd Bengal Cavalry, assisted, report that nothing could exceed the ardour and good conduct of their men.

The enemy left five dead bodies on the field, and we have had two men wounded and one horse killed ; two horses are missing.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

No. 255.—*Major-General England to Major-General Nott.*

*Camp, near Quetta, April 1, 1842.*

SIR,—I wish to acquaint you that the insurgents are so strongly posted and stockaded in a defile which leads from the village of Hykulzye to the plains in this direction, that I am of opinion that it is not to be forced by less than a strong brigade ; and such brigade should be equipped with mortars. I had no information whatever of this defensive arrangement on the part of the insurgents until I was stopped by it, with some loss of men, in my way to the village of Hykulzye, at which place I had intended to wait for my reinforcements, now in progress through the Bolan, and then to proceed to Killa Abdoola with some treasure, &c., for the use of the force under your command. I shall again attempt this operation with a brigade lightly equipped, and without knapsacks, as soon as I hear from you that you are prepared to meet it on the northern side of the Kojuck, and that this aid of treasure is absolutely necessary to you ; but it would in my opinion be most prejudicial to the safety of Quetta, if I remained longer from it than merely to perform this service. I beg to advise that the force you send to meet me at Killa Abdoola should be strong with mortars, if you can spare them, as I have none, for I am credibly informed that the Kojuck is stockaded. It is, however, possible I believe to turn it. I have had no intelligence from Candahar since the 19th.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

No. 256.—*Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, near Quetta, April 2, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that having advanced from hence on the 26th ultimo, with the troops mentioned in the margin\*, I arrived at the entrance of a defile which leads to the village of Hykulzye early on the 28th, at which place I had intended to await the remainder of the brigade now in progress to this place through the Bolan Pass.

\* Four guns, Horse Brigade ; 1 troop 3rd Light Cavalry ; 5 companies Her Majesty's 41st Regiment ; 6 companies Bombay Native Infantry ; 50 Poona Horse.

2. From the total impossibility which now evidently prevails in obtaining any sort of information of the enemy, and from the stern silence observed on such subjects by even those whose interest seems to depend on our success, I had no reason whatever to suppose that the people visible on these hills near Hykulzye were more than an assemblage of the scouts and marauders which are thus placed on all parts of this country wherever our troops traverse it ; and the principal men of the village of Hyderzie, which is but six miles from the defile in question, and who received us on the preceding day with the greatest apparent cordiality, carefully kept from our knowledge though much questioned on the subject, that Mahomed Sadig, the insurgent chief south of Candahar, was strongly posted in the pass above-mentioned and contiguous heights, for the express purpose of opposing our progress.

3. It became evident as we approached, that there was some preparation made for resistance by the insurgents on the commanding ground which flanked our line of march at this point ; and, after a rapid reconnaissance, I proceeded to attack the principal hill by four light companies, including that of Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, supporting the attack by the remainder of the wing of that corps, under cover of the four guns of Captain Leslie's Horse Artillery ; the remainder of the troops being duly distributed for the protection of the baggage.

4. The enemy kept his strength concealed behind a succession of breastworks improved by a ditch and abattis, until our advance reached the crest of his exterior defence, when a crowded body suddenly sprung up, and made the contest so unequal, that it was immediately evident it could not be advantageously maintained.

5. The light companies fell back, therefore, on the small supporting column of Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, which, on the appearance of the enemy's cavalry, which now rushed out from behind the hills, formed square, and gallantly resisted the efforts which were made to penetrate and break it ; the matchlock men of the enemy still keeping up a sharp and destructive fire from the heights.

6. To persevere in a second attack on the now developed strength of the enemy, with the small numbers I had disposable for such an operation, I deemed to be unwarrantable ; and I therefore determined to move by my right to the ruined village of Bazar, three miles to north-east, in which direction the baggage was first ordered to proceed, and the troops followed across the plain in echelon of squares, the artillery protecting by alternate guns, and the whole covered by as good a display of cavalry as we had at command. ●

7. The steady manner in which this movement was made, prevented any close molestation from the enemy ; neither did they make any attack on us during the night.

8. I here discovered that 400 men, principally cavalry, had joined the insurgents' forces, from Candahar, the day before my arrival, and that, with a view to resist us, Mahomed Sadig had collected also at this point, from Shoranent and Shawl, 500 men, and the Mirza, a Kakur chief, with 100 of that tribe, also formed part of his force ; the rest of the enemy's strength was made up by the Atchukzye horse, formerly in our service, by armed villagers of the neighbourhood, making an estimated total of at

least 1,500 or 2,000 men. Many officers, however, consider it to have been much greater.

9. I moreover discovered that the defences within which the enemy fought, had been works of two months' preparation, and I have seldom seen better cavalry than those, which, for *the first time*, displayed themselves, when the light companies fell back on Her Majesty's 41st, at which moment several of the enemy were bayoneted in their attack on the square of that half battalion.

10. On the morning of the 29th, it was perceptible that the insurgents had been collecting further reinforcements of armed villagers during the night, and that arrangements were making by them on an increased scale to resist any renewed assault on our part; and it being evident that the object of my remaining in the Pisheen Valley was negatived, whilst its resources and communications were thus in the hands of an enemy much stronger than myself, and that the latter could not be dislodged from the important heights he occupied without incurring severe additional losses, I felt I should best serve the views and interests of Government by falling back to my position at this place until reinforced; and I am happy to say that this difficult operation has been accomplished, although encumbered with a train of 1,500 baggage animals and camels, and four and a half lacs of treasure, and many wounded men, notwithstanding the constant presence of the enemy, without hurry, and without incurring the loss of any baggage or article of public property beyond such as might reasonable happen in any ordinary march in India.

11. In passing near some strong ground yesterday near Koochilach, a company of Her Majesty's 41st Regiment ascended a steep hill on our left, and killed sixteen of a party of the enemy, from whom our column was receiving some annoyance in its progress many others being wounded.

12. Having now detailed the circumstances belonging to the military events in this vicinity for the last few days, I solicit the favour of bringing to the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, the good conduct of the troops generally, and the gallantry of Her Majesty's 41st in particular, under Major Browne. I had every reason to be also satisfied with the good practice of Captain Leslie's efficient battery and Major Apthorp, of the 20th Bombay Native infantry (severely wounded, and since dead), led the light companies to the attack in the best possible style.

13. I have received from Major Wyllie, Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Boyd, Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Captain Davidson, Deputy Commissary-General, and the rest of the officers of the staff, very valuable and zealous assistance.

14. I beg to inclose a return of killed and wounded, as well as a copy of a letter which has this day been addressed to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Stacy, of the 43rd Bengal Native Infantry, who has been a volunteer with this force during its recent operations, and I quite concur in the sentiments expressed in the 6th paragraph of the Lieutenant-Colonel's communication.

15. I further beg leave to submit, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, a copy of a letter which I have this day addressed to General Nott.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

*Sinde Field Force.—Return of Casualties in Action with the Enemy, near Hykulzye, on the 28th March, 1842.*

*Head-Quarters, Camp near Koochlach, March 30, 1842.*

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment of Foot—1 captain, 2 serjeants, 1 corporal, 14 privates, killed; 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 50 privates, wounded.

Light Company 6th Regiment N. I.—1 sepoy, killed; 3 sepoys, wounded.

Light Company 20th Regiment N. I.—5 sepoys, killed; 1 major, 2 naicks, 7 sepoys, wounded.

Light Company 25th Regiment N. I.—1 naick, 2 sepoys, killed; 6 sepoys, wounded.

Total—1 captain, 2 serjeants, 2 corporals or naicks, 22 privates or sepoys, killed; 1 major, 1 serjeant, 3 corporals or naicks, 63 privates or sepoys, wounded.

Grand Total—27 killed; 71 wounded.

*Names of Officers killed or wounded.*

Captain W. May, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, killed.

Major Apthorp, 20th Native Infantry, commanding Light Battalion, wounded, severely and dangerously, since dead.

*Remarks.*

Wounded—13 privates, dangerously; 1 serjeant, 3 corporals, 20 privates, severely; 33 privates slightly.

W. WYLLIE.

No. 257.—*Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Stacy to Major-General England.*

*Quetta, March 31, 1842.*

I have said the affair of the 28th, however distressing, has not been unproductive of good; it has shewn us, besides other facts, that our intelligence is next to nothing, our information so imperfect, that the existence of the entrenched position, which it appears the enemy had been engaged on the last two months, was utterly unknown to us, nor should we, I believe, have learnt that similar works have been prepared in the Kojuck, but for an advance on Hykulzye. Let it be observed, that our ignorance of the existence of this entrenchment, and the time necessarily taken to prepare it, prove, no less, our want of common information beyond our piquets, than the astonishing unanimity which is leagued against us.

No. 258.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Benares, April 22, No. 4, 1842.*

(Extract.)—I have the honor to transmit to you copies of the several letters addressed by me from this city, to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the instructions I have deemed it right to send to Major-General Nott.



These several documents will place you fully in possession of the views I entertained at the period at which those letters were written.

Yesterday I received the dispatch containing the gratifying account of Sir Robert Sale's victory at Jellalabad, and other dispatches conveying the intelligence of Brigadier England's having regained his position at Quetta without further loss, and of his having been joined there by the remainder of his brigade.

These several events although they improve our prospects to some extent, have in no respect altered my deliberate opinion, that it is expedient to withdraw the troops under Major-General Pollock, and those under Major-General Nott, at the earliest practicable period, into positions wherein they may have certain and easy communication with India.

That opinion is found upon a general view of our military, political, and financial situation, and is not liable to be lightly changed. I shall do all in my power, to make manifest the high estimation in which I hold the conduct of Major-General Sir Robert Sale and the garrison of Jellalabad. I transmit, herewith, a copy of the Notification I have prefixed to the Gazette, and shall consider in what further manner I may confer honor upon that distinguished officer, and his gallant brothers in arms.

No. 259.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.*

*Benares, April 19, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General to instruct you to take immediate measures for drawing off the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye. You will effectually destroy all such guns as you cannot conveniently bring away. You will destroy the fort likewise, unless, at the time at which the operation shall be effected, which is hereinbefore enjoined, Prince Timour, having remained faithful to British interests, shall possess a sufficient force to be reasonably expected to be able to maintain that fort, upon your giving it into his charge.

2. You will evacuate the city of Candahar, giving that too into the charge of Prince Timour under the circumstances above-mentioned : you will otherwise ruin its defences before you evacuate it.

3. You will then proceed to take up a position at Quetta, until the season may enable you to retire upon Sukkur.

4. The object of the above-directed measures is, to withdraw all our forces to Sukkur at the earliest period at which the season and other circumstances may permit you to take up a new position there. The manner of effecting this, now necessary, object is however left to your discretion.

5. You will understand that, in the event of Prince Timour having continued faithful, it is the desire of the Governor-General to afford him the means of preserving, by his own native troops, or any other troops in his pay, the city of Candahar, and the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzye ; but no British guns must be left which you can carry away ; and no British officer must remain in his service, retaining his commission in the British army.

I have, &c.,

T. II. MADDOCK.

No. 260.—*The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

Benares, April 19, 1842.

GENERAL,—The fall of the citadel of Ghuznee had removed the principal object for which it was expedient to retain the force under Major-General Nott, in its advanced position at Candahar.

2. The severe check experienced by Brigadier England's small corps on the 28th ultimo,—an event disastrous as it was unexpected,—and of which we have not yet information to enable us to calculate all the results,—has a tendency so to cripple the before limited means of movement and of action which were possessed by Major-General Nott, as to render it expedient to take immediate measures for the ultimate safety of that officer's corps, by withdrawing it, at the earliest practicable period, from its advanced position, into nearer communication with India.

3. Under this impression, I have thought it right to transmit the enclosed instructions to Major-General Nott.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 261.—*The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

Benares, April 19, 1842.

GENERAL,—The intelligence just received of the successful entrance of Major-General Pollock into the Khyber Pass, supported by a large body of Sikh troops, and the more recent accounts from Jellalabad, seem to justify the expectation that, by this day, the junction of Major-General Pollock with Major-General Sir Robert Sale will have been effected, and their combined force be in sufficient strength, either to retain possession of the country near the Jellalabad during the hot season, or to return without material loss to the vicinity of Peshawur.

2. The retention of the combined force in the vicinity of Jellalabad, during the hot months, may be more conducive to the health of the troops than a retrograde march through the Khyber Pass, and might have some material influence upon any negotiation which might be instituted for an exchange of prisoners.

3. On the other hand, it is obvious that the position of Major-General Pollock's force at one end of a long and difficult pass, with an enemy in its front, and an ally, not to be entirely depended upon, in its rear, is not one in which, having regard to military considerations alone, a general would readily place himself.

4. It has been already intimated to your Excellency, in the letter from the Governor-General in Council of the 15th March, that, in the opinion of the Government, military considerations alone should hereafter direct the movements of the British armies in Afghanistan.

5. The only question, therefore, will be, in which position will Major General Pollock's force remain during the hot months with most security to itself, and with the least pressure upon the health of the troops, its ultimate retirement within the Indus being a point determined upon,

because the reasons for our first crossing the Indus have ceased to exist.

6. Your Excellency is so much nearer the scene of action in Upper Afghanistan than I am, or can soon be ; and you are, moreover, otherwise so much more qualified to form a correct opinion upon this subject than I am, that I feel I do best by leaving it in your Excellency's hands, and by requesting you to issue any instructions beyond those he already has, which your Excellency may think necessary for the guidance of Major-General Pollock.

7. I have forwarded to the Major-General a copy of this letter.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 262.—*The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Benares, April 19, 1842.*

GENERAL,—In my letters of this day's date, I have communicated to your Excellency the instructions I have deemed it right to send at once to Major-General Nott, and have requested your Excellency to send the further instructions which you may deem necessary to Major-General Pollock.

2. The object of the instructions which will thus be given to those officers is to bring their respective corps into easy and certain communication with India.

3. What ulterior destination may be given to those corps, when that of Major-General Nott, having drawn off the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, shall be concentrated ultimately in the vicinity of Sukkur, and that of Major-General Pollock, having drawn off the garrison of Jellalabad, shall be again on this side of the Khyber Pass, is a matter of the most serious consideration, and one upon which I am most anxious to have the opportunity of conferring personally with your Excellency, or with some officer in your confidence, whom you may depute to me for that purpose.

4. If new aggressive movements upon Afghanistan should be deemed to be necessary, it will be for our consideration, whether it may not be possible to select a new line of operations leading directly upon Ghuznee, which may enable us to concentrate our forces, and to hold them in more immediate and secure communication with India.

5. It will, however, likewise be for consideration, whether our troops, having been redeemed from the state of peril in which they have been placed in Afghanistan, and, it may still be hoped, not without the infliction of some severe blow upon the Afghan army, it would be justifiable again to push them for no other object than that of revenging our losses, and of re-establishing, in all its original brilliancy, our military character.

6. Whatever may be the course upon which we may ultimately decide, it will be my anxious desire to carry with us the Sikh Government : the cordial aid of that Government will still be required, should we determine upon the adoption of a new central line of operations ; and its cordial concurrence will likewise be required to enable us to terminate with

propriety and dignity the military measures in which we have been involved by the Tripartite Treaty.

7. With a view to secure the tranquillity of India, while so large a portion of our force is beyond the Indus, it appears to me that it would be advisable to form, at the earliest period, an army of reserve, of at least 15,000 men of all arms, perfectly equipped for immediate service, in such a position as may make it at once an apparent support to the corps in advance, and an object of apprehension to all who may entertain designs of hostility against the British Government.

8. It is impossible to doubt that, upon the first intelligence of the disasters experienced in Cabool, the Home Authorities will have taken measures for largely reinforcing us with British troops.

9. I shall not fail to impress upon them the expediency of largely increasing the proportion which British troops have of late years borne to the total numbers of the army in India, and of adopting other measures for increasing the efficiency of the native portion of our force.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 263.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Allahabad, No. 10, May 17, 1842.*

HONOURABLE SIRS,—Major-General Pollock prosecuted his march upon Jellalabad, without further opposition than that he had encountered in the Khyber Pass, and arrived there on the 16th ultimo.

On the 20th, the Major-General detached a force to meet Colonel Bolton's brigade, which had reached Peshawur on the 21st; and the two formed their junction, and marched together to Jellalabad, without encountering an enemy.

At Jellalabad, the united force was on half rations. Grain was coming in, and by the last accounts more rapidly; but the force had no sufficient means of movement, and seemed to be unable to procure any; otherwise, the discouragement was such amongst the enemy, and the confusion such, consequent upon the decease of Shah Shooja, that the march of the force upon Cabool, had it been equipped with the means of movement, and well supplied, would have been at the moment a march probably unopposed.

Apprehending that negotiations would be opened for the release of the prisoners now in the hands of the Affghans, I had, on the 25th of April, informed Major-General Pollock that the British Government would not ransom prisoners; but that if all our prisoners were surrendered, we would surrender all without any reservation; but that if a partial exchange only were agreed upon, Dost Mahomed could not be given up.

As soon as I had reason to believe that Shah Shooja was actually dead, I addressed a letter to Major-General Pollock, dated the 28th of April, informing him that, in the present divided state of Affghanistan, the British Government could not prudently recognize any successor to the throne, although it was desirous of seeing established in Affghanistan a national Government, approved by the people, with which it could maintain relations of amity. I likewise informed Major-General Pollock that

because the reasons for our first crossing the Indus have ceased to exist.

6. Your Excellency is so much nearer the scene of action in Upper Affghanistan than I am, or can soon be ; and you are, moreover, otherwise so much more qualified to form a correct opinion upon this subject than I am, that I feel I do best by leaving it in your Excellency's hands, and by requesting you to issue any instructions beyond those he already has, which your Excellency may think necessary for the guidance of Major-General Pollock.

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4. If new aggressive movements upon Affghanistan should be deemed to be necessary, it will be for our consideration, whether it may not be possible to select a new line of operations leading directly upon Ghuznee, which may enable us to concentrate our forces, and to hold them in more immediate and secure communication with India.

5. It will, however, likewise be for consideration, whether our troops, having been redeemed from the state of peril in which they have been placed in Affghanistan, and, it may still be hoped, not without the infliction of some severe blow upon the Affghan army, it would be justifiable again to push them for no other object than that of revenging our losses, and of re-establishing, in all its original brilliancy, our military character.

6. Whatever may be the course upon which we may ultimately decide, it will be my anxious desire to carry with us the Sikh Government : the cordial aid of that Government will still be required, should we determine upon the adoption of a new central line of operations ; and its cordial concurrence will likewise be required to enable us to terminate with

propriety and dignity the military measures in which we have been involved by the Tripartite Treaty.

7. With a view to secure the tranquillity of India, while so large a portion of our force is beyond the Indus, it appears to me that it would be advisable to form, at the earliest period, an army of reserve, of at least 15,000 men of all arms, perfectly equipped for immediate service, in such a position as may make it at once an apparent support to the corps in advance, and an object of apprehension to all who may entertain designs of hostility against the British Government.

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9. I shall not fail to impress upon them the expediency of largely increasing the proportion which British troops have of late years borne to the total numbers of the army in India, and of adopting other measures for increasing the efficiency of the native portion of our force.

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Apprehending that negotiations would be opened for the release of the prisoners now in the hands of the Affghans, I had, on the 25th of April, informed Major-General Pollock that the British Government would not ransom prisoners; but that if all our prisoners were surrendered, we would surrender all without any reservation: but that if a partial exchange only were agreed upon, Dost Mahomed could not be given up.

As soon as I had reason to believe that Shah Shooja was actually dead, I addressed a letter to Major-General Pollock, dated the 28th of April, informing him that, in the present divided state of Affghanistan, the British Government could not prudently recognize any successor to the throne, although it was desirous of seeing established in Affghanistan a national Government, approved by the people, with which it could maintain relations of amity. I likewise informed Major-General Pollock that

he might negotiate for an exchange of prisoners, with a *de facto* Government.

Your Committee is already aware that, on the 19th ultimo, I requested the Commander-in-Chief to give any further instructions his Excellency might deem necessary to Major-General Pollock. In the first instance, his Excellency informed me, by a letter dated the 27th of April, that he had not ventured to give any such instructions. Upon the receipt of this letter, I addressed to Major-General Pollock, on the 4th of May, a letter wherein I informed him, that neither his advance through the Khyber, nor the victory of Sir Robert Sale, nor the death of Shah Shooja, had varied my views. On the contrary, those events appeared to render his retirement more easy than it would have been, had important political considerations appeared to require other and ulterior operations. I expressed an opinion that his deficient means of movement and provision would have already induced him to withdraw within the Khyber Pass. I reminded the Major-General that no great object could be accomplished by an army deficient in the means of movement and supply : and I added, that I could experience no higher gratification than that of hearing that, the health of his army having been preserved, it was in a secure position, having certain communication with India.

On the 29th of April, the Commander-in-Chief did address orders to Major-General Pollock, directing him to retire at once, and only allowing him, under certain and specified circumstances, to delay that movement.

Upon the receipt of this communication I, on the 6th of May, expressed my entire approval of it, but again cautioned the Major-General not to endanger the health of his troops, which I feared might be seriously affected by the march across the Punjab at this season, directed by the Commander-in-Chief.

Anticipating the possibility that Major-General Pollock might have advanced upon Cabool, after relieving Jellalabad, I have already, on the 28th of April, informed him that that event would in no respect vary the view I previously took of the policy to be pursued ; and that I adhered to the opinion that the only safe course was that of withdrawing the army under his command, at the earliest practicable period, into positions within the Khyber Pass, where it might possess easy and certain communication with India.

I authorised the Major-General to place the Sikhs in possession of Jellalabad, if he should receive instructions to that effect from Mr. Clerk. I had understood that the Sikhs were desirous of possessing that place, with a view to the protection of the territories on the left bank of the Cabool river, which they coveted for themselves, and which, under present circumstances, I see no reason for withholding from them : on the contrary, I considered that if the Jummoo Rajahs could be induced to give up their schemes of conquests beyond the Himalaya, and be content to extend themselves in the territory on the left bank of the Cabool river, our interests would be promoted.

The unfortunate repulse of Major-General England in the Pesheen valley had not the fatal consequences I was led to anticipate, when the last overland mail was dispatched. He was enabled to retreat upon Quetta, on the 1st of April, without further loss ; and he was soon after joined there by the remaining portion of his force, which effected its

passage through the Bolan Pass without any difficulty. He had then 3,600 men at Quetta, and began to fortify his position.

I instructed Major-General Nott to withdraw the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and to retire to Quetta on his route to Sukkur, under the impression that Brigadier England's force might almost be considered as lost, and that the brigade advancing through the Bolan Pass would be seriously opposed : the more favourable state of things has not induced me to vary the order given for his retirement, which the season will not permit him to carry into effect before October.

Major-General Nott has directed Brigadier England to move on the Kojuck Pass with 2,500 : and he was to send a brigade to meet him. I apprehend, that about the 10th of this month, Brigadier England's force of 2,500 men, together with the force sent to meet him, having passed the Kojuck, will have reached Candahar.

Major-General Nott will then have under his orders above the passes a force of more than 13,000 men. He will be enabled to feed that force ; but not, I apprehend, to provide any considerable means of movement ; and his communications across the Kojuck Pass, and through the Bolan Pass, will be uncertain. In fact, military communication there is none between Candahar and the foot of the pass, for that cannot be called military communication upon which an army can depend, which can only be opened from time to time by the movement of strong bodies of troops.

Under these circumstances, I adhere to the orders already given to Major-General Nott to withdraw the garrison from Kelat-i-Ghilzye and retire upon Sukkur.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 264.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Allahabad, No. 14, May 17, 1842.*

(Extract.)—In continuation of my despatch of the 23rd ultimo, No. 3, I have now the honor of reporting such further particulars relative to the operations to the westward of the Indus, and of affairs in Affghanistan generally as are not contained in my separate despatch of this date, No. 10.

2. In my letter above referred to, I informed your Honorable Committee that Major-General Pollock's force had reached Dhaka, and that no further serious opposition to its advance to Jellalabad was apprehended. On the 10th of April, the Major-General reached Gurdee with part of his force, the narrowness of the pass, and necessary care of the baggage, rendering it impracticable for the whole to move in one body. On his arrival at Gurdee he met with some slight opposition from Saadat Khan, the opponent of Toorabaz Khan, of Lalpoora, a chief who has steadfastly adhered to British interests, and rendered important service by conveying money to the garrison of Jellalabad at the time of its greatest exigency. The Major-General had made arrangements for attacking the fort, but Saadat Khan fled, without awaiting the attack, and Toorabaz Khan was re-established in his principality of Lalpoora, and the General prepared for moving forward next day towards Jellalabad.



3. On the 16th of April, Major-General Pollock reported his arrival at Jellalabad, and expressed his gratification at finding the garrison in so healthy a state, and observed that he had been much struck by the strength of the works which had been erected by the indefatigable exertions of the garrison.

4. I forward as a number in the packet, copy of a Notification which I caused to be published, on the receipt of Major-General Pollock's letter, announcing his arrival at Jellalabad. I have addressed a separate letter to the Honorable the Court of Directors, dated 30th ultimo, on the subject of the honorary rewards and distinctions proposed to be conferred on the officers and men who composed the garrison of Jellalabad, and were present under Sir Robert Sale, at the action of the 7th April.

5. I have authorized Major-General Pollock to entertain an office establishment, at an expense of 475 rupees per mensem.

6. Major-General Pollock, in his letter, dated 18th ultimo, forwarded a copy of Captain Mackeson's report of the negotiations which had for a considerable time been going on with the Maliks of the Khyber, and which appeared to have ceased the day before the pass was forced; but after this success, the Maliks again made their appearance, with friendly professions. The Major-General remarked on the little dependence to be placed on any agreement with the Khyber Maliks for keeping open the pass, as any reverse on our side, or even the whim or caprice of a chief, might close it in twenty-four hours, if we had no other security but their forbearance to rely upon.

7. The Sikhs at the time held the pass as far as Ali Musjid, which was occupied by irregulars in our service. According to the agreement made with Rajah Golab Sing, the Sikhs were to hold the pass as far as Ali Musjid, until the 5th of June; and the General adverted to the hazard of its falling into the hands of the enemy, if troops be not then sent to occupy it, and observed, that if that garrison were the only post in the pass to be occupied by our troops, they would be unwilling to remain, without frequent reliefs, in so isolated a position, surrounded by an enemy; but he considered its occupation by our own troops to be absolutely necessary, if we are to depend on it in the time of need, and pointed out the great importance of its possession to a retreating army.

8. Mr. Clerk's dispatch of the 27th ultimo contains copies of further correspondence, on the subject of retaining a garrison of British troops in Ali Musjid.

9. Major-General brought to my notice the inefficiency of the arrangement for the movement of an army, occasioned by the existing mode of engaging camels, and the fact of no grass-cutters having been sent with Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons.

10. I have caused a letter to be made to the Commander-in-Chief, on the circumstance of Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons having been sent on foreign service without grass-cutters to procure forage for the horses; and I have directed Major-General Pollock to purchase such number of camels as he may deem necessary for the service of his army, and recommended that the drivers of such camels should be regularly enlisted into the service of Government, so that they might be retained in the performance of the duty they engage to execute by martial law; and if he should deem it expedient to form a corps of camel drivers under

European officers, I have authorised him so to do; and in short, to adopt any measure which might seem to him to be best calculated to ensure, for the use of the army under his command, the services of a sufficient number of carriage-cattle.

11. From a subsequent communication, it appears that partial arrangements had been made for supplying the horses of the 3rd Dragoons with forage, but General Pollock expressed his anxiety to have grass-cutters from the provinces, as he would, in that case, be more at ease as to the efficiency of the 3rd Dragoons; who, when an advance should be made, would probably have to play a conspicuous part, though at that time he believed that there was not a soul to oppose them between Jellalabad and Cabool.

12. In his dispatch of the 29th, Major-General Pollock recommended several measures for supplying the requisite means of carriage for his army, in the event of his advancing on Cabool. But, as your Honorable Committee will perceive, his recommendations on this important subject had been anticipated by the full power with which I invested him in my dispatch of the 4th instant.

13. In his letter of the 24th ultimo, Major-General Pollock submitted a copy of a letter which he had addressed to Mr. Clerk, pointing out the injurious tendency of the Sikh troops advancing to Dhaka and then withdrawing at the expiration of two months; and in Mr. Clerk's dispatch of the 30th ultimo, will be found copy of the reply which he addressed to the Major-General on the subject.

14. I referred General Pollock to the letter addressed to him by Mr. Clerk, informing him that on the 23rd of April, he had cautioned Captain Lawrence against the advance of Sikh troops to Jellalabad, and that in communicating with the Sikh Government, he had provided that none should advance without the Major-General's permission.

15. I concluded therefore that Captain Lawrence being thus instructed and informed by Mr. Clerk, would, on General Pollock's representation, so arrange, that no movement in advance by the Sikhs would take place without his approval.

16. I at the same time caused it to be intimated to Major-General Pollock that I was apprehensive that it would be found productive of much embarrassment, if the army under his command, and that of the Sikhs, were in force upon the same road, and suggested that it might be desirable, in the event of any Sikh troops having advanced through the pass, to endeavour to induce the Sikh generals to cross the Cabool river, if fordable, and to take up their quarters altogether on the left bank.

17. I forward copies of Mr. Clerk's dispatches respecting the co-operation of the Sikhs, and the best means of keeping open the Khyber Pass.

18. On the 3rd instant I referred Mr. Clerk to the notification which I had prefixed to General Pollock's despatch, announcing the passage of the Khyber, published on the 19th ultimo, and which I conclude he had communicated to Maharajah Shere Sing, as containing my recognition of the good service performed by the Sikh troops in the Khyber, and intimating my intention of congratulating the Maharajah. This intimation was deemed sufficient to enable Mr. Clerk to communicate my sentiments to His Highness.

19. In the event of his not having done so, I desired that he would make that communication through the minister, Rajah Dhyān Sing, and be careful to inform him that I had publicly expressed my sense of the good service rendered by the Sikh troops, and of the military distinction acquired by them immediately on receipt of Major-General Pollock's despatch, conveying an account of the operations in the Khyber Pass.

20. Anticipating that the Sikh Government may prefer some claim to pecuniary compensation, in consequence of the charge incurred in sending troops to the support of Major-General Pollock's movement through the Khyber Pass, I have called on Mr. Clerk for a report on the pecuniary transactions, as they now stand, between the two States, with reference especially to the obligations of the 15th Article of the Tripartite Treaty; and I have stated my opinion, that all sums actually received by the British Government from the Amcēers of Sind, under the 16th Article of that treaty, on account of the Lahore State, could only be considered as being held in deposit for the Maharajah; and I desired to be informed how the account of receipts and payments under that head now stands.

21. It will be seen from the demi-official letters inclosed in Mr. Clerk's despatch of the 4th instant, that the prospect of obtaining grain at Jellalabad has much improved. By the same, it appears that Colonel Bolton's detachment had, on the 28th April, met Colonel Monteath's Brigade at Lundikhana.

22. Your Honorable Committee will find copies of a correspondence which had passed between Shah Shooja and Captain Macgregor, on which it would be needless to offer any remark.

23. On the 13th April, General Pollock reported that a rumour obtained in that quarter, that Shah Shooja had been murdered. On the 15th idem, Mr. Clerk forwarded a translation of letters of intelligence, describing the particulars of that atrocity. From these accounts it appears that His Majesty was suspected of a favorable disposition towards the English; and having, when charged with it, fully avowed the fact, he was inveigled out of the Bala Hissar, when he was fired at by four Barukzyes, employed by a son of Mahomed Zeman Khan, who, finding the Shah still alive, went up to him, and dispatched him dead with a pistol.

24. Subsequent information has confirmed the report of the Shah's murder, and the elevation to the throne of Prince Futteh Jung, who has opened a communication with Major-General Pollock, and professes a strong inclination to co-operate with our Government. For particulars of the state of parties and affairs at Cabool, I beg to refer your Honorable Committee to the letters from Mohun Lall to Captain Macgregor, inclosed in General Pollock's dispatch of the 30th ultimo.

25. Prince Timour, the eldest son of Shah Shooja, was in Candahar when his father the Shah was killed; but I am not informed whether he has taken measures consequent upon that event.

26. It will be seen from the letter to Major-General Pollock, reported in my separate letter of this date, No. 10, that I have instructed him not to commit his Government to the recognition of any of the competitors to the throne of Cabool.

27. On the 24th ultimo, Major-General Pollock forwarded authentic copies of the several letters addressed in December and January last, by

Captain Lawrence and Major Pottinger to Captain Macgregor, with reference to the Treaty entered into at Cabool, for securing the retreat of the army, to that retreat, and to the subsequent disaster. I directed copies of these documents to be sent to the President in Council, with a request that they, as well as all other documents relating to the conduct of the military and political authorities at Cabool, during the last three months of 1841 and in January 1842, might be placed in the hands of some perfectly impartial person, for the purpose of separating as far as possible, such documentary evidence as they contain, relating to the military officers, from such as relates to the political agents, and submitting a report, upon which may be founded any charges to be preferred against the former, before a court-martial, and against the latter, to a court of inquiry, in pursuance of the determination contained in the notification of the 4th April, which accompanied the dispatch announcing the surrender of Ghuznee.

28. Considering Mr. Cameron, the law commissioner, to be best qualified for this office, I have suggested that he be requested to undertake it, and the memorandum found among Major-General Elphinstone's papers inclosed in General Pollock's dispatch of the 30th ultimo, as well as all other documents bearing on the subject, will be sent to the Presidency for the purpose of being analyzed as above indicated.

29. The best means of effecting the liberation of the prisoners now in the hands of the Affghans, has occupied my anxious consideration, and I beg to refer you to the letter I caused to be addressed to General Pollock, on the 25th ultimo, for a full exposition of my views on that subject.

30. On the 4th instant, Mr. Clerk forwarded copies of demi-official letters from General Pollock and Sir R. Shakespear of the 26th April. From these it appears that Captain Colin Mackenzie, one of the prisoners had arrived at Jellalabad, on his parole, on the evening of the 25th, with proposals from Mahomed Akbar Khan, relative to the release of the prisoners. In consequence, I apprehend of the miscarriage of another letter from the Major-General, I am still uninformed of the precise nature of these proposals, though one of them would appear to have been a demand for the release of Dost Mahomed Khan. It is stated that Major-General Elphinstone died on the 23rd, and that his body was to be sent into camp by order of Mahomed Akbar Khan.

31. In a dispatch dated 30th ultimo, Major-General Pollock submitted copy of a letter to his address from Major Pottinger, dated "Castle of Afzul Khan, Tezeen," 26th April, stating that Mahomed Akbar had the preceding day sent to Jellalabad the body of the late Major-General Elphinstone, that it was intercepted by a party of Ghilzyes under the supposition that the prince in Cabool had sent it, when the party conveying it, were made prisoners, and the European servant who accompanied it, was wounded. The Sirdar is said to have been much grieved at this occurrence, and had dispatched a party with private Moore, the General's servant, to convey the corpse to Jellalabad, where it arrived on the 30th ultimo.

32. On the 28th April, General Pollock reported that Captain Mackenzie would that evening return with his reply to the message received from Major Pottinger.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 265.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India in Council.*

*Simla, March 27, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I have the honor to transmit for your Lordship's decision thereon, a letter addressed to the Secretary to Government, in the political department, by Major-General Pollock, soliciting authority to increase the irregular levy, now in pay at Peshawur, from 400 infantry, its present strength, to 800, leaving the mounted portion of the levy 120 men, as it hitherto has been, under the political agent.

2. There are several good reasons given by the Major-General for this increased expenditure, but I have always understood that General Avitabile's new fort was to afford the required protection for baggage and stores left behind. If such shelter cannot be afforded, or is insufficient, it is certainly better to increase the levy, than to leave a large detachment behind when every man is, or may be, so much required.

3. Captain Mackeson proposes that the garrison of Ali Musjid should be exclusive of this corps; perhaps it is thereby meant that they may be again placed in that fort, as General Pollock proceeds towards Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 266.—*Mr. Maddock to General Sir J. Nicolls.*

*Fort William, April 8, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour, by direction of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 27th ultimo, and in reply, to inform your Excellency, that the sanction of Government to the proposed measure of increasing the irregular levy now in pay at Peshawur, has been communicated to Major-General Pollock.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 267.—*Mr. Maddock, to Mr. Clerk.*

*Allahabad, April 24, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, and of its several inclosures.

2. The Governor-General is of opinion, that the advance of the infantry of the 1st Reserve Brigade, and of the whole of the 2nd Reserve Brigade, which last, it appears, may be expected to reach Peshawur by the 28th instant, will, after his recent successes, and especially after the victory of Major-General Sir Robert Sale of the 7th instant, place Major-General Pollock in a position of strength, which will enable him to hold the Khyber Pass, even though the whole Sikh army should retire from it.

3. To hold the Khyber Pass, however, with a British force of more than 10,000 men, including that under Sir Robert Sale, with the feeling that any material diminution of that force would embarrass the communications of the army, can never be an object of rational policy, unless

some most essential objects were to be obtained beyond the pass by so holding it, and the communication between the pass and the Sutlej could at all times be certainly maintained, without dependence upon the continued friendship of a foreign State, or any material cost or difficulty.

4. But these latter considerations are altogether unattainable; and to hold the pass without having an army in the field beyond the pass, would be wholly unproductive of commensurate advantage, even if it could be certainly, easily, and cheaply effected.

5. To regain concentrated positions for our armies, having easy and secure communications with India, is the present object of the Government, and one not lightly to be changed.

6. The Governor-General, while he frankly acknowledges the valuable aid, which, on the recent occasion, the British troops derived from those of the Maharajah in the attack on the Khyber Pass, cannot but feel that a British army places itself in a false position when it depends upon any force but its own, for the security of its communications; and he will not, willingly, continue a state of things which is neither free from danger, nor consistent with the honor of the British arms.

7. The Governor-General has attentively considered the suggestion contained in your letter of the 14th instant relative to the giving over to the Sikhs of the fort of Jellalabad. His lordship entertains great doubt whether the Sikh Government, or the Jumnoo Rajahs, could be induced to accept the custody of that place. To occupy it, would apparently place them in a false position. Nevertheless, if it should be agreeable to the Sikhs to receive that place into their hands, the Governor-General sees no objection to your opening a communication with them upon the subject. All that the Governor-General regards is the security of our communication with the troops, beyond the Upper Indus, and their withdrawal, at the earliest practicable period, from their advanced positions, in a state of continued efficiency, undiminished by the climate, or by the enemy.

8. The first political object is the conservation of military strength, by which all political objects may be attained, and without which, none.

I have, &c.,

T. IL. MADDOCK.

No. 368.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Gurdee, near Lalpoora, April 13, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, that I arrived here on the 10th instant, with a part of the force under my command, as per margin\*. The remainder, under General McCaskill, was one march behind, in consequence of the impracticability of moving so much baggage through so narrow a pass at one time. On my arrival at the ground, I

\* One troop Horse-artillery—two Six-pounders, one Nine-pounder, and two Mountain Trains—Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons—the Irregular Horse—Her Majesty's 9th Foot—the 6th, 33rd, and 60th Regiments of Native Infantry—Capt. Ferris's Jezailchees.

found the men of Lalpoorah under Saadat Khan were firing upon our people. I fired a few shells during the day at bodies of men near the banks of the river; intelligence was received during the afternoon that Saadat Khan intended quitting the fort and town during the night, but at night it was understood that he would not go unless forced, which I accordingly intended should be effected without delay, and for this purpose, and to prevent the risk of a failure I ordered a strong party as below\*, under the command of Colonel Taylor, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, to move yesterday morning at 4 A.M. I also moved out three guns to the front of the Camp to divert the attention of the enemy, when the columns should advance, and the rear detachment mentioned in the margin was directed to remain on this side of the river at the ford, about six miles from our camp. About half-past 7 A.M., I saw a party of the enemy proceeding towards the ford. Saadat Khan was supposed to be with this party; but, when they saw the strength of the force sent against them, the Chief returned with his horsemen, and I saw them move off, after which not a shot was fired, and in a short time a messenger from the opposite bank of the river came to report that the whole of the enemy had absconded.

The ford was extremely difficult; and, I regret to say, that two men of the 3rd Light Dragoons were drowned. The troops are now re-crossing; but having only one boat, the process is tedious and slow: if the whole recross to-night, I shall move forward to-morrow morning. Toorabaz Khan accompanied our party across the river, and is now re-established in his chiefship.

2. I have the honor to inclose copies of a letter from Captain Mackesson to me, and of two letters from Captain Macgregor. The death of Shah Shooja must very materially affect the ulterior views of Government, and I beg that no time may be lost in sending me instructions for my guidance.

3. In my letter of the 8th instant, I have stated my intention of moving six companies of Native Infantry, to garrison Ali Musjid. This arrangement was subsequently changed, and the present garrison there consist of one company 6th Native Infantry; Captain Thomas, one regiment, and the men who formerly formed the garrison. I have sanctioned an increase to the latter to the strength of 600 men, and, I trust, that in a short time I shall be able to man the fort entirely under their protection, supported as they will be by their proximity to the Sikh army.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 269.—*Mr. Mauldock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, April 25, 1842.*

SIR,—It is naturally a subject of anxious consideration in what manner it may be most expedient to endeavour to effect the restoration to their country of the prisoners now in the hands of the Afghans.

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\* Two Horse Artillery guns—one squadron Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons—one Rissallah Irregular Horse—two Companies Her Majesty's 9th Foot—one wing 26th Native Infantry—one wing 33rd Native Infantry—one wing 66th Native Infantry. Rear Detachment:—two Horse-artillery guns—two squadrons Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons—one wing 26th Native Infantry.

2. The only safe and honourable course for a Government to pursue, under such circumstances, is to effect the release of prisoners by a general exchange.

3. The redemption of prisoners by the payment of a ransom, is a measure unknown to the modern practice of civilized nations, and which the Government of India cannot consent to revive.

4. If the Affghans had any regular Government with which it was possible to treat for the general exchange of prisoners, such a measure would be the most consonant to policy, and there would, on our part, be no reservation whatever of any prisoners in our hands.

5. But it is apprehended that the British prisoners are rather to be considered as being in the power of individual chiefs, and so held for the personal benefit of such chiefs in the matter of exchange or ransom, than as being the prisoners of any one chief, or of the State; and it may be impracticable to make their release the subject of a general arrangement.

6. If such should be the case, you are authorized to make such partial arrangements for the exchange of prisoners as you may deem most advisable, with this reservation, that the person of Dost Mahomed is not to be surrendered, in pursuance of any such partial arrangement, without the express authority of the Governor-General; nor is any expectation to be held out, that it will be so surrendered.

7. Your attention will naturally be, in the first instance, directed to the release of the female prisoners; the sympathies of all are engaged in their fate; nevertheless, the Governor-General feels it to be right to remind you, that all British subjects have an equal claim upon the consideration and protection of the Government, and that it is as much the duty of yourself, and of all the British authorities, to endeavour to effect the release of the last Sepoy, as that of the first European, by all means not tending to establish an injurious precedent, and consistent with the honor of the British Government.

8. You will take especial care, in any arrangement you may make, that you take full security for its due and faithful execution in all its parts.

I have, &c.,

H. T. MADDOCK.

No. 270.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, April, 28, 1842.*

SIR,—The reports of the death of Shah Shooja are so long continued, and are, upon the whole, so consistent, that the Governor-General cannot but attach great weight to them.

The death of the Shah is certainly an event not hitherto contemplated, and which may tend to create new embarrassments in the settlement of the affairs of Affghanistan.

That country appears to be so divided, that, under present circumstances, it would be obviously impossible for the British Government to recognize any individual as the successor to the monarchy of Affghanistan.

In all measures which may hereafter be adopted for the settlement of that country, the Governor-General is most desirous of carrying with the



British Government the willing acquiescence of the Maharajah Shere Sing.

At the present time, the only reply which can be prudently given to the application of any chief aspiring to the crown, for the recognition of the British Government is, that the British Government is sincerely desirous of seeing Afghanistan permanently settled under a national Government approved by the people ; that such has always been its desire, however interested persons may have misrepresented, or others may have misunderstood, our views ; that we are anxious to be enabled to establish relations of friendly intercourse with any such Government which may seem capable of maintaining them.

I have, &c.

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 271.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, April 28, 1842.*

SIR,—Although by my dispatch of this date, you will have received the instructions of the Governor-General to withhold the recognition of the British Government from any competitor for the throne of Afghanistan (in the event of the death of Shah Shooja), you will understand that that instruction does not prevent your treating with a *de facto* Government for the general exchange of prisoners, if it should appear that any such Government is capable of carrying any such exchange into effect.

I have, &c.

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 272.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, April 28, 1842.*

SIR,—The aspect of affairs in Upper Afghanistan appears to be such, according to the last advices received by the Governor-General, that his Lordship cannot but contemplate the possibility of your having been led, by the absence of serious opposition on the part of any army in the field, by the divisions amongst the Afghan chiefs, and by the natural desire you must, in common with every true soldier, have of displaying again the British flag in triumph upon the scene of our late disasters, to advance upon, and occupy the city of Cabool.

If that event should have occurred, you will understand, that it will in no respect vary the view which the Governor-General previously took of the policy now to be pursued.

The Governor-General will adhere to the opinion, that the only safe course is, that of withdrawing the army under your command, at the earliest practicable period, into positions within the Khyber Pass, where it may possess easy and certain communications with India.

In whatever measures you may adopt for the purpose of so executing the Governor-General's intentions, you will have especial regard to the preservation of the health of the troops, a subject of the deepest interest

to his Lordship, even if it were not so intimately connected with the efficiency of your army.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

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No. 273.—*Mr. Maddock to Major Outram.*

*Allahabad, April 28, 1842.*

SIR,—The recent events in the Khyber Pass, and at Jellalabad, having given apparently a new aspect to our affairs in Upper Affghanistan, I am directed to inform you, that those events have in no respect changed the view before taken by the Governor-General of the policy to be pursued with respect to the countries beyond the Indus.

The Governor-General adheres to the intention of withdrawing, at the earliest practicable period, the British forces now in Lower Affghanistan, into positions, in which they will possess the means of easy and certain communication with India.

The Governor-General is in correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief, upon the subject of giving to the army, under Major-General Nott, a large reinforcement in cavalry, as soon as the season will permit of its moving to the Indus, his Lordship's intention being to render that army thoroughly efficient in all arms.

Unless you should have received instructions of a different tenor from General Nott, you will, at the first convenient period, without prejudice to your health, proceed to Quetta, or to such other point as may enable you to give the greatest aid in facilitating the movements of Brigadier England and the Major-General.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 274.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Willoughby, Secretary to the Government of Bombay.*

*Allahabad, April 29, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General to inform you that his Lordship is of opinion, that it would be advisable that a general officer (inferior only in rank to Major-General Nott) should be sent to take the command of the large body of troops of the Bombay Army now in Sind and Affghanistan, and his Lordship requests that the Governor in Council will appoint such general officer, and direct him to proceed forthwith to assume the command of such troops.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

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No. 275.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Madlock.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, April 16, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to report my arrival here this day, and I have been much gratified at finding the garrison in so very healthy a state, and have been much struck by the strength of the works which have been

erected by the indefatigable exertions of the force under Major-General Sir Robert Sale.

2. I trust, either to-morrow or the next day, to be able to submit, for the consideration of the Governor-General of India, Captain Mackeson's report on the state of our negotiations with the Khyber tribes, and on which I shall have to make some remarks. I shall be under the necessity of sending a part of the force to meet and aid Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton in the protection of treasure, ammunition, &c., from Peshawur.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 276.—*General Orders by the Governor-General of India.*

*Head-Quarters, Allahabad, April 30, 1842.*

The Governor-General has received a report from Major-General Pollock, C.B., dated the 16th instant, announcing his arrival at Jellalabad.

The Major-General has thus carried into effect the orders of the Government in a manner which entitles him to the highest approbation.

Receiving the command of the army at Peshawur under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, he has, in the midst of new and unforeseen embarrassments and disappointments, preserved a firm mind, and, justly relying upon his own judgment, he has at last, with equal discretion and decision, accomplished the object he was directed to effect.

The Governor-General requests Major-General Pollock to accept his acknowledgments of the good service he has thus rendered to the Government of India, and begs he will communicate to the gallant officers and troops under his command, the entire satisfaction with which their conduct has been regarded on this occasion.

The Governor-General has already, in communicating the despatch from Major-General Sir Robert Sale, K.C.B., dated the 7th instant, expressed his high sense of the services of that officer, and of the garrison of Jellalabad, terminating on that day by a decisive victory, which would have left nothing to desire had Colonel Dennie survived to enjoy it.

The garrison of Jellalabad having on that day achieved its safety by its own prowess, and being now re-united to the army by the movements of the force under the command of Major-General Pollock, C.B., it remains only for the Governor-General to testify his opinion of the just claims of that garrison to the gratitude of the Government and of their country.

The Governor-General is pleased to direct that the second company of the sixth battalion of Artillery shall bear upon its appointments, and the 5th Regiment of Light Cavalry upon its standards and appointments, and the 35th Regiment of Native Infantry upon its colours and appointments, a mural crown superscribed "Jellalabad," as a memorial of the fortitude, perseverance, and enterprise evinced by those several corps during the blockade of Jellalabad.

The Governor-General is likewise pleased, in conformity with the recommendation of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to direct that "in order to give additional and lasting honours to the 35th Native Infantry, whilst it benefits the service generally, that corps shall hereafter

be made a light infantry regiment, the duties of which it is already so well acquainted with, and has performed with so much zeal and spirit."

The Governor-General is further pleased to direct that a silver medal be made for every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, European and Native, who belonged to the garrison of Jellalabad on the 7th of April 1842, such medals to be all similar, and to bear on one side a mural crown superscribed "Jellalabad," and on the other side the words "April 7th 1842."

The Government of India will present such medal to every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, European and Native, belonging to their service, and will request the Home Authorities to lay before Her Majesty their most humble prayer that Her Majesty will be graciously pleased to permit the Major-General commanding, and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates in Her Majesty's service, who formed part of the garrison of Jellalabad, to receive and wear a medal similar to that which will be so presented to their brothers in arms.

The Governor-General, taking into consideration the many great privations to which the troops composing the garrison of Jellalabad were exposed during the blockade of that place, and the noble fortitude with which all such privations were borne, as well as the various losses the troops sustained, is pleased to direct that a donation of six months' batta be made to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, European and Native, who composed the garrison of Jellalabad on the 7th of April, 1842.

The Governor-General will request his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the army to give instructions in due time that the several corps composing the garrison of Jellalabad may, on their return to India, be received at all the stations on their route to their cantonments, by all the troops at such stations, in review order, with presented arms.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 277.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, April 18, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to forward Captain Mackeson's report of negotiations which have for a considerable time been going on with the Maliks of the Khyber, and which, to all appearance, had ceased the day before I forced the Pass. When the troops had, contrary to expectation, succeeded, the Maliks again joined us, and I have no doubt that, through Captain Mackeson's exertions, the Pass will be opened on much the same terms that have been had recourse to hitherto, and which although good as long as they last, I can never depend upon, as any reverse on our side, or even the whim or caprice of a chief, might close the Pass in twenty-four hours.

The Sikhs at present occupy the Pass as far as Ali Musjid, and the fortress is occupied by irregulars. By the agreement entered into with Rajah Goolaub Sing, the Sikhs were to hold the Pass as far as Ali Musjid till the 5th of June. If they then quit it, and troops of our own are not sent to occupy it, I fear Ali Musjid must fall into the hands of the

enemy, supposing our negotiations to fail, I hope the strength of the garrison will be increased by recruits for the irregulars, but whatever their strength, if they are the only troops of ours in the Pass, they will scarcely be persuaded to remain in so isolated a situation, and surrounded by an enemy.

The occupation of the Pass by our own troops is, I consider, absolutely necessary, if we are to depend on its being kept open in time of need ; and the possession of Ali Musjid is of the highest importance to any troops retiring through the Khyber. On this side of it there is no encamping-ground for some miles ; the heights to be taken possession of, to command the fort, can be approached only by a circuitous and difficult route, and when attained would be several miles from the camp. The difficulties would in every way be very great, and the process of a siege might be very tedious, while in the meantime forage would fail : indeed, reviewing the whole question of the Khyber Pass, and the probability of a return through it, I cannot but look with anxiety to the probable loss of Ali Musjid, which is not very formidable to an advancing army, as encamping-ground is near at hand on the other side.

I now beg to bring to the notice of Government some points which are of a most serious nature, and go far to paralyze the movements of any army sent in this direction. The accompanying copy of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons will show that the camels are hired to Jellalabad, and I regret to say that nearly one-half never go beyond Peshawur, from which place they generally return, owing to the defection among the drivers, and the great want of carriage-cattle ; it was with the greatest difficulty I could procure twenty camels to bring on two additional lacs of rupees (I have only four altogether), and much of the small arm ammunition I was obliged to leave behind.

From the Sikh authorities I obtained no assistance ; indeed they made no effort to aid in recovering those who deserted : had we been assisted by the Sikh authorities I believe that every camel might have been recovered. In this crippled state I moved forward, and having arrived here the whole of the hired camel drivers have come forward in a body to say they have performed their engagement, and request that they may be discharged. The only alternative I have is to purchase the camels, but I fear the drivers will refuse to go. Captain Macgregor informs me he may probably get fifty camels, while I require at least 1500. My situation at the present moment is a difficult one, and much as I deprecate any retrograde movement, such a step is by no means improbable, as I have not yet been able to get in supplies in sufficient quantities to warrant my remaining here.

There is an abundance of grain at Peshawur, and Captain Lawrence has been exerting his influence to procure carriage ; how far he will succeed by the time the 31st Foot move forward I cannot say, but I confess that in the interim I cannot help feeling very great anxiety on the subject.

I take this opportunity of bringing to the notice of Government that in consequence of a system which obtains in the dragoon regiments on the Bengal establishment, a regiment ordered on such service as this is literally in a fair way of becoming quite unserviceable in consequence of the horses not being able to procure forage.

It was not known to me till yesterday that the 3rd Dragoons have no grass-cutters, and this morning it was officially reported to me that the horses would starve unless forage was procured for them. I have made arrangements for the present, and I hope I may continue to supply them, but I would here compare their situation with that of the Native Cavalry who are abundantly supplied, having grass-cutters.

I am given to understand that dragoon regiments in the provinces have no grass-cutters, but that a chowdry is attached to each troop, who supplies grass on contract. Here such a system could not succeed, and it could hardly be expected that several hundred grass-cutters would be collected at short notice, and if collected, little dependence could be placed in them. The state of the dragoons now here sufficiently shows the evil of such a system, as the regiment is thereby rendered almost unserviceable.

I have not heard anything further of the prisoners than that Mahomed Akbar had taken them to Tazeen, where he had left them, and had proceeded to Cabool.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 278.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, Deputy Commissary-General, to Captain Mainwaring, Officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary-General.*

December 18, 1841.

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that the whole of the hired or Rewarree camels engaged to carry public stores and private baggage from this place, with the corps and detachments recently gone towards Afghanistan, are only to carry their loads as far as Jellalabad. I have to request that you will, therefore, be good enough to prevent the owners of the cattle being forced to proceed beyond that place, as I have pledged myself to them that they will not be forced to go on; and I shall be obliged, if you will, after their arrival at Jellalabad, have the camels returned to Peshawur as speedily as practicable, and procure them a guard to protect them on the journey to the latter place.

I have, &c.,

J. D. PARSONS.

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No. 279.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

Allahabad, April 30, 1842.

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch (No. 2), dated Camp, Jellalabad, the 18th ultimo; and in reply to inform you that the circumstances mentioned regarding defective arrangements in the Regiment of Dragoons will be communicated to the Commander-in-Chief. The Governor-General concludes that you will have taken the most effectual means in your power to supply the deficiency complained of.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 280.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.**Allahabad, May 4, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General, seeing the extreme inconvenience and embarrassment to which you are exposed, through the hiring of camels, directs you to purchase such number of camels as you may deem necessary for the service of your army, and recommends that the drivers of such camels should be regularly enlisted into the service of the Government, so that they may be retained in the performance of the duty they engage to execute, by martial law.

2. If you should deem it expedient to form a corps of camel drivers under European officers, you are authorized so to do, and indeed to adopt any course which may seem to you to be best calculated to secure to the army the service of a sufficient number of camels.

I have, &amp;c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 281.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock**Camp, Jellalabad, April 28, 1842.*

SIR,—With reference to my letter (No. 2), dated 18th instant, I have now the honor to forward a report from Major Lockwood, which I called for yesterday. I have had a number of a koorpas made for cutting grass and I directed that the horses should be led out to graze, which has preserved their condition. If grass-cutters could by any possible means be sent from the provinces, I should feel much more easy about the efficiency of the 3rd Dragoons, which, when we advance, may possibly have to play a conspicuous part though at present I believe there is not a soul to oppose us between this and Cabool.

I have, &amp;c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 282.—*Major Lockwood to the Brigade Major, Cavalry Brigade.**Camp, Jellalabad, April, 28, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Assistant Adjutant-General, that I have up to this date registered seventy-two grass-cutters who furnish me with grass for 128 horses, several of them having tattoos. I have also two chowdries appointed to superintend them. I beg to add that, from arrangements now in progress, I expect in a few days I shall be enabled to register 200 more, at least, from amongst the syces paid for by the men of the regiment, in addition to the establishment allowed by Government.

I have, &amp;c.,

G. H. LOCKWOOD.

No. 283.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.**Allahabad, May 3, 1842.*

SIR,—The expediency of forming at the earliest period a camp upon or in the vicinity of the Sutlej, and of collecting in such camp a considerable body of troops, not less than 15,000 men of all arms, completely equipped for any service, has engaged the Governor-General's attention from his first accession to the Government, and his Lordship is in communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the army upon the subject.

2. It is his Lordship's intention to join such camp wherever it may be formed, probably early in October, and his Lordship would then desire an interview with the Maharajah.

I have, &amp;c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 284.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India.**Simla, April 27, 1842.*

(Extract.)—I have not ventured to give any instructions to Major-General Pollock. The 5th, 9th, 10th, and 11th paragraphs of your orders of the 15th March must now guide him. It is for him alone to decide between the practicability of a forward movement, either upon Cabool or Gundamuck (or its vicinity), and the withdrawal of the whole force to Peshawur.

The General is a clear-headed, good officer ; and you have loaded his advance with heavy cautions ; but he will stand alone, and treats those around him (as far as I know) rather as advisers than as his agents.

By his dispatch of the 16th, your Lordship will perceive that he feels it necessary to send back a part of his force to aid Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton through the pass. He promises an explanation of this necessity. My great doubt is, that he can equip the force for a movement in advance, at such a distance from our resources, and under the rooted dislike and fear of the Afghans, entertained by every class of camp-followers. If they move ill equipped, or are placed in an unhealthy position, the losses may be very heavy.

As to the power of the enemy, I do not anticipate any great difficulty in moving in any required direction, arising out of their resistance ; but for sieges the General is unprovided.

No. 285.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.**Allahabad, May 4, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General was in expectation that, in pursuance of the request contained in his Lordship's letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the 19th ultimo, (of which a copy was communicated to you,) his Excellency would probably have addressed instructions to you, founded



upon the more recent and accurate knowledge of your situation, which his Excellency's position at Simla enables him to obtain ; but his Lordship is now informed that his Excellency has not deemed it necessary to issue any such further instructions, relying upon your discretion in acting upon the instructions you already have, contained in the letter of the Governor-General in Council to his Excellency, dated the 15th of March.

2. You have since received, in the letter of the 19th ultimo, above referred to, a further indication of the views of the Government—views which have been in no respect varied by the demise of Shah Shooja, or by the victory of Sir Robert Sale.

3. On the contrary, that victory, in conjunction with your success, going far towards the re-establishment, in the minds of the Affghans, and of our troops, and subjects, and allies, of that sentiment of confidence in our military superiority, which it is so essential to preserve ; and the decease of Shah Shooja having manifestly relieved the British from all such engagements as might have been deemed to be of a personal character with him, it is in reality, and it will be in the opinion of all men, more easy for you to withdraw your troops from the advanced position they occupy, than it would have been, had political considerations of great importance appeared to require other and ulterior operations.

4. The most recent accounts which have been received of the difficulty experienced by you in obtaining supplies at Jellalabad, and in bringing forward supplies from Peshawur ; and the very deficient means of movement, as well as of provision, which you possess, induce the Governor-General to expect that you will have already decided upon withdrawing your troops within the Khyber Pass, into a position wherein you may have easy and certain communication with India, if considerations, having regard to the health of the army, should not have induced you to defer that movement.

5. The Governor-General is satisfied that you will have felt that no great object can be accomplished by any army having deficient means of movement and supply, and that nothing but a great object could justify the incurring of great risks.

6. His Lordship is too strongly impressed with confidence in your judgment to apprehend that you will ever place the army under your command in a situation in which, without adequate means of movement and supply, it could derive no benefit from its superior valour and discipline, and might be again subjected to a disaster which, if repeated, might be fatal to our power in India.

7. The first object of the Governor-General's anxiety has ever been to withdraw, with honor, into positions of security, the several corps of the army which he found scattered and surrounded in Affghanistan. That object may now be accomplished as respects the army under your command ; and the Governor-General could experience no higher satisfaction than that of hearing that, the health of that army, in whose welfare he takes so deep an interest having been preserved, it was in a secure position, having certain communication with India.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 286.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to the Governor-General of India.*

*Simla, April 29, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I have been honored by the receipt of your Lordship's dispatches of the 19th instant; and, having reconsidered the whole subject, I have to report to your Lordship that I have this day directed Major-General Pollock to withdraw the troops from Jellalabad.

2. Inclosed I have the honor to transmit a copy of my letter of this date to the Major-General, as it may be of importance to assist your Lordship in conveying your further orders, regarding the return of the troops to the provinces.

3. I trust that the early return of the Jellalabad brigade, which I have directed, may be approved; and that I may not be considered to have erred in giving some latitude, in certain specified cases, to the Major-General.

4. My opinion is, that the whole force should be withdrawn to our own frontier, if the season will admit. They cannot be accommodated in buildings at or near Peshawur, I apprehend: and tents, and even huts, in such a climate, afford very insufficient shelter.

5. On this subject, however, the Major-General has been directed to attend to the advice and wishes of your Lordship's Agent on this frontier, in conformity with Mr. Secretary Maddock's letter of the 10th February to Mr. Clerk, and with my instructions of the same date.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

P. S.—I have just received from Mr. Clerk a copy of his letter of the 24th to Mr. Maddock, and of Captain Mackeson's to him, of the 17th, also of Mr. Clerk's letter of the 23rd to Mr. Maddock; but I am not disposed to qualify, or even to postpone, the instructions to General Pollock, which I had previously prepared.

No. 287.—*General Sir Jasper Nicolls to Major-General Pollock.*

*Simla, April 29, 1842.*

SIR.—The Governor-General having transmitted to you a copy of his Lordship's dispatch to my address of the 19th instant, you will be prepared to receive a communication from me on the important subject thereof. You will be pleased, therefore, to conform to the following instructions.

2. Shah Shooja being dead, Ghuznee lost, and Major-General Nott directed by his Lordship's command (also of the 19th instant), to withdraw the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, to evacuate Candahar, and to retire, first upon Quetta, and when the season admits, upon Sukkur; you are required to make a similar movement in Upper Affghanistan, and to withdraw every British soldier from Jellalabad to Peshawur.

3. You are to destroy the fort and any useless guns; but as there need be no haste in the retreat when commenced, you are requested not to leave any trophies.

4. The only circumstances which can authorize delay in obeying this order are,—

1st. That you may have brought a negotiation for the release of the prisoners lately confined at Buddeabad, to such a point that you might risk its happy accomplishment by withdrawing.

2nd. That you may have detached a lightly equipped force to endeavour to rescue them.

3rd. That the enemy at Cabool may be moving a force to attack you. In this improbable case, should any respectable number of troops have descended into the plain below Jugdulluck with that intent, it would be most advisable to inflict such a blow upon them as to make them long remember your parting effort. If you should have such a glorious opportunity, I advise you to send your weak and inefficient men previously to Lalpoora.

5. I do not recommend delay in the first case, unless the prisoners are actually on their way to your camp, as no faith can be placed in Affghan promises or oaths. The second would, of course, require that you should await the return of the detachment.

6. I allude entirely to the officers and ladies now or lately at Buddeabad, or its vicinity. Those at Cabool cannot, I think, be saved by any treaty or agreement made under existing circumstances at Jellalabad.

7. You will be pleased, on reaching Peshawur, to dispatch to Ferozepore, without delay, the troops of all arms which so gallantly upheld our country's name at Jellalabad; and further instructions will be sent to you regarding the disposal of the other brigades. Sir Robert Sale may be permitted to remain at your head-quarters, should he desire to do so, and you will transfer him accordingly to another command, placing Brigadier Monteath in charge of the returning column.

I have, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

No. 288.—*The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Allahabad, May 6, 1842.*

GENERAL,—Your Excellency's letter of the 27th ultimo, informing me that you had not given instructions to Major-General Pollock, and that the 5th, 9th 10th, and 11th paragraphs of the orders of the 15th of March must now guide him, was received by me on the 3rd instant. On the 4th I addressed to Major-General Pollock the letter, of which a copy was transmitted to your Excellency. Yesterday evening the 5th, I received your Excellency's letter of the 29th ultimo, communicating to me the instructions you had on that day addressed to Major-General Pollock.

I have to thank your Excellency for having had the goodness to give those instructions, of which I entirely approve.

They are in accordance with the general principles which, in my letter of the 19th ultimo, were laid down for the Major-General's guidance.

I have this day addressed a letter to the Major-General, of which I inclose a copy.

Your Excellency will perceive that, under certain circumstances, the fort of Jellalabad may be placed in the hands of the Sikh troops upon the withdrawal of our army. This instruction is founded upon a communication I received, which led me to think that the Sikhs were not unwilling to receive that fort.

I inclose a copy of an extract from a letter addressed by my direction to Mr. Clerk upon that subject.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 289.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, May 6, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General received yesterday evening from the Commander-in-Chief a copy of the instructions his Excellency addressed to you on the 29th ultimo.

2. Of those instructions the Governor-General entirely approves. They are in accordance with the general principles laid down by his Lordship for your guidance, and you will execute them to the best of your ability, having regard always to the health of your troops, and to the efficiency of your army,—objects of primary importance.

3. There is one point upon which I am directed to desire you to attend to the instructions of Mr. Clerk. If that gentleman, the Governor-General's Agent at the Court of Lahore, should, upon your quitting Jellalabad, instruct you to deliver up that place to the Sikhs, you will do so leaving the fortifications as they are; but you will on no account deliver up that place to the Sikhs, in pursuance of any such instructions, one hour sooner than you may deem it to be consistent with the interests of your army to give it into their hands.

4. You will of course keep possession of Ali Musjid, until the last British soldier has passed it.

5. The Governor-General trusts that you will have had the discretion not to mention the nature of the orders given to Major-General Nott, which are referred to in the letter to you from the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 29th ultimo.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 290.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.*

*Allahabad, May 7, 1842.*

(Extract.)—The Governor-General deems it expedient to inform you that instructions similar to those addressed to you on the 19th ultimo, have now been addressed to Major-General Pollock, and that officer will withdraw his army into positions wherein they may have easy and certain communication with India, at the earliest practicable period, regard being always had, in the making of such movement, to the health and efficiency of the troops,—objects of primary importance.

The Governor-General feels assured that, in whatever movements you may have made, or may make, in pursuance of your instructions of the

15th of March and 19th ultimo, you will have had the same object in view, and will deem it to be your highest praise to bring back your army in health and undiminished strength.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 291.—*Major General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, March 24, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, that a copy of a demi-official communication, dated the 25th of February, 1842, addressed by Mr. Clerk to Major Outram, has just reached Candahar ; from which I learn, that "Government have directed the Commander-in-Chief to require Major-General Pollock to withdraw the Jellalabad garrison, unless unforeseen circumstances," &c.

When I view the intimation, thus received, of the orders of Government, in connexion with their intentions, conveyed to me in dispatches and also with their avowed determination to redeem the credit of the British arms in Afghanistan, publicly notified in general orders, under date the 31st of January last, I feel that a degree of perplexity and embarrassment has been thrown upon my position at Candahar, which I did not contemplate, and could not have contemplated, when the letters I have hitherto addressed to you were written.

The communications I have hitherto received from Government, have, it is true, prescribed to me no decided line of conduct ; but I am warranted in saying, that their general tenor was to the effect that, if, under existing circumstances, I could maintain my position at Candahar, without risking the safety of my troops, it would be consonant with the views and wishes of Government that I should do so.

I had a considerable body of troops, and, with much pains, had collected a reserve of upwards of six months' provisions. I felt assured of support, and of the receipt of the ammunition and stores I stood in need of, from Sind or India ; I knew that Jellalabad was in our possession, and that it was the resolution of Government to maintain it ; that large reinforcements were preparing for its support ; I could not over-estimate the value of this powerful diversion in my favor, nor could I shut my eyes to the fact, that the abandonment of Candahar by me, must have an unfavorable effect upon the measures in progress for the retention of our position at Jellalabad. Under these circumstances, I never had a moment's hesitation as to the course I ought to pursue, so long as discretionary power was left to me ; and all my arrangements have, consequently, been made with a view to the present maintenance and future extension, should such prove desirable, of our power in this country.

But, could I have foreseen that so immediately following their proclamation of the 31st of January, Government would have determined on withdrawing their troops from Jellalabad, excepting on the occurrence of "unforeseen circumstances," I should most probably have regarded this resolution of theirs, as distinctly pointing to their intention of evacuating the country altogether, and have taken measures accordingly.

Now, however, the position of the troops at Candahar is so far fixed, that I consider retirement would not only be disadvantageous, but almost impracticable, until the autumn ; and I trust that my having determined on remaining, may ultimately prove fortunate ; but the state of uncertainty into which I am now thrown, regarding our present position at Jellalabad, and the probable future policy of Government, must preclude my acting with full confidence in measures calculated to restore British influence in the country, by force of arms. I am also become doubtful of the propriety of retaining Kelat-i-Ghilzye as a separate garrison ; for there is but too much reason to fear, that the sacrifice of the garrison at Ghuznee must closely follow on the abandonment of our position at Jellalabad.

As long as both the positions of Candahar and Jellalabad are occupied by us, the attention of the insurgents in Affghanistan is distracted. No general or combined movement can be made by the Affghans while they are threatened from both these points ; but if one source of apprehension be removed by the withdrawal of our troops from Jellalabad, the undivided force of the people backed by success, and inflamed by religious enthusiasm, will be at liberty to concentrate its energy against our position at Candahar.

I believe that many people have been prevented from joining the rebel chiefs, now in arms against us near Candahar, from a feeling that we meditate the re-occupation of Cabool from the side of Jellalabad,—an impression that has been confirmed by the non-arrival of succour from Cabool, since the deputation of Atta Mahomed, on the first outbreak of the insurrection in that city. While we maintain an imposing attitude at Jellalabad, even supposing no advance takes place beyond that post, it is my opinion that but few troops and no artillery will be sent from Cabool in aid of the rebel cause at Candahar ; but, if Jellalabad be abandoned, I not only look forward to having to contend with a force from Cabool, much better equipped than is ordinarily the case with Affghan troops, but I anticipate a general movement against us from every part of the country.

If Government intend to recover, even temporarily, and for the saving of our national honor, their lost position in this country, even if doubtful of the policy that it may be deemed expedient to pursue, I earnestly hope that, before any immediate retrograde step is made in either direction, our whole position in Affghanistan will be attentively viewed ; and that the effect which a hasty retirement would certainly, and instantly, have on the whole of Beloochistan, and even on the navigation of the Indus, will be taken into consideration. At the present time, the impression of our military strength among the people of this country, though weakened by the occurrences at Cabool, is not destroyed ; but if we now retire, and it should again become necessary to advance, we shall labour under many disadvantages, the most serious of which, in my opinion, will be a distrust of their strength among our soldiers, which any admission of weakness is so well calculated to induce ; and in what other light could a withdrawal from Jellalabad or Candahar be viewed ?

If retirement should become necessary, it should take place simultaneously, and at a proper season. If Government should select Candahar as the point whence future operations against Cabool are to be directed, still

the retention of a position at Jellalabad in considerable force, will be of the most essential service in all future contemplated operations. In the sanguine hope that some unforeseen circumstance may have occurred to postpone the execution of the Government order for the evacuation of Jellalabad, I have thought it incumbent on me to address this letter to you.

Before closing my letter, I may mention that I am now in expectation of the march of Brigadier Englaud from Quetta, with supplies for Candahar. I have no correct information regarding the probable date of his quitting that post, nor of the strength of his force; but there is room for apprehension that the convoy he has to escort will be but weakly guarded, and every probability that it may be attacked. I am at present, therefore, compelled to remain at Candahar, prepared to move with a sufficient body of troops to the Brigadier's support, whenever I may receive certain intelligence of his movements.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 292.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, March 29, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you that, in consequence of the disputes between the troops and camp-followers and the Afghans in making purchases within the city, and to induce the people of the country to bring in supplies, I have been under the necessity of establishing a bazaar, on the outside of the town, and in order to its being properly regulated, and to prevent exactions and oppression towards the inhabitants of the district, to appoint a European officer to superintend it.

This bazaar was established on the 16th instant, and has been attended with the very best results; the people now willingly bring in every article they have for sale, and thus preclude the inconvenience of sending troops to the villages for supplies.

Under these circumstances I trust that Government will confirm the arrangement I have made, at least as a temporary measure.

I appointed Lieutenant Tytler to the charge, owing to his knowledge of the Persian and Hindoostanee languages, and to his great control of temper, which will, I hope, tend to conciliate the people bringing in supplies.

I trust that Government will grant Lieutenant Tytler the indulgence of a salary for the period he may be permitted to act in the situation in which circumstances have obliged me to place him.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

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No. 293.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, April 18, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th ultimo, inclosing copy of instructions addressed by his Lordship in Council to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, bearing date the

15th of March, 1842. It shall be my constant endeavour to carry into effect these instructions as far as circumstances will admit.

I have at present 7,000 men of all arms at Candahar, exclusive of sick and wounded : 700 of these are cavalry of a very inferior description, indeed are nearly useless in the field ; and three of the infantry regiments are composed of the Shah's Hindoostanee troops. The extent of the walls of the city is so considerable, that I conceive even a garrison of 3,000 men would be barely sufficient for its defence, in the event of the troops being employed on distant operations in the field ; and containing, as it does, all our provisions, ammunition, &c., it is of vital consequence to the troops under my command.

In the event of field operations, the deduction of these 3,000 men would leave me scarcely 4,000 troops, including this cavalry, to oppose the enemy in the field, and to guard a long train of provision and carriage-cattle ; and, however distant the service from this important magazine, every particle of food must be carried with the force ; thus crippling and retarding all its movements.

The troops and establishments at Candahar are four months in arrears, and there is not a rupee in the treasury ; nor can money be borrowed. We have no medicine for the sick and wounded : and, in the event of much service in the field, I fear we should run short of musket-ammunition, although I have contrived to have considerable quantity prepared from old and damaged powder ; frequent application has been made to the authorities in Sindh, during the last four months, for treasure, ammunition, stores, medicines, and particularly for cavalry, but no aid whatever has been afforded.

I want draught and baggage-cattle to enable me to move ; but without money, in a country like this, I can neither purchase nor hire them. I have no cattle for moving even three regiments ; during our field operations of last month, both officers and men marched without tents. Under these circumstances, my difficulties were certainly great ; but, although I consider it to be my duty to state these facts, the Government may rest assured of my best and unremitting exertions to carry into effect its views and instructions and to uphold the reputation of our arms, and the honor of my country.

Perhaps it is not within my province to observe, that, in my humble opinion, an unnecessary alarm has been created regarding the position of our troops in this country, and of the strength and power of the enemy we have to contend with. This enemy cannot face our troops in the field with any chance of success, however superior they may be in numbers, provided those precautions are strictly observed, which war, between a small body of disciplined soldiers, and a vast crowd of untrained, unorganized, and half-civilized people, constantly renders necessary. True, the British troops suffered a dreadful disaster at Cabool, and it is not for me to presume to point out why this happened, however evident I may conceive the reasons, and the long train of military and political events which led to the sad catastrophe.

Had I been reinforced with a single regiment of cavalry, I feel convinced that I could long since have tranquillized or subdued the rebellious feeling in the provinces dependent upon Candahar, and that a very few additional troops from Sindh, to garrison this extensive and import-



ant city, would have set me free from my present difficult position, and have enabled me at this moment to have been on my march to Ghuznee and to Cabool ; but, although near six months have elapsed since the outbreak at that city, no aid of any kind has been sent to me ; and the circumstances I have now detailed still confine me to this post, and its immediate vicinity.

It is with deep concern that I feel myself disappointed in the long-expected convoy from Sinde ; no doubt Major-General England has fully acquainted Government with the unfortunate check received by the detachment under his command in Pisheen, on the 28th ultimo, the moral influence of which has been great throughout the country, and has added considerably to the difficulties of my position. I am now under the necessity of directing a strong brigade to march as far as the Kojuck Pass, in hopes of at length getting the treasure, stores, &c., I stand so much in need of, and without which my force is paralyzed. I have requested Major-General England to send a detachment from Quetta for its conveyance. This strong brigade will be sent from Candahar for fifteen or twenty days, at a most critical period. I herewith transmit copies of letters transmitted by me to that officer on this subject.

I have not received a line from Colonel Palmer since November last ; and although I have no authentic information of the surrender of Ghuznee to the enemy, I fear there can be no longer a doubt of its having fallen into their hands in the beginning of March, and that the European officers are now prisoners in that garrison. This has been repeated by so many natives of the country, as to induce me to give credit to their assertions. They also declare that the surviving Sepoys have been sold into slavery. Whether the place surrendered for want of water, or whether Colonel Palmer acted upon the circular letter signed "Pottinger and Elphinstone," directing Jellalabad, Ghuznee, Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and Candahar, to be given up, I have not been able to ascertain.

What effect the murder of His Majesty Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk may have on this part of Afghanistan, it is at present difficult to say. His Royal Highness Prince Timour, who appears to be sincerely attached to the British Government, has formed no party, and, at this moment, possesses no influence in this country. I have not yet been able to ascertain his real sentiments regarding the murderers of his royal father, and the scenes now passing at Cabool, or what steps he has determined to pursue ; but I will take care to avoid offering any pledge on the part of the British Government to any future line of conduct towards His Royal Highness.

I have frequent communications with the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye. I have no intention of withdrawing the troops from that post for the present ; it is well supplied with provisions and water.

I am, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 294.—*Major-General Nott to Brigadier England.*

*Candahar, March 13, 1842.*

SIR,—I have been favored with a copy of your letter, of the 1st instant. I regret to find that you intended to march with treasure, ammu-

dition, &c., and under charge of only half the force you originally arranged. I would suggest, under circumstances, that you should halt at Quetta until you can assemble the force you noted in your letter now acknowledged. The delay of ten or fifteen days, as far as treasure is concerned, will be of no consequence whatever.

You will, of course, bring forward with you the company of Bengal Artillery now at Quetta, as well as the officers belonging to regiments at Candahar.

It is, in every point of view, desirable, that a strong brigade (such as noted by you) should push on to Candahar as soon as possible.

I am, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 295.—*Major-General Nott to Brigadier England.*

*Candahar, March 22, 1842.*

SIR,—I hope you have received some of my letters. It is desirable that ammunition, stores, medicine, and money, should be sent to this place ; but the state of the country renders it expedient that the convoy should come under a very strong escort. I can spare no troops from this ; and all I could possibly do would be moving a brigade a few marches to meet your force, and to do so it would be absolutely necessary that I should know the exact day on which your force may march from Quetta.

If it should be the wish of Government to retain Afghanistan, or to aid the garrison of Ghuznee, or to bring it off, it is absolutely necessary to push a strong brigade from Sinde to Candahar without delay. It is five months since the first outbreak at Cabool ; and in all that time, not the least aid has been sent here from Sinde ; on the contrary, our ammunition has been cut off by the unaccountable withdrawal of the important post of Killa Abdoolla ; the company of European Artillery sent from Bengal expressly for Candahar, has been detained for months at Quetta, I should feel obliged if you could forward a copy of this note to Major Outram, or the original.

I am, &c.,

W. NOTT.

P.S.—No important success can be gained here without a good body of cavalry.

No. 297.—*Major-General Nott to Major-General England.*

*Candahar, April 18, 1842.*

SIR,—I have been favored with your letters of the 1st and 10th instant. I have also heard of the affair you had with a party of the enemy on the 28th ultimo, and deeply regret the result. I have attentively perused the Government dispatch of the 15th ultimo, forwarded through you. I have looked at our position in Afghanistan in every point of view that my judgment, aided by three years' experience of its people, will admit of. I now deliberately note what I conceive to be necessary to carry out the intention of the Supreme Government, and to assert and uphold the honor of our country. Even should the Government ultimately deter-

mine on withdrawing the British troops from the right of the Indus, it would be impossible to retire the troops below the passes before October. The troops at Candahar are four months' in arrears, and we have not one rupee in the treasury. In the event of much field service, we should run short of musket-ammunition ; and we are without medicine for the sick and wounded. I think it absolutely necessary that a strong brigade of 2,500 men should be immediately pushed from Quetta to Candahar, with the supplies noted in the foregoing paragraph. I, therefore, have to acquaint you, that I will direct a brigade of three regiments of infantry, a troop of horse artillery, with a body of cavalry, to march from Candahar on the morning of the 25th instant. This force will certainly be at Chummun, at the northern foot of the Kojuck, on the morning of the 1st of May, and possibly on the 30th of this month. I shall, therefore, fully rely on your marching a brigade from Quetta, so that it may reach the southern side of the pass on the above-mentioned date. I believe there can be no difficulty whatever in accomplishing this, nor of crossing the Kojuck without loss, provided the heights are properly crowned on either side. I have crossed it three times in command of troops, and I know that what I now state is correct. There can be no danger in passing through Pisheen, provided a careful and well-ordered march is preserved, and patrols and flanking-parties of horse are thrown well out. The people of this country cannot withstand our troops in the open field. I am well aware that war cannot be made without loss, but I yet hope that British troops can oppose Asiatic armies without defeat ; and I feel and know that British officers should never despair of punishing the atrocious and treacherous conduct of a brutal enemy. You say that you are "not aware if you know the localities of Quetta ;" I know them well and I hope I shall be excused when I express my surprise that the authorities of Quetta should for a moment have thought of throwing up breastworks, and intrenching that straggling and wretched cantonment, when the town and citadel is so well calculated for every purpose which can render a post at all desirable in Shawl, and I am quite certain may be well defended by 500 men. Did I command at Quetta, I would relinquish the cantonment ; it is useless. Quetta is not a place for a large body of troops. I feel obliged to you for pointing out the many difficulties attending our position, but you are well aware that it is our first and only duty to overcome difficulties, when the national honor and our military reputation are so deeply concerned. Nothing can be accomplished without effort and perseverance. In reply to the last paragraph of your letter of the 10th instant, I have only to observe, that I have not yet contemplated falling back ; without money I can neither pay the long arrears due to the troops, nor procure carriage for field operations. I deeply regret this state of things, which ought to have been attended to months ago ; had this been done, I should now have been on my march to Gluznee. I shall fully rely on your brigade being at the Kojuck on the 1st of May or before. This letter I request may be forwarded to Major Outram.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

P.S.—You will of course perceive that I intend that your brigade should join and accompany the detachment sent from this, to Candahar. I have no cattle for treasure or stores.

No. 298.—*Major Outram to Captain Durand, Private Secretary to the Governor-General.*

*Sukkur, May 1, 1842.*

SIR,—Lest his Lordship should be doubtful of the means of moving the troops at Quetta, I give you an estimate of the troops at our disposal there. I presume that the carriage which took the brigade which accompanied or followed Major-General England from Dadur on the 7th March, and subsequently, must be equal to carry on the same force with ten day's provisions (which they took up the pass,) for I calculate that the few camels previously at Quetta, together with what carried the large portion of stores which would remain at Quetta, and some that have been purchased since the troops went up, must more than counterbalance the casualties incurred on the advance to, and retreat from, Hykulzye. These troops are (I roughly estimate the strength of the corps, but believe I am near the mark) :—

One troop Horse Artillery, 6 guns .....	150	
Her Majesty's 41st Regiment .....	750	Bayonets.
6th Regiment Native Infantry .....	850	„
Four Flank Companies .....	400	„
Three troops Light Cavalry .....	220	Swords.
Poonah Horse .....	250	„

2,400

The convoy now going up, and which made the first march into the pass to-day, consists of—

Two 24-pounders, Howitzers .....	50	
One squadron Light Cavalry .....	150	Swords.
One strong regiment Native Infantry .....	1000	Bayonets.
Also one company of European Artillerymen without guns.....	120	

3,600

That convoy took from hence 2,080 camels, of which 1,000 had just arrived from Joudpore; and were reported to have reached Dadur in excellent condition, excepting the smaller portion with the rear wing of the 12th Regiment, which had not arrived actually at Dadur when I last heard, but the accounts regarding them within four marches of Dadur were equally favorable. At Dadur, a considerable quantity of fresh camels had been purchased, which also will, I presume, accompany the convoy, which must thus have a large portion of spare carriage, besides much of the stores carried up by it being only intended for Quetta.

There can be no difficulty, therefore, in General England moving that amount of force, *i. e.*, 3,600 men of all arms, when the 12th Regiment joins, if he does not do so before with a smaller body, which I should not be doubtful or anxious as to the result of, if met by a brigade from Candahar at the Kojuck, nor should I have any fears for Quetta with a single regiment (and artillery) for the short time which would intervene ere the reinforcement got up, having now every confidence that our Brahooe allies will keep faithful, and, so long as they do so, the Kaukers alone would

not dare to oppose Major Reid's strong convoy ; while the Affghans will have enough to do with General England's brigade. The above calculation of 3,600 men being available after Major Reid's junction, is allowing two regiments of Native Infantry and six guns for the garrison of Quetta, which ought to insure the safety of that post. His Lordship will observe in my diary, dispatched to-day, that the officers commanding the Dadur and Sebee posts report their positions perfectly tenable against any native enemy, without further reinforcements, but that my assistants, in charge of Cutch, and with the Khan of Kelat, are quite confident that no attempt will be made upon them.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have received packets from Dadur 28th ultimo, Quetta 23rd, and Candahar the 17th and 18th, the latter containing a copy of a letter from General Nott to General England, the most refreshing draught I have quaffed since our reverses commenced, as giving the best possible assurance that General Nott is fully equal to the powers vested in him,—is fully bent on retrieving our honor, and fully powerful enough to insure his doing so, in conjunction with General Pollock. How fortunate it is Prince Timour has remained faithful throughout, which will greatly facilitate the settlement of the Candahar kingdom, whatever may be done with Cabool. All the gentlemen with me are employed in running off copies of these Candahar dispatches for General Pollock and Mr. Clerk, which will be sent off with this express. Mr. Hammersley writes, in forwarding them, that General England, in consequence of General Nott's orders, was to march on the 26th ultimo with 2,500 men, including all the regular, and nearly all the irregular cavalry, the European company of Bengal artillerymen, troop of horse artillery, &c. Although still far from well, the General goes himself. My assistant at Dadur reports on the 28th instant, "The pass clear,—no want of carriage, camels in abundance for sale and hire." Major Reid's convoy was to march into the pass on the 1st instant (to-day), after closing up the rear wing.

No. 299.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.*

*Allahabad, May 13, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General has received, in a manner which leaves no doubt of its authenticity, a copy of the letter addressed by you, on the 18th ultimo, to Brigadier England, directing that officer to move with 2,500 men upon the Kojuck Pass, and intimating that you would move a force to meet him.

2. Under the circumstances stating by you, of your want of treasure, ammunition, and medicines (with all of which Brigadier England could supply you), the combined movement so directed by you for the purpose of obtaining those supplies, is entirely approved.

3. The Governor-General, however, cannot but express his fear that Brigadier England having been ordered by you to bring on to Candahar the whole force of 2,500 men, with which you instructed him to move

upon the Kojuck Pass, your communications with the country below the pass will remain without any security.

4. Your position, when supplied with treasure, ammunition, medicines, will be more favorable than the Governor-General had reason to suppose it would be, when the instructions of the 19th ultimo were addressed to you; but this improvement of your position is not such as to induce his Lordship to vary those instructions, in so far as they direct your retiring upon Sukkur.

5. That movement you will make at such period and with such precautions as may best conduce to the preservation of the health of your troops and the efficiency of your army. The Governor-General understands that, consistently with the necessary regard to those objects of primary importance, you cannot retire below the passes till October.

6. Neither does the decease of Shah Shooja induce the Governor-General to vary those instructions, in as far as they relate to the measures you were directed to adopt on evacuating the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzye and the city of Candahar.

7. In the present divided state of Afghanistan, the Governor-General is not prepared to recognize any one as the sovereign of that country: but the fidelity of Prince Timour would justify his being put in possession of those places, and of Ghiriskh, on your retiring to the Indus.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 300.—*The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Allahabad, May 14, 1842.*

(Extract.)—I inclose a copy of a letter from Major-General Nott, to Brigadier England, dated the 18th of April, which was transmitted to my Private Secretary by Major Outram, and received here yesterday.

2. I likewise inclose a copy of the letter I addressed yesterday to Major-General Nott.

3. Some dispatch from Major-General Pollock, to me has, I have reason to think, been intercepted, and I have not that intimation of his views which Mr. Clerk appears to have had, when he acknowledged the receipt of your Excellency's orders to Major-General Pollock on the 5th instant.

4. The advance of the season, however, which really renders the retirement of Major-General Pollock at the present moment a measure of some hazard to the health of his troops,—the improved facilities which the Major-General finds of obtaining supplies of provisions,—but, more than all, the influence which those now about him, anxious to vindicate the army by some signal blow against the Affghans, and to effect the restoration of the prisoners to liberty by negotiation supported by force, must necessarily have upon his mind,—all these things induce me to apprehend that it will hardly be until October that the Major-General will commence his homeward march.

5. Your Excellency is of opinion that Major-General Nott cannot safely commence his march to the plains before the same time.

6. It will therefore probably not be until the end of November that the army of Major-General Pollock, nor until the end of December that the army under Major-General Nott, will be established within the British territory.

7. I have hitherto succeeded in preserving absolute secrecy with respect to the intention I entertain as to withdrawing from Afghanistan. I have done so by unusual means, but I deemed it to be essential to the public interests that entire secrecy upon that point should be observed. I feel that the difficulties, with which the two armies would have to contend in making their retreat, would be greatly increased, were the Affghans now acquainted with their intention to retire; and, in order to mislead them upon this point, even were there no other object, I should be disposed to form an army of reserve in a position from which it might advance to the support of either Major-General Pollock, or Major-General Nott, and, at the same time, overawe the states of India; and to make public at once the intention of collecting such an army.

8. I should be happy to be favored with your Excellency's intentions as to the selection of corps, and all the subsidiary arrangements, as early as you can furnish them to me; and the necessary orders shall then at once be given.

9. I think it will be desirable that I should join your Excellency's camp as soon as it is formed, and remain there a few weeks.

10. The army collected should be termed the Army of Reserve, and the camp should be one of exercise in great manœuvres. As many European regiments as we can get together should form a part of the force collected.

No. 301.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, April 19, 1842.*

SIR,—I have this day ordered the force mentioned below, to march to Lundi Khana, and there assist the force under Colonel Bolton, in escorting treasure, ammunition, and grain to this place, should I find it advisable to remain here.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

*Force ordered to march to Lundi Khana, under the command of  
Brigadier Monteath. C. B.*

Five Mountain-train guns.

Two squadrons 10th Light Cavalry.

150 Irregular Horse.

Two Companies Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.

The 33rd, 35th and one wing of 64th Native Infantry.

The Regiment of Jezailchees.

No. 302.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, April 20, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward copy of a letter received from Captain Mackeson, Political Agent, to my address.

I have already stated my views with regard to the Khyber Pass. I have also shown that from the system of supplying carriage-cattle, I have not the means of moving, and the country around cannot supply my wants. To establish depôts or strong posts at intervals on the road between this and Cabool, would so reduce the numerical strength of this force, that by the time it reached the capital it would be too weak to effect the desired object. For several marches no forage is procurable. Even if we had carriage, the conveyance of forage would so increase the number of animals to be protected, that I should much doubt our being able to convoy them in safety; and, I confess, after the treachery we have experienced, I could have no confidence in any promises of support from an Affghan; he might engage to lay in forage at intervals, for the express purpose of leading us into a difficult position, and then glory in having served his own cause, by bringing us to the verge of destruction.

The devastation of a few villages in our vicinity, with all grain and forage, would be a small matter in the eyes of an Affghan, if he could thereby destroy our force—and such a measure would assuredly go near to effect it.

I have maturely considered the question of our advance by this road to Cabool, and I confess that I see too many difficulties to warrant our risking such a course. The force I have the honor to command, if well supplied, is ready to march anywhere, and if I could have advanced by the rout of Candahar, our success would be certain. But to withdraw from this place at the present moment, would enable the enemy to concentrate all their strength in the vicinity of Candahar, which, until the junction of Brigadier England, would embarrass Major-General Nott.

I have not received any communication from any of the native chiefs since the death of Shah Soojah, or of his Naib Ameen Oollah, whose murder appears to be certain, though we have not yet received any particulars.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 303.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, April 24, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy and abstract translation of a letter received from Shah Baz Khan, and Meerza Mahomed Ameer to Mirza Aga Jan, the Governor of the Koorgeeanees, dated 17th instant.

The force said to be in preparation is supposed to be about 10 or 12,000 men, with which I should hardly suppose the enemy would venture on the plains. I am glad to say that supplies are coming in greater quantities daily, and I expect 7,000 maunds of Atta here from Peshawur with the 31st foot, which will, I hope, be at Ah Musjid the day after to-morrow.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

Q Q 2



No. 304.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.**Camp, Jellalabad, April 26, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, that late yesterday afternoon Captain Colin Mackenzie came into the Camp, being the bearer of a letter from Major Pottinger, C.B., a copy of which is enclosed herewith. I have thought it desirable, in communication with Captain Mackenzie, to confine my reply in this instance to the release of the prisoners, and the terms on which that very desirable object may be effected. A copy of my reply is also sent herewith, and I trust it will meet the approbation of his lordship. I regret to state Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., died on the evening of the 23rd instant, about half an hour before Captain Mackenzie left Mahomed Akbar Khan, and the Sirdar promised that the body should be sent to me—it has not yet arrived. I have received a letter written by General Elphinstone to the address of the Secretary to Government; also a narrative of events by him, from the 30th April, 1841, up to the time of his being detained by Mahomed Akbar.

I have also received notes of operations during the siege, drawn up by Lieutenant Eyre, with a request that I will read and forward them to Captain Durand; there are also many other documents in the possession of Captain Macgregor, which it is desirable Government should be in possession of. As this will entail much writing, I have authorised Sir R. Shakespear to engage additional clerks until all are prepared, and any information I may obtain verbally, or in writing, I shall not fail to communicate without delay.

The remaining prisoners were well, and were as well treated as could be expected at the hands of an Affghan.

I have, &amp;c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 305.—*Major Pottinger to Major-General Pollock.**Tezeen, April 20, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward by Captain Colin Mackenzie, the following message from Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan and the Ghilzie Chiefs, Mahomed Shah, Dost Mahomed, Khajewah Mahomed, and Gool Mahomed in Council (they inform me), with Khoda Baksh Khan and Azeez Khan.

The Sirdar wishes to know, in the first place, if we will consent to withdraw the greater part of our troops, and leave an Agent with a small body of men to act with whoever the confederates may elect as chief, in which choice they propose to be guided by the wishes of the two factions in Cabool, and wish us to release Dost Mahomed Khan.

Secondly.—They propose that if the British Government have determined on subjecting the country, and continuing the war, that the prisoners at present in Affghanistan shall be exchanged for Dost Mahomed Khan, his family, and attendants, and that the issue be dependant on the sword.

Thirdly.—In the event of neither of these propositions being approved of, they wish to know what terms will be granted to themselves individu-

ally ; whether we, in the event of their submission, will confine them, send them to India, take hostages from them, reduce their pay, or, in short, what they have to expect from our clemency.

Captain Mackenzie will verbally inform you of the state in which the affairs appear to us here, as well as what we hear of those at Cabool. The leaders appear panic struck, and endeavour to raise reports of our inhumanity and unforgiving nature, the better to keep the lower orders from awaiting our approach ; they have, moreover, recourse to force when any of the clansmen show dilatoriness in moving. If the present overture fails, I understand that the Sirdar intends carrying his prisoners into the Ahmedzay country, and taking refuge in their strong-hold, till he sees the result of your operations against Cabool ; however every day causes him to change his resolution, as it brings fresh news from the different parties throughout the country.

The Sirdar proposed to send Captain Mackenzie, as a person he trusted would act with justice towards him and his party, as well as for the English.

I have, &c.,

E. POTTINGER.

No. 306.—*Major-General Pollock to Major Pottinger.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, April 26, 1842.*

SIR,—The message from Mahomed Akbar Khan and other Chiefs has been communicated to me by Captain Mackenzie.

Kindness and good treatment of our prisoners will meet with due consideration at the hands of Government, and the release of them much more so ; their release would also greatly facilitate further communications between the Governments.

If money be a consideration, I am prepared to pay into the hands of any one deputed by the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan the sum of two lacs of rupees whenever the prisoners shall be delivered to me in this Camp.

Security for the payment of the money will be given in the way the Sirdar may point out, the accommodation being mutual.

Mahomed Shah Khan, Dost Mahomed Khan, and Khojeh Mahomed Khan, (his brothers), to enjoy the advantages arising from their hereditary possessions.

Speed is necessary to evince sincerity, the good faith of the British Government is manifest.

The other points contained in your communication must remain for future consideration.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 307.—*Captain Lawrence Mr. Clerk's Assistant, attached to Major-General Pollock, to Mr. Clerk.*

*Peshawur, April 25, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to inform you that Rajah Golab Sing has consented to lend me 3,000 maunds of atta, delivering them the day after

to-morrow at Ali Musjid. This, with the 2,000 maunds now being carried for us by the camels of the Sikh troops, will make up the amount of grain dispatched from Peshwaur, to be not less than 10,000 maunds, being double the quantity stated by Captain Mackeson as sufficient to relieve the troops at Jellalabad from their temporary difficulties.

Colonel Bolton's detachment marched this morning, and will be at Ali Musjid to-morrow. I follow them to Jumrood immediately, and shall accompany the column to-morrow. Yesterday I procured hostages, eighteen in number, from the Kokie Kheil and Malik Kheil; the latter, occupying the road beyond Ali Musjid, had hitherto refused to give hostages.

I have, &c.,

II. M. LAWRENCE.

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No. 308.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, April 28, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to report that Captain Mackenzie will return this evening with my reply to the message received from Major Pottinger. I have had a good deal of conversation with Captain Mackenzie on the subject of the message; he is of opinion, that although the name of Dost Mahomed has been introduced as if most anxious for his release, that in reality the Sirdars have scarcely a hope that their wishes will be attended to; but that their anxiety as to the third proposition is very great; that they are anxious to submit, but dread the climate of India, or a residence in London. Of this I was duly apprised before I wrote my reply; it was a point on which I could not offer an opinion, but one on which Captain Mackenzie would undoubtedly be questioned. I have, therefore, instructed him to anticipate any question which might be put, by being the first to say that the third proposition had been duly noticed by me, but that, at this stage of the affair, I did not consider it expedient to commit anything to paper, as the release of our prisoners would be the first indication on their part of good faith; that being accomplished, I should be better prepared to listen to any future overtures from the chiefs.

There was a fourth proposition or message, which was from Mahomed Akbar alone, delivered verbally to Captain Mackenzie, in the presence of Major Pottinger, but without the knowledge of even his cousin, Sooltan Jan. It related, as may be supposed, to himself and his own prospects, in the event of his submission. He instanced our treatment of Ameer Khan, who had long been our powerful enemy, and wished particularly to know what he might expect from our clemency, being willing to separate himself entirely from the faction now opposed to us. His position is evidently different from the others. That he was the murderer of the Envoy, there cannot be a question; and he evidently feels his guilt to be almost an insuperable bar to any terms from us; but he also feels that he has possession of the persons of our countrymen, and that circumstance seem to hold out to him a hope that his proffers of submission will meet with a favourable reception.

I think there can be no doubt that the Sirdar will again address me through Major Pottinger or Captain Mackenzie; I shall therefore be glad

to be put in possession of the views of Government in this point in particular with as little delay as practicable.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 309.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, May 15, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General to inform you that your letter, apparently communicating certain propositions from Mahomed Akbar (referred to in your letter of the 28th ultimo) has not been received.

2. If those propositions related to the exchange of prisoners, you have been already instructed as to the principles upon which, alone, such exchange can be made, in my letter of the 25th ultimo; and you have been informed by my letter of the 28th ultimo, that you may negotiate for such exchange with a *de facto* Government.

The Governor-General is at a loss to imagine what propositions, relating to himself, Mahomed Akbar can have laid before you. That person is not only the acknowledged murderer of the late Sir W. Macnaghten, but he deceived and betrayed a British army into a position in which it was destroyed.

4. It is not consistent with the honor of the British Government to enter into any terms for the making of a provision for so great a criminal. We might engage to spare his life, if he were to fall into our hands, because it would be difficult so to bring him to trial as to protect the Government from a colorable charge of violently prosecuting an unworthy revenge; but no more than this can be done, and this only, if he should promptly do all he can to repair the crimes he has committed.

I have, &c.

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 310.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, April 29, 1842.*

SIR,—I beg to state, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, that a report has reached me of Timoor Shah Zadah having left Candahar on his way to Cabool, although the report is not of such a nature that I can vouch for its truth. I think it very probable that the Prince may proceed to Cabool on hearing of his father's death; and, having already heard from Eutteh Jung, I may expect to have a message from the eldest son, Timoor; it is therefore in the expectation of such a communication that I beg to be informed of the intentions of Government, relating to the family of the late Shah Shooja.

When I have received the instructions of Government on this point, I shall take the liberty of suggesting whatever may appear to me to be desirable as to the movements of this force. I hope I shall have authority to move forward gradually, which, under existing circumstances, will have a much better effect than moving at once to Gundannuck, and then halting a long period.

If, as I hope, it be intended that I should advance either this year or early the next, I would strongly recommend that two 18-pounders, with an ample supply of ammunition, be sent without delay. In this country, every town is a fortified place. The bullocks, for the battering guns, should be picked and of the best kind ; and, considering the difficulty of the roads, to ensure efficiency, I would recommend a double set of bullocks. An artillery officer and men, with blacksmiths and carpenters should accompany the guns ; and whatever guard may be sent with them, instructions should be given for fatigue parties to accompany and assist the guns, to prevent their detention on the road. When the cattle are not only fatigued by a long march, but are kept from their food the greater part of the day, they very soon become unfit for any work.

With reference to the want of cattle with this force, I think it might, in a great measure, be remedied and with advantage, if Mr. Clerk were authorized to purchase mules and yaboos in the Punjaub. These animals abound in the Punjaub, and are of superior description ; they are very hardy animals and eat almost anything, whereas the camel of the Punjaub or of Hindoostan (of which we must have some) does not thrive in this country.

Camels of this country are sometimes procurable here, but there are none at present, for the alarm at the approach of this force seems to have driven every living creature to the hills—they are, however, now returning. In consequence of the absurd arrangement of hiring camels to Jellalabad and no further, I in common with many others am now distressed for carriage, and it is difficult to say how we can procure any. Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton lost nearly 300 camels by desertion before he reached Peshawur.

If my proposal for Mr. Clerk to purchase animals in the Punjaub be sanctioned a forward movement even to Cabool might be effected, if General Nott could move in concert.

I hope, in a day or two, to have authentic information from Cabool of the state of affairs, which was not, by the last account, at all settled.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 311.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Bushby, Secretary to the Government of India, at Fort William.*

*Allahabad, May 7, 1842.*

SIR,—In transmitting to you the letter from Major-General Pollock, dated the 24th ultimo, which encloses authenticated copies of the several letters addressed in December and January last, by Captain Lawrence and Major E. Pottinger to Captain Macgregor, with reference to the treaty entered into at Cabool, for securing the retreat of the army, to that retreat, and the subsequent disaster, and to the condition of the hostages and prisoners in the hands of the enemy, I am directed by the Governor-General to suggest to the President in Council that these documents, and all other documents relating to the conduct of the military and political authorities at Cabool, during the last three months of 1841, and in January, 1842, should be now placed in the hands of some perfectly

impartial person, for the purpose of separating, as far as possible, such documentary evidence as relates to the military officers from such as relates to the political agents; and submitting to the Government a report upon which may be founded any charges to be preferred against the former before a court-martial, and against the latter before a court of enquiry.

2. The Governor-General is persuaded that the President in Council will feel with him that the selection of the person to whom these several documents are to be submitted, and by whom such report is to be made, is a matter of the highest importance, with a view to the satisfaction of the public mind, as well as to the instruction of Government itself; and his Lordship suggests that Mr. Cameron, the Law Commissioner, should be requested to undertake the office.

3. That gentleman having no connection either with the military or civil service, and being accustomed to bring the powers of an acute and accurate mind to the consideration of subjects with judicial impartiality, will be most competent to analyse the evidence, and to report upon it in a satisfactory manner.

4. If Mr. Cameron should be willing to undertake this office for the accommodation of the Government, the Governor-General suggests that the President in Council should at once make public the concluding paragraphs (2nd and 3d) of Major-General Pollock's letter of the 24th ultimo, and announce that the several documents therein mentioned, and all others relating to the subject have been placed in Mr. Cameron's hands, for the purpose of investigation and report, upon which formal enquiry may be instituted.

5. It is, in the opinion of the Governor-General, of much importance that no delay whatever should take place, or appear to take place, in the redemption of the pledge given by the Government in the notification of the 4th ultimo, which accompanied the despatch announcing the surrender of Ghuznee.

6. The Governor-General has addressed a private letter to Mr. Cameron requesting him to undertake the duty of so analysing the documents relating to the disasters at Cabool.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 312.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Allahabad, June 8, No. 15, 1842.*

HONORABLE SIRS,—The short period which has elapsed since the date of my last letter to your Committee, though not marked by any events of striking importance, bearing on our relations with Afghanistan, has still been productive of considerable changes in the position of affairs in that country, and in the prospect of our early withdrawal of our armies from thence.

2. I must refer your Committee to the various inclosures which accompany this letter, which is a mere abstract of their contents, and de-

signed to give you, in a small compass, such information of importance as they contain.

3. In the thirty-first paragraph of my letter of the 17th ult. to your Committee, I alluded to certain proposals which had been made by Mahomed Akbar Khan, to Major-General Pollock. Of the nature of these proposals, and the manner in which they had been received by the Major-General, I was then uninformed, for the despatches in which they were reported had been forwarded by mistake to Calcutta, and were not returned from thence till after the despatch of the last month's mail.

4. From these documents, and the further negotiation which has been carried on by Major-General Pollock for the release of the British prisoners still in the power of Mahomed Akbar, it will be seen that the terms of Mahomed Akbar's first proposal were, first, that we should withdraw the greater part of our army, and leave an agent with a small body of troops, to act with some one chosen by the two contending parties at Cabool, and that we should release Dost Mahomed Khan. Secondly, that if we determined to subjugate Afghanistan, the issue of that must depend on the fortune of war; but in the meantime the British prisoners in Afghanistan to be exchanged for Dost Mahomed Khan, his family, and attendants; and in the event of neither of those proposals being agreed to, the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar desired to be informed what terms would be granted to him and the other insurgent chiefs on their submission.

5. The only point to which Major-General Pollock referred in his reply to these proposals was that relating to the release of the British prisoners, and, for this, he offered to pay the sum of two lacs of rupees.

6. From the reply, which I directed to be made to the Major-General, you will perceive that I could not approve of the offer which had been made to ransom the British prisoners, but such offer having been made before the Major-General received the Secretary's letter of April 25, I could not refuse to sanction it, if any negotiation should have been brought to effect upon that basis. I regretted that any necessity should have arisen of diplomatic correspondence with Mahomed Akbar.

7. Your honorable Committee will perceive that, subsequent to the opening of this negotiation, the affairs of Cabool, where Futtch Jung, a son of the late Shah Shooja, had been raised to the throne by a party headed by Ameen Oollah, who is considered a chief not inimical to the British, and was opposed by another party headed by the chiefs of Barukzyes, fell into such a state of disorder, that Mahomed Akbar was invited, or himself resolved to repair to the capital, where he was by the last accounts employed in strengthening his party, and laying his plans to bring the prince Futtch Jung under his own control, and to possess himself of the Bala Hissar, and all the wealth and property of the late Shah.

8. This altered state of his own prospects, led the Sirdar to send to Major-General Pollock a second series of proposals, couched in a far higher tone than the first. No official report on the subject, nor the reply of the Major-General to the last proposals, have yet reached me officially, but they appear to be, for the most part, quite inadmissible.

9. It appears, from the accounts that I have received from Cabool, that, although the Barukzye party succeeded in capturing some of the

small forts in the neighbourhood of the Bala Hissar, from which the garrison drew their provisions, their attempts on the fortress itself proved abortive, and they were therefore induced to enter into terms with the prince, through Ameen Oollah, the ostensible object being to unite all Mussulmans against the British power; but the real object of Mahomed Akbar and the Barukzyes being to obtain, eventually, possession of the Bala Hissar, and the guns and munitions of war, and the treasure contained therein.

10. Meanwhile, Major-General Pollock's force, amounting to upwards of about 12,000 men, has remained stationary at Jellalabad. It has been prevented from either moving forward, or of retiring, according to my wish, to a more secure position on this side of the Khyber Pass, from a deficiency of carriage-cattle, which has arisen from some faulty arrangements in the Commissariat Department, in arranging with the owners of camels, hired to accompany the different brigades of Major-General Pollock's army, that they should be discharged on reaching Jellalabad. I hope that greater efficiency will now be introduced into this department, and that a sufficiency of carriage-cattle will soon be pushed on to Jellalabad. The season is now, however, too far advanced to make it probable that Major-General Pollock will be able to commence a retrograde movement for some months, and my instructions to him have provided for the manner of employing his army if he should be thus detained beyond the Khyber Pass. According to the latest accounts from Jellalabad, the troops there remained healthy and supplies of provisions were coming in abundantly.

11. Your honorable-Committee's attention will be particularly drawn to the interesting report, by Major-General Sir R. Sale, of the siege of Jellalabad; and I need not press upon your notice the services of those officers who are named and recommended to distinction by the Major-General. The able services of Captain Macgregor, the Political Officer, at Jellalabad, have been specially acknowledged by me on the occasion of my abolishing the office of Political Agent at that place, as no longer necessary.

12.—Your honourable Committee will peruse with deep interest the observations of the late Major-General Elphinstone, Major Pottinger, Captains Macgregor, Mackenzie, Conolly, and Mohun Lal Lallea, native of Hindoostan, formerly in the service of Sir W. Macnaghten and Sir A. Burnes, on the causes of the late insurrection in Cabool. These papers I have caused to be printed at a press which has been attached to the office of the political secretary of the Government of India, in attendance on me. They will be communicated to Mr. Cameron, to assist him in the enquiry on which he is employed; and I shall send six copies along with this despatch for the use of your honourable Committee. The Political Secretary has attached a note to these papers to guard against an impression, which the perusal of them might otherwise create, of the measures which are said to have caused the insurrection having been specifically sanctioned and enjoined by the Government of India.

13. On the side of Caudahar, the interruption of communication by the Kojuck Pass has deprived me of the information, which I might otherwise have possessed, of the position of the army under Major-General Nott, and of the plans of that officer.



14. The following items of intelligence are derived from private communications received by Major Outram, and sent, for my information, in an unofficial shape.

15. After the repulse of Major-General England's brigade in the Pisheen country, near Hykulzye, that officer retreated to Quettah, and commenced fortifying the lines and town of that name. To this measure Major-General Nott objected, as calculated to produce an unfavourable impression; and directed Major-General England again to advance on the Kojuck Pass, where he would be assisted against all opposition to his passage, with his convoy of treasure, ammunition, medicines, &c. &c., by a strong force, principally of Infantry, that was to be detached from Candahar, to meet him. Major-General England accordingly marched from Quettah on the 26th of April, and although the enemy offered opposition near the same ground where they had before succeeded in checking his advance, the opposition was easily overcome, and the Major-General performed his march to Candahar with little further interruption.

16. Major-General Nott, since the arrival of this reinforcement, had resolved on the dispersion of the small parties of insurgents who remained attached to Prince Sufdur Jung, and a detachment had been sent out for the purpose, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Stacy.

17. The Prince Timoor Shah, eldest son of Shah Shooja, remains at Candahar, determined, apparently, not to make any effort for the assertion of his own rights of succession, or to undertake any operation on his own account without the full sanction and consent of the British Government.

18. Major-General Nott complains of the difficulty of procuring camels for the carriage of his army.

19. Everything remained quiet in the Ghilzie country, and the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie was unmolested. The same observation applies to the country near the Helmund and the frontiers of Girishk.

20. No effort had been made by the authorities at Herat, or the Candahar refugees, to add to our embarrassments at Candahar, from the prevalence of the insurrection in that neighbourhood, and the interruption of the communication between those provinces and Shawl and Sinde.

21. The councils of the young Chief, at Kelat, have remained pacific and friendly to the British Government, and under the judicious arrangements of Major Outram, the tribes of Cutchee, and those bordering on the Bolau Pass, have shown no symptoms of hostility.

25. The most friendly intercourse continues to be maintained by Mr. Clerk, my agent on the north-west frontier, and the Court of Lahore. The Maha Raja has himself proceeded to the westward, to give the weight of his own presence and influence, for the purpose of restoring order and discipline in his army. Discussions have taken place between the Sikh commanders, at Peshawur, and the British authorities, as to the positions to be occupied by the divisions of their force which may pass the Khyber.

26. The Maha Raja, Shere Sing, appears to entertain a desire to be put in possession of the fort and district of Jellalabad, on the British army finally evacuating that country; and this rather with a view to the renown attending such an accession to his territories than from any well-considered views of the consequences of such an extension of his dominions.

27. Mr. Clerk has been authorised and instructed to explain generally to the Maha Raja the line of policy which it appears to me expedient for the future to adopt towards Affghanistan. He will inform his Highness that since the death of Shah Shooja, and the present anarchy prevailing at Cabool, the tripartite treaty must be regarded as extinct ; but that I shall be prepared to enter into a new engagement with the Sikh state, the principal condition of which is that the Sikh Government will not acknowledge any ruler of Affghanistan without the previous recognition of the British Government.

27. Mr. Clerk is about to return to Lahore, where I have considered his presence to be highly desirable, while measures are in contemplation for the transfer of territory beyond the Khyber Pass to the Sikh Government, and while preparations are making for the eventual march of the large army under General Pollock's command, through the Maha Rajah's territory.

28. Rajah Goolaub Sing, on leaving Peshawur, proceeded in the direction of Cashmere, to collect his forces and organize his plans for the defence of Ladakh, against the threatened invasion of the Tibetan army from Lassa, by which Zarawur Singh was overpowered.

29. The ex Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan has been removed from Saharumpore to Mussorie, for the advantage of the climate of the latter station. He has been suffering from fever, but is reported convalescent.

30. I have announced the intention of Government to form a large army of reserve in the Sirhind territory, after the rains.

31. The inclosure to the document noted in the margin,\* is a report from Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., detailing the progress of events during the long and perilous siege, sustained by the force under his command, at Jellalabad. Major-General Pollock brings to the notice of Government the gallantry evinced by Major-General Sir R. Sale, and his small force, during the above eventful period ; and several officers, both in the service of Her Majesty and the honourable Company, who have distinguished themselves, are recommended for honorary distinctions, or brevet rank, or both. A list of these officers will be found in the report of Sir R. Sale, adverted to above. The officers of all ranks, and soldiers of all Arms, European and Native, are likewise represented as generally and individually deserving of reward and encouragement. Major-General Pollock states that he has had an opportunity of inspecting the works thrown up for their protection, by the indefatigable exertions of Sir R. Sale's force ; and that his surprise at their strength and extent was only equalled by his admiration of the excellent arrangement which must have pervaded all departments : since, after a siege of upwards of five months' duration, he found the garrison in excellent health and spirits, and in admirable state of discipline, with a good supply of ammunition, ready and anxious to take the field, and most willing to advance on Cabool.

32. In the letter from Mohun Lal, the intelligent moonshee of the late Sir A. Burnes, which forms one of the inclosures of the letter from Major-General Pollock, of the date noted in the margin,† your honours-

ble Committee will be put in possession of the manner in which the King Shah Shoojah ool Moolk, was, on the 5th April, treacherously murdered by a son of Nawab Mahomed Zeman Khan. It would appear that Prince Futteh Jung was placed on the throne of his deceased father on the 6th April, and that, at the same time, Nawab Mahomed Zeman Khan also declared himself to be king. Both parties collected adherents, but that of the Prince was the most numerous and formidable, owing to his having come in possession of the wealth (said to be twenty lacs, besides a considerable quantity of jewellery) which had been hoarded up by the late Shah. Various are the conflicts between these two factions which are stated to have taken place at Cabool; with varied success on both sides. Nawab Zeman Khan, after having beaten Naib Ameen Oollah and the Populzies, had offered the crown to Mahomed Akbar Khan, he himself being content to be Vizier; and again Mahomed Akbar Khan had made the same proposal to Prince Futteh Jung, offering to be Vizier under him, which proposition is said to have been acceded to by the Prince, under an apprehension that otherwise the Bala Hissar would be delivered up by Ameen Oollah to Mahomed Akbar, and being at the time deserted by his partizans, a few Arabs and about 1,500 Indians being all that were left in the Bala Hissar. Prince Futteh Jung finding his position insecure, frequently urged on the British authorities at Jellalabad to advance with their troops on Cabool; but, though willing to do so, Major-General Pollock has not found it practicable to move forward, for reasons which will be noticed in a subsequent paragraph. The Major-General, however, seemed to doubt the sincerity of Prince Futteh Jung, as the negotiations which were on foot at Cabool were said to be for the purpose of gaining time—whether they would ultimately unite all parties, remained to be seen. He observed that the compact between Mahomed Akbar and the Prince was a very unnatural one, and was entered into by the Prince solely on account of his weakness. The emissaries who brought the above intelligence reported that when all parties were agreed, Mahomed Akbar would march a force against Jellalabad. This resolve appeared to form an article in every overture made by Mahomed Akbar; but the Major-General was of opinion that he would hardly venture to try again his strength with the British troops, after the signal defeat he sustained on the 7th April, from the troops under Sir R. Sale, which had caused great consternation among the rebels in Cabool, particularly the Barukzies. The utmost confusion and disunion was, from all accounts, prevailing at Cabool.

33. The correspondence specified in the margin\* relates to the case of the officers who were serving with the force under Major-General Pollock, and had been formerly in the service of the late Shah Shoojah. The Major-General wished to be informed as to what was the intention of Government in regard to them. He was informed accordingly that the several crops in the service of the late Shah Shoojah could not be held to have survived that Sovereign, and that from the day of his death all the officers in question must be considered to have been placed at his disposal, and could only receive from that day the pay and allowances which they would have received if serving in Afghanistan with the corps to

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\* From Major-General Pollock, April 20, to ditto, May 19.

which they severally belong in the service of the company. As respects the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates of the several corps late in the Shah's service, their service was in the same manner considered to have ceased from the day of the Shah's demise ; but the Major-General was authorised to issue to them the pay and allowances to which they would have been severally entitled in the Shah's service from that day, as a temporary arrangement. The Major-General was likewise apprised of my desire to frame some satisfactory arrangement, by which the service of these men may be continued, should they desire it.

34. In regard to the advance on Cabool, Major-General Pollock and his gallant forces were ready and willing to march anywhere, but a want of carriage, cattle and forage, have compelled him to remain stationary at Jellalabad. This difficulty is ascribable to the mismanagement in hiring camels only to Jellalabad, and in neglecting to make other arrangements, which might have prevented the embarrassment which ensued from their being engaged to go only to Jellalabad, and be discharged there. In consequence of this, and with a view to prevent a recurrence of similar inconvenience, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was addressed on the 1st instant, suggesting to his Excellency the expediency of entrusting to some one officer (out of the usual routine) the sole duty, and thus imposing upon him the sole responsibility of making such purchases and hirings of camels and other animals as may be required for the effectual equipment of Major-General Pollock's forces ; of placing all the officers now employed for such purposes, whether political or military, in communication with, and (for such purpose) in subordination to, such chief officer ; and of directing such chief officer to furnish to his Excellency, to me, and to Major-General Pollock, weekly returns of his proceedings. The name of Major-General Battine, commanding at Ferozepore, having been brought to my notice as a valuable and energetic officer, I hinted to his Excellency that, in the event of his nominating either that officer, or the Quartermaster General of the Army, I would be prepared to invest the officer selected with the requisite authority.

35. In the inclosure of the letter from Major-General Pollock, dated 12th May, will be found a copy of the instructions issued to that officer by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, under date the 29th April last, as to the mode in which the retreat of the troops from Jellalabad to Peshawur was to be carried into effect, under my orders of the 19th April. On the 20th May, the Major-General, in reply to the letter addressed to him on the 4th, again represented the difficulty under which he laboured in procuring camels at Jellalabad ; and, under the circumstances stated, requested that he might be permitted to defer his retrograde movement until the month of October or November next. But you will perceive elsewhere\* that circumstances, connected with the disorganization of the Sikh troops in the rear of our army in Affghanistan, make me more earnestly desire the speedy return of that army to the Sutlej ; and that, in order to enable Major-General Pollock to meet any

\* Letters to Commander-in-Chief, and G. G., Agent, N. W. F., 23rd May.

difficulties in procuring carriage and supplies, treasure to the amount of ten lacs has been directed to be sent to Jellalabad.

36. A syce, who had been in the service of Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer at Ghuznee, had reached Jellalabad, and made the following statement regarding the destruction of the greater part of the force, which had been stationed in that fortress. Nine gentlemen\* were prisoners in the citadel, and about 100 sepoy were kept in the neighbouring villages. The sepoy were induced to give up their arms, on Shumsoodeen swearing on the Koran that he would give them a safe escort to Hindoostan; after which the Ghazecs commenced plundering them, when the sepoy fled and were either made prisoners or murdered. Lieutenant Lumsden and his wife were both killed on this occasion.

37. Captain Colin Mackenzie, one of the captives with Mahomed Akbar Khan, was sent by that chief to Jellalabad, and was the bearer of a letter from Major Pottinger. The following is the purport of the message sent by Mahomed Akbar. In the first place, he wished to know whether the British authorities will consent to withdraw the greater portion of our troops, and leave an agent, with a small body of men, to act with whoever the confederates may elect as chief (in which choice they proposed to be guided by the wishes of the two factions in Cabool), and he wished us to release his father, Dost Mahomed Khan. Secondly, he proposed that if the British Government has determined on subjecting the country and continuing the war, the prisoners in Afghanistan be exchanged for Dost Mahomed Khan, his family and attendants, and that the issue be dependent on the sword. Lastly, that in the event of neither of these propositions being approved of, he wished to know what terms would be granted to himself and the Ghilzie chiefs individually? whether we, in the event of their submission, will confine them, reduce their pay, or, in short, what is it that they have to expect from our clemency? The Major-General, in his reply, deemed it proper to confine himself to the release of the prisoners, and the terms on which that desirable object may be effected. Those terms were, that kindness and good treatment of the prisoners would meet with due consideration at the hands of the British Government, and the release of them much more so; and that their release would also greatly facilitate further communications between the two authorities: that, if money be a consideration, the Major-General was prepared to pay into the hands of any one deputed by the Sirdar, the sum of two lacs of rupees, whenever the prisoners should be delivered to him. That the security for the payment of the money would be given in the way the Sirdar may point out, the accommodation being mutual: that Mahomed Shah Khan, Dost Mahomed Khan, and Khajah Mahomed Khan (his brothers) would enjoy the advantages arising from their hereditary possessions: and that the other points contained in the Sirdar's communication, must remain for future consideration.

38. In acknowledging this letter from the Major-General, it was observed that to the first of Mahomed Akbar's propositions, it was inconsistent with honour and safety to accede.

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\* Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, Political Agent, Captain Alston, Lieutenant Harris, Lieutenant Pratt, Lieutenant Barnes (blind from wounds,) Ensign Williams Ensign Nicholson, Doctor (name not known), Lieutenant Crawford, Bombay Cavalry.

The Major-General was further informed, that under paragraph 13 of the instructions issued to him on 24th February last, he was authorised to speak of "the release of Dost Mahomed Khan, as an event which, under various contingencies of circumstances, might not be altogether impossible," and the death of Shah Soojah having evidently removed one obstacle to the release of Dost Mahomed Khan, I expressed my regret that the Major-General did not speak of that event, at least in the cautious terms he was authorised to employ. The third proposition was clearly one to which no reply could be made. I further observed, that the instructions of the 25th April will have placed him at liberty to negotiate for a general exchange of prisoners, not excluding Dost Mahomed Khan, and expressed my hope that he may have been enabled to conclude an arrangement upon that basis. The Major-General was informed that should he have pledged himself to the payment of any money for the release of any individual prisoner, under my previous instructions of the 24th February, I would sanction the same; but that after the receipt by him of my orders of the 25th April, he should adhere to the instructions they conveyed. I also stated, that I regretted the Major-General should have considered it to be necessary to have any diplomatic communication with Mahomed Akbar Khan, in whom it was impossible to place any trust.

39. Captain Mackenzie was sent a second time to Jellalabad, with very extravagant proposals from Mahomed Akbar Khan, which will be found detailed in a letter from Major Pottinger, forming inclosure of a demi-official communication from Major-General Pollock, dated the 8th May. Major Pottinger stated that Mahomed Akbar Khan felt disappointed with the offer made to him regarding the release of the prisoners—especially as not receiving any reply to his own overture: and advocated strongly the expediency, under existing circumstances, of conciliating, and thereby causing the separation from the Mahomedan cause, of one of its most powerful branches, the Ghilzies.

40. I regret to announce to your honourable Committee the death, on the 23rd April, of Major-General Elphinstone, said to have been hastened by the fatigue and privations endured by him in his captivity. The body of the deceased General was sent to, and interred at Jellalabad. Two letters which had been written by General Elphinstone, the one dated at Cabool, 8th December, 1841, and the other at Buddeabad, 23rd February, 1842, (copies of which accompany this dispatch), were forwarded to me in a letter from Major-General Pollock, dated 27th April last. From the first of these, addressed to the Envoy and Minister, it will be perceived that Major-General Elphinstone had strongly advised a retreat from Cabool under the critical position of affairs consequent on the outbreak at that capital.

41. In the same dispatch from Major-General Pollock will be found certain questions put by him to Captain Mackenzie, on the occasion of that officer's embassy to Jellalabad, together with replies to them, regarding the late disasters at Cabool. It will be observed in Captain Mackenzie's reply to the fourth question, that he denied the report, that at the interview between Sir W. Macnaghten and Mahomed Akbar, the late Captain Trevor had fired at the Sirdar: and he confirmed what had become somewhat doubtful, that the late Envoy met his death by the hands of Mahomed Akbar himself.

42. In a letter from Moonshee Mohun Lal, dated Cabool, 9th May (inclosed in a dispatch from Major-General Pollock, dated 15th May, No. 47), your honourable Committee will observe that, notwithstanding the vigilance observed in strictly guarding Dost Mahomed Khan within our provinces, it is alleged that he had found means to communicate with his son Mahomed Akbar. Captain Nicolson has been informed of this circumstance, and desired that in case he shall be enabled to intercept any letters to or from Dost Mahomed Khan, he will transmit them for my information, and furnish copies of them to my agent on the north-western frontier.

43. I have deemed it necessary to relieve Captain Macgregor from his political duties at Jellalabad, and have placed his services at the disposal of Major-General Pollock. In communicating this resolution to Captain Macgregor, I took the opportunity of according to him my approbation of the able and zealous manner in which he had discharged his duties as Assistant Political Agent. Major-General Pollock was, at the same time, informed that in the event of his having occasion for the services of any officer in the negotiation of any arrangement for the exchange of prisoners, or other duties, his secretary, Sir R. Shakespear, might be so employed.

44. With a view to keep myself regularly informed of the state of the army serving in Afghanistan, its means of supply, movements, &c., Major-General Pollock was, on the 29th ultimo, requested to submit periodical statements, furnishing the information required, together with a report of the actual position of the several parties in Upper Afghanistan.

45. The documents noted in the margin\* forwarded in a demi-official communication from Major Outram, is a report from Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar, of his having dispersed a rebel force of 12,000 men, of which one-half were well-mounted cavalry, under the command of Prince Sufdar Jung, and other Afghan Chiefs, to which allusion was made in my last month's dispatch. The enemy having approached close to Candahar, Major-General Nott made the necessary arrangements for the safety of the city, and, leaving a garrison of about 2,000 men in it, moved with the remainder of his force against the enemy, who retired as he advanced. They were driven first across the Turunk, and then across the Argundab. They would not allow the infantry to come in contact with them. On the 9th of March, the General got near enough to open his guns upon the enemy with great effect, when they were soon broken, and fled. The Major-General states that want of good cavalry saved them from being totally destroyed, and that they were dispersed in every direction. During a march of five days, opposed to the enemy, not a camel was taken or a particle of baggage lost. The conduct of the artillery and infantry was said to be excellent. During the Major-General's absence, a strong detachment of the enemy made an attempt on the city, and succeeded in burning one of the gates, but they were repulsed with great loss, by the gallantry of the troops in garrison under the command of Major Lane, of the 2nd Bengal Native Infantry.

46. Major Rawlinson, Political Agent at Candahar, states, in a letter

\* From Major-General Nott, dated March 12.

dated 2nd April, that Prince Sudfar Jung had expressed bitter repentance for what he had done ; but that if he would again be received into favor, he will go to Cabool, join his father (the late Shah Shooja), fight upon the side of the British Government, and after performing service in our behalf, look to restoration of our confidence in him. The Prince was expected to come in to Colonel Stacy.

47. In a despatch from the Political Agent, Sinde and Beloochestan, dated 8th of May, that officer forwarded copy of a letter addressed by Major-General Nott to the Secretary to the Government, on the 18th of March last, the original of which had not reached him.

The following is a summary of the position of Major-General Nott, as detailed in the report adverted to :—The total amount of the force under his command was stated to be 7,000 of all the arms (exclusive of sick and wounded), 700 of which were Cavalry of a very inferior description. The extent of the walls of the city is so considerable, that he conceived a garrison of 3,000 men would be barely sufficient for its defence, in the event of the troops being employed on distant operations in the field, thus leaving scarcely 4,000 troops, including the Cavalry, to oppose the enemy, and to guard a long train of provision and carriage-cattle. The Major-General then represents the want of money (troops and establishments at Candahar being four months in arrear), medicines for the sick, and ammunition ; for all these he repeatedly applied in vain to the authorities in Sinde. The want of draught and baggage cattle was also felt, without which no movement could take place, nor was there money to purchase any. The Major-General observes, that an unnecessary alarm had been created regarding the position of the troops at Candahar, and of the strength and power of the enemy, and that if he had been reinforced with a single regiment of cavalry, he is confident that he could long since have tranquillized or subdued the rebellious feeling in the provinces dependant on Candahar ; and that a very few additional troops from Sinde, to garrison Candahar, would have set him free from his present difficult position, and have enabled him to march to Ghuznee and Cabool ; but although six months had elapsed since the outbreak at that city, no aid of any kind had been sent to him. The Major-General adds, that Prince Timoor, the eldest son of the late Shah Shoojah, appeared to be sincerely attached to the British Government ; that he had formed no party, and that he possessed no influence in the country.

48. Major-General Nott reported further, that he had frequent communications with the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, which was well supplied with provisions and water, and that he had no intention of withdrawing the troops from that post for the present.

49. In reference to the measure indicated in the despatch of 21st of April, to the address of Major-General Nott, Major Outram\* forwarded extracts from his demi-official communications of the 2nd and 6th of January last, to the Private Secretary to the late Governor-General, containing his opinion of the policy it would be necessary to adopt with respect to the principality of Kelat. Major Outram is of opinion, that in the event of our retirement from Candahar, pecuniary aid should be substituted for military support to the Khanate of Kelat, which may be

\* Letter dated 8th May.



estimated at one and a half lac annually, and that it could be so arranged, in the shape of commutation for tolls, and remuneration for protection of merchandise throughout the Khan's territory, as would prevent any objectionable appearance to such arrangement. Should it be resolved to abandon the Kelat territory entirely, Major Outram would advocate the assumption, by the British Government, of the entire management of the whole of the Sukkur and Shikarpore districts on fair terms to the Ameers, as the means of rendering our power on the Indus invulnerable.

50. I deemed it proper to direct Major Outram, that with reference to the relative positions of himself and Major-General Nott, whenever his correspondence embraced matters of a political nature, he should communicate it through the Major-General.

51. The following are scraps of intelligence gleaned from Major Outram's communications.

52. Major-General England's column was expected to enter Candahar, on the 10th of May.

53. Colonel Stacy intended to move, on the 12th of May, with his brigade to Char Shukkur, some 35 miles from Candahar, to break up the Gazeer camp, and to destroy some of their most notorious villages.

54. Major-General Nott intended going with whatever force he could carry supplies for, in support of Major-General Pollock.

55. Everything was stated to be quiet in the Ghilzie country.

56. From the digest of intelligence furnished periodically by the Political Agent in Sind and Beloochistan, the following items are transferred to this letter for your honourable Committee's information.

From 2d to 8th of May.

Major-General England has carried the heights at Hykulzie, on the 28th of April, the enemy scarcely attempting resistance, and only ten being wounded on our side, among whom was an officer of Cavalry, Ashburner.

From 16th to 22d of May.

Toork Ali, leader of the Jekraees, had interceded for his pardon, and for his re-employment in the service of Government; to which the Political Agent had replied, that he would be pardoned and allowed to re-occupy his estates on making good the plunder he carried away with him, on his first flight to the hills, but that, after his repeated and last glaring breach of trust, he could not be re-admitted into the service.

57. The Bolan Pass continued unobstructed, and tranquillity prevailed throughout the whole of Sind and Beloochistan, the frontier of the latter being no longer agitated by the endeavours of the Afghan rebel leader, Mahomed Sadeeg, to excite disturbances within the Kelat territory. All the chiefs of the neighbouring tribes, lately concerned with Mahomed Sadeeg, were endeavouring to make their peace with the British Government.

58. The correspondence noted in the margin, relates to the removal of Lieutenant Hammersley, from his political duties in Shawl. In the letter from the political agent will be found detailed circumstances, which he hoped would induce me to suspend the measure, until an enquiry had been instituted as to the extent of the Hykulzie defences, and the probable time that may have been occupied in their construction.

To this recommendation of the Political Agent I did not think it proper to acquiesce, but as the corps (41st Native Infantry) to which Lieutenant Hammersley belongs, is at Gorruckpore, I authorised Major-General Nott to employ that officer in such military duties as he may think fit, pending the receipt of orders from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; and directed that, during his employment in such duties, Lieutenant Hammersley will be authorised to draw the same allowances as any other officer of his rank, serving with his regiment, above or below the passes, as the case may be, and no more.

63. In his letter of the 16th May, Mr. Clerk, agent on the north-west frontier, reported that he was using every exertion to apply the means of the Sikh Government, in men and money, to maintain the passage of the Khyber Pass; and expressed his opinion that it should rest with Major-General Pollock to discriminate what portions of that duty should be assigned to the Sikhs, what to the Political Agent under him for negotiation, and what to the troops newly entertained by him; and he suggested that the Major-General should be authorised to direct as many more men, such as those under Captain Thomas (Jezzailehes) as he thinks proper to be raised. In reply, I directed Mr. Clerk to be referred to the orders of the 15th March last, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, in which his Excellency was informed that the Government could not sanction of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-General Pollock, unless he were satisfied that he could, without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the Pass, and without depending upon the ability of the Sikh chiefs to restrain their troops, feel assured that he could by his own strength overawe, or overcome, all who may dispute the Pass, and keep up, at all times, his communication with Peshawur and the Indus. I further observed to Mr. Clerk, that the recent insubordination of the Sikh troops had, in one important point, shown the correctness of the opinion expressed in the orders quoted, and had increased my desire to see the troops under Major-General Pollock again in possession of easy and certain communication with India; an object which I had no doubt but the Major-General would endeavour to effect at the earliest possible period. Mr. Clerk was also informed that Major-General Pollock was already empowered to add to the irregular force under his command.

64. With reference to my instructions of the 24th and 17th of April last, Mr. Clerk stated, in a letter dated the 18th of May last, that the Lahore Government had evinced considerable desire to receive possession from the British Government of either Jellalabad, or Cabool, or both; but that before engaging definitively to hold Jellalabad, the Durbar was anxious to ascertain the views of the British Government for the final adjustment of the entire Afghan question. Mr. Clerk added that at present, the thought most occupying the Maha Rajah, was the position of the Sindhanwala Chiefs. There is nothing which his Highness would at present feel so great an obligation, as the restraining those Chiefs from creating commotion in his army and their renewing their allegiance on perfectly submissive terms to the throne. The next present object to the Maha Rajah, was to ascertain what may be the plans of the British Government regarding Afghanistan for the future, with a view to acquire the renown of some possessions there, but in particular, to give employ-

ment and diversion to portions of his large army. The first present object (continued Mr. Clerk) of the minister's anxiety, was the critical position of his dominion in Ladakh; and in so far as this places Cashmere in jeopardy, the Maha Rajah was also dissatisfied with the reports that were received of the hostile intentions of the Chinese authorities and the rebellion of the Ladakhees instigated by them.

Mr. Clerk added, that before leaving the Court at Lahore, preparations were making by the Maha-Rajah for an explanation of my entire views in regard to Afghanistan, and by the Rajah (Minister) for an opinion of the point to which the British Government would tolerate Chinese incursions before co-operating with the Sikh Government to drive them back. Mr. Clerk was informed in reply, that the letter addressed to him on the 16th of May will have placed him in possession of my views upon the subject of the final adjustment of the Afghanistan question; and that he was thereby instructed to bring the Lahore Government to entertain similar views, namely, that the future object and the policy of the two Governments should be, to maintain Afghanistan in that state in which it may be unable to do anything against us, and that the visionary design should be foregone of placing it in a state in which it should possess power, and be content to use it against invaders from the West, without entertaining any designs of ambition against its neighbours in the East.

65. On the 16th of May Mr. Clerk transmitted an account of acts of insubordination which had taken place amongst the Sikh troops at Peshawur subsequent to the departure of Raja Golab Sing, and stated that the cause of so large an army being kept at Peshawur was to be found in the irregular longings so often manifested by the British authorities to obtain possession of that province. In reply, I observed to Mr. Clerk that the account forwarded by him had given me much disquietude; and that I have always viewed with much uneasiness the presence of a Sikh force so unnecessarily large at Peshawur, and that I would be glad to see it diminished. I also expressed my surprise at the *cause*, stated by Mr. Clerk, of the Sikh army being so numerous at Peshawur, and authorised him expressly to give to the Maha Rajah my assurances that my Government entertained no wish to possess, or occupy any portion of His Highness's dominions, and was only desirous that His Highness should long retain them all in honour and prosperity.

66. In a subsequent letter, dated the 21st of May, Mr. Clerk reported that the Lahore Government had issued orders for a disposition of its forces on the Indus frontier, by which so many of its troops as were now assembled at Peshawur, would not for the present remain there. In reply, I expressed my regret that he did not state for what place, and for what objects, the Sikh troops have been ordered to leave Peshawur.

67. With another letter of the same date, (21st of May,) Mr. Clerk forwarded a copy of one addressed by him to Major-General Pollock on the 18th, informing him, with reference to the instructions of Government of the 3rd of May, that the Sikh Government was not prepared to accept the occupation of Jellalabad at present, but that should the Major-General be absolutely withdrawing from Jellalabad to India, he thought the Sikhs would accept the post. Mr. Clerk stated that he had not himself opened any negotiation with the Sikh Durbar on this subject, as he

did not believe that, with the negotiations pending in the Major-General's front, he would withdraw, or that, if such causes did not detain him, he could now withdraw with due regard to considerations relating to the health of his troops.

68. On the receipt of the foregoing letter, I caused Major-General Pollock to be addressed, that I did not suppose that he could have misunderstood the instructions of 29th April, issued to him by the Commander-in-Chief, which related to negotiations for the release of the prisoners ; but that if the observation in Mr. Clerk's letter to him of 18th May had been suffered to pass in silence, that silence might have appeared to be acquiescence in a wrong interpretation, and he might possibly have been so misled into adopting it.

69. On the 23rd ultimo, the requisite instructions were issued for a dispatch of 10 lacs of treasure to Major-General Pollock, to enable him to meet any difficulties in procuring carriage and supplies, in the present disorganized state of the Sikh army, in his rear ; and, in addressing the Commander-in-Chief on the subject, I reiterated my earnest desire for the speedy return of Major-General Pollock's army to the Sutlej.

70. In the circular order issued by my orders on the 26th ultimo, of which a copy is hereunto annexed, your Honourable Committee will observe that I deemed it expedient, under existing circumstances, to impress upon every officer employed either in the military or political service of Government, the necessity of preserving absolute secrecy in all matters of a military or political nature which may officially come to his knowledge.

71. On the 29th ultimo, Mr. Clerk was desired to acquaint the Maha Rajah with my intention of assembling an army of reserve upon or near the Sutlej, at the end of the rainy season.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

P.S.—I have this day received two dispatches from Major-General Pollock, dated the 25th ultimo, with one of which was transmitted a report from Cabool of the progress of affairs at that place up to the 22nd ultimo, when the Barukzye party was making strenuous efforts for the capture of the Bala Hissar. The Major-General's other letter represents the difficulties which would attend a retirement from Jellalabad at the present season.

I have also this day received a dispatch from Major Outram, dated the 28th ultimo, containing information from Candalar to the 10th ultimo, with an intimation of letters up to the 15th ultimo having been received from thence.

A translation of a letter from Prince Timoor to my address has been received in the same packet.

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#### No. 313.—NOTIFICATION.

*Allahabad, May 26, 1842.*

The Right Honourable the Governor-General of India has been pleased to direct the publication of the annexed copies of the dispatches from Major-General Pollock and Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B.

No. 314.—*Major-General Pollock to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, April 19, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward a letter from Major-General Sir Robert Sale, K.C.B., detailing the progress of events during the long and perilous siege sustained by the force under his command.

The gallantry of the Major-General and his small force are too well known to Government to require any commendations from me, but it is very pleasing to me to be the channel through which their many trials are brought to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

I have had an opportunity of inspecting the works thrown up for their protection by the indefatigable exertions of Sir R. Sale's force, and my surprise at their strength and extent has been only equalled by my admiration of the excellent arrangements which must have pervaded all departments, since, after a siege (by greatly superior numbers) of upwards of five months' duration, I find the garrison in excellent health and spirits, and in an admirable state of discipline, with a good supply of ammunition, ready and anxious to take the field, and most willing to advance on Cabool.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 315.—*Major-General Sir Robert Sale to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

*Jellalabad, April 16, 1842.*

SIR,—The relief of this place having been at length effected by the victorious advance through the passes of Khyber of the army under Major-General Pollock, C.B., I conceive that I owe it to the troops who have so long formed the garrison here to address to you a report, which may convey some notion of their conflicts, and the severity of their duties, labours, and privations. It has before been made known to the Government, that I reached Gundannuck on the 30th of October, 1841, under instructions from the authorities at Cabool, and there received intelligence of the breaking out of a terrific insurrection at the Affghan Capital, on the 2d November. My retracing my steps on that city was, in a military sense, impracticable, since the first inevitable sacrifice would have been of the lives of 300 sick and wounded, whom I could not have left in depot with the treasonable Irregulars at Gundannuck, whilst my cattle was unequal to the transport of my camp equipage, and my ammunition insufficient for protracted operations. In the position which I occupied, I could not absolutely command a day's provisions or even water, and should have been hemmed in on every side by hostile tribes, amounting to 30 or 40 thousand men, part of whom might have seized Jellalabad and reduced it to ashes, or, holding it, have left me no alternative but a disastrous retreat towards Peshawur. I therefore came to the resolution of anticipating any movement of this kind, and, by possessing myself of this city, establishing a point on which the force of Cabool

might retire, if hardly pressed, and restoring a link in the chain of communication with our provinces. Two marches brought me, after a successful contest at Futtalabad, to Jellalabad. My breaking up from Gundamuck was followed by the immediate defection of the irregulars there, the destruction of the cantonment, and a general rising of the tribes. I found the walls of Jellalabad in a state which might have justified despair as to the possibility of defending them; the enceinte was far too extensive for my small force, embracing a circumference of upwards of 2,300 yards. Its tracing was vicious in the extreme; it had no parapet excepting for a few hundred yards, which there was not more than two feet high. Earth and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ramparts, that there were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There was a space of 400 yards together, on which none of the garrison could show themselves, excepting at one spot; the population within was disaffected, and the whole enceinte was surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and gardens, from which a fire could be opened upon the defenders, at twenty or thirty yards.

The garrison took full possession of the town, in such a state, on the morning of the 12th of November, and, in the course of the day, the place, and detached hills by which on one side it is commanded were surrounded and surmounted by a force of not fewer than 5,000 insurgents. A general attack, on the 14th of November, ridded us of these enemies, and a similar array, brought against us a fortnight afterwards, was dissipated by a second sally, on the 1st of December. But we had seized the town, having in our possession not quite two days' provisions and corn for our men and horses, and beheld the arduous task before us of striving to render the works defensible, and collecting supplies for our magazine from the midst of a fanatical and infuriated people, with very narrow means, in the way of treasure, to purchase them. I appointed Captain Broadfoot, of Shah Soojah's Sappers, Garrison Engineer, and Captain Abbott, of the Artillery, Commissary of Ordnance. Captain Macgregor, Political Agent, gave me the aid of his local experience, and through his influence and measures our Dak communication with India was restored, and a great quantity of grain collected, whilst the unremitting and almost incredible labours of the troops, aided by the zeal and science of Captain Broadfoot, put the town in an efficient state of defence. Captain Abbott made the artillery dispositions in the ablest manner, and used every exertion to add to, and economize, our resources in the way of gun and musquet ammunition, in both of which we were deficient for the purposes of a siege. Lead and powder were procured in and about Jellalabad, and a quantity of cartridges discovered in an old magazine, and thus the troops completed to 200 rounds per man. It is to be remarked, that I might, in the second week of November, have marched upon Pesh Bolak, relieved from investment the corps of Jezzailchees under Captain Ferris, and with it operated a doubtful retreat, upon Peshawur. But I felt it to be my duty to give support to the last moment to our troops, struggling against their numerous enemies at Cabool, and maintain for them a point on which to retreat and rally, if they met with reverse.

On the 9th of January, I was summoned by the leaders of the Affghan rebellion to give up the place, in fulfilment of a convention entered into by the Political and Military Authorities at Cabool; but, as I was

fully assured of the bad faith of our enemies, I refused to do this ; and on the 13th received the melancholy intelligence of the disastrous retreat of our troops from the capital, and their annihilation in the Ghilzie defiles, by the rigours of the climate, and the basest treachery on the part of those in whose promises they had confided. Almost at the same time it became known to us that the brigade of four regiments, marched to my succour from Hindoostan, had been beaten in detail, and forced to fall back upon Peshawar : my position was most critical, and I might, whilst our enemies were engaged in plundering the force from Cabool, have attempted, and perhaps effected, though with heavy loss, a retreat across Khyber, but I resolved, at all hazards, on not relinquishing my grasp on the chief town of the valley of Ningrahar, and the key of Eastern Afghanistan, so long as I had reason to consider that our Government desired to retain it. The discouragements of my garrison at this moment were very great, their duties most severe, their labours unceasing, and the most insidious endeavours made by the enemy to seduce the native portion of them from their allegiance. But their fidelity was unshaken, and their serenity amidst labours and privations unclouded. With reference, however, to the state of fanatical excitement and national antipathy which prevailed around us, I had been compelled, as a measure of prudence, to get rid, first of the corps of Khyber rangers, and next of the detachment of Jezzaileches, and a few of the Affghan sappers, and a body of Hindoostanee gunners, who had formerly been in the employment of Dost Mahomed Khan. Works had in the mean time been completed, of which the annexed reports and plans of Captain Broadfoot contain ample details. Generally, I may state, they consisted in the destruction of an immense quantity of cover for the enemy, extending to the demolition of forts and old walls, filling up ravines, and destroying gardens and cutting down groves, raising the parapets to six or seven feet high, repairing and widening the ramparts, extending the bastions, retrenching three of the gates, covering the fourth with an outwork, and excavating a ditch, ten feet in depth and twelve feet in width, round the whole of the walls : the place was thus secure against the attack of any Asiatic enemy not provided with siege artillery.

But it pleased Providence, on the 19th February, to remove in an instant this ground of confidence. A tremendous earthquake shook down all our parapets built up with so much labour, injured several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawar face, and reduced the Cabool gate to a shapeless mass of ruins. It savours of romance, but it is a sober fact, that the city was thrown into alarm, within the space of little more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks of this terrific phenomenon of nature.

The troops turned with indefatigable industry to the reparation of their walls, but at the moment of the great convulsion, Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan Barukzye, the assassin of the late Envoy, and treacherous destroyer of the Cabool force, having collected a body of troops, flushed with a success consummated by the vilest means, had advanced to Murkhail, within seven miles of our gates. He attacked our foraging parties with a large body of horse on the 21st and 22nd of February, and soon after,

establishing his head-quarters to the westward, two miles from the place, and a secondary camp to the eastward, about one mile distant, invested the town, and established a rigorous blockade. From that time up to the 7th of April, the reduced garrison was engaged in a succession of skirmishes with the enemy, who, greatly superior in horse, perpetually insulted our walls by attacks and alerts, and compelled us daily to fight at disadvantage for forage for our cattle. The most remarkable of these affairs were those of the cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne, commanding a detachment of Shah Shooja's 2nd cavalry, and Jemadar Deena Singh, 5th Light Cavalry, already reported ; a sally under Colonel Dennie, C.B., to defeat a suspected attempt of the enemy to drive a mine, on the 11th of March ; the repulse of an assault upon the transverse walls to the northward of the place, on the 24th of the same month, by detachments under Captain Broadfoot (who was severely wounded), and Captain Fenwick, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry ; the capture of bullocks and sheep by Lieutenant Mayne on the 30th and 31st of January ; and by the seizure of large flocks of the latter, in the face of Mahomed Akbar's army, by a force of infantry under Captain Pattisson, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and of cavalry under Captain Oldfield, on the 1st instant. These successes were crowned by Providence by the issue of the brilliant and decisive attack on the camp of the Sirdar, on the 7th instant.

I have to notice, as a measure of defence, my having enrolled as a provisional battalion a large body of our camp followers, and armed them with pikes and other weapons. On all occasions of assault and sally, these men were available to make a show upon our curtains, and I have pledged myself to them to recommend to Government that they should enjoy all the pecuniary advantages of the native soldiers beyond the Indus. I at the same time held forth to the troops of Shah Shooja's force, the expectation that they would be put, during the especial service, on the same footing with their comrades of the Bengal army.

From the time that the Brigade threw itself into Jellalabad, the native troops have been on half, and the followers on quarter rations, and for many weeks they have been able to obtain little or nothing in the bazaars to eke out this scanty provision. I will not mention, as a privation, the European troops from the same period having been without their allowance of spirits, because I verily believe this circumstance and their constant employment have contributed to keep them in the highest health, and the most remarkable state of discipline. Crime has been almost unknown amongst them, but they have felt severely, although they have never murmured, the diminution of their quantity of animal food and the total want of ghee, flour, tea, coffee and sugar ; these may seem small matters to those who read them at a distance, but they are serious reductions in the scale of comfort of the hard-working and fighting soldier in Asia. The troops have also been greatly in arrears of pay, besides their severe duties in heat and cold, wind and rain, on the guards of the gates and bastions. The troops, officers and men, British and Hindoostanee, of every Arm, remained fully accounted on their alarm-posts every night from the 1st of March to the 7th of April. The losses of officers and men, in carriage and cattle, camp equipage and baggage, between Cabool and Jellalabad, were heavy ; and their expenditure, dur-



ing the siege and blockade, in obtaining articles of mere subsistence and necessity, has been exorbitant.

I feel assured that Major-General Pollock will consider it a most pleasing duty, to bring the series of labours, privations and conflicts, imperfectly sketched in the foregoing details, to the notice of the head of the Supreme Government in India, and through his Lordship to that of the Court of Directors and of our Sovereign, as a claim for public acknowledgment and substantial reimbursement and reward.

The report of Captain Broadfoot, in his capacity of Garrison Engineer, will meet with attentive perusal : I have already stated how much I have been indebted to his scientific attainments, as well as his distinguished activity and resolution during the siege. His fertility in resource obviated great difficulties, in procuring iron, timber, and charcoal ; and to the foresight of his arrangements we owe our having had a very ample supply of tools. The corps under his command performed from Bootkhak, the duties equally of good sappers and bold light infantry soldiers, and the Affghan Huzarce and Eusifzye portion of it have been singularly faithful in time of general defection. The two Infantry Regiments, under the lamented Colonel Dennie and Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, have vied with each other in the steady performance of the duties of that Arm : and it would be impossible for me to discriminate in favour of either, in awarding praise to the squadron of 5th Light Cavalry, under Captain Oldfield, and the Rissallah 2nd Shah Shooja's Cavalry, under Lieutenant Mayne : Lieutenant Plowden, of the former, has been distinguished on several occasions. The artillery practice of No. 6 Light Field Battery has ever been excellent, and has been equalled by that of the Mountain Train. Captains Abbott and Backhouse, and Lieutenant Dawes, have proved themselves excellent officers of Ordnance. I have more than once brought it to notice that Captain Macgregor, Political Agent, has cheerfully rendered very able assistance in serving the guns in every crisis of pressing danger. Of his labours in his own department, I ought not perhaps to attempt to constitute myself a judge ; but I know that they have been unrenmitting ; and their result in obtaining for my force supplies and information, and keeping up our communication with India and with Cabool, and securing for us Affghan co-operation, I may be allowed to appreciate, and am bound to point out to Government.

The medical duties of the garrison have been ably fulfilled by Surgeon Forsyth, Superintending Surgeon Shah Shooja's force and Assistant-Surgeons Robertson and Barnes, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Hare, 35th Regiment and Brown, late in charge of the Irregulars.

Captain Mainwaring, Commissariat Officer to the force, has been indefatigable in his efforts to keep the garrison well supplied, and his arrangements in very difficult times have merited my highest praise. Captain Moorhouse, 35th Regiment Native Infantry, has satisfactorily discharged his duties as Brigade Quarter Master ; he was severely wounded on the 7th instant.

It is gratifying to me to forward the opinion of my second in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, C.B., placed on record without solicitation, of the merits of the 13th Light Infantry, of which corps I am proud of being a member : I fully concur in the sentiments which he expresses,

and hope the distinction which he recommends for the officers of his own corps will be accorded. The cheerful and persevering manner in which the native soldiers laboured with the shovel, mattock, and hand-barrow were as surprising as their steadiness and courage in the field were conspicuous.

I have to acknowledge the zealous manner in which Brevet-Major Fraser, Light Cavalry, Brevet-Captain Gerrard, of the corps of Jezzailchees, Captain Burn, and Lieutenant Hillersdon of the Khyber Rangers, and Lieutenant Dowson, of the Janbazes, when their services could no longer be available with their corps, volunteered to do duty with any regiment in which they could be useful.

I must finally express my gratitude to Providence for having placed so gallant and devoted a force under my command ; in every way it has exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I beg leave in the strongest manner to solicit the interposition of Major-General Pollock, C. B., who has nobly laboured and fought to relieve it from its critical position in the midst of a hostile empire, in now committing it to the protection and favour of the Right Honourable the Govern-General in Council, and through him of the Court of Directors, and of our Sovereign.

I ask permission specially to recommend the following officers for honorary distinction, or brevet rank, or both, viz. Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, C.B., commanding 35th regiment Native Infantry now second in command ; Brevet-Major Fraser, Light Cavalry, who acted as my Aide-de-Camp on the 7th instant ; Captain Abbott, Commandant of Artillery and Commissary of Ordnance ; Captain Backhouse, commanding the Mountain Train and Senior Officer of the Shah's troops with my force ; Captain Broadfoot, commanding Sappers and Garrison Engineer ; Captain Oldfield, 5th Light Cavalry, Senior Officer of that arm : Captain Seaton, 35th regiment Native Infantry, particularly recommended for his conduct on the 7th instant by Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath ; Captain Youghusband, of the same regiment, who was distinguished with the advanced guard in the Khoord Cabool Pass, and there severely wounded ; Captain Burn, late Commandant of the Khyber Rangers, and doing duty with the 35th Regiment Native Infantry ; Captain Wilkinson, on whom the command of the 13th Light Infantry devolved in the field on the fall of Colonel Dennie, C.B. ; Captain Fenwick, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, whose highly deserving conduct in the Pass of Jugdulluck was noticed then in my dispatch ; Captain Havelock, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Persian Interpreter to Major-Generals Elphinstone and Pollock, and attached to me as staff, and who commanded the right column in the final attack on Mahomed Akbar's Camp ; and Captain Hamlet Wade, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, my Brigade Major whose exertions in the action of the 7th I have elsewhere highly commended. Both these latter officers rendered most valuable services throughout the investment and siege. The officers of all ranks, and soldiers of all arms, European and Native, I have likewise to represent as generally and individually deserving of reward and encouragement, and I hope that the Government will sanction my calling upon Commandants of corps and detachments to send in rolls of such native officers as they may deem worthy of the insignia of the order of "Merit" and of "British India."

I have, &c.,

R. SALE.

*Rank and Name of Officers Wounded.*

Artillery.—Captain Abbott, slightly.

Sappers and Miners.—Captain Broadfoot, severely.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.—Lieutenant and Adjutant Wood, and Ensign Oakes, slightly.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Troops under the command of Major-General Sir R. H. Sale, K.C.B., from 22nd February to 6th April, 1842.*

No. 6. Light Field Battery.—1 corporal killed ; 1 European officer, and 1 private wounded.

Detachment of 5th Light Cavalry.—1 havilder and 2 troopers killed ; 4 ditto wounded ; 1 horse killed and 12 wounded ; 1 syce killed, 2 ditto wounded ; and 1 grass-cutter killed of the Artillery and Cavalry.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.—4 privates killed ; 2 officers, 1 corporal, and 11 privates, wounded.

35th Regiment Native Infantry.—1 sepoy killed : 1 corporal and 10 sepoy, wounded.

Mountain Train.—No casualties.

Detachment 2d Cavalry S. S. Force.—1 trooper killed ; 4 ditto wounded ; 9 horses killed, and 3 wounded.

Sappers and Miners.—4 privates killed ; 1 European officer and 30 privates wounded.

Detachment 6th Light Infantry.—No casualties.

Total killed 14 ; wounded 66, not including camp followers, &c. ; horses killed 10, wounded 15.

*Return of Camp Followers Enlisted on the 15th January, 1842, by order of Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., as a Provisional Garrison.*

*Jellalabad, April 1, 1842.*

No. 6. Light Field Battery.—Mustered followers, armed 36 ; not mustered, armed 61 ; total 97 ; killed during the siege, 2.

Squadron 5th Light Cavalry.—Mustered followers, armed 7, unarmed 69 ; not mustered, armed 6, unarmed 19 ; total 101.

Rissalah Anderson's Horse.—Mustered followers, armed 4, unarmed 11 ; not mustered, unarmed 57 ; total 72.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.—Mustered followers, armed 124, unarmed 238 ; not mustered, armed 100 ; total 462.

35th Native Infantry.—Mustered followers, armed 77, unarmed 46 ; not mustered, armed 55, unarmed 110 ; total 288.

Sappers and Miners.—Mustered followers, armed 69, unarmed 19 ; not mustered, armed 40, unarmed 61 ; total 189.

Commissariat.—Mustered followers, armed 103 ; killed during the siege 7, and wounded 6.

Grand total—1,312 ; killed 9 ; wounded 6.

Those followers that were unarmed were told off to the ramparts, for the purpose of throwing large stones, a great quantity of which were collected. The whole of the camp rendered much assistance in the conveyance of building materiel, and working with furwahs and spades.

R. SALE.

No. 316.—*Captain Broadfoot to Major-General Sir Robert Sale.*

NOTE.—On the defensive works in Jellalabad, prepared by order of Major-General Sir Robert Sale, K.C.B.

*Jellalabad, April 16, 1842.*

SIR,—On the 12th of November, the Major-General commanding having resolved to occupy Jellalabad, directed me with a committee of officers to examine and report on the works of the place.

The committee reported unanimously that they were then not defensible against a vigorous assault.

As will be seen by the accompanying plan, the town is an irregular

quadrilateral, having half of the western side salient, and the southern side broken by a deep re-entering angle. It was surrounded on every side with gardens and houses, enclosed fields, mosques, and ruined forts, affording strong cover to an enemy ; these were everywhere close to the walls, and in many places connected with them. Beyond these on three sides (north, east and west), at from 400 to 500 yards, run the ruins of the wall of the ancient city, on which the sand has accumulated so as to form a line of low heights, giving cover to the largest bodies of men. Opposite the south-west angle a range of heights, composed of bare gneiss rocks, commences at 330 yards from the works and extends about 400 yards from north-north-east to south-south-west ; these completely overlook the town, and from the vicious tracing of the works enfilade some of the longest curtains : parallel to the north side, at 170 yards, runs a steep bank 20 feet high ; it extends a considerable way to the west and several miles to the east, affording a secure and unseen approach to any number of men ; it is, probably, an old bank of the river. From it numerous ravines run up towards the walls, affording the enemy a covered passage into the buildings and enclosures adjoining the works.

Two very solid walls, 300 yards apart, run from the place to this bank, thus enclosing on three sides a space, probably occupied originally by the Mogul Emperor's palace, but found by us to contain a large mosque and numerous gardens, and houses occupied by Fakeers ; one of the gates of the town opens into it, and it was traversed by a water course, about 10 feet wide, which entered the town by a tunnel under the rampart, large enough to admit several men abreast. A similar tunnel allowed it to pass out of the town, on the eastern side. The walls of the town extended about 2,100 yards, without reckoning the bastions of which there were 33.

The works were of earth, and in the usual style of the country, viz. : — A high thin rampart, but in a state of ruin, without parapets and without ditch, covered way, or outworks of any kind.

The bastions were full, but in some places lower than the adjoining curtains, very confined, without parapets, and sloping downwards from the gorge to the salient, so that the terrepleine was completely exposed.

There were four gates and a postern, all of the usual vicious native construction, and, except that on the northern side, in a ruinous state.

To give some idea of the state of the works, I may mention that of the committee sent to inspect them on the 13th of November, not one, except myself, succeeded in making the circuit. Large gaps cut off the communication, or insecure footing compelled the officers to descend among the adjoining enclosures, from which it was difficult to find the way ; while on the south side the ramparts were so imbedded in houses and surmounted by them, that its course could only be traced by laboriously threading the lanes of the native town.

On the north side, the wall rose to a very great height towards the town, but sloped down to the interior in a heap of ruins, almost everywhere accessible ; while at the foot, were houses and gardens so strongly occupied by the enemy, that during the night of the 13th of November our troops were unable to maintain their posts, and, with the exception of the gateway, a line of 400 yards, on the northern face, was without a

man in the works. Had the enemy then attacked us we must have been reduced to a street combat.

On the following morning (14th November), the Major-General ordered a sortie in force, which drove the enemy from his positions with such loss that it was some time before he ventured near enough to disturb our works, which were now as vigorously prosecuted as our scanty supply of tools and the difficulty of procuring materials allowed.

We had only the tools, as per margin\*, brought from Cabool with the Sappers for the operations expected in the Tazeen Valley ; and we were without wood or iron. Wood was obtained from the ruins of the cantonment and from houses demolished in the town. Iron was collected in small quantities from the neighbourhood, but it was that of the country, good in quality but imperfectly melted, and requiring about ten times as much labour and time as English iron. By the persevering labour of the troops, however, much was done, and when the enemy next attacked us (1st December) ramparts had been made and the guns mounted on the bastions, for which they were destined, the watercourses and other passages through the walls blocked up, the foot of the scarps cleared from rubbish, and parapets built in all the bastions and many of the curtains, while much of the external cover was destroyed.

On the 1st December the enemy were again routed, and the works proceeded with little or no interruption.

By the middle of January (the commencement of the rainy season) a parapet, nowhere less than 6 feet high, with a banquette, as wide as the nature of the rampart allowed, was completed entirely round the place. The gates were repaired and strengthened by buttresses ; two of them were retrenched and a ditch carried round the north-west angle, while some of the most dangerous ravines were laid open to our fire, and roads were opened into the low ground on the north side.

By the middle of February the ditch was carried round the place, with as good a covered way as the size of the ditch and supply of earth allowed ; while the mosques, forts, gardens, and cover of every description, had been destroyed for several hundred yards round the place.

At this time Mahomed Akbar Khan moved into the valley, in order to attack the place, but they were unable to effect more than a distant investment ; they frequently occupied the rocks on the south-west, but the parapets and traverses rendered their fire harmless.

On the 19th February an earthquake, which nearly destroyed the town, threw down the greater part of our parapets, the Cabool gate with the two adjoining bastions, the north-west bastion and a part of the new bastion which flanked it. Three other bastions also were nearly destroyed, while several large breaches were made in the curtains ; one on the Peshawur side, 80 feet long, was quite practicable, the ditch being filled and the ascent easy. Thus, in one moment, the labours of 3 months were, in a great measure destroyed.

No time, however, was lost ; the shocks had scarcely ceased when the whole garrison was told off into working parties, and before night the breaches were scarped, the rubbish below cleared away, and the ditches

\* 330 Pickaxes. 390 shovels, with others tools in proportion ; many tools, such as trowels, &c., have been made here.

before them dug out while the great one, on the Peshayur side, was surrounded by a good gabion parapet.

A parapet was erected on the remains of the north-west bastion, with an embrasure allowing the guns to flank the approach of the ruined Cabool gate; the parapet of the new bastion was restored, so as to give a flanking fire to the north-west bastion, while the ruined gate was rendered inaccessible by a trench in front of it, and in every bastion round the place a temporary parapet was raised.

From the following day all the troops off duty were continually at work, and such were their energy and perseverance that by the end of the month the parapets were entirely restored, the Cabool gate again serviceable, the bastions either restored or the curtain filled in when restoration was practicable, and every battery re-established.

The breaches have been built up, with the rampart doubled in thickness, and the whole of the gates retrenched.

It is not easy to give an adequate of the extent of the labour performed by the troop.

The parapets, banquettes, &c. &c. are built of the ruins of the buildings thrown down, cemented with clay mixed with straw and bound together, when requisite, by bond timbers; of this masonry above 104,500 cubic feet had been built before the earthquake, and since then (including new works), about 103,900 cubic feet have been erected, making in all above 208,000 cubic feet of masonry. But the material had to be procured from a distance by the laborious process of demolition; and the ruinous wall had to be scarped, cleared at the base, and prepared for the work.

The quantity of walls of forts, mosques, gardens, &c. &c. destroyed, were considerably more than double that of the walls of the place, and the excavation from the ditch exceeds 860,000 cubic feet.

In addition to this the troops had to build barracks for themselves and guard-rooms round the works, each corps undertook its own barracks, while the construction of the guard-rooms was superintended by Captain Moorhouse, Quartermaster of Brigade, and Lieutenant and Quartermaster Sinclair,\* of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, whose assistance on this point left me more leisure for the defensive works.

The working parties, in emergencies, consisted of all men off duty, often assisted by the guards when the works were near their posts.

On ordinary occasions they consisted of all the Sappers and Miners, about 200 men of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 120 of the 35th Native Infantry, a party of Artillerymen of Captain Abbott's battery, and all the men off duty in Captain Backhouse's Mountain Train, and the detachment of the 6th Infantry, Shah Shoojah's force doing duty with the Mountain Train detachments, also camp followers were employed in bringing materials, &c.

Nothing could exceed the cheerful energy of every officer and man in these labours.

The Sappers and Miners worked from day-break to sunset (with two

\* To Lieutenant Sinclair, also, we owe the mill used by the Commissariat. I only furnished materials and workmen; the credit of the whole contrivance and construction is due solely to Lieutenant Sinclair.—G. B.

hours and a half for meals), and when occasion required, at night. Their conduct was such as to leave me nothing to desire, and it has been honoured with the Major-General's recorded approbation.

Lieutenant and Adjutant Orr, and Lieutenant and Quartermaster Cunningham, who acted as my assistants, rendered me the most zealous and efficient aid, and I beg most respectfully to bring their great merit to the Major-General's notice. The European non-commissioned officers also displayed a zeal and intelligence deserving to be reported to the Major-General, more especially Serjeant-Major Kelly, Quartermaster-Serjeant Bruen, and Acting Staff-Serjeant Hughes, from Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.

The other troops having very severe garrison duty, laboured for a short period, yet seldom less than six hours a day.

It will be seen that the largest parties were furnished by Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and I know not how adequately to express my sense of the services of this admirable body of men; though having little more than every other night in bed, they laboured for months, day after day, officers and men, with a cheerfulness and energy not to be surpassed. To enumerate all, whose zeal and intelligence were conspicuous, would almost require me to go over the list of the officers, and to mention even many of the valuable non-commissioned officers; but I cannot deny myself the pleasure of naming those whose more extended professional education gave their aid additional value, namely—Captain Fenwick, Lieutenant Frere, and Ensign Parker. Separate portions of the works were also entrusted at various times to other officers, especially Lieutenants G. King, G. Wade, and Ensign Scott; and I have every reason to be satisfied with their execution.

The 35th Native Infantry were much employed in destroying the forts and other covers around the place; and it is due to Captain Seaton to mention his great activity, and the skill with which, by directing the watercourses used for irrigation, on the most massive ruins, he effected a quantity of demolition which, with our short supply of gunpowder, would have otherwise been impracticable.

With the exception of a few of the larger bastions, the whole of the batteries were prepared by the Artillery themselves (both Captain Abbott's battery and Captain Backhouse's Mountain Train), under the superintendence of their own officers. Besides this, a party of Captain Abbott's artillerymen was always ready to assist in the works generally; and they were most ably superintended by Lieutenant Daves, to whom I am indebted for aid, as constant as it was valuable and willingly given. Captain Backhouse, with his own men, and a detachment of the 6th Infantry, Shah Shooja's force not only prepared the parapets and embrasures for his own guns, and repaired the damages done to them by the earthquake, but he undertook and completed several of the most useful and laborious operations; he executed, among others, a large and widely branching series of ravines, giving cover to many hundred men, within pistol-shot of a very weak part of the works, which was filled up, or entirely laid open to fire, and that with a number of men, which without his untiring zeal and personal exertion would have been inadequate.

The camp followers were distributed to assist the troops, and they followed the example set them, and were extremely useful.

Appended are two plans and some sheets of sections. The first plan shows in some measure the way in which the space round the fort was originally encumbered by buildings and enclosures. The second gives an outline of the place as it now stands, while the sections will give some idea of the profile of the works, as we found them, and as we leave them.

The gates have been retrenched inwardly because, from the fall of the ground outside, and its conformation, no adequate work could have been raised without a labour we could not at the time spare, and without occupying more time than we could ever reckon on for unmolessted work.

The narrowness and shallowness of the ditch are owing to our want of tools, which limited the strength of our working parties so much, that anything stronger could not have been carried round in time to accomplish our object—that of interposing an obstacle to a sudden assault and escalade on every side, while the enemy were still numerous and elated by the Cabool disasters.

The breadth of the berm was necessary from the nature of the soil, a loose sand, and it varies as the necessity of including previous excavations, &c., obliged us to allow the tracing.

In conclusion, I have to solicit the Major-General's indulgence for this report, which has been prepared while suffering from a wound. If I have been diffuse in noticing the assistance received from the officers and troops, it must be ascribed to the admiration with which I daily, for many months, witnessed their labours under circumstances of extraordinary discouragement; on short allowance of provisions, with heavy duties of other kinds to perform, and, for a considerable time, harassed by incessant conflicts with the enemy. During all this time, there was not only no murmuring, but the utmost cheerfulness and zeal prevailed: it was not once necessary to resort to punishment, and I never had to make a single report other than commendatory.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE BROADFOOT.

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No. 317.—*Lieut.-Col. T. Monteath to Major-General Sir R. Sale.*

*Jellalabad, April 16, 1842.*

SIR,—The exertions of the garrison of Jellalabad, beyond ordinary routine, having ceased since the decisive victory obtained over the enemy on the 7th instant, and now finally terminated by the arrival of the British army under Major-General Pollock, C.B., I trust I may not be considered as going beyond the limits of my proper duty in addressing you to state as follows:

As doing but due justice on this occasion to Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry might be looked upon as a highly colored record of the merits of your own regiment, and seeing that no such partial bias can possibly be supposed to guide my feelings in the estimate I have formed of their deserts, I have pleasure in sincerely declaring that their conduct, throughout the painful and perilous position in which they have so long been placed, has



been such as fully to deserve the applause and admiration of their country and the confidence and best consideration of our well-beloved Sovereign.

On our throwing ourselves on the 12th of November last, into the old and ruined town of Jellalabad, without money, without food, and almost without protection, with a nation of highly excited and barbarous enemies in arms against us, our situation seemed as hopeless a one as British troops were ever called upon to confront; notwithstanding which, the enemy was twice within twenty days attacked, and on both occasions defeated with signal success.

You yourself will doubtless detail the works performed by the regiment; let it then be only my province who have witnessed their exertions almost hourly during a period of five months, to record, that their devoted perseverance and cheerfulness amidst all the gloom that surrounded them, after the destruction of their comrades of the Cabool force, could not have been surpassed by any troops in the world; and that after months of extreme toil, when an earthquake, such as man is not often in the habit of experiencing, in a moment left scarcely a vestige of their labour standing, their flying as they did with redoubled zeal to the work, and completing it in ten days (so that on the arrival of the enemy before Jellalabad, they declared that the calamity which had befallen the valley arose from nothing but English witchcraft, it being the only place that had escaped uninjured,) was what none but British soldiers could have performed, and what no price could have purchased, for it was the labour of the heart, work of all others most deserving of distinction and reward.

In regard to the Native Troops of all Arms, I shall refrain from saying much for a reason which has in a measure induced me to address this letter to you, but as you have yourself been a daily witness of their conduct under every description of circumstance, you have it fully within your own power to say all, of which the Government they serve may very justly feel proud, and it may serve to shew, as an example for imitation, what noble enthusiasm and zeal may be lighted up in their breasts by the high bearing and considerate conduct of determined British officers.

I shall conclude by observing that we can now, Sir, proudly march forth from this garrison with the enemy's standards in our hands, and their captured cannon to fire a salute, on delivering over the care of the honour of the British name, which we have had within our keeping for the last five months, pure and unspotted, and without a single circumstance existing to cast a breath upon its lustre.

The conduct of the officers of the 35th regiment generally, as well as those doing duty with it throughout the siege, I am proud to say, has been such as well to deserve any reward or distinction that can be conferred upon them.

Of those holding the rank of Captain and above it, which enables Her Majesty to advance them a step, I would strongly recommend Captain Seaton, 35th regiment; Captain Younghusband, 35th regiment (severely wounded); Brevet-Major Fraser, late 2nd Light Cavalry, and Captain Burn, 1st Regiment Native Infantry, both doing duty with the 35th regiment.

Of the Native Officers of the 35th regiment, I could also strongly recommend that six should, as a compliment to the regiment for its gal-

kant and meritorious conduct, receive the order of "Merit" and of "British India ;"—viz. :

SAHIB RAM, Subadar,  
MANICK SING, Subadar,  
DERKHOU SING, Jemadar,

RAMBUCCUS TEWARRY, Jemadar,  
HOOLAS RAM, Subadar, and  
HURRAM SING, Jemadar.

I have, &c.,

T. MONTEATH.

No. 318.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Allahabad, May 16, 1842.*

SIR,—You have been already informed that the Governor-General, on the 28th ultimo, adverting to the then accredited report of the death of Shah Shooja, informed Major-General Pollock that, in the present divided state of Affghanistan, it would not be prudent to recognise any individual chief pretending to the throne of that country.

2. The Governor-General is disposed to think that the Government of Lahore will take the same view of the course which, under present circumstances, it is prudent to adopt upon that subject. To recognise any pretender whom we might prefer, would, at the present moment, certainly have the effect of uniting the largest portion of the Affghans against him, and thus impose upon his allies the burdensome and fruitless obligation of supporting a powerless chief against the people whose allegiance he claimed. To abstain from recognising any pretender is probably to continue the state of disunion and confusion in which Affghanistan is involved. The Governor-General is persuaded that the Government of Lahore will have perceived the great practical change which the events of the last four years have effected in the situation of Affghanistan, and the permanent influence which that change must have upon its future relations with the adjoining States.

3. The British Government, in conjunction with the late Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing, moved against the Affghans, in order to remove from the Government of Affghanistan an able chief, who had in the course of many years succeeded in uniting it under his rule, who was forming and disciplining an army, and was supposed to entertain, in conjunction with the powers of the West, projects of hostility to the adjoining States upon the Indus.

4. That (our first) object has been completely effected : not only has Dost Mahomed Khan been removed from the Government of Affghanistan, but that country has been so entirely convulsed by the war, that, if Dost Mahomed were to be restored to-morrow, he would find an altered nation, and be unable to re-establish his authority in its former strength.

5. A further object of the advance of the allies against Affghanistan was to substitute for the authority of Dost Mahomed, which was deemed to be hostile, that of Shah Shooja, which, it was expected, would be friendly. Whether Shah Shooja did in reality justify that expectation, is a question it is no longer necessary to investigate. This, however, would be manifest from our recent experience in Affghanistan, if it had not been proved by all former experience in similar cases, that a sovereign who

appears to be altogether the instrument of a foreign State, cannot obtain the willing support of his subjects, so as to wield their power in favour of that foreign State ; on the contrary, he will be an object of hatred or contempt to his subjects, and his only resource, if he be desirous of securing their willing allegiance, will be in throwing himself into their arms and in asserting his independence of the foreign State which placed him on the throne. Had we succeeded in maintaining Shah Shooja upon the throne, we should have had a friendly sovereign, and a hostile people, in Affghanistan, and have been compelled to support that sovereign, in the event of an attack from the West not only against his subjects, in a position distant from our own frontier, which nothing but the presumed support of the people of the country could justify us in taking up.

6. The effect of our proceedings has been to render, for the present, equally impossible in Affghanistan the existence of a hostile or of a friendly sovereign wielding the united force of the nation. As against an invader, the Affghans are powerful in their mountains, and in the poverty of their country, but their poverty, combined with their divisions, will render them henceforth, as in all recent times, powerless as invaders. Their power against an invader will be exerted equally against an invader from whatever quarter he might come. It is for us to do nothing which can put an end to the divisions amongst themselves, which deprive them of all power beyond their frontier, which might be exerted against us.

7. You will endeavour to bring the Government of Lahore to entertain these views, and to regard as the future object of our joint policy the maintenance of Affghanistan in that state in which it may be unable to do anything against us ; foregoing the visionary design of placing it in a state in which it could, as a united monarchy, be powerful for us against an enemy advancing from the West, and yet be content to entertain no views of ambition against its neighbours in the East.

8. It appears to the Governor-General that this joint object of the two Governments, equally interested in its accomplishment, will be best effected by leaving the Affghans to themselves.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 319.—*Major-General Pollock to the Governor-General of India.*

*Jellalabad, May 8, 1842.*

MY LORD,—As nothing can be more gratifying to me than to know that any feeble endeavours of mine have met with your Lordship's approbation, I gratefully acknowledge the expression of your sentiments on the occasion of my late advance into the Khyber Pass. To the army which I have the honour to command, I owe the success which I have hitherto had the good fortune to experience, and I sincerely hope that we shall continue to deserve the encomiums your Lordship has condescended to pass on our operations thus far. I forwarded to Sir R. Sale your Lordship's letter for perusal, but have not received a reply ; the General has for two days been ill, but is now better and out of danger.

Captain Mackenzie has to-day again reached our camp, sent by Mahomed Akbar with very extravagant proposals, which will be forwarded

officially with my reply : he represents himself as having been called upon to fill the throne ; that his party is in the ascendant ; but that his sole object\* is to be on friendly terms with us. My reply will require some consideration, and must necessarily be very guarded. I know from other sources that there has been a struggle at Cabool ; but I have good reason to believe that, so far from the Barukzye interest being powerful, that the prince's party was successful, and that Mahomed Zemaun, one of the chief rebels, was very much dispirited. I experience considerable difficulty in framing answers, to keep up the communication with both parties, and still in no way commit the Government ; but if I would be informed of the ulterior views of Government, it would greatly facilitate the duty I have to perform. Although the official report will contain copies of all documents, I now take the liberty to inclose three. One from Meeria Aga Jan,\* giving an account of the affray at Cabool, a letter from Major Pottinger, and copy of Mahomed† Akbar's letter to me, to which he did not affix his seal, as he feared it might be produced against him. That Mahomed Akbar is ready to separate himself from his party and deliver up his prisoners, I have no doubt, but his terms I consider quite inadmissible ; he cannot, and I am sure he does not, expect that they will be complied with : but I believe he considers his cause a bad one, and that I may not suspect the real truth, he has increased his demands ; his sending Captain Mackenzie again, shows it was his anxiety on the subject, and he feels that his having possession of the prisoners must weigh with us in treating with him.

I may here perhaps be allowed to remark, that in any negotiations with these people, they cannot or will not understand the necessity of a reference to my own Government ; they suppose that I have full powers, and consider a reference a mere subterfuge to deceive them.

All is quiet around us at present, the chiefs are coming in daily, and provisions are abundant ; the weather up to this period has been favourable ; but, unless I receive instructions to the contrary, I propose moving forward gradually, till I reach a better climate, as I understand Jellalabad will become unhealthy as the season advances. I have difficulty in moving in consequence of the great want of carriage cattle.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 320.—*Major Pottinger to Major-General Pollock.*

*Teezeen, May 3, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 26th ultimo, which was delivered to me by Captain Mackenzie.

Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan was disappointed with the offer made to him, and particularly the not receiving any reply to his own overture, when Mahomed Shah and Dost Mahomed Khan's names were both specified. Situated as I am, my opinions are open to the charge of selfishness, if I give them in favour of the person who holds me prisoner ; however, as I can bring testimony that I have always opposed any propositions

that have hitherto been made for our ransom (because I considered it an improper precedent to be established in the first place, and in the second as being detrimental to the interests of the state, supplying an enemy with money while the scales were tolerably even), I will now venture a few observations on the subject, noticing, however, that I still consider ransoming prisoners for money as very objectionable.

At present the case appears to me in a peculiar light, and that Government may succeed in causing the separation from the Mahometan cause of one of its most powerful branches (the Ghilzees), through whose country we must pass if we advance ; at the same time, rendering the most energetic man of the party suspected, and releasing the families, and officers, &c., prisoners in their hands. Further, in the case of advancing on and garrisoning Cabool, the safety of our communications imperatively calls on us to be friendly with the tribes that can interrupt them, and therefore, sooner or later, unless we only mean to make a retributive inroad, the above-mentioned tribe must be gained to our interest.

There is doubtless a considerable chance of deceit, and of using such money to organize resistance to us ; but for my own part such I consider would be a fortunate circumstance, as a greater chance would be afforded of striking a decisive blow in the beginning of the campaign.

Mahomed Akbar Khan has written a letter to a memorandum, which Captain Mackenzie will lay before you ; the Sirdar has not signed it, as he fears it may be used against him in case of your not closing with his terms. What he states is, I believe, substantially true ; and I do not think it unreasonable he should demand a promise of protection and friendly treatment, if he breaks with his supporters, which the delivery of the prisoners is likely to cause. The detail of his wishes appears to me to be considerably more in a pecuniary light than he can expect under any circumstances, but his other demands are moderate. His requests are, 1stly. That a written promise of amnesty be given to himself, Mahomed Shah Khan, and the latter's family, for all past acts up to the date of delivery. 2ndly. That neither he or any of the above-mentioned family shall be sent out of the Cabool and Jellalabad districts, against their wishes. 3rdly. That they may not be obliged to pay their respects to you in our camp, till they be assured against any danger. 4thly. If we merely intend to revenge ourselves on the enemy, and then leave the country, he trusts the Government will be conferred upon him. 5thly. He wants a Jaghire to support his family, and names two laes as adequate. 6thly. He wants eight laes of rupees as a present to start him with. His great fear (as it is of all Affghans) is of being removed from this country. He also asks for his own women who are in his father's haram serai. They have asked for the money, if it is paid, to be given to his Colund Khan, who will remain as a hostage till the prisoners are delivered ; or that you pay it to Hindoos, who can empower their agents in Cabool to pay it on delivery of the prisoners.

The last news from Cabool is, that Nawab Zeman Khan and his party have thrashed Nayb Amanollah and the Populzie party, and have offered the crown to Mahomed Akbar Khan, with the Newab Zeman Khan for his Vizier. Parties have been coming in for several days to pay their respects, and invite the Sirdar to the capital. Under these circumstances,

the conduct of the Sirdar, in continuing the negotiation, appears a proof of his sincerity; and I trust I may be pardoned for remarking, that if his overtures, either as they are, or in a modified form, appear deserving of attention, that you will recollect that the delay of referring this to Government will lose us the opportunity which now apparently offers itself; and that the principal cause of the suspicious which eventually caused the failure of Sir A. Burnes's mission in 1837, and chiefly led to the necessity of the present war, was the making of such references. As the Affghans do not understand the system, they look on such an answer as an attempt to overreach them, and get exasperated more than they would be by a decisive negative.

I have, &c.,

ELDRED POTTINGER.

P.S.—I beg to apologize for the blotted state of my letter, as I only have time to write this while Captain Mackenzie is sleeping, preparatory to resuming the march.

No. 321.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, May 10, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit herewith the following documents:—Copy and translation of a memorandum, said to be written by Mahomed Akbar, but without seal or signature.—Copy of my reply to Major Pottinger, and of my notice of the memorandum.

2. I naturally feel some difficulty in replying to such documents, placed as I am in a novel situation, and without instructions to guide me. I have endeavoured to be guided in my reply, and to concede nothing that might hereafter embarrass the Government. I shall feel anxious to know if my reply meets the approval of the Governor-General. Captain Mackenzie, on his return to Mahomed Akbar, was not detained seven hours, but sent again with overtures now forwarded. I have reason to believe that he considers his situation a desperate one, and if so, he will be glad to accept moderate terms; but I hope I shall be in possession of the wishes of the Governor-General before I can receive another message from any of the parties. I am daily expecting to hear from the Shah Zadh.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 322.—*Translation of a Paper from Mahomed Akbar Khan, received on the 8th May, 1842, by the hands of Captain Mackenzie.*

MY FRIEND,—In the letter for Pottinger Sahib, which Mackenzie has brought, there is nothing to give me confidence. I have, therefore, thought it necessary to send Mackenzie Sahib to you a second time.

When first Secunder Burnes came, I did all in my power that the wishes of the English Government might be realised; but the English Government would not agree to give assistance if a foreign enemy invaded this country, and nothing was settled. After that, when an English army

entered my country, I was compelled to be your enemy, and was three years a wanderer, and returned at the end of the confusion (Cabool insurrection). In the time when Pottinger, Lawrence, and Mackenzie Sahebs came at the stage of Bottkak, I agreed to their wishes, and did all in my power to protect the army, as is well-known to the above-mentioned Sahebs : but I could not save them from the hands of the multitude, as all the army\* was disorganized, and the British soldiers could not protect themselves on account of the frost, and moreover, the gentlemen did not attend to my advice.

2dly. If I allow the English, who are my guests, to depart according to your suggestion, or according to Pottinger Saheb's advice, if I allow the English ladies to depart before the gentlemen, in either case all Mahomedans will look upon me as their enemy, and the whole multitude will be opposed to me. Under these circumstances, I beg you to reflect that, not having come to an understanding with you, and having made enemies of them (Mahomedans), how can I exist? At present, my friends and allies have possessed themselves of the government of Cabool, and all of them send daily to me three or four men with oaths and protestations, requesting me to come and to be their king ; and Mahomed Zeman Vuzer—all the Ghilzies are my friends : and I, from the friendship I bear you, do not consent to be the king of Cabool, since to be so must involve the necessity of being your enemy. I prefer your friendship to the throne (of Cabool), because if I was to go to Cabool now, the men of Cabool would push me forward, and then it would be difficult to release my guests, and to be on friendly terms with you. On this account I have written to show my friendship for your Government. Please God my services shall exceed the injuries I have done you. On condition that we are friends, let the terms of friendship between me and my friends such as Mahomed Shah Khan and others be written out, and be sent before the receipt of my guests in your camp, that I may feel confidence. The other matters have been explained to Captain Mackenzie verbally, and he will make them known to you. I hope that you will write down every article in a treaty, signed and sealed.

(There is no seal to this document.)

No. 323.—*Major-General Pollock to Major Pottinger.*

*Jellalabad, May 10, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 3rd instant. I regret that Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan should have been disappointed at my last reply, because I fully understood that I replied to his overture when I made the offer for the prisoners, and which I intended should be the basis of any negotiations that might afterwards be entered into. This point was, therefore, more particularly addressed to Mahomed Akbar Khan, and the other Sirdars not being included in this arrangement were particularly specified by name. This will, perhaps, account for what the Sirdar supposes an omission. Some parts of the commencement of your letter do not require an answer.

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\* Note—Captain Mackenzie says the word "Nisard" alludes to the mob of Afghans, whom the Sirdar means to say he could not govern.

The circumstance of receiving a Persian memorandum without seal or signature does not evince that confidence and good faith, which, ought to be shown where a good understanding between parties is desired. Protection would always be afforded to the Sirdar's person, if he break with his supporters in consequence of the delivery of the prisoners; but I had better, at once, answer the requests you have mentioned.

With regard to the first, it follows as a matter of course, that whenever we agree to any terms, amnesty for the past will result. The second request about residing at Cabool and Jellalabad is out of place now; it must depend upon contingencies, and be discussed only after other and more important points have been agreed upon.

With reference to the third request, the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar may be assured that I would guarantee his personal safety whenever he may visit my camp; but his doing so would require some preliminary arrangement, unless he voluntarily claims our protection, in which case I could immediately arrange for his safety and appeal to the Government in his behalf.

The fourth request refers to matters entirely depending on future results, and which are known to God alone. It would, therefore, be vain to speculate on them at this stage of our negotiation.

With regard to the fifth and sixth requests, I have already told you that I suppose the Sirdar resists his claim to any present on his delivering up the prisoners, which, as I have before stated, will be the best evidence of good faith, and a sincere wish for favourable terms with the British Government.

I have accordingly already mentioned the sum of two lacs of rupees: the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar must recollect that he is desirous of obtaining the females of his own family—the British Government will not require any money to be paid on their account; and I hereby guarantee that on all the prisoners being delivered over to me, I will write to India for the women of the Sirdar Mahomed Akbar, and I have no doubt that my request will be complied with.

As to the payment of the money for the prisoners now with or in the power of Mahomed Akbar, it shall be made to any person the Sirdar may appoint to receive it, or it shall be paid to Hindoos who can give bills on Cabool. The good faith and honour of the British nation is not doubted, and I therefore hereby pledge myself to pay the two lacs of rupees on account of Government whenever the prisoners are made over to me.

The news you have heard from Cabool is not correct: perhaps you refer to some old news which I may have forgotten, but the latest news I have from good authority, is in every respect different, and need not be mentioned here.

You observe that the conduct of the Sirdar in continuing the negotiation, appears a proof of his sincerity—it evidently does show his desire to come to terms.

You seem to think that the overtures as they are, or in a modified form, should meet with immediate attention, and without reference to Government, which latter course you surmise, might cause the Sirdar to break off the negotiation. This I cannot believe; because if, as I am to understand, the Sirdar is really sincere, he will have the good sense to



know that one Governor-General having gone, and his successor Lord Ellenborough having scarcely completed his journey to the Upper Provinces, it is impossible he can have given me the full instructions he will do when he has considered the state of the country.

When Burnes went in 1837, there was no change in the Government ; the same necessity, therefore, did not exist for receiving instructions.

This is a point which you should carefully explain to the Sirdar, because it is of great importance that he should not be deceived.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 324.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, May 12, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to forward a copy of a postscript, which I added to the letter which I addressed to Major Pottinger, relating to the prisoners—a copy of the letter has already been forwarded to you.



I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 325.—*Postscript of a letter from Major-General Pollock to Major Pottinger.*

*Jellalabad, May 10, 1842.*

\* P.S.—I ought, in the body of this letter, to have requested of you to remind Mahomed Akbar Khan that the treatment which the principal prisoner (General Elphinstone), of high rank and importance, met with, caused his death. He was in bad health, and at the time when he could not move without assistance he was hurried away from his residence, exposed to great heat and rain—his death was the consequence—and the greatest solicitude is shown about the health of the Sirdar's father, who has been removed, for the benefit of cool air, to Deyrah Dhoon ; these are facts which should weigh with the Sirdar when he must know that he is not swayed by any political consideration in retaining helpless females as prisoners ; indeed, the gentlemen he has possessed himself of, are all of no importance, in a political point of view.

G. POLLOCK.

No. 326.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, May 19, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 8th instant, addressed to his Lordship, and inclosing certain letters relative to past events at Cabool, furnished to you by Captain Macgregor, and communicating your opinion, while you request instructions from the Governor-General as to the course you should pursue.

2. Those instructions have already been furnished to you by my letters of the 25th and 28th of April, and of the 4th and 6th of May,

and by the orders you received from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 19th of April.

3. As, however, notwithstanding your being in possession of sufficient instructions for your own guidance, it may be convenient that you should be fully informed of the general views of the Governor-General, with respect to Afghanistan and the Sikhs, his Lordship has directed me to enclose, for your own sole information, copies of letters addressed by me on the 27th ultimo, and on the 16th instant, to Mr. Clerk.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 327.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, May 21, 1842.*

SIR,—Your letter of the 26th ultimo, having been mis-sent to Calcutta, was only received by me this day.

2. That letter incloses a copy of a letter from Major Pottinger, now a prisoner in the hands of Mahomed Akbar Khan, conveying a message from that person, and certain other Afghan chiefs, with the following three propositions :—

First.—The Sirdar wishes to know, in the first place, if we will consent to withdraw the greater part of our troops, and leave an agent, with a small body of men, to act with whomever the confederates may elect as chief ; in which choice they propose to be guided by the wishes of the two factions in Cabool, and wish us to release Dost Mahomed Khan.

Secondly.—They propose that if the British Government have determined on subjecting the country and continuing the war, the prisoners at present in Afghanistan shall be exchanged for Dost Mahomed Khan, his family and attendants, and that the issue be dependent on the sword.

Thirdly.—In the event of either of those propositions not being approved of, they wish to know what terms will be granted to themselves individually ; whether we, in the event of their submission, will confine them, send them to India, take hostages from them, reduce their pay ; or, in short, what they have to expect from our clemency.

3. Your answer to these propositions appears to have referred only to two points,—the release of the prisoners in the hands of the Afghans, and the terms to be granted to certain chiefs.

4. To effect the release of the prisoners you offered two lacs of rupees.

5. You consented that three chiefs, named by you (and mentioned by Major Pottinger as being with Mahomed Akbar Khan), shall enjoy the advantages arising from the hereditary possessions.

6. The Governor-General observes, that to the first of the propositions so made it was evidently inconsistent with honor and safety to accede.

7. Under the 13th paragraph of the instructions issued to you on the 24th of February (of which alone you were in possession on the 26th of April), you were authorised to speak of “the release of Dost Mahomed Khan as an event which, under various contingencies of circumstances, might not be altogether impossible ;” and the death of Shal-

Shooja, then known to you, having evidently removed one obstacle to the release of Dost Mahomed Khan, it is to be regretted that you did not speak of that event, at least in the cautious terms you were authorised to employ.

8. The third proposition was clearly one to which no reply could be made.

9. The instructions contained in my letter of the 25th ultimo will have placed you at liberty to negotiate for a general exchange of prisoners, not excluding Dost Mahomed Khan; and it is the hope of the Governor-General that you may have been enabled to conclude an arrangement upon that basis.

10. Undoubtedly, on the 26th of April, you remained authorised, by the instructions of the 24th of February, to give money, on the public account, for the release of individual prisoners; and if, previously to the receipt of my letter of the 25th of April, you should have concluded a negotiation for the release of any individual prisoners on that condition, the Governor-General would feel himself under the necessity of sanctioning any payment of money to which you may have then pledged yourself. After the receipt of that letter, you will, of course, in any further negotiation, have adhered to the instructions contained in it.

11. It cannot but be a subject of much regret that you should have considered it to be necessary, under any circumstances, to have any communication whatever of a diplomatic nature with Mahomed Akbar Khan, in whom it must be impossible for any one to place any trust.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 328.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, May 12, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated Allahabad, 25th of April, 1842, relating to the release of prisoners.

I take this opportunity of stating that the despatch, dated 19th of April, alluded to in the accompanying copy of a letter\* which I have received from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, has not been received by me.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 329.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Jugrawan, May 10, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter from Captain Lawrence, dated the 3rd instant, and with reference to its contents, I beg leave to state that I ascribe the backwardness of the Sikh authorities in the camp near Peshawar to provide carriage in general to the British Commissariat, to the expectation that all the carriage which they can command, and which is not excessive, ought to be held available for

\* Dated April 29.

their own troops in that quarter, amounting to thirty thousand men, and their aversion to provide bullocks in particular to a religious and invincible repugnance to consign them to a kine-killing country.

Every instance advanced as exhibiting a want of accommodation on the part of *Rajah Goolaub Sing* strikes me rather as marking defects in our own Commissariat there. For instance, the grain bags, the use of which to *Ali Musjid* were offered by the Sikhs, which they could scarcely have expected to see again, if carried beyond *Ali Musjid* to the camp of a large army, where the article must be also in so great demand.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK.

No. 330.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, May 15, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 28th ultimo, authorising me to treat for the release of prisoners with a *de facto* Government. I regret that the prisoners are not with the present ruler at Cabool (*Futteh Jung*), but, if he succeeds in his present struggle, I think it very probable he may secure the prisoners at Cabool, and his success will be the signal to *Mahomed Akbar* again to ask for terms.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 331.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, May 15, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 28th ultimo, on the subject of *Shah Shoojah's* death, and the impossibility in the present unsettled state of affairs for the British Government to recognise any individual as the successor to the monarchy.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 332.—*Major-General Pollock to Lieutenant-Colonel Luard.*

*Jellalabad, May 14, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter I have just received from the Secretary to Government; also a copy of my reply. I trust I shall be excused for delaying a few days, after I may be ready to move, to receive another letter from Government. Indeed, it is by no means certain that I shall have sufficient cattle to move, even when the reply from Government may arrive, for I require upwards of 2,000 camels, not reckoning those which must carry grain; it is, however, probable I may obtain yabooks and mules for grain. I shall be glad if it so turn out, for camels do not thrive here.

I trust the view I have taken of our situation here will meet the approbation of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 333.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Luard to Major-General Pollock.*

*Simla, May 28, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated Jellalabad, 14th May, 1842, inclosing a copy of a letter from the Secretary to Government, and your reply thereto.

In answer to your remark that you hope the view you have taken of your situation will meet the approbation of the Commander-in-Chief, I am desired by his Excellency to state that his order to you, dated 29th April, to withdraw the force under your command from Affghaistan, was sent under authority of the Governor-General of India (as therein stated, dated 19th April, 1842), and his Lordship has since approved of the spirit and wording of that order. His Excellency cannot observe, from Mr. Secretary Maddock's letter of 28th April, that any discretionary power was conveyed to you; on the contrary, you are therein told that, even had you advanced upon Cabool, his Lordship's view, previously taken, of the policy to be pursued, that is, "withdrawing at the earliest practicable period within the Khyber Pass," remained unaltered.

Mr. Maddock's letter of the 4th and 6th instant repeat this opinion.

On the 14th instant, by the Commander-in-Chief's order, I apprised you of the arrangements intended, to make your troops more comfortable when they had crossed the Indus: from this you will perceive that no change had taken place up to that date: these arrangements have now been approved by his Lordship in a letter of the 20th. The elephants and bearers will in part be assembled at Ferozepore; but his Excellency fears that your long delay, after the receipt of his instructions of the 29th ultimo, will not allow of any troops passing through the Punjab, though so much desired.

At all events, aid of all kinds may be given to you when you enter the Sikh country, which would have been impracticable had the Khyber Pass been again closed in your rear.

I have, &c.,

J. LUARD.

No. 334.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Allahabad, May 23, 1842.*

SIR,—The accounts transmitted in your letter of the 16th instant, just received, of the acts of insubordination which have taken place amongst the Sikh troops at Peshawur, subsequently to the departure of Rajah Goolaub Sing, have given the Governor-General much disquietude. His Lordship fears that the difficulties already so great in procuring provisions and carriage for the British army will be most seriously increased.

2. The Governor-General always viewed with much uneasiness the presence of a Sikh force so unnecessarily large at Peshawur, and he would be glad to see it diminished by any extensive grants of furlough. His Lordship desires that you will take an opportunity of expressing to the Maha Rajah his high sense of the energy displayed by his Highness, under these circumstances, in proceeding in person towards Peshawur, as well as of the provident wisdom evinced by his Highness in the measures which have been taken for bringing forward the means of carriage and supply.

3. The Governor-General has learnt with surprise that, in your opinion, "the cause of the Sikh army being so numerous at Peshawur is to be found in the irregular longings so often manifested by our authorities to obtain possession of Peshawur."

4. You are expressly authorised to give to the Maha Rajah the assurances of the Governor-General that his Government entertains no wish to possess or occupy any portion whatever of his Highness's dominions, and is desirous only that his Highness should long retain them all in honor and prosperity,—the faithful ally of the British Government, as his great predecessor, the Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing, was for many years.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 335.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Allahabad, May 23, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General is apprehensive that Major-General Pollock may experience some difficulties in his endeavours to procure carriage and supplies, from a deficiency of treasure.

2. If you should have reason to think that this is the case, you are authorised to take such means as, in the present state of the Sikh country and its army, may appear to you to be most secure, for the purpose of forwarding to the Major-General the sum of ten lacs of treasure.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 336.—*The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Allahabad, May 23, 1842.*

GENERAL,—Under the apprehension that Major-General Pollock may be in want of treasure, and so subjected to great difficulties in the procuring of carriage and supplies (in the present disorganised state of the Sikh army in his rear), I have authorised Mr. Clerk to send ten lacs to the Major-General, in such manner as he may deem most secure.

2. As a payment of ten lacs will be immediately made to the Sikh Government on account of sums received for them from Simde, and that sum is now at Ferozepore, Mr. Clerk will probably be enabled to take advantage of any escort the Maha Rajah may send for that sum, to pro-

fect the transport of the treasure intended for Major-General Pollock : such, at least, is Mr. Clerk's opinion.

3. I have suggested to Mr. Clerk that it would be well to induce the Sikh Government to grant extensive furloughs to their troops at Peshawur.

4. I have removed, I trust, by the declaration I have made, the apprehension which appears to have been entertained that the British Government desired to have possession of Peshawur. This apprehension, in Mr. Clerk's opinion, led to the congregating of so large a Sikh force there.

5. All these events and circumstances only make me the more earnestly desire the speedy return of Major-General Pollock's army to the Sutlej.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 337.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Allahabad, May 25, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th instant, No. , wherein you state that you are using every exertion to apply the means of the Sikh Government, in men and money, to maintain the passage of the Khyber Pass, and express your opinion that it should rest with General Pollock, to discriminate between what portions of that duty should be assigned to the Sikhs, what to the Political Agent under him for negociation, and what to the troops newly entertained or to be entertained by him, and suggest that the Major-General should be authorised to direct as many more men, such as those under Captain Thomas, as he thinks proper, to be raised.

2. I am directed by the Governor-General to refer you to the following passage in the letter, dated the 15th of March, 1842, from the Governor-General in Council to the Commander-in chief, which letter has been communicated to you :—

“His Lordship in Council cannot sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-General Pollock, unless that General should be satisfied that he can,—without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the Pass, which, obtained only by purchase, must, under all circumstances, be precarious, and without depending upon the fidelity of the Sikh Chiefs, or upon the power of those chiefs to restrain their troops, upon neither of which can any reliance be safely placed,—feel assured that he can, by his own strength, overawe or overcome all who may dispute the Pass, and keep up at all times his communication with Peshawur and the Indus.

3. The Governor-General has never seen reason to alter the opinion thus expressed.

4. The recent insubordination amongst the Sikh troops has, in one important respect, shown the correctness of that opinion, and has increased the Governor-General's desire to see the troops under Major-General Pollock again in possession of easy and certain communication with India, an object which his Lordship can have no doubt that the Major-

General will, in obedience to his instructions and to the clearest dictates of military prudence, endeavour to effect at the earliest period.

5. The Major-General is already empowered to add to the irregular force under his command.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 338.—*Mr. Maddock to the Secretary to the Government of India at Fort William.*

*Allahabad, May 26, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General deems it right to impress upon every officer employed either in the military or political service of the Government the necessity of preserving absolute secrecy in all matters of a military or political nature which may officially come to his knowledge. Such secrecy, the want of which is at all times disparaging and injurious to a government, is at the present moment essential to the success of measures upon which the safety of armies may depend.

2. The comparative unimportance of all movements of troops, and of most political transactions during a long and profound peace, may gradually have led to the habit of inconsiderately divulging the orders and intentions of the Government, but this cannot be done without the most extensive injury to the State in time of actual or apprehended war, or at a period of great political excitement; and the Governor-General must observe that officers, whose knowledge is limited to what comes before them in their official capacity, are not competent judges of the importance of the several facts thus brought to their knowledge; and, in divulging that which to them may seem little and unimportant, they may really be divulging that which, taken in conjunction with other facts not known to them, may convey very valuable intelligence to the enemy.

3. The Governor-General hopes that it will be enough thus to convey his opinion to the several higher officers of the military and political departments to secure their own absolute secrecy and their active aid in preventing the publicity which, through the means of their subordinates, may be given to matters of high public concernment.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 339.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Allahabad, May 26, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant, informing me that the Lahore Government evinces considerable desire to receive possession of either Jellalabad, or Cabool, or both; but that, before engaging definitively to hold Jellalabad, the Durbar is anxious to ascertain the views of the British Government for the final adjustment of the entire Afghan question.

2. The letter addressed to you by me, on the 16th instant, will have placed you in possession of the Governor-General's views upon the sub-



ject, and you are thereby instructed to endeavour to bring the Lahore Government to entertain similar views, namely,—that the future object of the policy of the two Governments should be to maintain Afghanistan in that state in which it may be unable to do anything against us, and that the visionary design should be foregone of placing it in a state in which it should possess power, and be content to use it against invaders from the West, without entertaining any designs of ambition against its neighbours in the East.

3. You have likewise been informed, by my letter of the 27th ultimo, that, if the Lahore Government, or the Jummoo Rajahs, with its permission, should be desirous of adding to its dominion the territory lying between the right bank of the Indus, the Suffed Koh range, and the Himalaya, the British Government would, under present circumstances, not object to the carrying of that object into effect, and would facilitate its accomplishment by placing Jellalabad in the hands of the Sikhs.

4. But that place can in no case be evacuated by the British troops one hour sooner than may be deemed consistent with their safety to give it up.

5. If the Lahore Government should be disposed to entertain these views, and to employ on its own account its too numerous army for the purpose of making these acquisitions, tending so much to its renown, the formation of a British army upon the Sutlej would strongly contribute to the maintenance of tranquillity amongst the Sindhawalla chiefs.

6. But, as a true friend of the Lahore Government the Governor-General would not advise it to engage in new designs for the acquisition of territory beyond the Indus, and, at the same time, to project conquests beyond the Himalaya. You have been already informed that the Governor-General will not engage in an armed intervention between the Sikhs and the Chinese, although his Lordship is willing to use his good offices for their reconciliation.

7. The Governor-General is prepared, therefore, to facilitate all the reasonable objects which the Lahore Government may entertain. It appears to the Governor-General that it would be most desirable that the Sikh army should not block up the Khyber Pass in the rear of Major-General Pollock, but either occupy positions in his front, or on the left bank of the Cabool river, so that it might at once be put in possession of the territory which may ultimately be annexed to the Lahore dominions.

8. To place a considerable force of Sikhs, in the present disorganized state of the Sikh army, in the rear of Major-General Pollock's position at Jellalabad, and between him and the mouth of the Pass, seems to be a measure fraught with danger, and, if it should produce no other effect, must seriously interfere with the present supply of Major-General Pollock's army.

9. That army has not the means of moving in advance, even if it were strong enough to do so, holding the passes in its rear, and securing, as it advanced, the several points which must be occupied in succession, to maintain its communication with India.

10. A British army must not depend, for the maintenance of its communications, upon the precarious discipline of Sikhs, and the yet more precarious fidelity of Afreedees. It must depend upon its own

intrinsic strength ; and, if that strength neither is, nor can be made sufficient for the purpose, retirement, at the earliest period consistent with the health of the troops, however painful that retirement may be, will be found the safest, and, in the end, the most honourable course for it to pursue.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 340.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Allahabad, May 27, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General has observed that in the letter of the Maha Rajah, dated the 5th May, in your letter in reply to the same, and in the reported conversations of Rajah Goolaub Sing, the Sikh troops which appear to have been ordered to advance through the Khyber Pass are termed the “stipulated troops.”

2. There is no stipulation between the British Government and the Lahore Government with respect to the advance of any Sikh troops, or to the service of any Sikh troops with the British army.

3. The stipulation contained in the 15th article of the tripartite treaty, for holding in readiness a body of 5,000 Mahomedans for the support of the late Shah, must of necessity have now ceased to have effect, when the Shah has been murdered, and no successor to the throne has been recognised by either Government, when therefore there is no object whatever under that treaty for which such troops thereby stipulated could be employed.

4. The inconsiderate adoption of this expression may lead the Lahore Government or its officers to the erroneous supposition that the British Government still deems the tripartite treaty, or part thereof, to be in force, whereas with respect to the provision in the 15th article of that treaty the Governor-General entertains doubts whether it has ever been observed so as to give the Lahore Government a just claim to the payment of any part of the annual sum thereby guaranteed to the Lahore Government ; and, with respect to the treaty generally, the Governor-General has no doubt that one of the contracting parties, in whose behalf and in whose favor it was executed, being no longer in existence, and there being no successor to such contracting party capable of executing its provisions, the treaty is, as regards the future, altogether abrogated and null.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 341.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, May 29, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General has experienced much disappointment at not receiving from you, from time to time since your arrival at Jellalabad, detailed statements of the condition of the army under your command, showing the number of effectives present, and of sick, and your means of supply and movement ; and his Lordship directs me to request that such

statements may be regularly and frequently transmitted to him, together with a report of the actual position of the several parties in Upper Affghanistan.

have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 342.—*Mr. Clerk to Mr. Maddock.*

*Basseean, May 21, 1842. •*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, copy of a letter addressed to Major-General Pollock, C.B., on the 18th instant.

I have, &c.,

G. CLERK.

No. 343.—*Mr. Clerk to Major-General Pollock.*

*Basseean, May 18, 1842.*

SIR,—With reference to the instructions of Government, addressed to you on the 3d instant, I have the honor to inform you that the Sikh Government is, at present, not prepared to accept the occupation of Jellalabad.

2. It seems that the Sikh Government would be glad to accept that, or any other fortress in Affghanistan, which the British Government might determine on abandoning; but that it feels there would be much indiscretion in stopping in a prominent position in that country until a declaration, by the British Government, of its ultimate views there, should enable the Sikhs to render their measures for the security of such positions more or less extensive and circumspect, according to the nature of those views.

3. Nevertheless, should you be absolutely withdrawing from Jellalabad to India, I think the Sikhs would, without further explanation of future plans, accept Jellalabad from you; and I think it would be in accordance with the intentions of the Governor-General that you should, at such a time, offer it to them.

4. I have not opened myself any negotiation with the Sikh Durbar on this subject, on such grounds; for I do not believe that, with the negotiations pending in your front, you will withdraw; or that, if such causes did not detain you, you could now withdraw, with due regard, to considerations relating to the health of your troops, as adverted to in the fourth paragraph of the instructions in Mr. Maddock's letter of the 4th instant, to your address.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE CLERK.

No. 344.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, May 29, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General has observed that, in a letter addressed to you by Mr. Clerk on the 18th instant, that gentleman remarks that

"he does not believe that, with the negotiations pending in your front, you will withdraw."

2. As Mr. Clerk was on the 18th instant, in possession of the orders addressed to you by the Commander-in-Chief on the 29th ultimo, the Governor-General infers that in so expressing his "belief that you would not withdraw with the negotiations pending in your front," he had in view the paragraphs in those orders which relate to negotiations for the release of the prisoners, which paragraphs are in these words :—

"The only circumstances which can authorise delay in obeying this order, are :—1st. That you may have brought a negotiation for the release of the prisoners lately confined at Buddeabad, to such a point that you might risk its happy accomplishment by withdrawing." Further on :—

"I do not recommend delay in the first case, unless the prisoners are actually on the way to your camp, as no faith can be placed in Affghan promises or oaths." Further on again :—

P. 6. "I allude entirely to the officers and ladies now, or lately, at Buddeabad, or its vicinity ; those at Cabool cannot, I think, be saved by any treaty or agreement made under existing circumstances at Jellalabad."

3. All these instructions obviously relate to negotiations almost brought to accomplishment at the time of your receiving the Commander-in-Chief's letter, not to negotiations which might then be pending, and of dubious event, still less to any which might be subsequently instituted.

4. The Governor-General is only at present acquainted with certain propositions having been made by Mahomed Akbar Khan (the Affghan, of all others, in whose promises and oaths no faith can be placed), to which you replied, through Major Pottinger, by the postscript to another letter from you to Major Pottinger, conveying a message to the same Mahomed Akbar Khan.

5. Nothing has come to his Lordship's knowledge which could lead to the conclusion that any negotiations with Mahomed Akbar Khan ever had been in the state which alone could have justified delay in withdrawing, in pursuance of the extracts I have cited from the Commander-in-Chief's instructions to you, of the 29th ultimo.

6. The Governor-General does not suppose that you can have misunderstood those instructions ; but, if the observation in Mr. Clerk's letter of the 18th instant had been suffered to pass in silence, that silence might have appeared to be acquiescence in a wrong interpretation, and you might possibly have been so misled into adopting it.

I have, &c.,

T. II. MADDOCK.

No. 345.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Allahabad, May 29, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General is desirous that no time should be lost in acquainting the Maha Rajah with the intention of assembling an army of reserve upon, or near, the Sutlej, at the end of the cold season, as his

Lordship is of opinion that it would be desirable at once to announce that intention publicly.

I have, &c.,

T. II. MADDOCK.

No. 346.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, May 19 1842.*

SIR,—I have this day received a copy of your dispatch (No. 26, of 1842), dated 27th ultimo, to Mr. Clerk, in which it is proposed that Jellalabad may be made over to the Sikhs. Such a measure would greatly facilitate the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan, as the Sikhs, for their own interest, would secure the Khyber Pass.

In any such arrangement it appears to me that the retrograde movement of our troops should be delayed till a more favorable season. At the present time, there is great scarcity of water in the Pass, and the troops would suffer much in consequence ; and, moreover, the negotiations for the release of the prisoners would be materially affected by retracing our steps now.

I am averse to having the Sikhs in my neighbourhood, on account of forage and supplies, but have suggested their advancing to the vicinity of Pesh Bolak or to Ali Lughman. I have preferred the former place, because the Malliks of Kote refuse to pay the revenue, and the proximity of any force to Kote is likely to produce the desired effect, without the necessity of my moving the British troops at this season more than is absolutely necessary. I shall be glad if any arrangement which may be made, touching the delivery of the fort of Jellalabad to the Sikhs, be kept secret, as its being known would operate against the release of the prisoners, and the fort should not be made over until our troops actually retire.

I have no intention of sending troops to Bazaar and Chora at present. They must necessarily go without tents ; and although two days only are mentioned, they might be detained longer ; and at this season, unless absolutely necessary, I think it would be an injudicious exposure of men to obtain a doubtful object.

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter from Captain Mackeson to my address, and copy of a letter from Captain Lawrence to the address of Mr. Clerk.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 347.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, May 20, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the —th instant, on the subject of my withdrawing from Jellalabad to Peshawur ; the dispatch of the 19th ultimo I have not yet received.

I have already in my letter, dated the 13th instant, entered on the subject, and must receive a reply before I shall be able to move.

I have endeavoured to procure camels here, and have written to Peshawur ; but I fear I cannot expect more than 400, including those coming from Ferozepore ; and unless more be sent from the provinces, I don't know where to look for them ; I have been able to purchase only a few here, and am therefore unable to move the whole force.

In order to meet the wishes of Government by retiring, the first object would be to secure the Khyber Pass with our own troops, leaving one regiment at Ali Musjid, and two at Lundi Khana, one of the latter being Europeans. I should also be obliged to send several hundred camels laden to Peshawur, with superfluous stores, which must return to take baggage, &c., of the force ; but even then, I should not be able to move the remainder. I shall therefore be glad if any letter from Government may authorise my remaining till October or November, in which case General Nott should also be directed to remain.

Although I do not think the troops suffer more in marching in hot weather than in a standing camp, yet I should be glad to spare them a march to Peshawur, at this season, certainly not more healthy than this place, for there are difficulties now which we should not experience in October or November. At present there is a great scarcity of water in the pass ; from Lundi Khana to Ali Musjid there is hardly a drop. At the top of Lundi Khana there are two wells ; but they could not supply water for a third of this force, and that only for a short time. The water below, on this side, is scantily supplied, and I fear there would hardly be sufficient for the troops on arriving there, and they would require to take on a large quantity. I am glad to say that supplies come in plentifully, and I have now upwards of forty days' attah and rice on full rations ; on this score, therefore, I have no fear : and if, in the mean time, exertions are made to send me camels, elephants, mules, or yabooos, I will move back whenever a good opportunity offers.

With regard to the Pass, the Sikhs being desirous of coming to this side of it, will, I doubt not hold it on their own account ; and if Jellalabad be made over to them, it will greatly facilitate our return to Peshawur.

I have been with the Commissariat Officer for some hours, endeavouring to make some arrangement by which I could move, but without success.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 348.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Muldock.*

*Jellalabad, May 20, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 4th instant, authorising me to purchase camels ; a few have been purchased, and I hope the natives will be induced to bring them in greater numbers when they find a ready sale.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

X X

No. 349.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.**Jellalabad, May 20, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 30th of April, 1842, on the subject of the dragoon regiment. A number of grass-cutters have been engaged ; and I have written to Peshawur for men, if procurable ; in the mean time, the horses are daily improving on bloosa mixed with grass. I hope soon to see them in as good condition as any cavalry horses here.

I have, &amp;c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 350.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.**Allahabad, June 1, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th ultimo, and to express the extreme regret of the Governor-General, that your army should be so deficient in carriage as you represent, and thus unable to move.

2. The retirement of your army immediately after the victory gained by Sir Robert Sale, the forcing of the Khyber Pass, and the relief of Jellalabad, would have had the appearance of a military operation successfully accomplished, and even triumphantly achieved.

3. Its retirement, after six months of inaction, before a following army of Affghans, will have an appearance of a different and less advantageous character.

4. It would be desirable, undoubtedly, that before finally quitting Affghanistan, you should have an opportunity of striking a blow at the enemy ; and since circumstances seem to compel you to remain there till October, the Governor-General earnestly hopes that you may be enabled to draw the enemy into a position in which you may strike such a blow effectually. You have already full powers to do everything you may deem necessary for the comfort of your troops, and for their efficiency.

5. The officers, termed Political Agents, well acquainted with the country, and with the people, are at your disposal, for the purpose of aiding you in the equipment of your army.

6. The Governor-General will request the Commander-in-Chief to select an officer who may be solely responsible for the procuring for your army of the means of movement, and bring into efficient co-operation all the several persons now employed for that purpose. This officer will be directed to report weekly to the Governor-General, and the Commander-in-Chief, and to you.

7. It will be for your consideration whether your large army, one-half of which would beat, in open field, everything that could be brought against it in Affghanistan, should remain entirely inactive during the period which must now apparently elapse before it can finally retire. Although you may not have, or soon be able to procure the means of moving your whole army, you may possibly be able to move a part of it rapidly against some portion of the enemy's force incautiously exposed, and of giving it a severe blow.

8. You may possibly be able to throw a portion of your force over the Cabool river, for the purpose of a chuppow, and of bringing in prisoners of importance, whom you may use in exchange. You may make your strength severely felt by sallies of this description, should they be practicable, and create a strong desire, on the part of the enemy, to induce you to leave the country.

9. You will recollect, in all you may undertake, that you must keep your communications in your own power, and not depend upon Sikhs or Afreedees.

10. The Sikhs you will endeavour to induce to occupy the left bank of the Cabool river, so that the road to your rear may be always unencumbered and free.

11. You have properly no political duties ; you are to be governed by military considerations alone, to make the force you have at your disposal felt by the enemy, whenever you can, and withdraw it at the earliest period, consistently with its health and efficiency, into positions wherein you may have easy and certain communication with India. The execution of these military objects will, of itself, accomplish all the political objects which the Government now has in Afghanistan.

12. It has already been intimated to General Nott that it is expected that considerations, connected with the season and the health of his troops, will not enable him to withdraw below the passes till October.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 351.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.*

*Allahabad, June 1, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed to inform you that, in consequence of the very defective state of the means of movement possessed by Major-General Pollock, it appears to be out of his power to retire from Jellalabad until October, when his retirement will certainly take place.

2. You will take care that the garrisons of Kelat-i-Ghilzie and Ghirishk shall be drawn away in such time as to enable you to move your army towards Sukkur as soon as the season will permit.

3. Every effort will be made by Major Outram to procure for you sufficient means of movement.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 352.—*Mr. Maddock to Major Outram.*

*Allahabad, June 1, 1842.*

SIR,—In communicating to you a copy of a letter this day addressed by me to Major-General Nott, I am directed to remind you that, it being necessary at the same time to provide the means of movement for Major-General Pollock's army, as well as Major-General Nott's, and likewise probably to move a large body of troops to a camp on, or near the Sutlej, it is desirable that the several officers charged with the procuring



of camels and other animals for these several purposes should confine themselves to particular portions of country, and not bid against each other.

2. You will, therefore, on your part, or on that of your subordinate officers, not make any purchases of animals, or engage any on hire, in the country to the eastward of Mitton Kote, and of the state of Jessulmere.

I have, &c.,

T. II. MADDOCK.

No. 353.—*The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Allahabad, June 1, 1842.*

GENERAL,—In communicating to your Excellency copies of the several letters addressed by my direction this day to Major-General Pollock, Major-General Nott, and Major Outram, I have to suggest to you the expediency of intrusting to some one officer the sole duty, and thus imposing upon him the sole responsibility of making such purchases and hirings of camels, and other animals, as may be required for the effectual equipment of General Pollock's force, of placing all the officers now employed for such purposes, whether political or military, in communication with, and (for such purposes) in subordination to, such chief officer, and of directing such chief officer to furnish to your excellency, to me, and to Major-General Pollock, weekly returns of his proceedings, showing the number of each description of animals with Major-General Pollock, and on the route to join him; the probable period of arrival; the probable position at the date of return; the number and description of persons accompanying the several convoys of animals, and under what terms engaged; and the cost of the animals, if purchased,—their hire, if hired,—should be annexed.

The officer selected by your Excellency should take care not to draw any supplies of animals from the country to the west of Mitton Kote and to the west of the States of Bhawalpore, Bikanere, and Jeypore, which has been allotted to Major Outram, for the use of the army of Major-General Nott.

The extreme deficiency of animals which appears to exist with the army under Major-General Pollock, and the necessity of providing at once for his wants, and for those of Major-General Nott, may render it difficult and expensive, to a great degree, to bring together the proposed army of reserve. Certainly, that army would only begin to move at the time when all the animals required for the armies beyond the Indus must be already with them, and it might draw its animals from other portions of territory: still, I apprehend, there would be very considerable difficulty in equipping it.

As the appointment of an officer with such high responsibility, and such important duties, is necessarily unusual, I am disposed to think that it would be perfectly justifiable to depart from usual rules in the selection of him; and, if, your Excellency should be of opinion that Major-General Battine, who commands at Ferozepore, and of whom I have heard a high character, would be most competent to perform the duty, or

if your Excellency would intrust it to the Quarter-Master-General, I shall be prepared to do anything that may be required for the purpose of affording to him all the requisite authority.

The cause of the whole mischief, is the having hired camels to Jellalabad, only with the condition that, immediately on arriving there, they should be sent back to Peshawur ; so that in no case could they have been used for an advance, and for retirement only, in the event of its being immediate.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 354.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Allahabad, June 1, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General to communicate to you a copy of a letter addressed by his Lordship, this day, to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. You will, of course, give, as indeed you have done, every aid in the procuring of the necessary equipment in animals for Major-General Pollock's army, and communicate confidentially, and zealously co-operate with any officer whom, at the request of the Governor-General, his Excellency may charge with the duty of superintending in chief the equipment of the army at Jellalabad.

3. The Governor-General entertains much doubt, whether it will be possible to furnish, at the same time, with the means of movement, two armies in the field, and the proposed army of reserve ; but his Lordship would forego with much regret the intention of bringing together the army of reserve at the place, and of the force, already indicated to you, as he attaches great importance to it.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 355.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Allahabad, June 4, 1842.*

SIR,—The obtaining of a sufficient supply of animals of burthen and draught for the use of Major-General Pollock's army is deemed by the Governor-General to be, at the present moment, the matter of most importance, inasmuch as that army, without such means of movement, is not only in a state of necessary inactivity, but in one of danger.

2. The Governor-General is satisfied that your most zealous exertions will be directed, in communication with the officer who may be especially made responsible for the management of this branch of the service, to the accomplishment of this essential object ; and the Governor-General invites you to acquaint him forthwith with your views upon the subject, and with such calculation as you may be enabled to make of the means of movement which, before the 1st of October, may be placed at Major-General Pollock's disposal.

3. The number of camels, whereby the five brigades were accompanied, appears to have been about 4,000, whereof 1,600 only were Go-

vernment property ; and all the hired camels, it is to be feared, have been withdrawn, while considerable losses have taken place amongst the camels which were Government property. The brigade under Major-General Sale likewise requires the means of movement, as it is apprehended that the Major-General was under the necessity of destroying the few camels he had some days previous to his victory of the 7th of April. Captain Mackeson appears to have been eminently unsuccessful in procuring camels at Peshawur.

4. Another matter of great importance, with a view to the retirement of the army of Major-General Pollock across the Punjaub, is the preparation of boats in sufficient number, and of ample size, for the passage of the several rivers. The Governor-General desires that there should, if possible, be procured ample means of passing all the rivers by more than one bridge.

5. The Major-General commanding in Afghanistan will, in due time, communicate to you at what points he may be desirous of having such bridges prepared, as he may see fit to move his army by more than one route.

6. The provisioning of the army on its march across the Punjaub is also a subject for previous preparation. If provisions can be collected at various points upon the route, the means of transport may be proportionately diminished ; but the army should, at all times carry with it, even under the most favourable circumstances, provisions for fourteen days, so that it may be at all times independent, and capable of acting as a military body.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 356.—*Mr. Maddock to Major Outram.*

*Allahabad, June 4, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General to request that you will report regularly and frequently respecting the camels and baggage-cattle with the troops, above and below the Pass, and upon the steps in course of being taken for adding to the means of carriage.

2. His Lordship desires that, as soon as a sufficient number of cattle shall have been provided for the wants of Major-General Nott's force, all further supplies of carriage and baggage-cattle should be directed to the north-western frontier, where there will exist still greater want of means for the movement of troops than you are likely to have to contend with.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

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No. 357.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, May 23, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 6th instant, intimating that the instructions sent to me by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief had met the entire approbation of the Governor-General, but that one point remained to be decided, viz., the

delivery of the fort of Jellalabad to the Sikhs. I conclude that I shall hear from Mr. Clerk very shortly on the subject, and will act accordingly.

I have written to Peshawur, to ascertain what assistance can be given in Puckauls for the supply of water, the want of which appears to me to be the greatest difficulty I have to contend against in returning. I have also written to Captain Mackeson, to report on the quantity of water at the stream below Lundi Khana. If that stream is found to afford a larger quantity than I have been given to understand it does, I hope to be able to supply the Europeans and Mussulmans of the force from Mussucks and Puckauls; and there are a number of large brass pots, which were procured for the Hindoos on the day we entered the pass. It is impossible to say what may be necessary in returning through the Khyber; but every precaution shall be taken whenever such an event takes place.

I have in a former letter stated that I do not think the troops suffer when marching in hot weather, more than they do when halting under canvas. I shall endeavour to move as much as possible during the night, to prevent exposure to the sun. I am still without the means of moving. I require many hundred camels.

There are 350 which have probably reached Peshawur; and about the same number are following from Ferozepore; but many more are required.

We arrived here, as you know, on the 16th ultimo, and, up to this date, I have lost only one European of the artillery by disease; and that not attributable to the climate; of the other European regiments (dragoons and infantry) not one man has died of disease. Considering the number of Europeans with the force, the climate may, up to this date, be considered, perhaps, superior to that of the provinces; but I fear the four next months would not prove so favourable. The prevailing sickness here is diarrhoea and dysentery, which I attribute partly to the water, and partly to too great indulgence in the fruit, which is just beginning to get ripe: there are also some cases of fever from exposure.

Supplies continue to come in abundantly, and I am happy to say that the horses of the dragoons are daily improving.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 358.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, June 6, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 23rd ultimo.

2. In that letter you acknowledge the receipt of my letter, of the 6th ultimo, in terms which induce the Governor-General to think it necessary to guard against the possibility, however improbable, of your having on one point misunderstood the instruction therein conveyed to you.

3. You say, "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 6th instant, intimating that the instructions sent to me by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief had met the entire approbation of the Governor-General, but that one point remained to be decided,

viz., the delivery of the fort of Jellalabad to the Sikhs. I conclude that I shall hear from Mr. Clerk very shortly on the subject, and will act accordingly."

4. The words in my letter of the 6th, to which you refer, were these :—" There is one point upon which I am directed to desire you to attend to the instructions of Mr. Clerk. If that gentleman, the Governor-General's Agent at the Court of Lahore, should, upon quitting Jellalabad, instruct you to deliver up that place to the Sikhs, you will do so, &c.

The Governor-General thinks it is scarcely possible that, from these words, you can have inferred that you were to delay your movement from Jellalabad, until it had been decided whether it should be given up to the Sikhs or not ; nevertheless, the expressions in your letter of the 23rd ultimo, which I have cited, lead his Lordship, in caution perhaps extreme, to direct me to inform you that you are not to wait for any instructions from Mr. Clerk upon the subject of giving up Jellalabad to the Sikhs, but only to obey those instructions, if you should receive them before you leave that place.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 359.—*Mr. Madlock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Allahabad, June 6, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that the Governor-General has, this day, published a general order for the assembling of an army of reserve in the Sirhind division.

2. The army will consist of twelve regiments of Infantry, of which four will be European, of five regiments of Regular Cavalry, of which one will be European, and of two regiments of Irregular Cavalry. There will be attached to the army four batteries of Horse Artillery, and three batteries of Foot Artillery.

3. I am likewise directed to inform you that the Governor-General will at an early period, give orders for the formation of a moveable camp in Bundelcund, and of another moveable camp in the vicinity of the Nerbudda and Taptee.

4. It may be expedient, likewise, to form a similar camp in the district of Tirhoot ; but the Governor-General entertains no serious apprehensions of any hostile movement on the side of Nepal, and relies upon the effect which the general display of armed preparation will have upon the Durbar of Katmandhoo, to preserve tranquillity in that quarter.

5. The large reinforcements of British troops, which will begin to arrive before the end of the rains, will enable the Governor-General to give the requisite strength to any corps it may become necessary to assemble on the frontiers of Nepal.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 360.—*Mr. Maddock to Major Outram.**Allahabad, June 7, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated Sakkur the 27th of May, 1842.

I am directed by the Governor-General to inform you that his Lordship highly appreciates the public zeal you have manifested in the performance of your duty, at much personal risk, by proceeding at this season, to Quetta, where your exertions are especially required in aid of Major-General Nott's army.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 361.—*Major-General Pollock to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.**Jellalabad, May 24, 1842.*

SIR,—Since the receipt of your orders, I have been endeavouring to procure carriage-cattle, for the purpose of withdrawing the troops ; but I am sorry to say I am entirely dependent on Peshawur, or the provinces : 350 camels will, I believe, have arrived at Peshawur from Ferozepore, and 350 are, I believe, on their way ; but still I shall require many. Captain Lawrence is endeavouring to procure even bullocks ; but there seems to be great difficulty ; and, at present, I must wait the result of Mr. Clerk's communication to the Sikh Government at Lahore, about Jellalabad.

I heard yesterday evening that an officer on your staff had written to an officer here that we were ordered back. Sir Robert Sale has endeavoured to counteract the bad effect such a report might create. A few days ago I was on the point of ordering a brigade to occupy the Pass, and then requested of Sir Robert Sale, and others, to whom I was obliged to communicate the true state of the case, to give out that we required treasure from Peshawur, and were sending in superfluous baggage. But the letter which has been received, and coming from the quarter it does, has evidently made an impression ; and I only hope it may not extend to the native population, which would, indeed, be ruinous. In a late letter to Government, you will have seen how anxious I was that any proposed movement towards Peshawur should be communicated to no one from whom it could be withheld. The moment such a thing is known, it is probable supplies will cease to come in ; we should be in difficulty about forage ; all who are now friendly would be ready to oppose us ; and, if I had not time to secure the Pass, the consequences might be serious indeed. I fear this will be much too late to prevent future communications of the kind ; but I consider it my duty to point out how dangerous they are, and how much our difficulties might be increased by their being known to the natives of the country, especially those connected with the Khyber Pass. I have just heard that bets were made at messes as to the probable date of our moving, and this before native servants, who will, I fear, make the report current in the bazaar. I have taken steps to prevent any great mischief resulting, by ordering the Deputy-Quarter-Master-General, a few miles in advance,

to mark out a new encamping ground ; and I shall have such inquiries made among the natives about bringing stores (supplies) there, that will make them believe I shall move forward. I am sorry to have had occasion to write on such a subject to you, but I have no alternative.

I have to thank you for your congratulatory letter, on my reaching Jellalabad. It is a great pity I had not the means of returning, as Government is so anxious on the subject. I have now ordered rafts to be made, by which I can float down a number of stores, which would otherwise require land carriage.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 362.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, May 25, 1842.*

SIR,—With reference to my letter of the 23rd instant, relating to the practicability of retiring through the Khyber at this season, I have now the honor to forward letter from Captain Mackeson, whom I had requested to offer any observations on the difficulty or otherwise of now retiring through the Pass. His letter seems to bear me out fully in the opinion I had expressed that we should not withdraw till a more favourable season.

The necessity of crowning the heights the whole way cannot be questioned, for plunder will at all times attract numbers ; and, from my own experience, I know how trying it was to the troops (even in the beginning of April) on the heights, although every precaution was taken to supply them with water. Now the difficulty would be much greater, and I could not expect to supply water during the whole time we should be making each march, and without it the men could not ascend steep and precipitous mountains. I therefore strongly urge the necessity of remaining in this vicinity till the season becomes more favorable. With regard to our situation here, or a march or two in advance, we need have no fear of want in provisions. Supplies come in quicker than we can store them ; grain is becoming cheaper ; and when the troops are collected, the price will fall still lower, and the supply will be even more abundant ; in the mean time, carriage-cattle can be collected, and I hope ere long I may be able to obtain the prisoners. The whole country around is perfectly quiet, and as long as we remain in advance, in force, the passage of the Khyber may be considered quite safe. I propose (if Government will sanction the measure) having the old Ali Musjid garrison increased to 1,000 men ; and the newly raised regiment, under Captain Thomas, I propose stationing at Ludi Khana. One regiment, and a wing of another, with Captain Ferris's Jezzailchees, five mountain-train guns, and 200 irregular horse, are stationed at Dhaka. With regard to the climate, it is hot, but I do not think it more so than in the provinces, and I consider it far superior to Peshawur, and I can at any time improve it by moving forward ; but I must confess, I cannot but look upon a retrograde movement, at present, as pregnant with great distress to the whole force, and very probably loss of life.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 362.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

Jellalabad, May 21, 1842.

SIR,—I have the honor to forward herewith, for the information of the Governor-General of India, copies of a P.S. from General Nott, and a letter from Major Rawlinson, both dated the 6th instant.

I have, &amp;c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 364.—*Postscript of a Letter from Major-General Nott to Major-General Pollock.*

Candahar, May 6, 1842.

England has now, with the aid of my brigade, crossed the Pass. He brings with him two 12-pounder howitzers; but for these, I should not have a single howitzer at command. Mortars I have none. I expect the troops here on the 10th. The Ghazees still keep head within a few miles of us—not in great strength; the nucleus however exists. I have directed all camels within reach to be procured on any terms; want of money alone prevented me doing this earlier. The force I shall take from this must depend on the available carriage. I trust it may amount to 5,000 men. Rely on my making every effort to communicate with you; but, from past experience, I must regard this as extremely doubtful, and that we must not depend on mutual intelligence, enabling us to make combined movements. No opportunity shall be lost; but, if all attempts at correspondence fail, I will still hope that, as we have one object at heart, the similarity of our operations may, in some measure, supply the want of concerted plan.

I have, &amp;c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 365.—*Captain French to Major Outram.*

Sebee, May 10, 1842.

SIR,—In reply to the inquiries made by you relating to the probable number of camels that could be procured by October next, I have the honor to state I am informed by the officer in charge of the Commissariat at Dadur, that 1,000 could be purchased by the named month, and that, provided twenty days' previous notice were given him, he could hire about 2,000 more.

The number of Government camels now here, and at Dadur, is 382, but they are chiefly sick ones.

Should camels, to any great amount, be essentially requisite, the sooner authority for purchasing them is given, the better. I think I could purchase many in the Murree hills.

I have, &amp;c.,

P. FRENCH.



## No. 366.—NOTIFICATION.

*Allahabad, June 11, 1842.*

The Right Honourable the Governor-General of India is pleased to direct the publication of the annexed copies of despatches from Major-General Nott, commanding the British force at Candahar.

By order of the Governor-General,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 367.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.**Candahar, March 29, 1842.*

SIR,—With reference to the concluding paragraph of my letter to your address, under date the 12th instant, I have now the honour of forwarding to you Major Lane's report of an attack made on one of the city gates of Candahar, which was most gallantly repulsed by the Bengal Sepoys, small details from Her Majesty's 40th regiment, and from the 4th company 2nd battalion of artillery.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 368.—*Major C. R. W. Lane to Captain Scott.**Candahar, March 12, 1842.*

SIR,—For the information of Major-General Nott, commanding, I have the honour to report the following particulars of an attack made upon Candahar, on the night of the 10th instant.

During the forenoon of the above date, large bodies of the enemy, horse and foot, were observed assembling from all quarters, taking up a position near old Candahar and the adjoining villages; and in the course of the day their numbers rapidly increased, parties from the main body moving round, and establishing themselves in front of the Shikarpore gate. As their object was evidently to attack the garrison, the Political Agent directed the inhabitants to shut their shops, and remain within their houses, and precautions were taken to secure the gates by piling bags of grain inside.

About eight o'clock, P. M., a desperate attack was made upon the Herat gate: and, owing to the darkness of the night, some combustibles were placed near it and ignited unperceived, and in a few minutes the gate was in flames. I immediately ordered a party of 100 rank and file from the 2nd regiment, and a company from the Shah's 1st Infantry, to support the guard at the gate; and two guns were also placed in position commanding the entrance.

Dense masses of the enemy had now collected at this point, keeping up an incessant and heavy fire, which was returned with great effect from the ramparts, but so reckless and daring were the assailants that, notwithstanding the fearful havoc among them, eight or ten men actually forced their way, by tearing down the burning fragments of the gate, and scrambling over the bags of grain; these were instantly shot, and their

fate, together with the galling fire from the walls, dismayed the attacking party, who retired about midnight, after four hours' resolute fighting.

Another attack took place at the Shikarpore gate about nine p. m., and a similar attempt was made to fire it, which, however, failed, and the assailants were driven back. A small party also approached the Cabool gate; but the garrison being everywhere on the alert, the enemy was compelled to retire about one o'clock A. M. of the 11th; and when the day broke, not a soul was visible.

The guards over the several gates were so completely sheltered, that not a single casualty occurred, whilst the well-directed and destructive fire which was maintained for nearly four hours must have done great execution. Upwards of fifty dead bodies were found in and near the Herat gate, and from the determined assault of the enemy who came close up to the walls, their loss must have been immense; report estimates it at 1,000 killed and wounded; and I am informed by Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, that Prince Suftur Jung, Meerza Ahmed, and other Sirdars, were present, encouraging the assailants.

A considerable quantity of grain was unavoidably destroyed at the Herat gate, but, as it presented a strong barrier, I trust the sacrifice will be considered unimportant. This gate has been built up, and the others have been temporarily barricaded with grain bags.

Before concluding my report, I would beg to acknowledge the valuable assistance rendered me on this occasion by Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, and Captain Ripley, Fort Adjutant. The exertions of every officer and soldier in garrison were unremitting, and it affords me infinite pleasure to bear testimony to the admirable conduct of all parties during the attack.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES R. W. LANE.

No. 369.—*Major-General W. Nott, to Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, March 28, 1842.*

SIR,—Having deemed it desirable to detach a brigade under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer, for the double purpose of foraging, and giving protection to the numerous villages along the left bank of the Urghundab river against the marauding system adopted by the rebel army, commanded by Prince Suftur Jung and other Affghan chiefs, I have now the honour to forward to you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, a report from that officer of an attack made on his detachment, and of the complete defeat of the enemy. I have ascertained that their loss was great, and that several of their chiefs were killed and wounded, while our loss was comparatively trifling.

On my arrival on the field, I was pleased with the judicious arrangements made by Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer; and the cool and determined manner in which he opposed the enemy and protected his convoy did credit to our arms; and I beg leave to bring him under the favourable notice of Government.

The enemy were finally driven across the Urghundab, in the greatest confusion, and with very considerable loss. The Artillery and Infantry distinguished themselves.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 370.—*Lieutenant-Colonel G. P. Wymer to Captain Scott.*

*Candahar Camp, Baba Wullee, March 27, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to report for the information of Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar, that, in obedience to his instructions, I marched from that place with the force noted in the margin,\* on the morning of the 25th instant, with the intention of foraging for the cavalry and cattle at the village of Seikhchulah; but, on receiving a report from Captain Dallas, that the country thereabouts had recently been foraged over, and the water turned off by the enemy, he suggested the advantage to be derived by a move upon Baba Wullee, which was adopted. On reaching that place, I sighted the rebel camp on the opposite side of the Urghundab, distant about four miles, and large bodies of cavalry grazing their horses between it and the river. I continued my march to the spot selected for my encampment, and, shortly after reaching it, at half-past ten or eleven, a large body of the enemy's cavalry was observed forming and occupying the pass in my rear; on which I reinforced the rear-guard with two guns and a wing of the 38th Native Infantry, placing the convoy under the hills in the rear, and protecting its front and flanks with the force at my disposal, which had hardly been effected, when, finding the force above mentioned fast increasing, I deemed it highly necessary to move back for their dispersion, taking with me two horse-artillery guns, under Lieutenant Turner, the 38th Regiment, and a party of Skinner's Horse, under Lieutenant Travers, detaching two companies 38th Regiment, to drive the enemy from the tops of some low hills they had crowned with horsemen on my left, which was speedily done, and the well-directed fire from Lieutenant Turner's guns soon drove in the body of the enemy collected on the pass, commanded, I am told, by Salloo Khan and Taj Mahomed, who moved round to join the party then threatening the right flank of the convoy. On this, I retraced my steps, and rejoined the convoy, which had been left under Lieutenant-Colonel McLaren's charge, during my absence, and who had dislodged a third body of the enemy from the inclosed gardens and villages in his front, with a part of the 16th Regiment. On my reaching the convoy, I directed Captain Macan, commanding the Shah's 2d Regiment, to move his corps, supported by two guns, and the half of Leeson's Horse, under Ensign Chamberlain, against the party on the right flank, which movement had been partly executed, when the force under the Major-General's personal command arrived to my support, at the time when the party of cavalry, under Ensign Chamberlain, received a partial check from an overpowering body of the enemy, and that officer was

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\* One troop Shah's H. Artillery; half a troop Haldane's Horse; half a troop Leeson's Horse; 16th regt. Bengal N. I.; 38th regt. ditto; 2nd Shah's regt.

severely wounded, and Lieutenant Travers slightly, who acted in concert with him.

Inclosed I have the honor to forward a return of the killed and wounded on the occasion, and to express my entire approbation of the conduct of all officers and men engaged in the action.

I trust I may be permitted to bring to the Major-General's notice the admirable practice of the artillery, under Lieutenant Turner's guidance, every shot from which told with beautiful effect upon the dense masses of the enemy.

To Lieutenant Waterfield, Adjutant 38th Regiment, who acted as my personal staff on the occasion, I am much indebted for the very able manner in which he conducted the various duties assigned him.

I have, &c.,

G. B. WYMER.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer, in the engagement with the Enemy, near Baba Wullee, on the 25th instant.*

*Camp, Baba Wullee, March 27, 1842.*

Horse Artillery S.S.F.—1 syce wounded.

16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.—2 havildars, 3 privates, wounded.

38th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.—1 jemadar, 12 privates, wounded.

Shah's 2d Regiment of Infantry.—1 naick, 3 privates, wounded.

Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry.—1 private, 1 horse, killed; 1 ensign, 1 naick, 6 privates, 7 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Detachment 1st Irregular Bengal Cavalry.—2 privates, 4 horses, killed; 1 lieutenant, 2 naicks, 5 privates, 5 horses, wounded.

Total.—3 privates, 5 horses, killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 1 jemadar, 2 havildars, 4 naicks, 29 privates, 1 syce, 12 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Grand Total of killed, wounded, and missing.—42 officers and men; 18 horses.

*Names of Officers wounded.*

Doing duty with Detachment 1st Irregular Bengal Cavalry.—Lieutenant Travers, 2d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, slightly.

Doing duty with Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry.—Ensign N. B. Chamberlain, 16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, severely.

G. P. WYMER, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Detachment.*

Examined.

J. WATERFIELD, *Lieutenant, Acting Detachment Staff.*

No. 371.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, May 17, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th ultimo, which reached me last evening, conveying to me the orders of the Governor-General of India, for the withdrawal of the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie and Candahar, and for the posting of the troops in the valley of Shawl, with the ultimate view of marching them upon Sukkur.

These measures shall be carried into effect, and the directions of his Lordship accomplished in the best manner circumstances will admit of I shall experience a great want of carriage; the force, at present, is large; the camp-followers numerous; stores, guns, &c., very considerable; and, when it is known that the British troops are about to retire

from Affghanistan, which the evacuation of Kelat-i-Ghilzie will render obvious, many difficulties will arise : from that moment we must not expect the least aid from the natives in the country, in providing supplies or carriage, or rendering assistance in any way whatever ; on the contrary, we must expect to encounter every impediment, and every annoyance ; those who are now our friends, and they are many, must, in all appearance at least, oppose us in everything to prevent their being compromised in the eyes of their countrymen. It must be for me to endeavour to overcome these and many other difficulties, and to do all in my power to uphold the honour of our country.

I will not conceal from you that I have, and still may experience much inconvenience, in consequence of the measures directed in you communications being made public ; the subject of your letter of the 15th March was speedily known, even to the Affghan chiefs, although I have not, up to this moment, made known its contents to my old and confidential staff : and your communication, now under reply, may possibly become equally public, and still more seriously injurious. I have not received the original, but a copy, signed, "Outram, Political Agent."

The climate of Quetta is so very unhealthy in July, August, and September, that I could have wished to have avoided exposing the troops to its dreadful effects during these months ; but, on the withdrawal of the garrison from the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, the period of my continuance at Candahar must depend upon the feelings perceptible in the country towards the British force.

I am of opinion that Prince Timoor is sincerely attached to the British Government, but I believe he has no influence in this country, and that he will be desirous of accompanying the English troops. I shall be most anxious to receive the orders of the Governor-General of India regarding him.

I shall, of course, regularly communicate to you my proceedings in carrying into effect the orders now received.

Under the circumstances noted in your letter, it is almost useless for me to acquaint you that I have in a great measure put down rebellion, and tranquillized the districts of Candahar ; the people are cultivating their lands, and living in peace, with the exception of 500 or 600 men under Prince Sufter Jung.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 372.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, May 21, 1842.*

SIR.—With reference to your letter to my address, under date Benares, the 19th of April, 1842, I have now the honour to acquaint you that I have ordered the small fort of Killa Abdoollah, situated at the southern foot of the Kojuck Pass, to be re-occupied by British troops (Sepoys), for the purpose of facilitating the movement directed in your letter above alluded to, and I have made arrangements for depositing there grain and other supplies, which will be necessary for the retiring troops.

I have directed all public cattle now at Quetta to be immediately

sent, under a proper escort, to Killa Abdoollah, where I shall have a brigade from this to receive charge of them, and to bring them on to Candahar. It would be very desirable for the troops to remain at Candahar until the end of September, to preserve them from the ill effects of the Quetta climate. But the period of my continuance here must depend upon the state of the country, after the withdrawal of the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and the state of British affairs at Jellalabad; for although I have in a great measure succeeded in tranquillising the Candahar districts, yet the possible event of the withdrawal of the troops from Jellalabad, and the fact of the retirement of the Kelat-i-Ghilzie garrison, would probably induce those villagers who have retired to peace and to the cultivation of their lands to re-assemble in arms, and once more place themselves under the guidance of those chiefs who are now fugitives, owing to the success of our arms, and the subsequent measures adopted to conciliate the people whom they and the Moollahs has seduced into rebellion.

I shall therefore not lose a moment in making all necessary arrangements for carrying into effect the orders I have received, without turning to the right or to the left, by the idle propositions and wild speculations daily and hourly heaped upon me from all parts of Afghanistan and Sind, by persons who are, or fancy themselves to be, representatives of Government west of the Indus. I know that it is my duty, and their duty, implicitly and zealously to carry into effect every order received, without inquiring into the reasons for the measures adopted, whatever our own opinions or wishes may be, and without troubling Government with unnecessary references.

After due consideration, I am come to the conclusion that his Royal Highness Prince Tinoor has no party, no influence, and that he cannot remain in this country with safety to his person on the retirement of our troops. I, therefore, beg for instructions to guide me in my conduct towards him.

There are also many individuals in important situations here who have shown attachment to us, and who have committed themselves by serving the British Government. I believe that some of these will petition for permission to accompany the force under my command, at least as far as Shikarpore. Am I to afford protection to these people, or how am I to act towards them? I will direct Major Rawlinson to draw up a memorandum regarding these persons, and, should I then deem it of sufficient consequence, will forward it for the information of Government. I have permitted the Chief Saloo Khan of Pishen, who had joined the rebels, to return to the head of his tribe; and he has promised to exert himself to keep open the communication between Candahar and Quetta, and to forward our dawks.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

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No. 373.—*Major-General to Nott Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, May 21, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acquaint you that on the 19th instant I detached the following force to Kelat-i-Ghilzie, under the command of

Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer, of the 38th Regiment Native Infantry, for the purpose of carrying into effect the orders of the Governor-General of India, contained in the first paragraph of your letter of the 19th April, 1842.

1st troop Bombay Horse Artillery.	Her Majesty's 40th Regiment.
Captain Blood's battery, four 9-pds.	2nd Regiment Native Infantry.
Detail 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.	16th                   "                   "
Half Shah's 1st Cavalry.	38th                   "                   "
Detachment, Captain Haldane's	Detail of Madras Sappers.
1st Irregular Horse.	Detail of Bengal Foot Artillery.

Having received information that a body of Ghilzies, amounting to about 5,000 horse and foot, had assembled in the vicinity of the fort of Kelat, determined me on sending a force able to overcome all opposition.

Before the receipt of your letter of the 19th April, I had equipped this force, which, with two additional regiments of infantry, another troop of horse artillery and the remainder of the Shah's 1st cavalry, I had intended to march in command of, for the purpose of throwing supplies into Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and endeavouring to recover the late Gluznee garrison, now in the hands of the enemy, and making a diversion in favour of General Pollock's army.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

#### NO. 374.—NOTIFICATION.

*Allahabad, June 27, 1842.*

The Right Honourable the Governor-General of India is pleased to direct the publication of the following despatches from Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar :

#### NO. 378.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, May 21, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward to you a despatch from Major-General England, No. 254, of the 29th ultimo, detailing an affair with the enemy in Pisheen.

I am, &c.,

W. NOTT.

#### NO. 375.—*Major-General England to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Candahar.*

*Camp, at Lora River, April 29, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Major-General commanding the troops in Lower Afghanistan and Sindh, that I yesterday attacked the enemy's strong position in front of the

Hykulzie, with the troops mentioned in the margin,\* and dispersed them in all directions.

2. The three columns of attack were led by Major Simmons, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment; Captain Woodburn, 25th Bombay Native Infantry; and Major Cochran, Her Majesty's 41st; the latter being accompanied by a wing of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, under Captain Teasdale, commanding that corps.

3. The reserve was in the hands of Major Browne, commanding Her Majesty's 41st Regiment.

4. Nothing could be more successful than the combinations; and the insurgents, after a short resistance, fled into the rugged mountains in their rear, leaving their standards, and being closely and gallantly pursued by the 3d Light Cavalry, under Captain Delamain.

5. The practice of Captain Leslie's horse artillery battery was, as usual, most effective; and the conduct of the troops excellent.

6. I beg to annex a list of the casualties which have occurred in this affair.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

#### SINDE FIELD FORCE.

*Return of Casualties in Action with the Enemy near Hykulzie, this day.*

*Camp, near Hykulzie, April 28, 1842.*

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment.—2 rank and file wounded.  
3d Light Cavalry.—1 lieutenant, 1 havildar, 3 rank and file, 7 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.  
Light Battalion.—2 rank and file wounded.  
General Staff.—1 captain wounded.  
Total.—1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 havildar, 7 rank and file, 7 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.  
Grand Total.—10 officers and men, 7 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

#### *Remarks.*

Wounded.—4 rank and file severely; 4 rank and file slightly.

#### *Names of Officers wounded.*

Lieutenant W. Ashburner, 3rd Cavalry, severely wounded.  
Captain Deere, A.D.C., slightly wounded.

R. ENGLAND.

No. 376.—*Major-General W. Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, May 29, 1842.*

SIR,—Aktar Khan, Chief of Zamindawur, having assembled three thousand men, crossed the Helmund, and joined the rebel force under Prince Suftur Jung and Atta Mahomed, on the right bank of the Urghundab, taking advantage of the absence of Brigadier Wymer, who had been detached into the Ghilzie province with a large portion of my force, and nearly the whole of my cavalry. The enemy, under an impression that we had not a sufficient number of men to hold the city, and at the same time to attack them in the field, took possession of some steep

\* One troop Bengal Horse Artillery—3rd Light Cavalry—Poona Horse—Her Majesty's 41st Regiment Light Battalion—25th Regiment Native Infantry.



rocky hills within a mile of the city walls. I instantly moved out with the troops noted in the accompanying field return, leaving Major-General England, K. H., in command of the city. The Ghazees had about 8,000 in position, and 2,000 men guarding the Baba Wullee pass, and roads leading to their camp. Our troop carried all their positions in gallant style, and drove them in confusion, and with great loss, across the Urghundab river.

I was ably assisted by Brigadier Stacy and every officer present.

Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, with his accustomed zeal, was in the field, and gallantly led a small body of Persian and Afghan horse to the charge.

I inclose a list of killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

*Field Return of the Troops present in the Action of the 29th of May, 1842, under the command of Major-General W. Nott, Commanding in Lower Affghanistan and Sindh.*

Horse Artillery, S. S. F.—1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 1 adjutant, 4 staff-serjeants, 2 farrier-serjeants, 1 native doctor, 2 subadars, 2 jemadars, 13 serjeants, 16 corporals, 3 trumpeters, 8 rough-riders, 102 gunners, 58 syces, 130 horses, 12 six-pounder guns.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment.—1 major, 1 captain, 7 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 1 surgeon, 1 assistant-surgeon, 19 serjeants, 13 corporals, 10 drummers, 339 privates.

42d Regiment Bengal N. I. 2d Brigade.—1 major, 2 captains, 5 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 1 assistant-surgeon, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 serjeant-major, 1 quartermaster-serjeant, 1 native doctor, 6 subadars, 8 jemadars, 47 havildars, 41 naicks, 10 drummers, 515 sepoy.

43d Regiment Bengal N. I. 2d Brigade.—1 major, 4 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 1 assistant-surgeon, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 serjeant-major, 1 quartermaster-serjeant, 4 subadars, 3 jemadars, 23 havildars, 19 naicks, 9 drummers, 303 sepoy, 1 lascar, 6 bheestees.

Detachment Light Battalion, Bombay.—1 ensign, 1 jemadar, 3 havildars, 2 duffadars, 26 sepoy.

Detachment 25th Regiment, Bombay N. I.—1 ensign, 1 subadar, 2 havildars, 2 duffadars, 1 bugler, 31 sepoy, 1 bheestee.

Detachment Poona Horse.—1 naib rissaldar, 1 kote duffadar, 1 duffadar, 1 farrier, 79 troopers, 83 horses.

Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry.—1 ensign, 4 rissaldars, 5 naib rissaldars, 22 duffadars, 6 nagarchees, 206 sowars, 243 horses.

Total.—3 majors, 4 captains, 18 lieutenants, 11 ensigns, 1 surgeon, 3 assistant-surgeons, 3 adjutants, 2 quartermasters, 2 serjeant-majors, 2 quarter-master-serjeants, 4 staff-serjeants, 2 farrier-serjeants, 2 native doctors, 17 subadars, 20 jemadars, 108 serjeants, 116 corporals, 39 trumpeters and buglers, 9 rough-riders and farriers, 1,604 gunners, troopers, privates, sepoy, &c., 58 syces, 456 horses, 12 6-pounder guns, 1 lascar, 7 bheestees.

W. NOTT.

(Examined.) THOS. POLWHELE.

N.B.—Brigadier L. R. Stacy, commanding 2d brigade; Captain T. Dixon, Major of Brigade.

*Return of killed and wounded of the Troops engaged with the Enemy near Candahar, on the 29th May, 1842.*

Horse Artillery S. S. F.—1 havildar, 3 privates, 1 syce, wounded.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment.—11 privates, wounded.

42d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.—1 lieutenant, 6 privates, wounded.

43d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.—1 havildar, 18 privates, 1 bheestee, wounded.

Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry.—1 private, 1 horse, killed; 1 ensign; 1 jemadar, 1 naick, 5 privates, 11 horses, wounded.

Total.—1 private, 1 horse, killed ; 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 1 jemadar, 2 havildars, 1 naick. 43 privates, 1 bheestee, 1 syce, 11 horses, wounded.

Grand Total of killed and wounded.—53 officers and men, and 12 horses.

*Officers Wounded.*

Lieutenant J. J. Mainwaring, 42d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, slightly.  
Doing duty with detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry, Ensign N. B. Chamberlain 16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, severely.

Manour Khan, naib risaldar, Shah's 1st cavalry.

W. NOTT.

(Examined.) THOS. POLWHELE.

No. 377.—*Major-General Nott to Major-General Pollock.*

*Candahar, May 30, 1842.*

SIR,—I was, last evening, favoured with your note of the 15th instant. Agreeably to the orders of the Supreme Government, under date the 19th April, I have withdrawn the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie ; the order left me no discretion ; the same order applies, in the same positive manner to Candahar ; however, it will take some time to arrange, and, before I can possibly carry it into effect, there will be ample time for the Government, should they deem it advisable, to send me other orders. I shall be prepared to advance, or retire, agreeably to the pleasure of Government. I found it necessary to send the chief part of my force to bring off the troops, guns, and stores from Kelat-i-Ghilzie ; the enemy took advantage of this, and 8,000 Ghazees came and took possession of some rocky hills within a mile of the city-walls, under an impression that I had not sufficient men to hold the city, and, at the same time, to attack them ; however, I moved out with Anderson's guns, 1,000 infantry, and about 250 horse. Our troops carried the enemy's positions in gallant style ; it was the finest thing I ever saw. These 8,000 Affghans, led on by Prince Suftur Jung, and many chiefs, could not stand our 1,200 men for one hour ; and yet the cry of the press is, that our Sepoys cannot cope with the Affghans. I would at any time lead 1,000 Bengal Sepoys against 5,000 Affghans. I hope you have received some of my letters. My beautiful regiments are in high health and spirits.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 378.—NOTIFICATION.

*Allahabad, July 2, 1842.*

The Governor-General has great satisfaction in making public the following despatch from Major-General Nott, and the report from Captain Craigie, commanding the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, of the gallant and successful defence made by that garrison against a large force of Affghans by which it was assaulted. On this occasion, the late Shah Soojah's 3d Regiment of Infantry and the detachment of the Bengal 43d Regiment Native Infantry displayed that decided superiority over their enemies which has been uniformly manifested by the several corps composing Major-General Nott's army.

No. 379.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

Candahar, May 27, 1842.

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, that an attack was made on the Fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, on the morning of the 21st instant, by a body of four thousand Ghilzies; the accompanying letter from Captain Craigie details the result.

I am, &amp;c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 380.—*Captain J. H. Craigie to Captain Thomas Polchele.*

Kelat-i-Ghilzie, May 21, 1842.

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of Major-General Nott, commanding in Lower Affghanistan and Sinde, that Kelat-i-Ghilzie was attacked, at a quarter before four o'clock this morning, in two places, viz., at long neck to the north-east, and at an outwork constructed last winter by the sepoys, to give a raking fire in rear of the barracks.

The enemy advanced to the assault in the most determined manner, each column consisting of upwards of 2,000 men, provided with thirty scaling ladders; but, after an hour's fighting, they were repulsed, and driven down the hill, losing five standards (one of which was planted three times in one of the embrasures), and the whole of which are now in our possession.

Of the enemy's loss I am unable to give any correct account, as their killed and wounded, during the greater part of the attack, were immediately taken to the rear; but one hundred and four (104) dead bodies were left on the slope of the hill, and from six A. M. till three P. M. the enemy were employed in carrying off such of their dead and wounded as had been taken to the rear.

The greatest gallantry and coolness were displayed by every commissioned, non-commissioned officer, and private (both European and native) engaged in meeting the attack of the enemy, several of whom were bayonnetted on the top of the sand-bags forming our parapets. On our side, I am happy to say, only six (6) sepoys were wounded, viz., two of the detachment 43d N. I., and four of the 3d infantry.

A body of about 300 of the enemy, when driven back, took shelter under the rocks below the outwork, but were immediately dislodged by a company of the 3d infantry, which I detached for that purpose.

I have, &amp;c.,

J. HALKET CRAIGIE.

No. 381.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

Allahabad, July 8, No. 22, 1842.

HONOURABLE SIRs,—I have the honor to transmit, in a separate packet, by the present mail, copies of all papers and correspondence

relating to affairs in Afghanistan and the Punjab, which have been placed on record since the date of my last despatch on the same subjects.

2. To those papers and the abstracts of the correspondence, I must refer your honourable Committee for the details of occurrences in the past month, and of the instructions which I have issued to the officers charged with the management of military and political affairs in those countries, and I propose in this address no more than to give your honourable Committee a brief outline of the events which have occurred in the past month.

3. The force under Major-General Pollock at Jellalabad has during this period remained nearly inactive, and the weather not having been so hot as in these provinces, the health of the troops had not been affected at the date of the Major-General's last reports.

4. My instructions of the 1st ultimo to Major-General Pollock have induced him to contemplate a forward movement of such portion of his army as he has equipment for, which may be of political advantage in displaying his force in a state of activity, and may afford to that portion of it which will advance towards the upper end of the Jellalabad valley a still more temperate and salubrious climate than that of Jellalabad. The Major-General has already moved a brigade of his army on Pesh Bolak, a measure which he deems prudent as a demonstration to overawe the turbulent tribes situated on the flanks of his future line of march when he retires through the Khyber.

5. For the convenience of immediate reference, I insert below\* an abstract of the strength of the Major-General's force and of the carriage which he possesses, and of that which is required to render the whole force efficient for movement. To the deficiency of beasts of burden and of draught, under which this force labours, is to be attributed mainly, the state of inactivity in which it has so long remained. Had the Major-General found his force properly equipped in this respect after his reaching Jellalabad on the 16th April, he would probably have immediately moved forward, and when he received the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, directing him to retire to the eastward of the Khyber Pass, he would immediately have acted on those directions, but for his inability to move his whole force from a deficiency of carriage cattle.

6. The defective arrangements of the Commissariat in the hiring of camels were the original cause of this embarrassment. I have taken measures to ensure more activity and intelligence in the direction of this essential branch of military preparation, but a considerable time must elapse before the whole of Major-General Pollock's army can be properly equipped for any extensive movement.

7. A Sikh force of between 4,000 and 5,000 men with guns has advanced to Jellalabad, and is now encamped on the left bank of the Cabool river.

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\* Officers., 348 ; Non-Commissioned Officers, 1,809 ; Privates, 12,778—Total, 14,935 ; deduct sick.

Cattle present :—Elephants, public, 71 ; Camels, public 3,323, hired 98 ; Bullocks, ordnance, public, 141 ; train, public, 447 ; carriage, public, 24, hired, 2,093 Mules, public, 80, hired, 22 ; Asses, hired, 64.

Carriage required :—Elephants, 52 ; Camels, public, 3,559, private, 1,994 ; Bullocks, public, 3,906, private, 18 ; Bullocks for trains, 447 ; Mules, Yaboos, Asses, 106.

8. Boosah or chopped straw for the use of the cattle of the army is the only article of supply of which any serious deficiency is contemplated ; but as a forward movement will place the resources of the country more at our disposal, and the revenues of the Jellalabad district are collected by officers, under Major-General Pollock's orders, in kind, I am in hopes that the supply of this article will become more abundant.

9. The intelligence which has been lately received by Major-General Pollock from Cabool with great despatch and regularity contains a clear and connected account, mostly from the pen of Moonshee Mohun Lall, of the progress of events at that capital since the date of my last despatch : and from it your honourable Committee will regret to perceive that, notwithstanding the existence of a strong party at Cabool opposed to the ambitious designs of Mahomed Akbar, and the the persevering resistance offered to his attacks on the Bala Hissar by the Arab and Hindoostanee followers of the Prince Futteh Jung, Mahomed Akbar at length succeeded in making himself master of the principal portion of that fortress, and in compelling the prince to acknowledge him as his prime minister, and to admit 2,000 of his troops into the fort. The prince has been compelled to make large advances in money to Mahomed Akbar, and must be considered at the date of the last accounts to be in the power of that chieftain, though he still continues to hold out hopes of his being able to free himself from this thralldom if the British force should move on the capital ; and the party of Zemaun Khan, which is decidedly opposed to the usurpation of Mahomed Akbar, is still unsubdued and in force in Cabool, where the Persian party of Kuzzelbashées is also thought to favor the prince.

10. The letters from Prince Futteh Jung and Mohun Lall of Captain Macgregor at Jellalabad previous to the capture of the Bala Hissar by Mahomed Akbar, had repeatedly urged the expediency of the advance of the British army, even as far as Gundamuk, as a measure which would lead almost certainly to the dispersion of the Barukzye party, and the probable flight of Mahomed Akbar and the liberation of the British prisoners.

11. These unfortunate persons have been removed from their former places of confinement to the neighbourhood of Cabool, and it is supposed with the view of their being carried off to Toorkistan if the advance of General Pollock had forced Mahomed Akbar to quit Cabool.

12. The despatches from Candahar, which will be forwarded to your honourable Committee by the present mail, comprise the official reports from Major-General Nott, commencing with that dated the 12th of March of the state of affairs in that quarter, and of military occurrences of which intelligence had already reached me from other quarters, and has been communicated to your honourable Committee. The delay which has attended the transmission of these reports must be mainly attributed to the interruption of correspondence by the Kojuck Pass, till that pass was cleared of the insurgents by the advance of Major-General England, after the defeat of the enemy at Hykulzie on the 29th of April.

13. On the 17 of May, Major-General Nott acknowledged the receipt of my instructions of the 19th of April, directing him to evacuate Kelat-i-Ghilzie and Candahar, and to withdraw his army to Shawl. Previous to the receipt of these instructions the Major-General, after he had been

reinforced by the junction of the troops under Major-General England, was making preparations for organizing a sufficient force with which he proposed to advance in person for the relief or recapture of Ghuznee, and to co-operate with Major-General Pollock. But on the receipt of my orders of the 19th of April, given immediately after the receipt of the intelligence of Major-General England's repulse at Hykulzie on the 28th of March, and when it seemed uncertain whether any part of his brigade would return, he immediately relinquished this enterprise and proceeded to carry into effect the first part of my orders, by withdrawing the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and dismantling the fortifications erected there. A detachment under Brigadier Wymer was ordered to proceed to Kelat-i-Ghilzie for this purpose, and the Brigadier returned to Candahar on the 11th of June, having destroyed the works at that place, and bringing away the guns, ammunition, &c.

14. Meanwhile, however, a bold attack had been made by the neighbouring tribes on the position of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, who to the number of two thousand or more approached the place on the morning of the 21st of May, and commenced a determined assault, in which, although some actually reached the embrasures, they were repulsed with great loss, leaving 104 dead bodies on the slope of the hill, besides great numbers carried off by themselves, and leaving behind them five standards and all their scaling ladders.

15. Captain Craigie's report of this gallant affair, in which the garrison sustained a very trifling loss in wounded, has been published by my orders in the Gazette.

16. Major-General Nott's despatch of the 29th of May reports that the notorious chief Aktar Khan, having joined the insurgents under Suf-tur Jung with a body of 3,000 troops, their united force amounting to about 10,000, taking advantage of the absence of Brigadier Wymer's detachment and the best part of the cavalry of the Candahar division, took up a strong position within a mile of Candahar, when they were attacked by the Major-General with a force of arms of about 1,500 men, and were quickly defeated and dispersed with great loss.

17. The Major-General's report of this gallant action has been published in the official Gazette.

18. All the country to the south of the Pesheen valley has remained tranquil. The tribes in that quarter, including some of the Kakurs who had been induced to join Mahomed Sadik, have made their submission to the Political Officer at Quetta. The Bolan Pass has continued undisturbed, and the Government of Nusseer Khan, the young chief of Kelat, has actively co-operated with the British authorities in maintaining the peace of the country. The Ameers of Sindh have also made preparations for liquidating the arrears of their tribute, and appear to have desisted from the hostile intrigues in which there is reason to believe they were till lately engaged.

19. Major Outram has at my suggestion proceeded to Quetta, where his influence and activity may be of great benefit in the arrangements which will be required to facilitate the march of Major-General Nott's force to the plains of Sindh.

20. My attention having been drawn to the excessive number of officers employed in political duties in Western Afghanistan and Sindh,

I have dispensed<sup>4</sup> with the political services of the following officers, and placed them at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief.

Lieut. E. K. Elliott, 43d N. I.	Lieut. J. D. Leekie, 22d By. N.I.
Lieut. C. A. Jackson, 31st N. I.	Lieut. E. B. Eastwick, 6th do.
Lieut. J. T. Pattenson, 2d N. I.	Lieut. H. J. Pelly, 8th do.
Lieut. C. F. North, By. Eng.	Lieut. G. H. Robertson, 25 do.
Lieut. T. Postans, 13th By. N. I.	

21. I shall carry these reductions much further at the earliest possible period.

22. The Government of Lahore has continued to evince a firm disposition to co-operate cordially with us, and to improve and strengthen its alliance with your Government. As I have already mentioned, a Sikh army of between four and five thousand men has advanced through the Khyber Pass, and taken up a position near Jellalabad, subject to such directions as its commander may receive from the British general.

23. The only occurrence of unusual importance which has been reported to me from the Punjaub, since the date of my last despatch, is the death of Maee Chund Koonwur, the widow of the late Maha Raja who opposed the accession of Maha Raja Shere Sing. She was barbarously murdered by her own female domestics during the absence of Shere Sing from Lahore. The violent death of a lady who has held so exalted a position in the state is calculated to excite suspicions, from which it must be desirable that the minds of the Sikh soldiery should be diverted, and I have communicated my views to this effect to Mr. Clerk.

25. The death of Maee Chund Koonwur has recalled the Maha Raja to Lahore, but I have not yet heard of his arrival.

26. The Sikhs have continued to occupy and guard the Khyber Pass from its eastern extremity as far as Ali Musjid, and Major-General Pollock has been in correspondence with Mr. Clerk on the subject of arrangements for putting the Sikhs in possession of the Jellalabad valley on its evacuation by the British army.

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 382.—*Mr. Hamilton to Mr. Maddock.*

*Agra, June 10, 1842.*

SIR,—In continuation of my letter of the 7th instant, I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to request that you will inform the Governor-General that replies have been received to the communication made in a private form to the several magistrates noted in the margin,\* regarding the number of mules and ponies they might be able to collect in their respective districts. It would appear that the numbers, stated opposite

* Magistrates of	Mules.	Ponies.
Bareilly... ..	1,000	4,000
Saharunpore... ..	1,500	—
Mooradabad, Meerut... ..	1,000	1,000
Agra... ..	300	not stated but
Delhi... ..	200	numerous,
Bijnore... ..	250	
	4,250	5,000

to each district, may be obtained within two months, at a price ranging from forty to seventy rupees for mules, and from twenty to fifty for ponies.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor is still of opinion that Major Gwatkin would be the person best qualified to have the general charge of the whole arrangements ; but, as it might be inconvenient to bring all the cattle to Haupper, a subordinate of the stud department might be stationed at Loodiana, subject to the Major's orders, there to receive the animals purchased in the upper districts.

3. I am desirous to take this opportunity to notice the necessity of early orders for the preparation of pack-saddles and halters, in the event of its being determined to adopt this plan of procuring baggage-cattle.

I have, &c.,

N. HAMILTON.

No. 383.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.*

*Allahabad, June 10, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, this day, of your several letters of March the 12th, 16th, 24th, 28th, 29th, 31st, of April the 24th, and 28th, and of May 17th.

2. The Governor-General fully appreciates the zeal with which you have applied yourself to the execution of the orders conveyed to you in my letter of the 19th of April. It would have been gratifying to his Lordship if Prince Timoor, who appears to have remained uniformly faithful to the British Government, by which his family have been so long supported, had been able to establish some influence in the neighbourhood of Candahar, which would have rendered it possible to leave him in possession of that city, with the prospect of his being able to preserve it by his own means.

3. If that should not be the case, upon your leaving Candahar you will execute the instructions contained in my letter of the 19th of April, with respect to that city.

4. In the event of Prince Timoor desiring to accompany your army to the Indus, you will permit his Highness to do so, treating him always with the respect due to his misfortunes and his fidelity, and you will assure him that he will be received in the British dominions with distinguished consideration, and the hospitality which the British Government extends to the unfortunate.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 384.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, June 2, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 185) dated 19th May, 1842, with annexed copy of a letter to the address of Captain Macgregor.



I feel greatly obliged by having the services of Captain Macgregor continued to me, for I have no hesitation in saying that under existing circumstances they are invaluable. To his judicious management I am indebted for the abundant supplies which pour in from every quarter ; his knowledge of the whole country hereabouts, and his personal acquaintance with the Chiefs, enable him to overcome difficulties where another would in all probability fail. At my request he will continue to afford all the aid in his power, and I trust that his continued exertions will be duly appreciated and remunerated by Government.

With regard to the Khyber, I confess I should very much regret placing the negociations connected therewith in the hands of any other than Captain Mackeson until we are able to retire through it ; it requires that a person should be on the spot to watch narrowly the proceedings of the Malliks, and if the Sikhs do not aid in keeping open the communication, the greatest caution must be observed. Captain Mackeson is now at Dakka, and is certainly indefatigable in his endeavours to secure the safety of the parties going to and fro. I therefore earnestly beg that no change may take place in the management of the affairs of the Khyber, which, it seems to me, would involve the more than probable result of our communication being cut off ; and in that case the certainty of my being again obliged to force my passage under less fortuitous circumstances than attended my advance—and I am still without carriage cattle to enable me to move, for which I must look to the provinces. With reference to Captain Macgregor, I should observe that he is collecting the revenue of the valley in kind, and thereby saving to Government a heavy expenditure for grain and forage. I am not aware what measures are being adopted for supplying me with carriage. 350 camels were despatched from Ferozepore, I think some time in April, and should have reached Peshawur ; 350 more, with a company of sappers, are also on their way ; but even if they arrive, there will still be a great deficiency. I have already stated the difficulty of retiring now through the Khyber. I have no greater fear for the troops when marching than in a standing camp ; but the want of water is the most serious evil, and would be most severely felt in the Pass. If, however, the Governor-General is still of opinion that the trial should be made, I would suggest the following :—

That the Sikhs be required to hold the Pass up to Ali Musjid ; that carriage-cattle, either camels, mules, or yaboos, be sent in sufficient numbers, with all practicable dispatch, to enable me to move ; and I would direct Captain Lawrence to send on the animals with empty water jars, to be deposited at the top of Lundikanna, from whence every available puckaul, bheestie bag, and brass pot should be filled, and the march thence to Ali Musjid undertaken, during a moonlight night ; but the move should be kept secret. I don't think I have any right to complain of unusual sickness yet, but this is the first of four hot months ; and although I shall endeavour to get the men into houses as comfortably as I can, I am aware that we must expect sickness, though not more, if so much, as at Peshawur.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 385.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.**Jellalabad, June 3, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 21st May, 1842.

With reference to my offer of two lacs of rupees, I beg to state that I made it under the belief that such an offer had already been made ; and it was done previously to the receipt of your letter, dated 25th April, 1842.

With regard to my not having noticed that the release of Dost Mahomed, under various contingencies, was not altogether impossible, I felt that I was then replying to Major Pottinger's proposals from Mahomed Akbar, who had possession of only some of the prisoners, and that he had certainly not then the power of releasing all ; and, moreover, Captain Mackenzie seemed to speak distinctly as to the indifference of the chiefs about Dost Mahomed's release ; and I may add that I had very great reluctance to communicate with Mahomed Akbar at all ; but there was no other channel through which I could negotiate for the prisoners he retains in his possession.

Your letter, dated 25th April, paragraphs 5 and 6, seems to me to imply that, in treating, as I did, for only a portion of the prisoners, I should not be justified in naming Dost Mahomed ; but that whenever an opportunity might offer for negotiating for the whole, I might include his name.

With reference to the 10th paragraph of your letter, I shall not of course, make any pecuniary offer. I regret the application of this rule to all cases ; because, although I have been disappointed about the prisoners at Buddeabad, I have just now some hope of men of the 44th, and artillery being released. The sum demanded was 1,200 rupees. There are, I believe, nineteen altogether.

With reference to the 13th paragraph of your letter, I can only express my regret that I should have erred in communicating through Major Pottinger, with Mahomed Akbar. I did so with very great reluctance, but I saw no other hope of obtaining the release of the prisoners he has in his power.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 386.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.**Jellalabad, June 11, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your circular letter, dated May 26, 1842.

The very serious evil which might accrue to the forces in this country by any premature and unnecessary disclosure of an intended movement, especially a retrograde movement, is so fully felt by me, that nothing could have induced me to divulge the orders of Government on such a subject. The consequence was, that officers in the camp were not aware of any intended move, till communicated to them from the provinces.

I state this, because it might be supposed that I had incautiously mentioned that General Nott and I had been directed to retire.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 387.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, June 12, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 242 of 1842, dated 26 May, enclosing copy of a letter to Mr. Clerk, No. 241 of 1842, of the same date. In the event of the Sikh Government determining to occupy Jellalabad and the valley of Ningrahar, I conclude they would do so in great numbers; of this I should wish to have timely notice, as the presence of so large a force would or might seriously affect my supply of forage. It appears to me also, that if they do come, the sooner I withdraw after their arrival the better. For the next two months it would hardly be desirable that they should march so large a force into the country, as in that case I should certainly be distressed for forage, and there is nothing now on the ground for cattle.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 388.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, June 13, 1842.*

SIR,—I have had the honour to receive your letter, No. 254, of 1842, dated 29th May, 1842, on the subject of a remark made by Mr. Clerk in a letter to me, dated 18th May, 1842.

I beg to say, in reply, that if I had had carriage cattle to move the force when I received the orders of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, I should have marched for Peshawur forthwith. I regret to state, that, of the camels which were coming with Lieutenant Goodwin, of the Engineers, 274 have deserted at the Attock.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 389.—*The Governor-General of India to General Sir Jasper Nicolls.*

*Allahabad, June 18, 1842.*

GENERAL,—Mr. Clerk will make arrangements to the effect that all the States in his neighbourhood, except Putteeala, shall contribute their means of carriage to Major-General Pollock's army; and the extensive resources of Putteeala will be reserved for the use of the army of reserve.

It is very right to send for the Commissary-General, but our arrangements with the Sikh Government are now so far advanced, that we ought to be prepared to move Major-General Pollock's force long before the

Commissary-General will be near the Sutlej ; and I must again suggest to your Excellency the expediency of appointing, in this emergency, some able officer who may temporarily have the whole responsibility of providing Major-General Pollock's force with the means of movement. Upon this subject such officer should, of course, place himself in communication with Mr. Clerk.

I should not object to his having three or four very active temporary assistants under him ; not to sit copying letters, but to move about, and communicate personally with the several individuals from whom the supplies must be procured.

Will your Excellency act at once in this matter, and place in the hands of the officer you may select, the Lieutenant-Governor's proposition for the purchase of mules and ponies for his consideration ?

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 390.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.*

*Allahabad, June 25, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your several despatches of the 21st and 29th of May, and I am directed to express to you the Governor-General's entire approval of the measures therein reported to have been adopted by you. I am at the same time directed to offer to you his Lordship's sincere congratulations on the good conduct and success of your troops, in the attack directed by you, upon the enemy's position in the vicinity of Candahar, on the 29th ult.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 391.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, June 25, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General heard yesterday, with extreme regret, that there had been a very extensive desertion amongst the hired camel drivers, at Attock ; and that, on the 7th instant, 319 loads were lying there, without camels to carry them.

2. If this should be the consequence of the desertion of 319 out of the 350 camels, you had reason to expect, in one convoy from Ferozepore, it is serious indeed.

3. The Governor-General has taken, both before he heard of the last misfortune, and since, every step which has occurred to him for the supply of your army with its necessary means of carriage, and has distinctly expressed his opinion to the Commande-in-Chief that this is an object which must be effected, at whatever cost, at the earliest possible period.

4. His Lordship has suggested that, in order to secure the fidelity of the camel drivers, yet more than it may be secured, by keeping back a portion of their pay, a force of irregular cavalry should accompany the next convoy. Mules and ponies will be purchased, as well as camels.

The hiring system will be discontinued, and all the drivers will be in the service of Government.

5. A force of nearly 5,000 Sikhs having now moved through the Khyber, and the portion of the Sikh army which is at, and near Peshawur, having evinced much want of discipline, it is a matter for your consideration, whether you should not move a brigade through the pass, to remain there, near Peshawur, for the protection of your communications.

6. In deciding upon this point, you will consider the effect which a change of position will have upon the health of the troops.

7. The Governor-General hopes that you would, without difficulty, be able to conceal your intention of making a movement with a view to a permanent change of position, by combining it with the march of some convoy, and giving to it the appearance of a movement made for its protection.

8. The late unfortunate event at Lahore—the murder of Mace Chund Koonwar—may detain there Rajah Dhian Sing, and may thus, for some time, prevent his joining the Sikh camp near Jellalabad, as he apparently intended to do, for the purpose of making the necessary preliminary arrangements for his having that place given up to him.

9. The same event may possibly, too, have some effect upon the discipline of the Sikh troops in your rear. You will, therefore, perhaps, have to rely more than ever upon your own resources, and you must look to nothing but the security of your army.

10. If you should move a brigade to the neighbourhood of Peshawur, you will make such communications as may seem to you to be expedient, to the officer in command of the Sikh troops; but, as a month will have elapsed since the date of the last letter from you, before you can receive this, it is obviously impossible to give you any precise instructions.

11. Upon that point you will understand only, generally, that it is the Governor-General's wish to take all measures in communication with, and in concurrence with the Sikhs; but you must consider the security of your army to be the object paramount to all others in his Lordship's mind.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 392.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, June 14, 1842.*

SIR,—I have had the honour to receive your despatch, No. 277 of 1842, dated June 1st, 1842, conveying to me the instructions of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, consequent on the report his lordship has received of the great want of carriage-cattle with this force. I feel greatly indebted for the prompt measures which have been taken to supply me; and I hope I shall soon be able to take advantage of the instructions contained in your letter, by moving a brigade towards Pesh Bolak and some other places, which, being connected with the Pass, require strong measures, that they may know what they are to expect, in the event of their attempting any obstruction to its free passage. With reference

to Pesh Bolak, treasure to the amount of more than 30,000 rupees, and a gun, are now in their possession.

I will do myself the honour to write again on this subject, when my plans are more matured.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 393.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, June 30, 1842.*

SIR,—I had, yesterday, the honour of receiving your letter of the 16th instant, inclosing returns, in compliance with the request conveyed in my letter of the 1st instant, of the strength of your army, and of the carriage and supplies at your disposal, as well as a statement of your daily consumption, and of the additional carriage you require.

2. It must be evident to you, that without frequent and detailed information upon all these points, it must be impossible for the Governor-General to know what service the army, under your command, is competent to perform; nor can his Lordship provide you with every necessary equipment without being accurately informed of your wants.

3. There have been some inaccuracies in the returns so furnished by you, which I am directed to bring to your notice.

4. In the return of the strength of regiments, the number of horses attached to the 10th Light Cavalry is altogether omitted.

5. In the return of camels and of the animals required for the army, the number of private camels is stated, but in the return of camels and other animals attached, there is no entry at all under the head of private camels.

6. The Governor-General has heard, with extreme regret, of the desertion of the camel-drivers at Attock, on the 7th instant; and his Lordship fears that you may be exposed to great inconvenience, for want of the stores that convoy of camels was conveying to you.

7. Every exertion is now making to effect the purchase of 4,000 mules in the upper provinces, and Mr. Clerk is likewise exerting all his influence in the endeavour to purchase camels in the territory adjoining the Sutlej.

8. The Governor-General hopes, that by the middle of August or the beginning of September, your army will be fully equipped with carriage.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 394.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, June 11, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th of May, 1842, and beg to assure you, for the information of the Governor-General of India, that my best endeavours shall be constantly exerted to carry into effect the orders conveyed in your letters of the 13th and 19th of April, and that of the 7th ultimo.

Being well aware, from experience, of the unhealthy state of Quetta during the months of July, August, and September, it is my wish to keep the troops at Candahar until the 15th of September; but should circumstances render it necessary for the safety of the troops under my command, that retirement should take place at an earlier period, his Lordship may rely upon my doing what may be requisite for the reputation of our arms and for the honour of our country.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 395.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Candahar, June 11, 1842.*

SIR,—With reference to your letter of the 19th of April, 1842, and to my reply under date the 21st ultimo, I have now the honour to acquaint you that Brigadier Wymer's detachment has returned to Candahar, giving escort to the guns, ammunition, &c., from Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and that he reports having destroyed the works of that fort, agreeably to his instructions.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 396.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, June 18, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 4th instant, giving cover to one from you, to the address of Mr. Clerk, instructing him to procure carriage-cattle for this force. I trust that, through Mr. Clerk's exertions, I shall not long be without the means of moving. I shall keep Mr. Clerk informed of our wants from time to time.

By the 1st October it is to be hoped the rivers will have fallen, in which case they will be fordable at certain parts, when fewer boats would perhaps be required to form a bridge.

With regard to passing through the Punjab, by different routes,—if supplies are forthcoming, the whole force might return on one route in two divisions, leaving an interval of a day between each, and, by this means, there would be less destruction to the cultivation.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

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No. 397.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, June 21, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of date 6th June, 1842. I beg to state that had it been in my power to retire on Peshawur, I should not have delayed doing so, for the purpose of making over Jellalabad to the Sikh troops, unless the transfer could

have been effected immediately. It will be observed that in my letter, No. 64 (to which yours, No. 313, is a reply,) I have stated that, owing to the want of carriage-cattle, it was not in my power to withdraw this army.

I consider it highly desirable that the transfer of this valley should be made to the Sikh Government before the army under my command is withdrawn; and as the arrangements for this measure will necessarily occupy some time, I have deemed it advisable to write to Mr. Clerk on the subject, a copy of which letter I have now the honour to inclose.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 398.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, June 21, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honour to forward copies and translations of a letter from Mahomed Shah Khan Ghilzie to the address of Captain Macgregor, and of my reply thereto.

It is proper to mention Capt. Macgregor's letter to Mahomed Shah Khan was written before my arrival here.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 399.—*Translation of a Letter from Mahomed Shah Khan Ghilzie to Captain Macgregor, without date.*

Your letter has been received, and has afforded me much pleasure. I have been much pleased with what you say regarding the release of the English gentlemen who are under my protection, and the friendship which you express for my relations, and the message which you sent by the bearer of the letter, desiring me to send, or cause to be sent, the gentlemen to Major-General Pollock, as the English Government would reward such service. My friend, ingratitude is not permitted in your religion nor in mine. I also wish, that in the way of friendship, they (the prisoners) may be released from the Sirdar (Mahomed Akbar), you should make a good arrangement for their release, and write me the particulars, that I may discuss the proposal with the Sirdar. I hope in God that my friendly disposal to the English may be always known.

No. 400.—(Translation.) *Mr. McGregor to Mahomed Shah Ghilzie.*

*Jellalabad, June 21, 1842.*

The friendly letter which you wrote to Captain Macgregor has been received, and I have perfectly understood its contents. You write "that an arrangement connected with the release of the prisoners ought to be explained and discussed here." It is very desirable that an arrangement should be made for releasing all the prisoners who are at Cabool, Ghuznee, and Buddenabad. If all the English prisoners who are in this



country are collected together and released, the Affghans who are in Hindoostan shall also be set free. You should arrange this matter so that there may be no mention of paying money, and according to the proposal I have made of an exchange of prisoners, because it is not according to the custom of nations to purchase the release of prisoners.

It is desirable that to attain that object some trustworthy person be sent by the Chiefs as an ambassador, with whom the matter can be discussed.

No. 401.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Nott.*

*Allahabad, July 4, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General having understood that Major-General Pollock was, on the 17th ultimo, about to move a force upon Pesh Bolak, and subsequently to make a movement in advance, thinks it expedient to transmit to you a copy of my letter to the Major-General of the 1st of June, that you may not be misled into the belief that any change has taken place in the main object of the instructions heretofore furnished to the Major-General.

2. His Lordship has heard with great satisfaction that a convoy of 3,000 camels has passed up the Kojuck Pass, and he now hopes that your army, or the principal part of it, will be sufficiently equipped with carriage.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 402.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, July 4, 1842.*

SIR,—It has given great satisfaction to the Governor-General to learn, from your letter of the 14th ultimo, that you have sufficient means of movement to be enabled to act upon the suggestions contained in my letter of the 1st ultimo.

2. You will not have mistaken the object of that letter, which was merely to suggest that, as far as your means of movement allowed, you should make your strength felt by the enemy during the period of your necessary detention in the valley of the Cabool river.

3. No change has, from the first, taken place in the Governor-General's views of the expediency of withdrawing your army at the earliest period, consistent with the health and efficiency of the troops, that is, as is now understood, in the beginning of October.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 403.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Allahabad, July 8, No. 24a, 1842.*

HONORABLE SIRS,—I send herewith copies of letters addressed by me to Major-General Nott, to Major-General Pollock, to Major Outram, and

to the Governor of Bombay, and of a memorandum for Major-General Sir Charles Napier.

All these documents I have deemed it necessary to withhold, for the present, from the records of the offices here, on account of the absolute necessity of preserving secrecy in the important matter to which they refer.

They will be placed upon the records as soon as Major-General Nott's decision shall be known.

My letter to Major-General Nott so fully explains the grounds upon which I have ventured to afford him an option as to the line of his retirement upon the Indus, that I deem it necessary to do more than refer you to the document itself, for an explanation of my views upon the subject.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 404.—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Nott.*

*Allahabad, June 4, 1842.*

GENERAL,—You will have learnt from Mr. Maddock's letters of the 13th May, and 1st of June, that it was not expected that your movement towards the Indus could be made till October, regard being had to the health and efficiency of your army.

You appear to have been able to give a sufficient equipment to the force you recently dispatched to Kelat-i-Ghilzie, under Colonel Wymer; and, since his return, you will have received, as I infer from a private letter addressed by Major Outram to Captain Durand, my private secretary, a further supply of 3,000 camels.

I have now, therefore, reason to suppose, for the first time, that you have the means of moving a very large proportion of your army with ample equipment for any service.

There has been no deficiency of provisions at Candahar at any time; and, immediately after the harvest, you will have an abundant supply.

Nothing has occurred to induce me to change my first opinion, that the measure, commanded by considerations of political and military prudence, is to bring back the armies now in Affghanistan at the earliest period at which their retirement can be effected, consistently with the health and efficiency of the troops, into positions wherein they may have easy and certain communication with India; and to this extent the instructions you have received remain unaltered. But the improved position of your army, with sufficient means of carriage for as large a force as it is necessary to move in Affghanistan, induces me now to leave to your option the line by which you shall withdraw your troops from that country.

I must desire, however, that, in forming your decision upon this most important question, you will attend to the following considerations.

In the direction of Quetta and Sukkur, there is no enemy to oppose you: at each place occupied by detachments, you will find provisions; and, probably, as you descend the passes, you will have increased means of carriage. The operation is one admitting of no doubt as to its success.

If you determine upon moving upon Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jellalabad,

you will require, for the transport of provisions, a much larger amount of carriage ; and you will be practically without communications, from the time of your leaving Candahar. Dependent entirely upon the courage of your army, and upon your own ability in directing it, I should not have any doubt as to the success of the operation ; but whether you will be able to obtain provisions for your troops, during the whole march, and forage for your animals, may be a matter of reasonable doubt. Yet upon this your success will turn.

You must remember that it was not the superior courage of the Affghans, but want, and the inclemency of the season, which led to the destruction of the army at Cabool ; and you must feel as I do, that the loss of another army, from whatever cause it might arise, might be fatal to our Government in India.

I do not undervalue the aid which our Government in India would receive from the successful execution by your army of a march through Ghuznee and Cabool, over the scenes of our late disasters. I know all the effect which it would have upon the minds of our soldiers, of our allies, of our enemies in Asia, and of our countrymen, and of all foreign nations in Europe. It is an object of just ambition, which no one more than myself would rejoice to see effected ; but I see that failure in the attempt is certain and irretrievable ruin ; and I would endeavour to inspire you with the necessary caution, and make you feel that, great as are the objects to be obtained by success, the risk is great also.

If you determine upon moving by Ghuznee, and entirely give up your communications by Quetta, I should suggest that you should take with you only the most efficient troops and men you have, securing the retreat of the remainder upon Killa-Abdoola and Quetta.

You will, in such case, consider it to be entirely a question to be decided by yourself, according to circumstances, whether you shall destroy, or not the fortifications of Candahar ; but, before you set out upon your adventurous march, do not fail to make the retirement of the force you leave behind you, perfectly secure, and give such instructions as you deem necessary for the ultimate retirement of the troops in Sinde, upon Sukkur.

You will recollect that what you will have to make is a successful march ; that that march must not be delayed by any hazardous operations against Ghuznee or Cabool ; that you should carefully calculate the time required to enable you to reach Jellalabad in the first week in October, so as to form the rear-guard of Major-General Pollock's army. If you should be enabled by a *coup-de-main* to get possession of Ghuznee and Cabool, you will act as you see fit, and leave decisive proofs of the power of the British army, without impeaching its humanity. You will bring away from the tomb of Mahmood of Ghuznee, his club, which hangs over it ; and you will bring away the gates of his tomb, which are the gates of the Temple of Somnaut. These will be the just trophies of your successful march.

You will not fail to disguise your intention of moving, and to acquaint Major-General Pollock with your plans, as soon as you have formed them. A copy of this letter will be forwarded to Major-General Pollock to-day ; and he will be instructed, by a forward movement, to facilitate your advance ; but he will probably not deem it necessary to move any troops

actually to Cabool, where your force will be amply sufficient to beat any thing the Affghans can oppose to it. The operations, however, of the two armies, must be combined, upon their approach, so as to effect, with the least possible loss, the occupation of Cabool, and keep open the communications between Cabool and Peshawur.

One apprehension upon my mind is that, in the event of your deciding upon moving on Jellalabad, by Ghuznee and Cabool, the accumulation of so great a force as that of your army, combined with Major-General Pollock's, in the narrow valley of the Cabool river, may produce material difficulties in the matter of provisions and forage; but every effort will be made from India to diminish that difficulty, should you adopt that line of retirement.

This letter remains absolutely secret.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 405.—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, July 4, 1842.*

GENERAL,—I have the honour to communicate to you a copy of a letter I have this day addressed to Major-General Nott. You will endeavour to combine your movements as far as you can with those of the Major-General, should he decide upon adopting the line of retirement by Ghuznee and Cabool; and as soon as he shall have advanced beyond Ghuznee, you will, as senior officer, issue such orders to Major-General Nott as you may deem fit; but until the Major-General shall have passed Ghuznee, his movements must rest with himself, as he alone can know all the circumstances by which they must be determined.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 406.—(Extract.) *The Governor-General of India to Major-General Nott.*

*Allahabad, July 5, 1842.*

In the event of your availing yourself of the option given to you in my letter of yesterday's date, and of your deciding upon the route of Ghuznee and Cabool, I have to express my wish that you should send Major-General England to command at Sukkur.

In the event of your moving upon Ghuznee, I request you will give the earliest intimation of your intention to Sir George Arthur, the Governor of Bombay. I shall write confidentially to Sir George Arthur, and desire him, in such an event, to send, as soon as the season will permit, Major-General Sir Charles Napier to command all the forces between the Kojuck and the Indus.

No. 407.—*Memorandum by the Governor-General of India, for Major-General Sir Charles Napier.*

*Allahabad, July 6, 1842.*

It is to be expected that, in the event of Major-General Nott's moving upon Ghuznee and Cabool, he will take with him the two British regiments, and nearly all his cavalry; and that the force which he will send back into Sinde will consist of Bombay troops, and the late Shah Shooja's, and the Poonah Horse, and to these may probably be added detachments of nearly all the regiments taken on to Ghuznee, consisting of the old and weak and sickly men.

Probably the force taken on will not exceed 7,000 men. There has been no return for a long time of the amount of force Major-General Nott has; but probably about 4,000 men would, together with some number of refugees, proceed to the valley of Pisheen.

The whole object of the Government is to draw down to Shikarpore, Sukkur, and Bukkur, all the troops left by Major-General Nott, and all those now below the Kojuck Pass, at as early a period as may be consistent with their health and efficiency. They cannot begin to move till October, and their march need not be hurried.

It is apprehended that there will be a great deficiency of cavalry with this force; and Sir George Arthur will have the goodness to consider with Sir Charles Napier how the deficiency can best be supplied. Our allies, the Amcers of Khyrpoor and Hyderabad, have not been wholly without suspicion of infidelity to the British Government; and it is not quite impossible that a portion of the force may be required to visit Hyderabad before its return to Bombay. There are likewise some arrangements to be made respecting the Island of Bukkur and the town of Sukkur, which will be facilitated by the presence of a considerable body of troops at that point.

The Bengal Regiment there would be withdrawn.

In any case, some force, amounting, at least, to a strong brigade, would be left at Bukkur and Sukkur.

Kurachee will continue to be held for a time. The garrison there might be strengthened, if necessary, but no more troops will be sent from Bombay thither.

Major Outram, and all the political authorities, would be placed under the Major-General.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 408.—*The Governor-General of India to Major Outram.*

*Allahabad, July 7, 1842.*

SIR,—It is expedient that Major-General Nott should have sent up to him, without delay, every camel and other animal of burthen or draught you may be able to dispatch to him with security.

I desire, therefore, that you will take immediate measures for sending them up.

You will have the goodness not to mention your having received this

letter except to the Major-General; and it would be desirable that the frequent transmission of public despatches to Candahar should not be taken notice of.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 409.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

Allahabad, August 6, No. 28, 1842.

HONOURABLE SIRS,—Mr. Clerk informed me, on the 23rd of July, that the state of his health would render it necessary for him to proceed to the hills at the latest on the 10th of September, and to abstain from all business for six months or a year.

2. Until the 10th of September, Mr. Clerk feeling the urgency of the several matters he had in hand, is willing to remain, although with considerable risk to himself.

3. Your Honorable Committee are well aware of the value of Mr. Clerk's services, and of the extent of his personal influence with the Durbar of Lahore and the Sikh chiefs, and population on both banks of the Sutlej,—an influence without which, at the present time, it would be perfectly impossible to furnish Major-General Pollock's army with the supplies required to make it capable of executing any extended military movement.

4. By you, therefore, as by me, the temporary retirement of Mr. Clerk must be felt as a very serious public misfortune. To me it seemed so nearly to affect the success of the several measures in which he is now engaged as the Governor-General's Agent, that I decided at once to proceed to join him as soon as the overland mail, which will convey this letter, may be dispatched; and I hope that I may be able, after passing two days at each of the stations of Cawnpore, Meerut, and Kurnaul, to arrive at Simla on or about the time of Mr. Clerk's arrival there, and to have the opportunity of communicating personally with him, and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, for six or seven weeks, before I proceed to join the army of reserve at Ferozepore.

5. The time and place of assembling that army had, until within these few days, been left undecided; but the recent complexion of the accounts from the Punjab, and Mr. Clerk's opinion, in conformity with that I have been led to form, that the continuance of the existing Government in that country is very doubtful, induced me at once to fix Ferozepore as the place of assembly, and the 15th of November as the time.

6. The assembling of so considerable an army at the time at that point will have a material effect in strengthening the existing Government of Lahore; it will, I trust, generally facilitate the operations of the armies in Afghanistan; by the appearance of assured support, it will give confidence to the troops composing the force itself, and some experience in the greater movements of war to our officers; while exhibiting our undiminished military strength to the States by which we are surrounded, it will induce the abandonment of any intentions they might entertain of hostility to our Government.

7. I have from the first been so satisfied of the policy of assembling

this army, that I have hardly deemed it necessary to advert to the obvious reasons for it. If I could at any time have entertained a doubt about the expediency of the measure, that doubt would have been removed by Mr. Clerk's having suggested it very soon after I was in communication with the Commander-in-Chief upon the subject, and by his having more than once, and again recently resorted to it, as a step calculated to be eminently useful in the present state of affairs.

8. I proceed to Simla for the same reason for which I came to Allahabad, with the view of placing myself in the position in which the presence of superior authority for the direction of political and military measures, seems to be most essential to the public service.

9. There are inconveniences undoubtedly attending the separation of the Governor-General from the Council of India, and I see and feel their weight. I was in hopes, that under very favourable circumstances, I might have been enabled to return to the Presidency in January, after having arranged in a secure manner the affairs which drew me hither, and those hopes are not yet renounced; but I must admit that the circumstances developed in the "Punjab Intelligence," the murder of Mace Chund Coonwur, the evident suspicions of Raja Goolaub Sing, the jealousies and uneasiness manifested by the Maharaja, and his occasional indiscretion in making known his feelings, together with the conversations in the durbar, which exhibit generally, on the part of the Chiefs, doubts of the continuance of our power, and suspicions of our intentions, if we should retain it. All these circumstances concur to make me apprehensive, that however favorable may be the result of our proceedings in Afghanistan, it may still be necessary that I should remain during the next hot season, especially in the absence of Mr. Clerk, to watch events, and provide for all contingencies.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 410.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Allahabad, August 16, No. 29, A, 1842.*

HONOURABLE SIRS,—I have the honor to forward to you several letters, written subsequently to my secret and confidential dispatch, in which I communicated the option I had offered to Major-General Nott, of retiring by Ghuznee and Cabool, instead of by Quetta.

These letters I have, equally with the others, deemed it necessary for the good of the public service, to keep this day entirely secret.

I have only communicated, generally, in a private letter to Mr. Clerk, my Agent on the north-west frontier, the substance of the instructions addressed to Generals Nott and Pollock, with a view to his guidance in negotiations with the Durbar of Lahore.

You will perceive, from the perusal of these letters, that I adhere absolutely to my original intention of withdrawing the whole army from Afghanistan; and that I have, in the most emphatic manner, repeated the order before given for that withdrawal.

Some risk I deem it justifiable to incur for the recovery of the guns and of the prisoners, and with the view of exhibiting the triumphant

march of a British army over the ground, on which it once suffered defeat ; but I consider the preservation of the army in Afghanistan essential to the preservation of our empire in India ; and, however the world might forgive or applaud me, I should never forgive myself, if I exposed that army to any material and serious danger, for the possible accomplishment of any object now to be obtained in Afghanistan.

My hope and expectations are that, without incurring such danger, I shall effect, through the instructions I have given, every object now desired by the people of England.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 411.—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Nott.*

*Allahabad, July 10, 1842.*

GENERAL,—Your means of communication with Major-General Pollock must be so uncertain, that I think it right to send you a copy of a letter I received from him to-day, conveying information as to his present plans, and as to the extent of carriage he possesses ; which may be of use to you in enabling you to come to a safe decision, as to your line of retirement.

Every effort is making to increase Major-General Pollock's amount of carriage ; but there is such a terror of Afghanistan, on the part of the drivers of camels, that further, and extensive, desertions may be expected, and the animals which leave Ferozepore may never reach Jellalabad.

Your success and your safety must, in a great measure, depend upon the support you may receive from the Major-General; by a march upon Cabool, simultaneous with yours ; and you see what apprehensions he entertains of passing Gundamuck.

The return of your two armies to India, in a state of efficiency, is of more importance than any success you might obtain at a great cost of men ; and, as I have already told you, the occurrence of another great reverse would be of very fatal consequence.

With these cautions, I must again leave the line of your retirement to your own decision, to be founded upon your knowledge of circumstances, at the period when your march would commence ; and I can only again assure you, that the most favorable construction will be put upon your conduct.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 412.—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Nott.*

*Allahabad, July 16, 1842.*

(Extract)—Such earnest representations have been made to the Deputy Commissary-General, who is at Loodiana, to Mr. Clerk, and to Major-General Battine, who are in communication with the Deputy Commissary-General, upon the subject of the carriage and supplies required for Major-General Pollock's army, and it has been so distinctly stated to them, that it is absolutely necessary that Major-General Pollock should



have the means of moving his whole army, with fourteen day's provisions, by the 21st of September ; that I feel satisfied that every exertion will be made, and that, if that army be not on that day so equipped as to be enabled to move in any direction, it will be the result of circumstances beyond human power to control.

I have suggested that the supplies furnished to Major-General Pollock should be calculated for 700 men beyond the number of the troops now with him, on the ground that it may be necessary to give provisions from our magazines to the Sikh troops ; but, in fact, with a view to the possible advance of the army under your command.

Mahomed Akbar has told Mohun Lall, that, in the event of the British army advancing, he shall not meet it in the field, but defend the town of Cabool ; upon which I immediately sent 400 more rockets to Major-General Pollock.

I hope you have received the rockets I sent to you by dawk. They left Allahabad on the 14th of May, and were, I believe, at Ferozepore, on the 10th of June. Your engineer officers will be aware that the composition in the rockets should be taken out, and re-made, as it will have been injured by the heat.

I do not know whether you are aware, that Major-General Pollock has no battering guns.

No. 413.—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.*

Allahabad, July 17, 1842.

GENERAL,—The accounts I have received to-day from Major Outram, of Major-General Nott's present means of carriage, and of the facilities which exist for increasing them, lead me to think that no difficulty on that head will occur, to prevent the Major-General from executing the march upon Ghuznee and Cabool, which he was authorized to make by my letter of the 4th instant, of which I transmitted a copy to you.

Major Outram says, that Major-General Nott has already sufficient carriage for present purposes ; and he can obtain, on hire or by purchase, 3000 or 4000 more camels for his force, whenever he pleases. Major Outram has directed about 1300 camels now at Sukkur, to proceed to Ferozepore, if the march can be made at this season. I have sent instructions to Mr. Clerk, to communicate with the Lahore Government, about the march of these camels by way of Mooltan, or any shorter (and practicable) route of Peshawur.

Your carriage will, if my orders can be obeyed, be completed by the 21st of September, to what will be sufficient to move, in any direction, your whole force.

I really do think that at last all are working zealously and earnestly for you equipment.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 414.—*The Governor-General of India to Major Outram.**Allahabad, July 17, 1842.*

SIR,—I gather from Major-General Nott's letter to you of the 22nd ultimo, and your reply thereto, that the Major-General was in want of money, and that you had six lacs in the treasury at Quetta.

In all probability the Major-General will therefore have given you instructions to send up the largest portion of the money in your treasury to him at Candahar ; but, whatever may be the state of your treasury when you receive this letter, I request that you will at once, if you can do so safely, send up to Major-General Nott all you have disposable ; and, deeming the urgency of supplying his force to be greater than that of supplying the force below, you will even run the risk of exposing yourself at Quetta to temporary inconvenience, in your endeavour to meet the demands of the force at Candahar.

I am much gratified, by the accounts received from you to-day, of the extent of carriage now at Major-General Nott's disposal, and of the facilities with which you think it can be immediately increased. It is essential that the Major-General's army should have furnished to it ample means of moving in every direction ; and I indulge the hope that, through your able and zealous exertions, this has now been done.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 415.—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.**Allahabad, July 23, 1842.*

GENERAL,—I am in hopes that Major-General Nott will to-day be in possession of my letter of the 4th instant, and that you will, very soon after you receive this letter, be made acquainted with the Major-General's intentions.

My expectation is, that Major-General Nott will feel himself sufficiently strong, and be sufficiently provided with carriage, to march upon Ghuznee and Cabool.

I have taken the precaution of instructing Major Outram to send up to Candahar every disposable camel, and all the treasure at Quetta, about five or six lacs ; and I have likewise instructed Major Leech, who may have reached Quetta, to return to Candahar. Major Leech's local knowledge will be of much use to Major-General Nott, if he should advance on Ghuznee and Cabool.

Major-General Nott, looking forward to the difficulties of the march, and the uncertain time it may occupy, and necessarily impressed with a deep sense of the importance of terminating the whole combined operations, and bring off the two armies into the plains before the commencement of severe weather, will hasten his preparations for leaving Candahar, and I anticipate his being able to do so by the 15th of August.

I do not apprehend that between Candahar and Ghuznee any obstacles will be offered to his march, by an enemy disheartened by repeated discomfiture, and completely taken by surprise ; and I look forward to

the army from Candahar being to the north of Ghuznee by the 10th of September.

I have used every exertion in my power to complete the equipment of your army with carriage. From fifteen to twenty lacs of treasure will be forwarded to you, in addition to the ten already transmitted ; and the Commissariat has been directed to provide the means of carriage for provisions for 7,500 men beyond the amount of 'your present force, such carriage being equal to the transport of fourteen days' supply.

I am assured by Mr. Clerk, that the requisite carriage will be furnished by the time fixed—that was, originally, the 1st of October ; and since, the 21st of September.

I am hardly sanguine enough to think that all I have directed to be done, will be done by that earlier day ; but I certainly entertain the expectation that, leaving, as you probably will, the 2nd Regiment of Native Infantry, and 200 Irregular Cavalry, in the Khyber Pass, to occupy that position, and leaving likewise a garrison in Jellalabad, you will possess sufficient carriage to move the remainder of your army in advance, to support the march of Major-General Nott upon Cabool.

Mahomed Akbar Khan will probably retire from Cabool, on the appearance of the combined army.

The expectations of its advance will revive and invigorate the factions opposed to that chief ; and it is not altogether improbable, that the result may be his overthrow, and the nominal establishment of a Royal Government, in the person of some other chief, or of the Prince Futteh Jung.

You are already authorized to treat with a *de facto* Government for the exchange of prisoners ; but you will avoid doing any act from which it might be inferred that the British Government recognized any authority which may be established in Cabool.

You will distinctly declare that you are not authorized to make any such recognition, and you will refer the matter to me.

The object of the combined march of your army, and Major-General Nott's upon Cabool, will be to exhibit our strength where we suffered defeat ; to inflict just, but not vindictive, retribution upon the Affghans ; and to recover the guns and colours, as well as the prisoners, lost by our army.

The first of these objects is evidently attainable ; but I cannot but entertain much doubt whether even the presence of two victorious armies at Cabool will effect the recovery of the prisoners.

The difficulty of recovering the prisoners arises from the circumstance of there being no strong established Government in Cabool, which would have at once the will, and the power, to coerce individual chiefs, and to compel them to surrender the prisoners they may respectively have in their possession, for the purpose of relieving the country from the presence of a foreign army.

Our coercion of the Government of Algiers in 1816, led to the restoration of slaves, the private property of individuals ; but the Government of Algiers was strong, and had power to compel such restitution. The apprehension of the consequences which might result from further refusal to surrender the Russian slaves, led the Government of Khiva, in the last year, to compel individuals to give up their property ; but the

Government of Khiva, too, was strong, and had the power to enforce obedience to its will.

There is no such Government, and there is no present prospect of the establishment of any such Government, at Cabool ; and, most unfortunately, the early and frequent mention of ransom has led those who hold our prisoners in their power, to consider them as a valuable property.

The pressure of war may undoubtedly become so severe as to induce a somewhat general desire amongst the Affghans to terminate hostilities with us, by the surrender of all they have taken from us, and this general desire may practically compel the restitution of the prisoners ; but I look to this event, as one rather to be desired than expected.

There is one other event, too, rather to be desired than expected, perhaps, but which must be deemed of not impossible occurrence,—the surrender of Mahomed Akbar Khan into your hands by the faction hostile to him.

To the possession of that chief's person, I attach very great importance. You are already authorized to give an assurance, that his life shall be spared ; but you will not make any other condition, nor make that lightly. I earnestly desire that that chief, the avowed murderer of Sir William Macnaghten, and the betrayer of a British army, should come into our power without any condition whatsoever.

Should Mahomed Akbar retain his authority after your advance upon Cabool, he will endeavour to protract any negotiation, in which he will involve you, so as to detain you at Cabool until the severe season shall return, when he will expect to obtain over you the same success which he obtained over our army last year, through the same means of cold and famine.

You will, therefore, not delay any operation whatever, which military considerations would suggest to you, in consequence of any pending negotiation. You will, as long as the season permits you to remain with perfect security, rely upon your own force, and upon that alone, for the effecting of your objects, and exert that force vigorously, giving every proof of British power, which is not inconsistent with the usages of war, and the dictates of British humanity ; but you will never forget that, after so exhibiting that power, you are, without allowing yourself to be diverted therefrom by any object, to obey the positive orders of your Government to withdraw your army from Afghanistan.

It will be your highest praise, after having re-established the opinion of the invincibility of the British arms upon the scene of their late misfortunes, to restore its armies to India in a perfectly efficient state, at a period, when I assure you that their presence in India is most desirable.

I trust that the last man of the two armies will have repassed the Sutlej by the 1st of January; and that I may then have the satisfaction of offering to you my personal congratulations upon your having successfully accomplished every object you have been directed to effect, and realized every reasonable wish of your country.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 416.—*Major-General Nott to the Governor-General of India.*

Candahar, July 26, 1842.

MY LORD,—Having well considered the subject of your Lordship's letter of the 4th instant ; having looked at the difficulties in every point of view, and reflected on the advantages which would attend a successful accomplishment of such a move, and the moral influence it would have throughout Asia ; I have come to a determination to retire a portion of the army under my command, *via* Ghuznee and Cabool. I shall take with me, not a large, but a compact and well tried force on which I can rely. Your Lordship may rest assured that all prudence, and every military precaution, shall be observed : there shall be no unnecessary risk ; and, if expedient, I will mask Ghuznee, and even Cabool. But, if an opportunity should offer, I will endeavour to strike a decisive blow for the honor of our arms.

The greatest difficulty I am likely to experience will be the want of forage in the neighbourhood of Cabool, and thence to Jellalabad, in consequence of the large bodies of horse, which have so long consumed, and still continue to consume it. I, therefore, hope that measures will be taken to have supplies of forage, and a few comforts for the European troops stored at Jellalabad, which place I shall endeavour to regulate my march so as to reach the first week of October.

I have commenced arrangements for the remainder of the force retiring upon Sukkur, under the command of Major-General England, who will receive the necessary instructions for his guidance in withdrawing the troops from Candahar, and the different posts between this and Shikarpore.

I am most anxious, notwithstanding the conduct of the Affghan chiefs, that our army should leave deep impression on the people of this country, of our character for forbearance and humanity.

All our guns, also six brass pieces, belonging to the late Shah Shoojaool-Molk, shall be taken to Sukkur. All unserviceable articles, not worth the carriage, will be destroyed.

Having now acquainted your Lordship of my determination, I shall not fail to keep your Lordship constantly informed of my proceedings.

I have, &amp;c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 417.—*Major-Outram to the Governor-General of India.*

Quetta, July 26, 1842.

MY LORD,—I had the honor to receive your Lordship's commands, dated 7th instant, this morning, and I beg to inclose, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a letter I immediately addressed to Major-General Nott in consequence.

The Major-General having intimated, on the 19th instant, that he had then within 800 camels of what he required, to move all the troops at Candahar ; and, as he must have since provided some, by purchase I presume that the additional 500 I now purpose sending, will meet his entire wants.

Having, I confidently trust, secured the resources of Beloochistan, I have no fear of not being able to furnish what may hereafter be requisite for the troops to the southward of Candahar.

I have, &c.,

J. OUTRAM.

No. 418:—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, July 29, 1842.*

GENERAL,—The information conveyed in your letter of the 14th instant, with respect to the opening of a negotiation for the exchange of prisoners, will not induce me to relax in my endeavors to supply your army with the means of movement; nor are you to consider the orders you before had, to be, in any respect, varied, in consequence of the mission of Hajee Buchtiar Khan to your camp.

Before your letter of the 14th instant was received, directions had been published for the assembly of the army of reserve at Ferozepore, on the 15th November, and those directions will be executed.

I had, likewise, before the receipt of that letter, given directions for the formation of my own camp at Goruchtesir Ghaut, on the 15th of October, instead of at Cawnpore; and, I trust, I shall be able to join the army of reserve, very soon after it is assembled.

No new orders will be sent to Major-General Nott. I expect that the advance of the army from Candahar will facilitate your negotiations at Cabool.

In the event of all your demands being complied with, by the surrender to you, of all the guns, colours, and trophies of war, taken from us, and of all the British prisoners within the reach and power of the *de facto* Government of Cabool, and of your consenting thereupon, according to the instructions I have sent to you to-day, to desist from military operations, it will be necessary to make provision with respect to the army of Major-General Nott, which may then be in march for Ghuznee and Cabool.

It appears to me to be far better, and more honorable to our arms, that that movement should be continued, than that, even on the actual delivery of the guns, colours, trophies, and prisoners it should be countermanded; but there may be military reason, connected with carriage and supply, which may render it, under such circumstances, more convenient, that Major-General Nott should retire by Quetta, rather than by the route of Ghuznee and Cabool.

If this should be your decided opinion you are at liberty to give instructions, accordingly, to Major-General Nott.

In either case, whether the movement of the army from Candahar shall be continued in the direction of Ghuznee and Cabool, or countermanded upon Quetta, you will provide that two commissioners, one being a British officer, late a prisoner, and the other an Affghan chief, of rank and respectability, shall proceed to the camp of Major-General Nott with your orders, and that all the resources of the country shall, by the *de facto*

Government, be placed at the Major-General's disposal, for the use of his army during its march.

Such march would be conducted as through a friendly country, with all the precautions of war, not one of which could be safely omitted.

I entertain great doubts of the recovery of the British prisoners at Ghuznee, unless Major-General Nott should advance to that place; and his retirement by Quetta, after his movement upon Ghuznee and Cabool shall have been commenced, would, under any circumstances, be misrepresented, to the prejudice of our arms.

Still, there may exist reasons, as I have already said, for his retirement by Quetta, and you will give directions according to your discretion.

It will be safer that you should consider any arrangements you may negotiate, for the surrender to you, of the guns, and colours, and for the exchange of prisoners, and for the cessation of hostilities, and for the march of Major-General Nott's army, as forming parts of a purely military convention, such as any General, commanding an army in chief, must, of necessity, be competent to make; leaving it to political authorities to enter into terms of peace.

Such terms of peace can only well be settled after further communication with the Government of Lahore, by Mr. Clerk, my Agent for the North-Western Frontier.

You are fully authorized, however, to declare that the British Government neither had, nor has, any desire to dictate to the Affghans the form of Government they shall adopt, or to designate the person upon whom they shall confer supreme authority.

We desire only, that the Affghans shall have a Government capable of maintaining, and willing to maintain, the relations of peace and friendship with its neighbours; and such a Government, when satisfied that it has the character of permanence, we shall be forward to recognize.

We desire to see, firmly established in Affghanistan, a friendly and independent Government. It was because the Government of India thought it had reasons to believe that the Government of Cabool was forming connections which were inconsistent with its independence, and evinced hostility to the British power, that an army was directed to march upon the Indus, and a Sovereign, having hereditary claims, and supposed to be, not only friendly towards us, but popular with his former subjects, was supported in his endeavours to repossess the throne. That Sovereign is no more. Our engagements, whatever they may have been, have died with him, and we are now at liberty to concur in the establishment of the independence of Affghanistan, under whatever Government, or person, the Affghans may prefer.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 419.—*Major-General Nott to the Governor-General of India*

*Candahar, July 28, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I have been honored with your Lordship's letter of the 5th July, 1842. My letter of the 16th instant, will have acquainted your Lordship of my having determined on retiring a portion of the army under my command, *via* Cabool and Jellalabad.

I shall lose no time in intimating my intention to Sir George Arthur, Governor of Bombay.

The inclosed memorandum will show your Lordship the intended division of the troops.

There may be some little alteration, when I shall have fairly calculated my means of carriage for both divisions.

I certainly could have wished to have taken Her Majesty's 41st Regiment with me, knowing the great consequence of the adventurous march before me. But, when I look to Sind, and to the want of confidence in our brave troops, shown by certain officers, I must give up that wish, however desirable, to insure the safety of the division which I am not to accompany.

I can see no difficulty or danger to the division which will retire to Sukker; and their numbers will be augmented at every post on their route. What the division, retiring *via* Ghuznee and Jellalabad, may have to encounter, remains to be seen; but I trust our exertions will overcome all difficulties, and that your Lordship will not be disappointed.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

*Detail of Troops about to move under the Command of Major-General Nott.*

Two troops of Horse Artillery.

9-pounder Foot Battery.

3rd Bombay Cavalry.

Five Rissalahs, Christie's Irregular Horse.

Five ditto, 1st Bengal ditto.

Her Majesty's 40th Regiment.

2nd	} Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry.
16th	
38th	
42nd	
43rd	

3rd or Captain Cragie's Irregular Bengal Infantry.

*To retire on Sukkur, under Command of Major-General England.*

One troop, Captain Anderson's Horse Artillery.

One Foot Battery (six guns) Bullock.

• Four 18-pounders.

3rd and 4th Companies 2nd Battalion Bengal Foot Artillery.

A detachment of Poona Horse.

Two Brigades of Christie's Horse.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment.

24th Bombay Native Infantry.

Seven Companies late Bombay Light Infantry Battalion.

1st, or Captain Griffiths' Irregular Infantry.

2nd, or Captain Macau's ditto.

3rd, or Captain McDonald's ditto.



No. 420.—*Major-General Pollock to the Governor-General of India.*

*Jellalabad, July 17, 1842.*

MR LORD,—I had the honor to receive your Lordship's letter dated the 4th instant, late yesterday afternoon; also copy of your dispatch to General Nott. I have already written to the General, to ascertain what his plans will be, after the receipt of your Lordship's letter, apprizing him that, if he returns by Ghuznee and Cabool, he should give me the earliest information of the strength of his force, in order that I may lay in supplies accordingly.

When I receive his reply, I shall be able to determine on my own movements, which, from your Lordship's exertions in my behalf, will not, I hope, much longer be crippled. I had the honour to forward, three days ago, the substance of my reply to the messenger from Cabool. It will be quite evident to your Lordship that, although the messenger is sent in the name of Futteh Jung, the nobles and people of Cabool, the prime mover is Mahomed Akbar.

The King is a mere puppet in his hands, and both are now much in want of money. I confess I do not expect that all the terms will be agreed to, in consequence of the introduction of the clause about the guns. If an objection be started, or, as I expect, money be demanded, in either case it will enable me to cease negotiating; for I beg, with submission, to state that I would rather dictate terms at Cabool, or leave lasting marks of our retrieved honor there, than encounter the treachery which other modes of dealing with Affghans must always be open to. It is supposed by natives here, that the present mission from Cabool as a mere ruse to prevent my despoiling the lands, forts, &c. of Mahomed Shah, in Lughman. He is our bitterest enemy now. His possessions are, however, I am afraid, secure; for, on sending to inquire, I find that the three rivers to cross are not fordable, and that the whole country is under water, with rice crops. I have not yet settled all accounts with the Shinwarrees, who have been, all along, opposed to us. Two or three of their Chiefs are servants of Mahomed Akbar, and are now at Cabool.

Brigadier Monteath will accordingly destroy their forts, and secure a further supply of grain and bhoosa to be sent in to me.

Captain Macgregor's exertions on this occasion have been unceasing, although occasionally, as at present, suffering from fever and ague.

I hope the brigade will not be detained many days more; they have effected all I could expect.

The punishment inflicted on delinquents has had a most salutary effect, and not a shot has been fired. The weather, for some days, has been very hot, and we are looking anxiously for rain.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 421.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Allahabad, August 17, 1842.*

(Extract.)—Since the dispatch of the last mail, I have continued to receive constant reports furnished by Moonshiee Mohun Lall, of the progress

of events at Cabool, and from them your Honorable Committee will learn that Mahomed Akbar has succeeded in overcoming the parties of Zeman Khan and Khan Shureen, and installing himself in the office of Vizier to Prince Futteh Jung, whom he has formally proclaimed king. The Prince is not, however, allowed to enjoy any power or authority : he has been compelled to surrender to Mahomed Akbar the money and property of the late Shah Shooja, which had come into his possession, and he is retained in his present situation merely as long as it may suit the convenience of Mahomed Akbar that he should hold it. Many of the influential chiefs of Cabool and the provinces are believed to be inimical to Mahomed Akbar, and a small portion of the country is already said to be in insurrection against the ruling authority.

2. The British prisoners, who were in the hands of Mahomed Akbar, have all been brought to Cabool or its vicinity : this measure having been resolved upon to secure them against any sudden effort which General Pollock might make for their recovery, and with a view to their removal to Toorkistan, if that general advancing on Cabool, Mahomed Akbar should find himself compelled to fly in that direction. Measures were taken by General Pollock to counteract this design, and he received assurances from many of the most powerful chiefs that they would not permit it to be carried into execution. Meanwhile a correspondence has been entered into between General Pollock and the Authorities at Cabool, which is designed on the General's part to lead to a negotiation for a general exchange of prisoners, and the restoration of the guns and other military trophies of the late Cabool force, now in the hands of the Affghans.

3. My instructions of the 29th ultimo, addressed to the Major-General will apprise your Committee of my views and intentions as to the tone in which such negotiations should be carried on. I have therein told the Major-General that when every gun, and colour, and military trophy in the hands of the Affghans, and every prisoner within the reach and power of the *de facto* Government of Cabool, have been surrendered to him, and not till then, he may give orders suited to a state of returning peace ; and I have authorised the Major-General to declare that, when this condition shall have been fulfilled, I will cause Dost Mahomed Khan, and all the prisoners in our hands, to be honorably conveyed to the frontier, and delivered over without condition. I have strongly objected to any payment being made on account of the maintenance of the British prisoners in Affghanistan, though that course has been advocated by some of the British officers now in confinement at Cabool ; for I apprehend that any such concession would lead to a belief that while ransoming our own prisoners, we were compelled to give theirs without ransom.

4. I have no reason to believe that these negotiations are now assuming a form which promises to lead to any satisfactory result, but, as abundant supplies of carriage cattle are on their way to Jellalabad, from Hindoostan, Major-General Pollock will, in the course of next month, be enabled to give such weight to the demands which he is directed to make, as will result from the perfect efficiency of his force, for any operation which it may then be desirable to undertake. Some obstacles may be found to exist to the entire restoration of all our prisoners, in the circumstance of a portion of them being in the power of Shumsodeen Khan,

the Governor of Ghuznee, who has not yet apparently yielded allegiance to the existing Government of Cabool.

5. Your Honorable Committee will observe that the operations conducted by the force under the command of Brigadier Monteath have been perfectly successful. I have the honor to inclose a copy of the order with which I published the Brigadier's report of proceedings in the Shinwarree Valley.

6. Your Honorable Committee will find amongst the inclosures No. 24, an interesting paper, by Moonshee Mohun Lall, on the causes of the Affghan insurrection, and on the events which succeeded the outbreak at Cabool in November last. I would also draw your attention to the copy of an unfinished letter from the late Sir William Macnaghten, to the address of the Secretary of the Government of India, in the Secret and Political Department, which is the only document that has reached the Government of India from the late Envoy since the first breaking out of the insurrection. Some additional information is now constantly reaching me of the circumstances which preceded and attended the destruction of the Cabool force, and these are regularly transmitted to Mr. Cameron, the officer who has been selected to examine and report upon all such documents, with a view to ascertain to what causes that event, and the subsequent loss of Ghuznee, are attributable.

16. From the correspondence your Honorable Committee will learn the arrangements that have been in progress, under my orders, for supplying carriage to the forces under the command of Generals Nott and Pollock, and for providing what may be required for the use of the army of reserve that is to be assembled at Ferozepore in the month of November.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 422.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Allahabad, August 17, No. 35, 1842.*

(Extract.)—During the five weeks which have elapsed since I last had the honor of addressing you, I have taken every possible measure for the furnishing of Major-General Pollock's army with carriage; and I have every reason to expect that, by the 21st of September, or, at the latest, by the 1st of October, that army will be enabled to move in any direction.

2. Major-General Nott's army will certainly, by the same period, be amply provided with the means of movement.

3. You will observe that overtures of negotiation, for an exchange of prisoners, have been made by the *de facto* authorities at Cabool. Those overtures, if serious, must have been based upon a very false view of the present disposition of the British Government, and of the force of the army.

4. The replies of Major-General Pollock have been in perfect accordance with my instructions, founded, I hope, upon true principles of policy, and upon just views of national dignity and honor.

5. I do not expect that these negotiations will have any result; but

I do expect that the trophies of war which fell into the hands of the Affghans, in January last, and most of the prisoners then taken from us, will be ultimately restored upon honorable conditions.

6. You will perceive that I have instructed Major-General Pollock to place Mahomed Akbar Khan upon his trial ; and, if he should be convicted, to deal with him as he would with any person who might be convicted, under similar circumstances, of the crime of murder, of which that chief is accused.

7. I have adopted this step, upon full consideration, and with a thorough conviction of its expediency.

8. You will be gratified to learn, that every expectation exists that the neighbourhood of Jellalabad will afford ample supplies of provision to the army, without drawing upon Peshawur, which is itself fully supplied.

9. The army has at present three months' supply of attah and wheat.

13. I have informed Mr. Clerk, that I have no desire that the occupation of Jellalabad, upon the retirement of the British army, should be at all pressed upon the Maharajah. The delivery of that place to the Sikhs, would be a measure of unmitigated hostility to the Affghan nation, precluding all hope of any pacific arrangement upon any point.

14. The circumstances which existed when I consented to deliver Jellalabad to the Sikhs, may have justified the measure ; but, if there should arise the chance of the establishment of any permanent Government at Cabool, capable of maintaining, and willing to maintain, relations of amity with neighbouring States, it would be desirable that we should retain the means of forming such amicable relations, and of effecting a settlement which might produce tranquillity on both banks of the Indus.

No. 423.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, June 23, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to transmit herewith copy of a report from Brigadier Monteath. The lesson taught to the people in the direction of Pesh Bolak, will prove very beneficial, and tend to secure our communication with the rear. There are large quantities of bloosa, which will be collected, and sent for the use of the force.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 424.—*Brigadier Monteath to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Camp, Goolai Forts, June 22, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor of reporting for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., that I yesterday obtained possession of the gun which was taken when Captain Ferris retired from his position at Pesh Bolak ; the chief in whose fort it was deposited, distant about three miles from hence, having surrendered it.

As the people of the five-and-twenty Golai forts taken by this force, made no attempt to enter into any arrangements as to restitution or compensation for the British property plundered and destroyed by them, I have commenced upon the removal of the grain and wood into the camp, and have sent working parties to cut down all the trees, mulberry and willow, about the forts, amounting, I should think, to about eight or nine hundred, which might, if cut up, be of great service as fuel for the army; but independent of this supply, the engineer officer informs me, that the rafters lying in piles and in the roofs of the houses, would alone be equal to the consumption of two months for the army, therefore, it might be worth General Pollock's consideration, whether or not it be in his power to remove it from Barruk-ab (distant twenty miles from Jellalabad) where a dépôt might be formed, in the first instance, by the wood being sent from hence to that place: the village belongs to Kalat Khan, and is looked upon as safe.

Captain Macgregor having procured eight hundred bullocks from the country, I have directed Lieutenant Becher to select 4,000 of the best rafters for building purposes, which shall be dispatched to-day, if possible, to Baruk-ab, from whence they must be taken up by cattle from Jellalabad.

The country here I consider as very favorable for troops; as it is very open and high, abundance of the best water, and plenty of good grass and forage for horses and camels, and as all at present seem pleased with the change from Jellalabad, the force might conveniently remain here until everything useful was removed. Of bhoosa there seems to be a great quantity, and as there are ten or twelve mills available for our use I understand, should our remaining here for a time be thought advisable, the wheat, if I can find the means of winnowing it, shall be ground into flour for our own uses.

Captain Lloyd has this morning reported to me, that he yesterday procured attar to an extent beyond the consumption of a day. If equally successful for the future, it will give us leisure to convert our own wheat into flour. Therefore if it, bhoosa and wood, can be brought to account, the saving to Government will be very considerable.

When the whole of the wheat and bhoosa has been brought from the forts into camp, which I hope will be the case in a couple of days from hence, I will then make my report on the subject.

The Chiefs on the opposite side of the valley were yesterday in consultation as to the sums to be paid by them in the way of recompense to us for our losses, but I have not yet learnt their determination. Unless, however, they are of a satisfactory nature, I shall move down upon them as soon as I am a little at leisure.

Barley for the horses seems to be our chief difficulty, and should we not succeed in our endeavours to obtain it in sufficient quantities, it must be sent from Jellalabad or Dakka. Ghee and dhal will also be required for the natives; and tea and other necessaries, which Captain Lloyd will apprise Major Thompson of, for the Europeans.

I have detached one hundred men under a European officer to Pesh Bolak, distant about one mile and a half, to protect it, as from thence our supplies are drawn.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of the copy of the opinion of Government as to the legality of corporal punishment being inflicted on Native soldiers by the Provost Marshal when found marauding.

I have, &c.,

J. MONTEATH.

No. 425.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Head-Quarters, Candahar, July 4, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th ultimo, relative to the formation of an army of reserve in Sirhind after the rains.

I have nothing new to communicate : all has been tranquillized in the vicinity of Candahar ; the people have returned to the cultivation of their lands, but the several chiefs talk of assembling forces from the province of Zaminshawar and other districts. I do not think they will succeed, and if they do, they will not be able to face the force under my command.

I have the honor of inclosing the translation of an intercepted letter from Prince Futtah Jung to his brother Sufter Jung ; the latter is now living in the city of Candahar.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 426.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, July 2, 1842.*

SIR,—With reference to the concluding paragraph of my letter to your address, of date the 27th ultimo, I have now the honor to forward a statement showing the quantity of carriage cattle required for each regiment and detachment of this force, and also the total number required for the whole force, together with the number now in our possession, I beg to draw attention to the N.B. at the bottom of this document, in which the causes of the increase in the number of camels required are explained.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE POLLOCK.

*Detail of Cattle required for the Force under Command of Major-Genl. Pollock,  
Camp, Jellalabad, June 27, 1842.*

	Elephants.	Camels.		Banjar- ree Bul- locks.		Transport Train Bullocks.	Ordnance Bul- locks.	Carriage Bul- locks.	Mules, Yabooos, and Asses.
		Public.	Private	Public.	Private				
3d Troop 1st Brigade Horse Art.	7	37	26	..	..	..	..	..	..
3rd ditto 2nd ditto ditto	..	67	34	..	..	47	..	..	..
Veterinary Surgeon	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2nd Company 2nd Battalion	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
European Foot Artillery	..	37	6	24	16	..	141	..	..
4th ditto 6th ditto Native Inf.	..	6	1	..	..	..	..	..	..
2nd ditto 6th ditto ditto	..	226	3	..	..	..	..	..	..
Her Majesty's 3rd Lt. Dragoons	23	298	117	..	..	..	..	..	..
1st Regiment Light Cavalry	..	98	75	..	..	..	..	..	..
10th ditto ditto	..	98	111	..	..	..	..	..	..
3rd ditto Irregular ditto	..	18	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Party of 1st and 4th ditto	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..
Detachment 5th Light Cavalry	..	51	45	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ditto 2nd ditto, S. S. F.	..	3	25	..	..	..	..	..	..
Her Majesty's 13th Light Inf.	..	366	169	..	..	..	..	..	..
35th Regiment Native Infantry	..	70	115	..	..	..	..	..	..
Sappers and Miners (Broadfoot	..	75	73	..	..	..	..	..	75
Jezailchees	..	1	9	..	..	..	..	..	..
Her Majesty's 9th Regt. Foot	..	360	75	..	..	..	..	..	..
26th Regiment Native Infantry	..	88	102	..	..	..	..	..	..
60th ditto ditto	..	80	132	..	..	..	..	..	..
Sappers and Miners	..	20	14	..	..	..	..	..	..
30th Regiment Native Infantry	..	86	132	..	..	..	..	..	..
53rd ditto ditto	..	97	101	..	..	..	..	..	..
64th ditto ditto	..	102	108	..	..	..	..	..	..
Her Majesty's 31st Regt. of Foot	31	242	161	..	..	..	..	..	..
33rd Regt. Native Infantry	..	103	179	..	..	..	..	..	..
6th ditto ditto	..	115	132	..	..	..	..	..	..
Field Ordnance, Park or Magazine	..	110	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Paymaster to the Force	..	2	1	..	..	..	..	..	..
General Field Hospital	..	13	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Medical Department	..	13	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Staff of Division of Infantry un- der General McCaskill	..	1	10	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ditto 2nd Brigade of Infantry	..	..	7	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ditto 4th ditto ditto	..	..	10	..	..	..	..	..	..
Commissariat Treasuries	..	14	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
General Staff	..	10	26	..	..	..	..	..	..
For Hospital Khajawahs not in- dented for	..	198	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Puckals, &c.	..	95	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Field Depôt, Brigade Go-downs, and Commissariat Officers	..	500	..	7110	..	..	..	24	208
Field Magazine, Treasure, & spare Carriages for Horse & Foot Art.	..	..	..	..	..	401	..	..	..
Mountain Train	..	8	10	..	..	..	..	..	..
Spare	..	373	205	704	2	..	..	..	..
	66	4102	2257	7838	18	448	141	24	283

N.B.—The increase upon the last return is caused by the troops detached being now included, which they were not before, and the calculation for the carriage of supplies being now made for fourteen days, instead of for seven, as formerly, and seven for victualling stores for Europeans, instead of for three days; also three days' grain for cavalry and artillery horses.

W. J. THOMPSON,  
*Assistant Commissary-General.*

*Statement showing the quantity of Carriage required, present, and wanting to complete, for the Force under Major-General Pollock.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, June 27, 1842.*

	<i>Public.</i>						<i>Hired.</i>		
	<i>Elephants.</i>	<i>Carriage Camels.</i>	<i>Ordnance Bullocks.</i>	<i>Transport Train Bullocks.</i>	<i>Carriage Bullocks.</i>	<i>Mules, Yabooos, Asses.</i>	<i>Rearree Camels.</i>	<i>Banyaroo Bullocks.</i>	<i>Mules, Yabooos, Asses.</i>
Required as per annexed detail.....	66	6359	141	448	24	109	..	7856	174
Present ....	66	3293	141	448	24	109	98	3106	174
N. B.—5 Elephants and 178 Camels sick, not included.							under discharge.		
Wanting to complete..		3066						5750	

W. J. THOMPSON,  
*Assistant Commissary General.*

No. 427.—*Mr. Maddock to Lieutenant Brown, Assistant to the Political Agent in Sindh.*

*Allahabad, July 17, 1842.*

SIR,—With reference to Major Outram's letter to you dated the 27th ultimo, respecting the sending of all the available camels at Sukkur to Ferozepore, "provided Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons considered it advisable, and you found that the animals could travel that road at this season," I am directed by the Governor-General to instruct you to despatch all such available camels to Ferozepore, if the march should be now practicable, whatever may have been the reply given to your reference by Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, unless you should have received orders to the contrary from Major Outram before the receipt of this letter.



2. I have addressed a letter this day to Mr. Clerk, informing him of the probable march of these camels, in number, as it is understood, about 1,300, and have transmitted to him the instruction of the Governor-General to communicate with the Lahore Government upon the subject, and to obtain their consent to the passage of the camels by Mooltan, or any other route which may be shorter than that to Peshawur by Ferozepore, and equally practicable. A copy of this letter is sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, who will communicate with Mr. Clerk, and if an ample supply of camels and other animals shall have been already sent to Major-General Pollock, the camels from Sukkur will march to Ferozepore for the use of the army of reserve.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 428.—*Major-General Pollock to Lieutenant Conolly, a prisoner at Cabool.*

Jellalabad, July 4, 1842.

SIR,—With reference to your letter to Sir R. Shakespear, of date 26th ultimo, if you think your coming here can in any way facilitate the release of the prisoners, I shall be happy to see you ; but I think that some person on the part of the Chiefs you mention, viz., Meer Hajee, Mahomed Zeman, and Khan Shureen, Khans, should be deputed to accompany you, with some powers to treat about a general release of all prisoners in Hindoostan, and all in Afghanistan, without reserve. The above Chiefs are mentioned, because they are all respectable, and they have shown kindness to the prisoners they have had charge of ; and it would not, perhaps, be a difficult matter for them (respected as they are) to possess themselves of all the prisoners, including those at Ghuznee, and then determine on any final arrangement for the exchange. They would not doubt our sincerity. With regard to the passing of a bill for 107,852 rupees, I will refer your letter to the Governor-General, but I can hardly expect a favorable result to such a demand, without an account of any kind. If sums are charged, which are not expended for the expenses of the prisoners, and they are paid, it is an inducement to retain the prisoners. How many prisoners are there ? and how can such a sum have been expended since early in January ? I am very glad to find a disposition on the part of Meer Hajee, Zeman Khan, and Khan Shureen, to treat for the liberation of the prisoners, and hope soon to hear again that measures are being taken by them, and others, for so desirable an end.

A very large force of about 25,000 men is ordered to assemble at Ferozepore under the Commander-in-Chief.

There are about 20,000 men here, and there are about 15,000 with Nott.

10,000 men are also on their way from England, and will make an overwhelming army ; and it will be a fearful day for Afghanistan, if such an army advance. The release of the prisoners, and delivery of our guns,

no doubt, will go far to appease the British Government, but any further treachery will doubtless be visited by some signal blow.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

P.S.—I have, in reply to a letter from him, written to Mahomed Shah Ghilzye, mentioning that no difficulty would be made by me regarding an exchange of prisoners.

No. 429.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

Jellalabad, July 10, 1842.

SIR,—I have the honor to forward a copy of a letter from Moonshee Mohun Lall, of date the 4th instant, in which it will be observed, that Aga Humza is willing to raise 5,000 men to prevent Mahomed Akbar from carrying off the prisoners; for this service, it is suggested that 10,000 rupees would be required. I am doubtful if such a sum would be sanctioned by the Governor-General, though it does not appear to me to be objectionable, as it is money paid for service done, and not as a ransom. I should, of course, agree to pay only on reaping the advantage; but, with my present instructions, I should hardly consider myself justified in authorizing the payment of any money for the prisoners, unless for their support. I am afraid it will be difficult, if not impracticable, to obtain a general release. The prisoners are retained by different parties, each being desirous of making his own terms. I did hope that my letter to Mahomed Shah would have produced a favorable reply, but none has been received. There is scarcely time for a reply from Lieutenant Conolly, but, even if all the prisoners now at Cabool could be placed under one chief, it is doubtful if Shumsodeen at Ghuznee would give up his. Mahomed Akbar is evidently in difficulty about money; and, notwithstanding his having raised himself as he has, he appears to have made no friends, and if he fails in raising money, he will not long have power; he is a sad stumbling-block in the way of all negotiations.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 430.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

Jellalabad, July 12, 1842.

SIR,—I have the honor to forward copies of letters which I received yesterday from Moonshee Mohun Lall, of date the 6th, 8th, and 9th, instant. It will be seen by these letters, and by the copies of Captain Conolly's letters, yesterday forwarded, that there is a party at Cabool anxious to assist in preventing the removal of our prisoners. I cannot but think that the liberation of the prisoners is an object which it is my duty to effect, by every means in my power, consistent with the orders which I have received.

2. In the 11th paragraph of your letter, of date 1st ultimo, I am told that I have properly no political duties, but am to be governed by military considerations alone. I trust that I am not in wrong thinking that

the above instructions do not preclude negotiations regarding the prisoners. It will be observed, by the letters now forwarded, that, with the exception of those at Ghuznee, all the British prisoners are now assembled in the Bala Hissar, at Cabool, and it is possible that Mahomed Akbar may have been induced to thus collect them, by my letter to Mahomed Shah Khan Ghilzye, a copy of which I forwarded to you, with my letter, No. 126, of 1842; but it is of course desirable to avoid, if possible, any negotiation with Mahomed Akbar, and also to put it out of his power to remove the prisoners.

3. There are conflicting interests at Cabool which are not easily reconciled, and leave me very doubtful of success, and make me hesitate to commence any negotiation; but I trust that the Right Honorable the Governor-General will not disapprove of my having written the inclosed letters to Meer Haje and Ameenollah, with a view to interesting them in preventing the removal of our prisoners. I have also the honor to inclose a copy of Sir R. Shakspeare's reply to Moonshee Mohun Lall's letters.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 431.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, July 27, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 150, and I am directed by the Governor-General to inform you that the opinion you therein express, "that it does not appear to you to be objectionable to pay 10,000 rupees for the purpose of raising men to prevent Mahomed Akbar from carrying off the prisoners," is perfectly correct, and for the reason given by you, namely, that that "would be money paid for service done, and not as a ransom."

2. The Governor-General would readily sanction any expenditure you may deem necessary for the purpose of raising a corps in the rear of Mahomed Akbar, on the road to Bamecan, with the view of intercepting the prisoners, should he attempt to send them off in that direction.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

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No. 432.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, July 13, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 25th June, 1842, relating to the loss of camels near the Attock, and am very glad that the system of hiring will hereafter be discontinued.

With regard to the Sikhs here, they have conducted themselves generally very well, since their arrival; they have been much delayed in crossing the river, in consequence of the rapidity of the stream, and having only one boat; but nearly the whole are across; and Captain Lawrence, who has lately come from Peshawur, states that the conduct of the Sikh soldiery at that place has of late much improved; they

have also been diligent in the duties required of them in the pass, which they still hold up to Ali Musjid.

The five companies and three guns in Ali Musjid make that place quite secure. Captain Thomas, with a part of his corps, was ordered to Lundi Khana some days ago. A regiment and a wing of Native infantry, with five guns, and 200 irregular horse, are at Dhaka; and I have ordered the Jezailchees to proceed thither, whenever their services can be dispensed with by Brigadier Monteath. Whenever I return, I must send a brigade to occupy the pass near Lundi Khana; the object would be concealed, in the same way that I have hitherto done, by putting in orders, that the party is for the relief of the troops at Dhaka; but, in all such cases, the officers (there are only a few I hope) do the mischief: if there is any suspicion, they do not hesitate to talk of it, and some, I am sorry to say, are supposed to be paid for making communications to the papers, which would not, generally speaking, be of much importance, if they were always founded on truth.

The death of Race Chund Koonwur, does not appear to have created the slightest sensation among the Sikh troops here, or at Peshawur.

At this season, I do not think I could, with reference to the health of the troops, occupy the pass at any point except Lundi Khana. From Dhaka, the troops could move to Lundi Khana in a few hours; the latter place is now I think, secure; and the troops, as long as circumstances will admit, are better at Dhaka than in the pass, as there is a difficulty about water, and little space on which to encamp with safety.

Whenever I return, I must expect some opposition; but as I have made my way through once, I hope I shall be equally fortunate in a second attempt, by making proper arrangements.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 433.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, July 14, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, that Captain Troup, of the 48th Regiment Native Infantry, arrived in this camp late yesterday afternoon, having left Cabool on the 11th instant. A Barukzye chief accompanies him on the part of Futteli Jung and (as reported to me by Captain Troup) the whole of the chiefs and people of Cabool, his name is Hajee Buktiwar Khan; he is a native of Candahar, and has been selected for this mission as being a very intelligent man, neutral, and as knowing much of European character, having been at Bombay and other places within our provinces. I had a long conversation with Captain Troup early this morning, and at twelve o'clock to-day, he brought Hajee Buktiwar Khan to me. It appears that the latter has no specific terms to offer on the part of the authorities of Cabool, but he has been sent to endeavour to effect a change of prisoners, and to ask our wishes on the subject. I have told him that on the release of the whole of our prisoners, including those at Ghuznee, the British Government will release those now in Hindoostan, including Dost Mahomed Khan; and that we

shall expect to have our guns restored. The terms proposed by me appeared to be well received but the chief, as if not altogether unprepared for the announcement of the release of Dost Mahomed, expressed considerable anxiety on the part of his employers, as to the terms on which the Ameer would be released. On this point I could not, of course, give him any information, but I promised to refer the subject to the Governor-General by express. At first the Chief seemed to doubt my being without instructions on such a point, having at the same time authority to intimate the terms on which the Ameer's release would be granted. The Chief stated that His Majesty Futteh Jung, the nobles and people of Cabool, were most anxious that some treaty of friendship should be entered into between the British Government and Dost Mahomed, previously to his leaving Hindoostan. I stated that I would communicate these wishes to the British Government, and expressed a hope, indeed a belief, that whenever the release of the Ameer might take place, it would proceed from a desire to be on friendly terms, but that I could not say what terms might be proposed or accepted. I was asked whether it was our intention to interfere in the Government of the country: my reply was, that from the first we never intended remaining in the country, and that we should not interfere in their choice of a king; that I understood Futteh Jung had been raised to the throne by general consent, and that I looked upon the Chief as a messenger from the king, the nobles, and the people of Cabool. This explanation on my part appeared to be perfectly satisfactory.

The Chief will write to the Cabool Government to-day, and with Captain Troup, proposes remaining here until I can receive a reply to this letter, unless recalled by the Cabool authorities.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a letter from Major Pottinger, on the subject of this letter. Captain Troup has explained to me that the offence taken at my letter arose from the circumstance of my having been informed that General Elphinstone's death was occasioned by the treatment he received.

With regard to the proposal that Maharajah Shere Sifg should be a mediator between the British Government and the Affghans, as I apprehended that there might be a difficulty, and, moreover, as I saw no good reason why such a course should be pursued, I preferred omitting all mention of the Sikhs, especially as the Barukzye Chief made no mention of them; he adverted to the difficulty of settling where and how the prisoners on either side were to be delivered; to which I replied, that the preliminaries having been generally agreed to, the subsequent arrangements for carrying them out must be determined hereafter, but that the Affghans had already experienced sufficient proof of our integrity not to doubt us. As there may be a hesitation on this last question, I shall be glad to receive any instructions which may be deemed advisable.

I have not on this occasion replied to Major Pottinger; as a prisoner, I cannot consider him a Political Agent; but I have told Captain Troup that he may write if he pleases, and that when Futteh Jung addresses me, I shall not fail to reply.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 434.—*Major E. Pottinger to Major-General Pollock.*

*Cabool, July 10, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 10th May, 1842, and have to inform you that it was regarded as most offensive by Akbar Khan, and as evincing hostility rather than a wish to treat.

It is not my duty to comment on your letter, and as my opinions are laid before you in my letter of the 3rd May, there is no reply required from me, but to the 10th paragraph, which refers to myself, and the postscript regarding General Elphinstone's death.

Firstly.—Regarding the 10th paragraph; the position of affairs at this place will, I trust, ere this have proved to you that the information I had the honor of submitting in my letter of the 3rd May was correct.

Secondly.—In attributing Major-General Elphinstone's death to his removal from Buddabad, I believe you have been misinformed, for I have heard Mr. Surgeon Magrath state before we left the above-named place, that the General's case was hopeless. His death was probably hastened by the heavy rain we experienced on our march from Soorooby to Teezeen; previous to that the General told me he felt advantage from the change of air. In corroboration of this, I have the honor to transmit a private note on the subject from Dr. Magrath himself. I also feel it but proper to assure you, that in the Affghan fashion, every attention was paid which prisoners could expect, and that any incivility we received, was from the inferior agents, against the wish of Mahomed Akbar Khan, who, on complaint, gave redress as far as lay in his power.

Being very anxious to transmit as full an account as possible of the events in the beginning of last winter, I have at last succeeded in persuading Mahomed Akbar Khan to again make an overture. Captain C. Troup, 48th Bengal Native Infantry, Brigade-Major S.S.F., has therefore been allowed to proceed, and will deliver this letter.

I have sounded Mahomed Akbar, as far as possible, on the subject of his feelings towards us; they appear hostile, and I much doubt if he will consent to treat on any terms but those of retaining the country. I have told him that in my own opinion, such will be inadmissible as a preliminary, if even at all so; and that you have demanded the release of the prisoners on equitable terms, as a proof of sincerity, and without which you will not treat. He then offered to exchange the whole of the prisoners for those in India. (His offer includes the hostages and wounded left in Cabool.) His father having given himself up voluntarily, he argues, we have no right to detain. He also proposed to make his prisoners over to the Sikhs, if the British do so by theirs, and to make the Maharajah mediator in the quarrel. I could, of course, hold out no hope to him of his father's release, or the last question, and therefore avoided the subject, lest hinting at refusal should militate against sending an officer to your camp. At present I do not think it would be advisable to ransom us for money, as he is in want of that necessary; and the name and character of the British must suffer in the opinion of our own subjects, and soldiers in India, if we were to pay for the release of a few Europeans, while so many hundreds, indeed I may say thousands, of your

native soldiery and camp followers are reduced to the condition of slavery throughout this country, and many other poor wretches deprived of their hands and feet, or otherwise mutilated or diseased, are supporting their precarious existence by beggary. If these latter persons be not released, many, if not all, must perish in the ensuing winter; and it appears to me that Government will lay itself open to the odium and charge of undue partiality if it release, as above, by ransom.

The officers of the 27th Bengal Native Infantry at Ghuznee are said to be exposed to great hardships, and it is reported that Colonel Palmer has died under torture to exact money. I have heard this from so many quarters, and from such respectable persons, that I fear the account is but too true, as it is consonant with the usages of these tribes. Shumsodeen Khan has, I am told, refused to deliver up those officers to Mahomed Akbar; but the latter is so determined to hold all our prisoners, that I expect soon to hear of his having overcome the objections of his cousin.

Cabool is now completely in the hands of this Chief. Many are inimical to him, but his own energy and that of his supporters is so much the greatest, that no one is likely to oppose him, unless the British troops advance, and even then, I think, he will always be able to make his retreat good before any one here has courage to move. A proclamation, threatening punishment if the ladies are withdrawn might do good. Letters to the Hazara Chiefs of the family of Yazadan Buksh, in Beysunt, Meer Mowhill of Yekawbaz, Meer Buz Ali, and Meer Mahomed Hoozy, and Meer Yakawb of Deh Zingy, and to Zool Fezar Khan, Governor of Bameean, would probably prevent the carrying us off through those districts, either west or north, Mahomed Shah Khan is the right hand and head of Mahomed Akbar, and I regard it as nearly impossible to detach him from the party at present. He has got enemies, and I have, without evincing hostility, endeavoured to form a party against him; my hostility has, however, been suspected by him; but I trust that his suspicions of me are a little allayed. Any offers you make to him he communicates to the Chief, and enhances his own support and fidelity by so doing, as he has chosen his principal line of action as our open enemy, and only enters into negotiations with you for the purpose of gaining insight into your plans, keeping up communication with the Affghans about you, and probably hopes to secure his Lughman property, and may be, eventually, his pardon by such conduct. He, however, is our bitterest as well as ablest enemy, and will be the last to submit to our sway. By reducing his castles and property in Lughman, you will cripple his means, and, it may be, oblige him to fall on his master for money. This will give opportunity for his enemies to undermine him; and, if not to overthrow him, certainly to weaken his influence. Under such circumstances he may yield to our offers, though I much doubt it.

Captain Conolly, and the other officers and men left here, have been delivered up to Mahomed Akbar Khan. Captain Conolly was authorized to draw bills on the Governor-General, to meet the expenditure of the sick and wounded left behind, and of the officers left as hostages. As I feared the Affghans might use force, or threaten him, I publicly limited him to the sum of 10,000 rupees a month, with the understanding, that he should only draw for the sum actually requisite, without reference to

the amount of pay due to those left behind. There was, besides, a certain sum allowed as hire for the fort or castle in which the sick and wounded were left, and for the support of the guard of Affghans, to secure them from insult. I have not the means of consulting the documents, or should send you copies of all connected with the arrangements. Captain Conolly informs me you have dishonoured his drafts. I therefore enter into this explanation, to account for the drafts. In addition to the men left, a number of fugitives from the retreating force returned to Cabool, who it was necessary to take care of, and they increased the expenditure above that I originally contemplated. In consideration of this explanation, I trust you will accept the bills tendered : in our present state of surveillance it is utterly impossible to render regular accounts ; and to attempt it would cause suspicion. Hereafter I suspect the expences of the hospital will be defrayed by Mahomed Akbar Khan, and of course such bills need not be drawn, and will, if necessary, continue to be drawn by Captain Conolly, as originally appointed.

I have, &c.,

ELDRED POTTINGER.

No. 435.—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.*

Allahabad, July 29, 1842.

GENERAL,—Mr. Maddock, the Secretary to the Government of India, has submitted to me your letter of the 14th instant, communicating the arrival in your camp of Captain Troup, of the 48th Regiment of Native Infantry, (a prisoner to the Affghans,) and Hajee Buktia Khan, a native of Candahar, deputed to you, as Captain Troup informed you, by Futteh Jung, and the whole of the chiefs and people of Cabool.

2. The letter of Major Pottinger, which you inclosed, gives a different character to Captain Troup's mission to your camp, for that officer attributes it to his having persuaded Mohamed Akbar Khan to make another overture, and to send Captain Troup with his letter.

3. You acted properly in not replying to Major Pottinger's letter on this occasion : and you have taken a correct view of that officer's position, in considering that, as a prisoner, he cannot be a Political Agent.

4. The explanation you gave to Hajee Buktia Khan, of the views of the Government of India, was in conformity with your instructions ; but as you were distinctly authorized to negotiate with a *de facto* Government of Cabool, for a general exchange of prisoners, not excepting Dost Mahomed Khan ; and it has never been on any occasion intimated to you, when such general exchange of prisoners has been mentioned, that any specific terms were to be attached to the delivery of Dost Mahomed Khan : I regret that you should have imagined that any further instructions could be required upon that head. In a general exchange of prisoners, Dost Mahomed Khan would be given up unreservedly, and without any conditions, exactly as any other prisoner.

5. It appears, that in the name of Futteh Jung, Mahomed Akbar Khan is exercising a more extensive authority than it has hitherto been deemed probable that the divisions amongst the chiefs would permit to be



concentrated in the same hands, and that he has obtained possession of the persons of all the prisoners except those at Ghuznee, whom he understood to have demanded from Shumsodeen Khan.

6. These circumstances afford better hopes of the ultimate recovery of all the prisoners, than it has yet been allowable to entertain ; but I must impress upon you, that no trust whatever is to be placed in any Affghan ; and that all military operations must proceed as if no negotiation was in progress.

7. When every gun, and colour, and military trophy in the hands of the Affghans, and every prisoner within the reach and power of the *de facto* Government of Cabool, has been surrendered to you, then, and not till then, you may give orders suited to a state of returning peace.

8. You may inform the Affghan chiefs, that these are your positive instructions. But that immediately upon receiving from you the report of the surrender to you of the trophies of war, and of the prisoners, I will direct Dost Mahomed Khan, and all the prisoners in our hands, to be honorably conveyed to the frontier of Cabool, and delivered without any condition. I will likewise then consent there shall be peace between the British Government and the Affghan people, and I will recognise the Government which the Affghans may seem to prefer.

9. It is my wish to carry with me, in all measures relative to Affghanistan, the willing acquiescence of the Maharajah Shere Sing ; but you rightly judged that the intervention of the Sikhs, as mediators, could not be allowed, nor indeed could such a proposal be seriously made. The Maharajah is at war with the Affghans as we are, and peace, as well as war, will be common to the two Governments.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

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No. 436.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, July 29, 1842.*

SIR,—It is to be expected that in the event of any arrangement being made for the general exchange of prisoners, a demand will be brought forward by the Affghans for the payment of money on account of the maintenance of the British prisoners while in their hands.

2. The Governor-General directs me to remind you that the British Government has expended a large sum in the maintenance of Dost Mahomed Khan and his family, and of the other Affghan prisoners in our hands.

3. Although this sum must be much larger than any sum really expended by the Affghans in the maintenance of British prisoners, yet seeing the improbability of our coming to any settlement with the Affghans whereby any balance which might appear to be due to us would be paid, the Governor-General is willing to cancel the account on both sides.

4. The strongest objections exist to our agreeing, in any general exchange of prisoners, to pay any sum on account of maintenance.

5. It would be represented that the Affghans had compelled the surrender of the prisoners in our hands, and had only given up the prisoners in their hands for a ransom.

6. The Governor-General cannot consent to any arrangement which can be so represented.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 437.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

Jellalabad, July 16, 1842.

SIR,—I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, copy of a letter from me to Major Pottinger, C.B. I have deemed it proper to send this letter, for though it is little more than acknowledging the receipt of his communication (copy of which was forwarded to you with my letter of 14th July, 1842,) still it will prevent any misunderstanding as to my not sending him replies to the proposals he has sent.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 438.—*Major-General Pollock to Major Pottinger.*

Jellalabad, July 15, 1842.

SIR,—I have had the honor to receive your letter, dated the 10th instant, which was delivered by Captain Troup, who was accompanied by an Agent from Cabool. I have communicated to Captain Troup and the Agent all that appears necessary on the subject of an exchange of prisoners. While you continue a prisoner, and consequently not a free agent, I see no necessity for your being the channel of communication.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

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No. 439.—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.*

Allahabad, August 3, 1842.

SIR,—In the event of Mahomed Akbar Khan's coming into your hands, without any previous conditions for the preservation of his life, I request that you will inform him, that he will be tried for the murder of Sir William Macnaghten, and confine him accordingly, as you would any other person accused of a similar crime, and try him as you would any other person, and deal with him, if he should be convicted, as you would any other person found guilty of murder under similar circumstances.

You will not hurry his trial, so as to commence it with insufficient proof of is undoubted and admitted guilt.

The only other circumstance which should induce you to delay his trial is, the consideration that British subjects still remaining, at the capture of Mahomed Akbar, in the hands of the Affghans, might possibly be made to suffer in the event of his execution. Upon this point you will act according to your discretion.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 440.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, July 25, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to request that you will bring to the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General the following circumstances.

I have found it necessary during my halt here to send escorts with every string of camels sent from camp, for the purpose of bringing in supplies of grain and bhoosa, and notwithstanding every precaution, on some occasions, camels have been carried off by small parties of thieves, who conceal themselves in certain strong places near the high road. These places are protected by the Affghan rulers when governing this country, by posting thannas of twenty or thirty men, who hold breast-work near them, and protect kafilahs and travellers; but it would obviously be objectionable to employ regular troops in this duty; and, owing to the employment of Captain Ferris' regiment of Jezailchees, with Brigadier Monteath's force and Captain Thomas' regiment in the Khyber, have not had any Irregular Infantry disposable for this duty except the Sappers and Miners under Captain Broadfoot, and the men of this regiment have been constantly employed in building hospitals for the European regiments until within the last two days, when I have taken the earliest opportunity of detaching 200 of them, and 200 Irregular Horse, under the command of Captain Broadfoot, to Killa Mahomed Hoosain Khan, a fort about fifteen miles from camp. This fort has been carefully examined, and the adjacent country reconnoitred, by the chief engineer and the Assistant Quartermaster-General, who report very favorably upon it. I have given directions for the collection in it of a large supply of grain and bhoosa, and I would wish much to have a post of Irregular Infantry stationed about half way between it and this camp, but I have no Irregulars disposable. Again, in another direction, Chipreel, from which a very great portion of our supplies are drawn, I have no resource but to send strong escorts of regular troops with each string of camels sent for grain or bhoosa, and these duties are found to be very harassing to both infantry and cavalry. For these reasons I should beg to suggest that I be allowed to entertain one or even two hundred of the inhabitants of this valley, who could be employed with great advantage if posted in small parties along the main roads from the chief villages to camp. The expense of a body of 200 of these men would be under 2,000 rupees per mensem, and I think it very probable that many camels might be saved by them which would otherwise fall into the hands of the enemy. A party of twenty-eight Ghilzyes under a Chief, whose fidelity has been tested, are now in this camp. They have been hitherto employed under Captain Mackeson at the Peshawur agency, but I have directed them to remain with this camp from the 1st instant: and should the proposal I have made meet the sanction of Government, the chief I have alluded to would have no difficulty in completing his party in a few days to the number of men mentioned.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 420.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.**Jellalabad, July 27, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward the following documents connected with a reconnoissance, made on the 24th instant, from Brigadier Monteath's camp, preparatory to the advance of the Brigadier's force into the valley of the Shinwarees; this advance was fixed for yesterday, the 26th instant, but I have not yet received official reports of further operations from that quarter.

Inclosure No. 1.—Copy of a letter from Brigadier Monteath, C.B., to Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant-General, dated Camp, Muzzeena, 25th July, 1842.

Inclosure No. 2.—Copy of a letter from Captain Willis, Her Majesty's 31st Foot, commanding the party, dated Camp, Muzzeena, 24th July, 1842.

Inclosure No. 3.—Copy of a letter from Captain Ferris, commanding the Regiment of Jezailchees, dated Camp, Muzzeena, 24th July, 1842.

Inclosure No. 4.—Copy of a report on the country reconnoitred by Captain Robertson, Field Engineer, dated 24th July, 1842.

Inclosure No. 5.—Return of killed, wounded, and missing.

Inclosure No. 6.—Return of ammunition expended.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 442.—*Brigadier Monteath to Captain Ponsonby.**Camp, Muzzeena, July 25, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor of addressing you to state, for the information of Major-General Pollock, that on account of the confined and extremely difficult nature of the country from hence to the entrance of the Shinwarree Valley, and which difficulties are to be encountered throughout it, I deemed it expedient, before committing the troops under my command in an advance, to send out Captain Robertson, of the Engineers, to make a reconnoissance of the road and country in our front, giving him an escort of 400 regular troops, under Captain Willis, Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, and the Jezailchees, under Captain Ferris.

Inclosed I beg to send Captain Robertson's report, and that of Captain Willis, together with returns of the troops employed, killed, and wounded, and ammunition expended on the occasion.

I have, &c.,

T. MONTEATH.

No. 443.—*Captain Willis to Captain Lugard, Major of Brigade.**Muzzeena, July 25, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report that this morning, agreeable to instructions received last night from Brigadier Monteath, C.B., commanding, I proceeded with the following reconnoitring party, towards Muzzeena,—viz. 27 officers, 55 serjeants, 10 drummers, 724 rank and file, 1

jemadar, and 20 troops ; after passing a river, about two miles from camp, we ascended a bare hill, and proceeded along its ridge for about two miles farther, when the advance guard, composed of a corps of Jezailchees, under Captain Ferris, was fired on by a party occupying the adjoining heights, killing one non-commissioned officer, and wounding two or three of the men. In my course to the termination of the ridge, the enemy skirmished with the advanced-guard, who drove them before it. I halted here a short time, when Captain Robertson, of the Engineers, reported that he had completed his observations. In obedience to my instructions, I prepared to return to camp. By this time the surrounding hills were covered with the enemy, who, by the beat of tom-toms, were collecting in great force, and advancing towards my position on the ridge of the hill. The Jezailchees descended the hill, and drove the enemy back, when I recalled them, covering them as they fell back, by the grenadier company of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment. I continued my return, skirmishing for about four miles with the enemy, who in number, perhaps, from 800 to 1,000, hovered round for that distance. I am not able to estimate the loss the enemy suffered, but am sorry to report that of my own party were three killed and twenty-six wounded, as the accompanying return will show.

I also beg to inclose the report of Captain Ferris, commanding the Jezailchees.

I have, &c.,

W. G. WILLIS.

No. 441.—*Captain Ferris to Captain Willis.*

*Camp, Muzzeena, July 24, 1842.*

I have to report for your information, that having been ordered to take the whole of my regiment,\* and form the advance guard of the troops employed on the reconnoissance of the Shinwarree Valley, this morning, I detached my native Adjutant, Ali Wurdee Khan, with twenty men, to skirmish on my part, and cover my advance along the ridge of the hills over which the road runs. After I had advanced about one mile and a half along the ridge, I found myself opposed by about 200 Shinwarrees, who were speedily dislodged by Ali Wurdee Khan's party which on seeing the enemy, I had reinforced by another company. After this my advanced party was skirmishing with the enemy the whole way to Sekunder Khan's fort, at which I halted my regiment and waited till your arrival. I need not detail the operations in which my regiment was engaged after this, as you yourself witnessed the whole of them. I, however, beg leave to bring to your notice the great assistance I received from Lieutenant Dowson, my Adjutant, and from Hyder Ali Khan and Ali Wurdee Khan, my Native Commandant and Adjutant.

I have, &c.,

J. FERRIS.

\* Strength ; 1 commandant, 1 adjutant, 1 native commandant, 1 native adjutant, 6 jemadars, 6 naib jemadars, 36 havildars, 36 paiks, 350 rank and file.

No. 445.—*Captain Robertson to Brigadier Monteat.**Camp, Muzzeena, July 24, 1842.*

## REPORT OF A RECONNOISSANCE OF THE YAGHI FORTS.

I examined the ground this morning for a distance of about seven miles from camp. The route lies at first across the fields, and numerous water-courses. At about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile from camp a stream is passed, flowing from the valley over a wide bed of large pebbles and boulders. The water at present does not occupy more than 10 feet in breadth, and is shallow; half a mile further on the ridge, bounding the valley to the eastward, is reached. Up to this point the road has been made practicable by Lieutenant Becher of the Engineers.

The slope up the side of the ridge is practicable, though steep; it is rocky, and strewed with small stones, which would be a severe trial to laden camels.

Along the ridge we proceeded for about five miles; the route is practicable, but from its stony nature, camels would only proceed slowly, and accidents would be probable. The ridge is crossed by hollows about at right angles to its course, forming a series of transverse ridges; all those passed are practicable. The slope from this range down to the valley varies, but is for the most part easy, though not practicable, without difficulty, for camels, except in one or two places. On the opposite side of the valley the slope from the heights is more abrupt; in some places precipitous. The altitude of these bounding heights is about 200 or 250 feet in general.

The valley is between 800 and 900 yards wide from ridge to ridge. A rough measurement at the place where our reconnoissance terminated, gave 864 yards.

The valley is at present a swamp, the paddy fields being under water. During the skirmishing this morning it was quite clear the fields were impassable, the enemy always advancing and retiring on the dividing ridges.

This valley contains several forts; all seemed to be unoccupied; and the most part much ruined and dilapidated. These forts appear to be of the same construction as others on this part of the country. Their are of small size; the largest did not appear to have a side of 100 paces. Their shape is quadrangular, with towers at the corners, two tiers of loop-holes in the towers; and the curtains usually contain a few. The gates of most of the forts I have examined are open to attack, and very slight; and from the appearance of those viewed from the heights to-day, I do not think they are strong. The houses in some of the forts about on the walls, forming a sort of rampart, the curtain being usually 12 or 15 feet higher than the roof (which is 10 feet from the ground). The walls are about 6 feet thick below, tapering to 6 inches above. This description, I conceive, will be found generally applicable to the forts near this. From the swampy state of the valley the approach of the gate may be difficult.

The fort (Sekunder Khan's) to which my attention has been particularly called, if Toorabaz Khan's people correctly pointed it out, is more ruined than the generality, and it appears to me most improbable that it is now occupied, or that any enemy could dream of defending it. The place is

situated on the eastern side of the valley, and the hill slopes down to it. On this slope, encamping ground may be found, but stony and rocky; forage for horses or cattle I doubt the possibility of obtaining.

A force proceeding up this valley, even on the ridge traversed to-day, would always (especially during a retrograde movement), be liable to many casualties, particularly when encumbered with a train of baggage animals; many of the latter would be shot, as the enemy would be incited by a hope of plunder. The exposed nature of the ground would render this very probable.

I have strong doubts whether the fort was correctly pointed out to me. Some of the Jezailchees of the escort stated, that the principal fort was further up the valley, and from their indications of its position, I conceive it to be full three miles further than the point at which our progress terminated, as it was deemed inadvisable to proceed further from camp.

I have, &c.,

J. W. ROBERTSON.

*Return of Men killed, wounded, and missing, of a reconnoitring Party, under the command of Captain Willis, H. M. 31st Regiment.*

*Mazeena, July 24, 1842.*

Corps.	Killed.						Wounded.						Missing.						Remarks.			
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Privates.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Privates.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Serjeants.		Corporals.	Drummers.	Privates.
Her Majesty's 31st Regt. ....	1																					
33rd Regt. Native Inf. ....				1						2			10									
53rd Regt. Native Inf. ....													1									
Jezailchees. ....				1		1				2	1		10									And 1 Nat. Adj. wounded.
Total of each ....				2		1				4	1		21									
Grand Total. ....				3						26												

W. G. WILLIS, *Captain.*

*Return shewing the strength of the reconnoitring Party under Captain Willis, H. M. 31st Regiment.*

*Mazzeena, July 24, 1842.*

<i>Corps.</i>	<i>Officers E. &amp; N.</i>	<i>Serjeants.</i>	<i>Drummers.</i>	<i>Rank and file.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Her Majesty's 31st Regt.	5	8	3	133	149	
33rd Regt. Native Inf.	3	6	1	106	116	
53rd Regt. Native Inf.	3	5	2	105	115	
Jezailchees . . . . .	16	36	4	380	436	
Total . . . . .	27	55	10	724	816	

W. G. WILLIS, Captain.

*Return of Ammunition expended by a reconnoitring Party, under command of Captain Willis, H. M. 31st Regiment.*

*Mazzeena, July 24, 1842.*

<i>Regiments.</i>	<i>No. of rounds expended.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Her Majesty's 31st Regiment . .	1403	
33rd Regiment Native Infantry . .	4357	
53rd Regiment Native Infantry . .	906	
Total . . . . .	6666	

W. G. WILLIS, Captain.

No. 446.—*Notification by the Governor-General of India.*

*Allahabad, August 11, 1842.*

The Right Honorable the Governor-General is pleased to direct the publication of the following letter from Major-General Pollock, and of the Report from Brigadier Monteath, of the successful operations of the force under his command in the Shinwaree valley.

By order of the Right Honorable Governor-General,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 447.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, July 29, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of my letter to the Adjutant-General of the Army, of this date, forwarding copies of letters and other documents from Brigadier Monteath, reporting the result of an attack on the enemy in the Shinwaree valley.



The loss sustained by the enemy must have been considerable, for in a letter which one of the Chiefs addressed to Captain Macgregor on the 28th instant, he states, that they were still burying their dead. The effect in the whole valley by such a complete defeat of the Shinwarrees, and the destruction of so many of their forts, will be productive of the most beneficial effects.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 448—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, July 29, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, copy of a letter, dated Camp Mazzeena, 27th instant, from Brigadier Monteath, C. B., commanding the troops in the Shinwarree Valley, together with copies of the documents to which it refers. Although the loss of the enemy on this occasion has not been stated by Brigadier Monteath, I have every reason to believe, from authentic sources, it has been considerable. One of the chiefs, Shadoo, had a nephew and a first cousin killed in the action, and another chief, Hoosain, also lost a son.

The enemy were busily employed during the afternoon of the 26th in burying their dead, and on the day subsequent to the engagement, the Shinwarree chiefs sent into camp to express their willingness to pay the revenue.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 449.—*Brigadier Monteath to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Camp, Mazzeena, July 21, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor of addressing you, to state, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C. B., that, in accordance with the intention expressed by me in my letter of the 24th instant, I marched out yesterday morning at day-light, to attack the enemy with the following troops and guns :—five nine-pounders, one twenty-four pounder howitzer, fifty sappers and miners, one squadron 1st Light Cavalry, seven companies Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, seven ditto 33rd Native Infantry, seven ditto 53rd Native Infantry, Ferris' corps of Jezailchees.

As the road into the enemy's country was nearly impracticable for loaded animals, and we must have lost a great many camels had I attempted to move with our baggage, I resolved on returning to my present position after the operations I had in view had been concluded ; therefore, having compressed the camp as much as possible by striking a portion of it, and collecting the tents and baggage on one spot, I left it in charge of Major Hewitt, 33rd Regiment, with the following troops :—two companies Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, ditto 33rd Native Infantry, ditto 53rd Native Infantry, two squadrons 1st Light Cavalry, fifty Jezailchees, and one hundred of Toorabaz Khan's men.

On the troops gaining the left ridge of the Shinwarree valley, which was the most practicable, the enemy retired out of their forts, and I

detached Lieutenant Becher, of the corps of engineers, with the sappers and miners, to set fire to them, which he did in succession up to the fort of Secunder Khan, at the head of the valley, the force moving parallel along the ridge for the protection of the party. Thus at one time the interiors of five-and-thirty forts were in a blaze along the valley, the enemy contemplating the scene from the heights in the vicinity of Secunder Khan's fort, where they had taken up positions, and from whence they were driven in gallant style by the advance, consisting of the light and two battalion companies Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, the light companies 33rd and 53rd Regiments, and the Jezailchees, under Major Skinner, H.M. 31st Regiment.

At this moment the guns, having been brought into position by Captain Abbott, opened a fire of Shrapnell shells upon them, which did considerable execution, and so disconcerted them, that parties left the field altogether and never returned.

Having effected everything in the way of destruction, I caused two companies of the 53rd Regiment to be extended along a ridge below that from whence the advance had driven the enemy, and of which it remained in possession. In the rear of the companies of the 53rd, a company of the 33rd was extended along the top of another ridge, and in rear of that company, on a higher ridge, two guns were placed in position to aid in covering the retirement of the advance from the enemy, who were all ready to attack them as soon as they should commence their descent from the heights. On these arrangements being completed, the recall was sounded to the advance, and I am happy to say, the whole joined the main body without a single casualty occurring.

Major Skinner's party being exceedingly fatigued, for the heat had been excessive, and the labour great, I directed them to fall in with the main column, and ordered out two companies from each of the three regiments, to cover our retrogression homewards. These were formed into two parties, and extended across the ridge in two lines of skirmishers. In the rear of the second line I placed two guns, with a company of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment flanking each of them, also a party of forty cavalry; and a line of Skirmishers was thrown out along the whole right flank of the column to the edge of the ridge (where the ground from its broken character was most favourable for the enemy,) and which communicated with the rear line of the covering force placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton, Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, at his own solicitation.

In this order we retired seven miles and a half over as bad a road as can well be supposed, and although I had anticipated loss and great annoyance from the enemy throughout the march, yet it seemed as if they had had enough, as their attacks were languid and remarkably cautious throughout, and I am rejoiced to say that at half-past 3 P. M., we arrived in camp without loss or injury of any kind.

It gives me great pleasure to record the zealous conduct of the troops generally, and the cheerful and praiseworthy manner in which the soldiers of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment laboured to drag the guns up such places as the horses, notwithstanding their unequalled qualities, were incapable of doing.

Herewith I beg to inclose Major Skinner's Report, and I can myself bear ample testimony to the gallant conduct of himself, and those under his command ; and I should be unjust were I not to say that the conduct of Captain Ferris, his Native Cammandant, Hyder Ali, and the whole corps of Jezailchees, was highly distinguished.

My thanks are very justly due to Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton, Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, for the able manner in which he conducted the duties of covering the retirement of the force, and particularly so to Major Skinner, for the zealous and gallant manner in which he led the advance against the enemy ; to Captain Ferris, for the gallant manner in which, with his corps of Jezailchees, he drove the enemy from their position on the heights ; to Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Dawes, for the very successful practice of the guns ; to Lieutenant Becher, for the zealous and satisfactory manner in which he, with the detachment of sappers and miners, constructed a road for the guns, and fired the enemy's forts in the valley ; and to Lieutenant Lugard, Her Majesty's 31st regiment, Major of Brigade ; Lieutenant Mayne, Assistant-Quarter-Master-General ; Captain Lloyd, Sub-Assistant-Commissary-General, and Captain Robertson, Field Engineer, for the assistance afforded me by them in the field.

I have also to express my thanks to Captain Macgregor, Political Agent, who, when the opportunity offered itself, served the guns.

Inclosed is a return of killed and wounded of the force employed, and one of ammunition expended.

I have, &c.,

T. MONTEATH.

No. 450.—*Major Skinner to Brigadier Monteath.*

*Camp, Mazeena, July 27, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report to you, that when the advanced guard, composed of the following details, viz.—the three light companies of the brigade; with two battalion companies of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, and the corps of Jezailchees, reached the crest of the ridge over which the main column was moving, about eight o'clock, A. M., I observed the enemy posted in small bodies upon the different heights and ridges in my front, while several parties occupied gardens and broken walls at the foot of the line of hills I was upon, above the valley on the right hand.

A sharp fire was opened upon the line of skirmishers, who quickly advanced and drove the enemy off. The corps of Jezailchees swept the front, the left hills were cleared by the light company of the 31st Foot ; and the light company of the 33rd Native Infantry on the right skirmished throughout that part of the valley nearest the ridge ; the remaining companies were in support. We advanced to Secunder Khan's fort of Muriaz, over very broken and difficult country with frequent descents and ascents, the enemy sometimes keeping up a good fire, but always abandoning the line of heights as we ascended, and falling back to others. I halted at Secunder Khan's fort, from which a few shots were fired as we advanced, when it was evacuated.

This fort hangs over a narrow valley on the right hand, fields of rice in many parts of it now under water. A narrow stony ridge in the midst of this valley was occupied by the enemy, and commanded the post among trees at the foot of the fort, which I wished to hold ; the enemy was soon driven off the first part of the ridge, and fell back to a higher peak, from which it became also necessary to drive them ; this was done by the Jezailchees under Captain Ferris, in very good style, who held it till withdrawn. At the head of the valley in which we now were, there stands a high hill with a fort upon its summit, a considerable distance off. All the ridges from which the enemy had been driven, appear to draw to a point at this fort, and their retreat was always towards it.

Many men were collected there, and large parties were sent out to my right ; this induced me to draw the companies of the 31st Foot on the left nearer to me. The enemy soon appearing on the summit of a hill above my left, however, I sent one company of the 31st Regiment to drive him away and occupy the hill. This duty was remarkably well performed by Captain Marshall, of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, whose company was employed upon it. The enemy retreated with some loss, and took up another position under cover of a sungah, or breastwork of stone, within shot. He was driven from it with great gallantry by Lieutenant M'Ilveen, of the 31st Regiment, and a party of No. 7 company of that corps. Lieutenant M'Ilveen (a very promising young officer indeed) was, I regret to say, killed in this assault upon the sungah.

A narrow valley of rice fields, completely swamped, separated, the ridge, on which my right was, from two small forts ; a garden at one end of the rice valley below the ridge towards the first of two forts, was held by the light company of the 33rd Native Infantry : the enemy descended from a high line of sand-hills, and occupying these two forts, annoyed my position a good deal. He was driven from them by the Light Company and part of No. 6 of the 31st Regiment, who had no other ground to advance on but the narrow ridges that divided the terraces of rice ; they moved along these under a sharp fire, and drove the enemy from his position. I occupied these forts, and leaving Brevet Major Urnston, of the 31st Regiment, in command of the post, ceased from further operations. None of the forts I have mentioned were tenable by the enemy ; the walls were breached in many places by the earthquake in February last. When I was ordered to fall back on the main body about half-past one P. M., Major Urnston retired in good order followed at a distance by the enemy, (who had fired constantly into the forts when we occupied them), over the difficult ground behind him, having set fire to the villages within the two forts before he left them.

The advance guard being collected together above Secunder Khan's fort, joined the main column. I have great pleasure in assuring you, that during several hours of most active operations over the difficult country we were in, every officer and man under my command behaved admirably.

I have, &c.

THOS. SKINNER.

*Return of Killed and Wounded in Action, under the Command of Brigadier Monteath, on the 26th July 1842.*

*Camp, Mazeena July 27, 1842.*

Her Majesty's 31st Regiment—1 officer killed : 7 rank and file, wounded.

33rd Regiment Native Infantry—1 serjeant, 8 rank and file, wounded.

53rd Regiment Native Infantry—5 rank and file wounded.

Jezailchees—2 rank and file killed ; 2 rank and file, wounded.

Total—3 killed ; 23 wounded.

*Strength of the above Corps.*

Captain Abbott's Battery—2 Officers, European and Native, 2 Serjeants.—No. 6, Light Field Battery.

Squadron 1 Light Cavalry—11 Officers, European and Native, 10 Serjeants, 129 Rank and File.

Her Majesty's 31st Regiment—24 Officers, 34 Serjeants, 500 Rank and File.

33rd Regiment Native Infantry—26 Officers, European and Native, 32 Serjeants, 494 Rank and File.

53rd Regiment Native Infantry—25 Officers, European and Native, 42 Serjeants, 542 Rank and File.

Jezailchees—15 Officers, European and Native, 32 Serjeants, 343 Rank and File.

Total—103 Officers, European and Native, 153 Serjeants, 2,008 Rank and File.

T. MONTEATH, & EDWARD LUGARD.

*Return of Ammunition expended in Action, under the Command of Brigadier Monteath, on the 26th instant.*

*Camp, Mazeena, July 27, 1842.*

Captain Abbott's Battery—37 rounds.—Shells, Shrapnell, 24-pounder, 6.—Do. 9-pounder, 23, and round shot 9-pounder, 8.

Squadron 1st Light Cavalry—None.

Her Majesty's 31st Regiment—4,889 rounds.

33rd Regiment Native Infantry—2,892 rounds.

53rd Regiment Native Infantry—4,954 rounds.

Jezailchees—6,678 rounds.

Total—19,450 rounds.

T. MONTEATH & EDWARD LUGARD.

*No. 451.—Major-General Pollock to Mr. Muddock.*

*Jellalabad, August 2, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report the arrival in camp this morning, from Cabool of Captains Lawrence and Troup, accompanied by Hajee Bukhtear Khan, and bringing letters from his Majesty Futtch Jung, Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan, and the Chiefs of Cabool. I will do myself the honor of sending copies and translations of these letters together with my replies to-morrow.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

*No. 452.—Major-General Pollock to Mr. Muddock.*

*Jellalabad, August 3, 1842.*

SIR,—Captain Troup assures me that the Wuzer is sincere in his offer of liberating the prisoners, if I promise that our troops shall be withdrawn from Afghanistan, but this of course it is not in my power to do, more than appears in my letter in reply to his Majesty Futtch Jung

(Inclosure No. 11), which will be sent to Cabool this evening. I think that my advancing to Futteehabad with a part of this force may expedite the release of the prisoners.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 553—*Translation of a Paper received from Hazeer Bukhtear, inclosed in Letter from His Majesty, Futteh Jung.*

July 30, 1842.

The contents of this paper are—

1st. Such English gentlemen and ladies as are in Affghanistan, Wuzcer Mahomed Akbar Khan will convey to Jellalabad, and make them over to the English Government.

2nd. General Pollock, with all the English army, shall start immediately from Jellalabad towards their own provinces, and shall not on any account delay. And the gentlemen and the Candahar force, and the troops in all other parts of Affghanistan, shall march by my (General Pollock's) order through the Bolan Pass; and quitting the whole of Affghanistan, we will depart and will not interfere in any way with the affairs of Affghanistan.

3rd. The Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, with all his relations and dependants, and all other natives of Affghanistan who are in Hindoostan, shall be released; and I will have them taken to Mahomed Akbar Khan. And all the matter of the army, of the English Government, whatever is in the hands of Mahomed Akbar Khan shall be given up to me; and whatever is not at present collected shall be forwarded to India, as soon as possible, by two gentlemen whom I will leave for that purpose; and the English army shall not delay its march on their account. Also there shall be no delay in the arrival of Dost Mahomed Khan. These few lines have been written as the basis of a Treaty.

No. 454.—*Translation of a Letter from Major-General Pollock to his Majesty Futteh Jung.*

Jellalabad, August 30, 1842.

A. C.—I have received your letter of 30th of July. When I heard of the approach of European gentlemen from Cabool, it was my belief that you had agreed to all terms, and that the whole of the prisoners, European and native, would immediately be sent; and I was prepared, on my part, to send to Hindoostan for all the prisoners who are retained there.

There is delay without a cause. It is well known to you that if I promise and affix my seal to any paper, it need not be doubted. I have already written distinctly the terms in my letter of 24th of July, to which you appeared to agree.

They are, that on delivery (or as soon after as practicable) of our prisoners and hostages, European and native, and restoration of the guns left on the march, the whole of the Affghan prisoners, including the Ameer, in Hindoostan, shall in like manner be restored without delay to their own country.

I have already said that the English did not come to Afghanistan to remain, but they cannot submit to be dictated to as to the time of their quitting it. Your Majesty must know that this is not the season at which to move troops, I therefore must suppose if the prisoners are detained any longer that the offer of an exchange has not been sincere. I cannot, of course, see the object in prolonging this state of enmity, especially after hearing that your Majesty, the nobles, and people of Cabool, were desirous of ending the strife.

It will be for you to determine whether good faith has been preserved, and whether the line of conduct pursued by you or your advisers has evinced an earnest and sincere disposition for peace. I have written one word, and I have not swerved therefrom.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 455.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Allahabad, August 17, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 3rd instant, and to communicate to you his Lordship's entire approval of the answers you addressed to Prince Futteh Jung and Mahomed Akbar Khan, as well as of the measure adopted of extending to Mohun Lall the protection of the British Government. With reference to the negotiation now in progress, and to the terms of your former instructions with respect to an exchange of prisoners, I am directed to observe that of course you understand that the whole family of Dost Mahomed Khan must follow the condition of that chief, and be either retained or exchanged, as he may be.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 456.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Simla, September 16, No. 37, 1842.*

(EXTRACT.)—The first part of the operation of withdrawing the armies from Afghanistan has been most successfully effected by Major-General England, who arrived at Quetta on the 26th ultimo with the following troops:—one troop of Captain Anderson's Horse Artillery; one Foot battery, six guns, bullocks; detachment of the Poona horse; two Rissalahs of Christie's horse; 25th Bombay Native Infantry; seven Companies late Bombay Light Infantry Battalion; 1st, or Capt. Griffiths' Irregular Infantry; 2nd, or Captain Macan's ditto, ditto; 5th, or Captain Macdonald's ditto ditto; and all the invalids and useless followers of the Candahar army, together with Prince Timour.

2. The convoy was accompanied by nearly 10,000 animals.

3. The Major-General having left Candahar on the 7th of August reached the foot of the Kojuck Pass on the morning of the 16th. The troops had marched twenty-four miles during the night, but the heights being unoccupied, a force was immediately detached to take possession of them, and succeeded in that object. By the evening of the 18th all the

difficulties of the pass were surmounted, the loss sustained having been very trifling.

4. The further progress of the column to Quetta was unopposed.

5. It is the intention of Major-General England to move his whole force in three divisions to Dadur. The first division will leave Quetta this day, and the last, which the Major-General will accompany, will march on the 2nd of October.

6. Major-General Sir C. Napier, K.C.B., appointed to command all the forces below the Kojuck mountains, and on both banks of the Indus from Sukkur to the Sea, will have sailed from Bombay on the 1st instant in the *Zenobia*, with 200 of the 28th Queen's. The remainder of that Regiment will follow to Kurachee, and the 22nd Queen's will be concentrated at Sukkur. The column under Major-General England being without any European troops, this measure became necessary.

7. Its weakness in cavalry compels me to detach from Ferozepore to Sukkur the 9th Light Cavalry.

8. I do not at present anticipate that it will be necessary that the troops in Sind should enter upon any active operations; but without European troops or regular cavalry, the large body of men under Major-General England's command can hardly be considered an army; and it ought to be rendered capable of engaging in any operation which may be required from it.

9. It has ample means of carriage. It has, I hope, sufficient supplies of provisions; and there are ten lacs at Sukkur, besides the sums in the treasuries of Hyderabad and Kurachee. Fifteen lacs are to be forwarded from Bombay as soon as the season will permit.

10. Major-General Nott moved from Candahar on the 10th ultimo, with the following troops;—Two troops of Horse Artillery, one 9-pounder Fort Battery, four 18-pounders, with two companies Bengal Foot Artillery, 3rd Bombay Cavalry, five Rissalahs Christie's Irregular Horse, three Rissalahs 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry, Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, 2nd Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, 16th ditto, 38th ditto, 42nd ditto, 43rd ditto, 3rd, or Captain Craigie's Irregular Bengal Infantry.

11. More than one letter addressed to me by the Major-General must have been intercepted. I have reason to believe that he has taken with him the four 18-pounders; but my official information would have led me to suppose that those guns had been sent with Major-General England's column.

12. The calculation of Major-General Nott was, that, allowing for a halt at Ghuznee, he should reach Cabool between the 15th and 20th of this month.

13. He was to carry with him forty days' provisions.

14. I do not know officially the extent of his means of carriage; but I gather from the extract from a letter from Major Rawlinson to Major Outram, which was communicated by the latter officer, that the number of camels was only 800, the remainder of the animals being probably mules and yabooks, much better adapted to the country than camels.

15. The Major-General carried with him a large quantity of ammunition.



16. Major-General Nott appears to have been disappointed in the amount of treasure furnished to him, and to have only ten lacs when he expected to have had twenty.

17. I entertain the highest expectations of success, founded on the soldier-like qualities of this well-disciplined and brave army, which has long acted together, commanded by a general and officers in whom it has entire confidence, and accustomed to beat the enemy whenever it has been able to meet them.

18. Major-General Pollock has received only one communication from Major-General Nott, dated the 26th July, announcing his intended movement, and the probable time of his arrival at Jellalabad, namely, the first week in October.

19. Major-General Pollock has advanced three brigades of his army to Gundamuck, and will have moved on Cabool on the 5th or 6th instant.

20. The brigade under Brigadier Monteath made an attack upon the forts and villages in the Shinwarree valley before it joined head-quarters, and was thoroughly successful, destroying everything in the valley, and effecting its retreat with little loss.

21. The advance guard of Major-General Pollock's force, under the Major-General himself, drove a body of the enemy from a very strong position at Mamoo Khail, three miles to the southward of Gundamuck, on the 24th ultimo, and that position has since been occupied by our troops.

22. Every possible effort has been made to supply Major-General Pollock's force with carriage, and to provide for the expected wants of Major-General Nott's force, when it joins the army in the Cabool valley.

23. In the ten weeks ending the 8th of September, there have been purchased 7,653 camels, and 5,026 mules and ponies; 1,265 Bringaree bullocks have been hired, and 1,000 camels; and I have reason to think that 1,500 more Bringaree bullocks have been hired at Peshawur, making in all 16,444 animals.

24. The purchases of camels continue, and I have directed that every mule may be procured which can be deemed fit for service.

25. I am satisfied that I shall have the entire concurrence of your Committee in the opinion I have expressed to the Commissary-General, that the army *must* be supplied, cost what it may; and that it is better to have a thousand animals too many than a hundred too few.

26. The losses of animals, however, must of necessity be so large that I have no hope that all my efforts will do more than provide for the absolute requirements of the retiring army.

27. Camp equipages, clothing, shoes, medical and other comforts, are to be forwarded by these animals; and I trust the army will feel that it incurs no suffering which could have been obviated by the paternal care of the Government.

28. Major-General Pollock has with him 10 lacs, and 20 more lacs are in progress through the Punjab.

29. Measures are already directed to be taken for the provisioning of the army during its homeward march.

30. The last convoys of animals will meet it on march, and supply the daily losses.

No. 457.—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.**Allahabad, August 17, 1842.*

GENERAL,—You will have heard, I conclude, that Major-General Nott has resolved on retiring a portion of his army by the route of Ghuznee and Cabool.

He will take with him Her Majesty's 40th, the five Bengal Regiments, the late Shah's Regiment, which was at Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and about 1,000 cavalry, with two troops of Horse Artillery, and a battery of Foot Artillery 9-pounders. I think the Infantry will amount to 4,500 or 5,000 men.

The Major-General calculates upon reaching Jellalabad by the first week of October.

I have directed comforts and necessaries for the 40th Queen's, to be sent to Jellalabad.

Every exertion will be made to send bhoosa to you by the animals now on their march.

The Major-General seems to apprehend that the greatest difficulty he will have to encounter is from the want of forage, between Cabool and Jellalabad.

I rely with confidence upon Major-General Nott's receiving the most efficient co-operation from yourself, and from every man in your army. I know all the difficulties which both armies have to contend with, but the permanent advantage of success will be great, and it will shed imperishable glory upon all who have the good fortune to contribute to obtain it.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 458.—*The Governor-General of India to Major Burlton, Commissary General.**Allahabad, August 17, 1842.*

SIR,—Major-General Nott has availed himself of the option as to his line of retirement given to him in my letter of the 4th ultimo; and he will march upon Ghuznee and Cabool with the five Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry, the Regiment of the late Shah's Infantry, which was at Kelat-i-Ghilzye, Her Majesty's 40th Foot, and about 1,000 cavalry, with two troops of Horse Artillery, and a 9-pounder battery of Foot Artillery.

The Major-General calculates upon reaching Jellalabad by the first week in October.

I request that you will take measures for dispatching immediately to Jellalabad the comforts and necessaries which the 40th Queen's will require on their arrival. They will probably be very deficient in shoes and clothing, and in all camp equipage.

It may be advisable to send an additional quantity of medicines.

As it is possible that the operations in the Cabool valley may be protracted to a later period than is now anticipated by unforeseen events, it is desirable that some quantity of warm clothing should be sent; but nothing must be allowed to delay the progress of the mules now on their march to Peshawur.

The main difficulty will arise out of the want of forage ; and any possible measure should be adopted for sending bhoosa to Jellalabad.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 459.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, August 5, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, that subsequent to the dispatch of my letter No. 189, of date the 3rd instant, a letter was received by me from Mahomed Akbar Khan, complaining of my having moved troops into Lughman during the pending negotiation. This report must have originated in a reconnoissance made by Captain Lawrence with a small escort of Sikh troops, on the other side of the river. Hajee Buktiar, when talking on this subject, remonstrated against my advance to Futteeabad, but as I had previously decided on this measure, I have thought it proper to add a postscript to my letter to His Majesty Futteh Jung (Inclosure No. 11, to my letter to your address above alluded to), to the effect that "It is my intention to advance a force to Futteeabad, and to delay them until eight days, to admit of an answer being received from Cabool." Captains Lawrence and Troup, with the Hajee, will start for Cabool to-morrow, taking with them my replies. When I last wrote I believed my letter to Futteh Jung would have been forwarded that evening, but it was not sent, and the arrival of the horseman the following day, caused another delay in its dispatch.

I have directed Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., to march to-morrow to Futteeabad with Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 35th Regiment Native Infantry, 3rd troop first brigade Horse Artillery, and I have directed Brigadier Wild to proceed to-morrow with the 30th Native Infantry, and the Jezailchee corps, to Dakka, and on his arrival to assume charge of the troops at that post. I have reason to expect that the ten lacs of treasure will shortly arrive at Peshawur, and the 6th Native Infantry will escort it from Dakka to this place ; the 30th Regiment of Native Infantry remaining at Dakka.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 460.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, August 6, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward copy of a document received from Captain Troup, being translation of a conversation which took place with Mahomed Akbar during the short stay made by Captain Troup in Cabool, after his return with my first answer. I take this opportunity of stating that it is my opinion that Mahomed Akbar's chief object in desiring me to give a sealed paper, specifying that I will withdraw all troops from Affghanistan, is to strengthen himself by the publication of such a document at Cabool, the effect of which would be to thoroughly dishearten such chiefs as look to our assistance for the means of freeing themselves

from his tyranny. Were I to say that I should leave this valley in October, the reply would be that the prisoners should be sent then: but such a promise would so strengthen Mahomed Akbar, that I think it probable that he, when the time arrived, finding that our advance on Cabool was impossible for the next seven months, might be tempted to procrastinate, under the idea that we had determined to withdraw our troops, and that after our departure he might obtain a large sum as ransom for the prisoners. Apart from this, it is impossible for me to pledge myself to withdraw on a certain date, and I, of course, could not take upon myself to issue any order to General Nott.

The advance of a brigade to Futteeabad will tend to alarm Mahomed Akbar, and make him the more anxious to induce us to quit the country. Captain Troup has expressed a doubt on this subject, and fears that this step may induce Mahomed Akbar to send the prisoners to Toorkistan, but I cannot think this will occur, as I have reason to suppose that there is a strong party at Cabool, which has determined not to allow the removal of our prisoners, and I also believe that the Wallee of Khooloom has written, refusing to receive Mahomed Akbar if accompanied by the prisoners.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 461.—*Conversation between Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan, Major Pottinger, and Captain Troup, on the morning of the 29th July, 1842.*

Mahomed Akbar opened the conversation by stating that it was recommended that great men should ask advice of each other, even if inimical to each other, and related the fable of the besieged King; he then told us, he wanted advice as to what he should do, and in answer to the question what his own wishes were, declared he required only our promise of friendship. Major Pottinger, then, presuming that he must bear in mind that, though the Vizier had his own authority in full, we were servants, and could, therefore, not give advice, if our opinions, ran contrary to our King's interests, however as far as it did not clash with our duty, we would be happy to do so, and therefore advised that the prisoners should be at once sent down, for if a delay took place, it would come within the declaration of General Pollock that the business was off if any delay took place; however, as the Chief stated, he agreed to the General's proposition, it might pass if he wrote down that he agreed to the proposition, but as the Affghans considered the statement confused and a little doubtful, he sent a memorandum of what they thought was the meaning, and begged if it were correct that the General would kindly inform him of it by affixing his seal to such a writing. Under these circumstances, the General might not consider the stipulation broken, but as it would virtually be so, we thought it most advisable for him to at once send down the prisoners, if he really wished to make terms. The Vizier said that he would not give up the prisoners without a written promise, and that the people were all determined to support him; that we must put it out of thought that we could release the prisoners by force; that as soon as he heard our troops had reached Charbagh he would send the ladies, &c., off to Toorkistan,

and fight here as long as he could, and that if obliged to flee he would take care not one of the prisoners should return to the English, for he would scatter them by twos and threes through Toorkistan with all the chiefs. He was very anxious that a specification should be in the document regarding giving up Candahar to Prince Timour, but modified the proposal to requesting a general assurance that we would not interfere in the arrangements of the country.

No. 462.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Jellalabad, August 8, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, the copy of a memorandum by Captain Macgregor, on the progress of the brigade under the command of Brigadier Monteath, C.B., detailing the movements of this force, and the advantages which have accrued from its having been detached on this duty.

I have reason to believe that the operations of this force have been attended with the very best results. The tribe of Shinwarrees took a prominent part in the attack on the late Cabool force, and shared largely in the plunder of its baggage, and the murder of our unfortunate soldiers and camp followers when disabled by the excessive cold.

This race has ever been deemed dangerous by the Affghanistan rulers; they have for ages committed their depredations, almost with impunity; and retiring to their mountains, have derided the power of the governors of Jellalabad:

They had lately attacked some camels close to the camp, and when an attempt was made to seize them, they succeeded in killing the son and wounding the followers of the chief employed against them. They were thus fitting subjects for chastisement, and the destruction of their forts has proved to all the tribes in this valley, that their mountain strongholds cannot protect them from punishment if they provoke us to attack them.

Many of the chief supporters of Mahomed Akbar have lands and possessions on this and the other side of the river, and the movements of this brigade have caused great alarm to these people.

I should do great injustice to Captain Macgregor if I failed in bringing to the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, the very valuable assistance which he has afforded on this and every other occasion. From him every information was received regarding the country and its inhabitants, and through his exertions and influence supplies were procured not only for the consumption of the brigade, but also a very valuable addition to the stores of the force at Jellalabad. During the greater part of the time this brigade was detached, he suffered, from fever and ague, but he never allowed sickness for a day to interrupt his duties.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 463.—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.*

*Bewar, August 26, 1842.*

(EXTRACT.)—I had the honor of receiving this day your letters of the 13th and 15th instant. I rejoice that you have heard directly from Major-General Nott, of his intention to move upon Ghuznee and Cabool.

In my letter of the 29th July, I referred to the possible occurrence of circumstances under which the guns and prisoners having been delivered to you, you might, on account of the deficiency of supplies in the vicinity of Cabool, deem it expedient that Major-General Nott should return to India by some other route.

I provided for an extreme case only, and so you must have understood me to consider it, for I can hardly imagine the existence of circumstances which could justify the diversion of Major-General Nott's army from the route of Ghuznee and Cabool, when his intention of marching by that route shall have been once clearly indicated.

Further, from the accounts I have received to-day, I should apprehend, that Major-General Nott's army, now retiring by any other route than that it has taken, would be exposed to greater dangers and hardships than can attend it in the valley of the Cabool river. You will have heard, subsequently to the receipt of Major Rawlinson's letter, inclosed in your letter of the 15th instant, that I have directed that Prince Timour and Major Rawlinson shall both accompany Major-General England's force. Prince Timour's presence in Cabool could not but have been injurious. He might have divided the party, such as it is, of the late Shah's family, and he is a man without ability.

No. 464.—*Mr. Maddock to the Superintending Surgeon of the Army.*

*Meerut, August 30, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General to inform you that a supply of medicines will be required immediately for two Regiments of European Infantry, and two troops of Horse Artillery, one company of Native Light Artillery, and six Native Regiments of Infantry, and about 800 Native Cavalry at Jellalabad, in addition to the force now there.

2. The Commissary-General will immediately provide the necessary carriage, on being informed of its amount.

3. He is at Ferozepore.

4. The greatest dispatch is to be used in carrying into effect this order.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 565.—*Mr. Maddock to the Quartermaster-General of the Army.*

*Meerut, August 30, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General to inform you that a supply of camp equipage for the following strength of force, in addition

to that at present under the orders of Major-General Pollock, will be required at Jellalabad :—

2 Troops of Horse Artillery.	8 Rissalahs of Irregular Horse.
1 Company Native Foot Artillery.	2 Regiments of European Infantry.
1 Regiment of Native Cavalry.	6 Regiments of Native Infantry.

2. The arrival of the above additional amount of camp equipage, without delay, being urgent, a copy of this letter has been transmitted direct to the Commissary-General, and to the officers of the Commissariat Department at Kurnaul and Delhi, as also to the Commissary of Ordnance at Delhi with the view of the necessary steps being immediately taken for the preparation and transmission of the required camp equipage.

3. I have been directed, in the absence of the Military Secretary to Government, to request that you will authorize the issue upon such indentures as may be served in consequence of these instructions.

4. A copy of this letter will be sent to the Military Secretary to Government, Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 466.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Sultanpore, August 20, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, copy of my letter addressed to the Adjutant-General of the Army, reporting my having marched towards Gundamuck with the troops detailed therein.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 467.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Sultanpore, August 20, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I marched this morning, with the troops as per margin\* towards Gundamuck, where I shall assemble the whole of the force intended to proceed to the capital. I shall have to remain at Gundamuck some days, to await the arrival of the remainder of the troops, and to enable the Commissariat Officer to send up the supplies for the march.

I propose taking to the capital the undermentioned troops :—

3rd Troops 1st Brigade Horse Artillery .....	4 guns.
3rd ditto 2nd ditto ditto .....	4
Captain Abbott's Battery .....	6
Captain Backhouse's Mountain Train .....	3

Total 17 guns.

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\* Captain Abbott's Battery ; 5th Company's Sappers and Miners, one squadron 5th Light Cavalry ; Head Quarters and 1 squadron 10th Light Cavalry ; Her Majesty's 9th Foot ; 26th Regiment Native Infantry ; 60th ditto ditto.

5th Company Sappers and Miners.  
 Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons.  
 1st Regiment Light Cavalry.  
 Squadron 5th Light Cavalry.  
 Head Quarters, and a Squadron 10th Light Cavalry.  
 600 Sowars of 3rd Regiment Irregular Cavalry.  
 The whole of Sir R. Sale's Brigade of Infantry.  
 Ditto Brigadier Tulloch's ditto.  
 Her Majesty's 31st Regiment of Foot.  
 33rd Regiment Native Infantry.  
 Regiment of Bildars under Mr. Mackeson.

The whole of the troops move in the lightest marching order, and are in excellent spirits at the prospect of advancing.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 468.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Neemla, August 22, 1842.*

SIR,—The force having advanced, the Sikhs, who were on the left bank of the Cabool river, have requested permission to be allowed to recross. They have urged that when we advance, they are left, as it were, alone. I have yielded to their wishes, on their consenting to take up a position near Gundamuck, in the valley of Hissaruck, which will be pointed out to them, and which will tend to facilitate our communication with the rear.

They are very anxious to participate in our advance movement, and as their conduct since their arrival has met my entire satisfaction, I shall, perhaps, let a small portion go on, if their prejudices are not allowed to interfere with the European troops. I shall, however, take every precaution to prevent the least misunderstanding on their part. They solicited this indulgence; and I understand from Captain Lawrence that they are most anxious to be employed. They would most willingly have gone to Lughman, had the state of the country admitted of such a move; but I found that nearly the whole country was under water with rice cultivation, and therefore not practicable with guns, and they requested that a part of this force might accompany them.

They will, of course, carry their own supplies, if they advance with us.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 469.—*Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, near Killà Abdoolla, August 19, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that the British force at Candahar having evacuated that city on the 7th and 8th, I moved from my encampment, near its walls, on the 10th, pursuant to instructions,



with the detachments mentioned in the margin\*, en route to Quetta, and that I arrived on this ground yesterday.

2. It was communicated to me on the 9th and subsequently, that the insurgents were preparing to attack the column and convoy under my charge in its passage, and especially that they would make efforts to intercept it in the strong country of the Kojuck range, at the northern extremity of which I arrived, with little molestation, on the morning of the 16th.

3. Whatever might have been the intention of the enemy, it was ascertained by reconnoitring, that the highest points of the mountain were not yet occupied by them, and I thought it right, therefore, notwithstanding that the troops had just completed a night march of twenty-four miles, to push forward a light column to seize the summit at once.

4. This operation was performed by three battalions, and the most important ridge, and all the peaks commanding the principal passes were gained by the troops before dark.

5. On the following morning, the insurgents began to appear in small bodies on different hills, but, the route being flanked, they did little mischief, and the baggage, artillery, and immense retinue under the protection of this camp, including 9,000 or 10,000 beasts of burden, began the ascent, covered by a rear-guard of two battalions and the cavalry; and I was soon made aware of our good fortune in having seized the heights on the previous evening, for the number of the enemy gradually increased, but all their efforts to capture the baggage, or indeed to interrupt us to any serious extent, were frustrated, and the passage across the Kojuck mountains may be said to have been perfected by noon on the 18th.

6. I have had the highest reason to be gratified with the exertions of all the officers and troops on this occasion, and it is entirely owing to their incessant efforts in duties of great fatigue, under a privation of water, both in climbing up the extreme points of the range to drive off the enemy whenever they appeared, and in dragging thirteen pieces of artillery over the ridge, that this service has been accomplished with so little loss on our side of life or of convoy.

7. I beg to inclose a list of the casualties in killed and wounded of this column which have occurred since I left the immediate vicinity of Candahar.

8. My last accounts of Major-General Nott were of the 13th, three marches north of Candahar.

9. His Highness Prince Timour and his family are in my camp, and every possible attention is paid to his comfort and safety.

10. The Right Honorable the Governor-General will have been informed that the Chief Saloo Khan, who had taken service with us after the affair with the enemy of the 28th of April, near Hykulzye, suddenly absconded from the military post held by us at this place on hearing of our abandonment of Candahar: and it was presumed, therefore, that he was at the head of the insurgents in the Kojuck Hills, but I am not inclined to believe that he was thus employed, and I think it more probable

\* One troop late Shah's Horse Artillery, 7 guns drawn by bullocks, 2 rissalahs Irregular Horse, 1 rissalah Poonah ditto, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, late Light Battalion ditto, 1st, 2nd, and 5th Regiments late Shah's Infantry.

that he may have proceeded to join Prince Sufter Jung, who had placed himself at the head of affairs at Candahar.

11. I have no information to warrant the expectation of any serious opposition between this and Quetta, especially as the Brahoe connexion with the Affghans seems severed for the present; and I hope to be enabled to report my arrival at Quetta to his Lordship on the 27th or 28th instant.

12. Pursuant to the instructions of Government of the 19th of March, I have assumed the political responsibilities as well as military command, vacated by the casualty therein contemplated, in the departure from these countries of Major-General Nott.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

*Return of Casualties among the Troops under the Command of Major-General R. England, since leaving Candahar up to this date inclusive.*

*Camp, at Killa Abdoola, August 19, 1842,*

1st Irregular Cavalry—1 private, 1 horse, killed; 1 private, 1 horse, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Poonah Horse—1 bheestee wounded.

Detachment 12th Regt. N. I.—1 private killed,

25th Regt. N. I.—1 private wounded

Light Companies—1 havildar wounded; 1 private missing.

1st Irregular Infantry—1 havildar, 1 private wounded.

5th Irregular Infantry—1 havildar, 1 private wounded.

Total—2 privates, 1 horse, killed; 3 havildars, 4 privates, 1 bheestee, 1 horse, wounded; 1 private, 1 horse, missing.

W. WYLLIE.

*No. 470.—Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Mammoo Khail, August 25, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I reached Gundamuck on the morning of the 23rd instant, with the following troops :—

One squadron 5th Light Cavalry, head quarters and one squadron 10th Light Cavalry, No. 6 Light Field Battery, 5th company Sappers and Miners, H.M. 9th Foot, 26th Native Infantry, 60th Native Infantry.

On approaching the ground, a few horsemen appeared, but retired as we advanced. I soon learnt that the enemy, under the Chiefs Hadji Ali and Khryroollah Khan, occupied the village and fort of Mammoo Khail, about two miles from Gundamuck, I determined upon attacking them the following morning.

I ordered up a squadron of the 3rd Dragoons and Captain Broadfoot's corps of Sappers from General Sale's camp, and they joined before daylight the following morning.

At four, A.M., yesterday morning, I moved towards the enemy with the troops undermentioned :—

One squadron 5th Light Cavalry, one squadron 10th Light Cavalry, No. 6 Light Field Battery, 5th company Sappers and Miners, H. M. 9th Foot, 26th Native Infantry, 60th Native Infantry, and Broadfoot's Sappers.

On clearing the broken ground in front, I divided the infantry into two columns, with a wing of Her Majesty's 9th Foot at the head of each, and skirmishers in front. I directed Captain Broadfoot, with his corps, to go to the right. The cavalry also advanced on the right to cut off the retreat of the enemy.

Captain Abbott's battery accompanied the columns, and, as we advanced, occasionally opened on the enemy, who continued in position so long we hoped they would oppose us with their whole force, but they retired on our approach, and we entered the village.

The fields in front of the village were purposely flooded to prevent our advance. The left column then went towards the fort of Mammoo Khail, and the right column proceeded to Koocee Khail; the ground was impracticable for cavalry, nearly the whole distance, but on one or two occasions an opportunity did offer, and the enemy suffered accordingly. Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, with some companies of the 9th Foot and 26th Native Infantry, occupied part of the heights in front of the village of Koocee Khail, while Captain Broadfoot, and some of the 26th Native Infantry, cleared the hills to the left of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor's position. As Koocee Khail is about two miles from Mammoo Khail, and as a position there might have been attended with risk, unless very strongly supported, I directed Major-General McCaskill to retire on Mammoo Khail. As I considered it of importance to hold Mammoo Khail, which was the enemy's position, I wrote for the whole camp to be brought here, and it arrived in safety yesterday afternoon.

I left the camp standing, and selected Major Davis, of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, to command the party as per margin\* for its protection. The duty was one of considerable importance, as it was by no means improbable that the enemy would take advantage of our advance to send a party to the camp. The squadron of dragoons having arrived just as I was starting, their horses would not have been equal to a day's hard work, which induced me to leave them in camp. The overthrow of this party of the enemy must, I conclude, have been very unexpected, as the whole of their camp equipage, with its carriage cattle, was captured by Captain Broadfoot's corps and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

I have much gratification in reporting that the troops, both European and Native, of each branch and department, well supported the character of British soldiers.

Where all are equally zealous in the cause, and devoted to their duty, my thanks are equally due to all; but I may be permitted to mention the names of corps and departments employed. Major-General McCaskill, K.H., commanding the right column; Brigadier Tulloch, commanding the left column; Captain Abbott, commanding light field battery; Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, K.H., commanding Her Majesty's 9th Foot; Major Huish, commanding the 26th Native Infantry; Captain Napleton, commanding the 60th Native Infantry; Major Blair, commanding the 10th Light Cavalry; Captain Oldfield, commanding a squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry; Captain Tait, commanding the 3rd Irregular Cavalry; Captain Abbott, Field Engineer; Lieutenant Becher, com-

\* Three companies of the 26th Native Infantry, three companies of the 60th Native Infantry, and 50 sowars of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

manding Sappers and Miners ; and Superintending-Surgeon Stiven, and Captain Nugent, officiating Sub-assistant Commissary-General. The officers of the Staff who conveyed my orders to the different columns, and otherwise aided in the movements of the day, were Captain Havelock, Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-General ; Captain Smith, Major of brigade ; Captain Ponsonby, Assistant-Adjutant-General ; Captain McAdam, Deputy Judge-Advocate-General ; Captain Lane, Commissary of Ordnance ; Lieutenant Sir R. Shakespear, Military Secretary ; Captain Codrington, Assistant Quarter-Master-General ; Lieutenant Mayne, Officiating Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General, who was most active throughout the day ; Lieutenant Tytler, Baggage-master ; Lieutenant Pollock, Aide-de-Camp, and Captain Macgregor, Aide-de-Camp ; to the last mentioned officer I am not only indebted for services in the field, but for valuable information, and for constant exertions to obtain supplies for the force, which his local knowledge and personal acquaintance with the Maliks enabled him to do.

I have this morning heard from several quarters, that the two Chiefs Hadji Ali and Khyroollah Khan have gone to Cabool, attended by about 60 men. If I had removed to camp at Gundamuck yesterday, there can be little doubt that the enemy would have reoccupied this place, and he would have announced to the Cabool authorities he had beaten us back. Koocele Khail has been destroyed by fire ; the fort and village of Mammoo Khail have been also destroyed by fire ; and, before I quit this place, the trees, to which much value and importance are attached, will be cut down.

I have the honor to inclose a return of casualties. I regret I shall be deprived of the services of Major Huish, 26th Native Infantry, and Captain Edmonds, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, for some time, though I hope not long. Lieutenant Robertson, of the 37th Regiment Native Infantry, doing duty with the 26th Native Infantry, is slightly wounded, and will, I trust, soon return to his duty.

I have the pleasure to inclose reports from Major-General McCaskill, K.H., and Captain Broadfoot.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 471.—*Major-General McCaskill to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Camp, Mammoo Kkail, August 25, 1842.*

SIR,—I beg to detail to you, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C. B., the operations of the right column in the affair of yesterday, after it had become separated from that of the left, on the complete success of the combined attack on the enemy's position in advance of Mammoo Khail.

You are aware that this force consisted of four companies of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and six of the 26th Regiment Native Infantry, under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, K.H., of the former corps. The enemy had fled before our troops, and abandoned the village of Koocele Khail, but reinforced strongly by the fugitives driven back by Brigadier Tulloch's column, he assumed a menacing attitude, and occupied in force a range of heights and detached summits in the Soofaid

Koh. The most salient of these was a spur of mountain within long musket range of the buildings of Koocele Khail. From this and from other eminences of the most precipitous character the Ooloos were dislodged with the utmost spirit and gallantry by the details under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, aided in the most effective manner by a party of Captain Broadfoot's corps of Sappers and Miners. The enemy were reinforced from time to time, and made many bold attacks, and kept up a sharp fire of jezails from the loftiest peaks of the mountain, but our troops, though so much pressed as to be compelled to recede from ground which they had gained in one direction, maintained an advanced position among the hills, until withdrawn by order of Major-General Pollock, first into the plateau in front of the village of Koocele Khail, which they burnt down, and then back upon the present site of encampment. In retiring over the plain between the two principal villages the movement was covered by a squadron of the 5th, and another of the 10th Light Cavalry, but the attempts of the Ooloos to annoy were timid and feeble in the extreme, and our troops did not sustain a single casualty from their effects. Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor speaks in high terms of the support which he received from Major Huish, commanding the 26th Regiment Native Infantry, who was wounded, and afterwards from Captain Handscomb, of the same corps, and from Captain Ogle, commanding Her Majesty's 9th Foot; and I beg to be permitted to bear my testimony to the merits of the Lieutenant-Colonel's own exertions on this occasion, as well as to express my sense of the gallantry of the troops engaged, and to acknowledge the able assistance which I received from Captain Havelock, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Mayne, 37th Regiment Native Infantry, Officiating Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master-General, and Lieutenant Bethune, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, my Aide-de-Camp. The intrepidity also with which Captain Broadfoot's Sappers and Miners aided in the attacks on one of the advanced heights deserves my marked commendation.

I have, &c.,

JOHN McCASKILL.

No. 472.—*Captain Broadfoot to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Camp, Mammoo Khail, August 25, 1842.*

SIR,—Agreeably to orders, I have the honor to report the proceedings of the column intrusted to me by the Major-General commanding, in the action of yesterday.

I moved, as directed, with the Sappers (about 220 men) and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry (250 men), across the ravine on the right of the force. We found the enemy strongly posted in an orchard, with some inclosures; and the usual field-works of loose stones in their front, were also occupied. This position flanked the approach of the main body.

Having formed an attacking party in front, I sent the rest of the Sappers in column under Lieutenant Orr, to turn the enemy's left flank, and Captain Tait's Horse still more to the right, and in advance, to cut off their retreat. While we waited in this order the advance of the force, the enemy reinforced the orchard, and moved out to attack us. I was

therefore obliged to advance before the force arrived. The enemy's positions were quickly carried in succession. One party was driven towards the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, who pursued, and the remainder fled to the village of Mammoo Khail, into which the main body of the enemy were at this moment driven by the fire of our artillery; they opened a fire on us, ill-directed, but so heavy that we were obliged to attack the village. They fled when we reached it, and the Sappers pursued to the fort, but were so exhausted by the march from Futteeabad and the previous operations, that the enemy was able to enter and barricade the gate. Their fire was kept down by one party of the Sappers, while the rest climbed on each other's shoulders over a half-repaired bastion, about eight feet high, and covered with thorns. The enemy fled over the walls on the other side, leaving the rear-gate barricaded. This, and descending from the walls, lost so much time that pursuit was nearly hopeless, so far as our now exhausted men were concerned. We pressed on with the least fatigued, however, and keeping up to the hills, forced the enemy into ground, our cavalry were approaching, and we had the satisfaction of seeing the cavalry overtake and attack them.

Parties were directed to destroy the forts abandoned on the cavalry approaching, while with a few men I pushed on to the last village near the hills. There we surprised the enemy, whose head-quarters were there, driving them out of the village and adjoining camp, and obtaining their tents, cattle, and ammunition, and a good quantity of provisions. The enemy (who were evidently the Jezailchees from Cabool) fled to the hills, the fire of which swept the village.

I was now directed to take a party of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, the Sappers being now worn out, except about six men, and attack the hills; the first and second heights were carried at the point of the bayonet, and flanking parties having turned the shoulders of the high range, we were advancing up it when the main force arrived, and our further progress was stayed. My separate command now ceased, and I was soon after ordered with the Sappers to head-quarters.

The conduct of the troops, officers and men, European and Native, was admirable; and it is due to the 26th Native Infantry to mention, that, in storming the second height with a party of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, a party of the former corps joined us, and behaved with the same spirit as the rest.

I have, &c.,

G. BROADFOOT.

*No. 473.—Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of Troops under the personal command of Major-General Pollock, 24th August, 1842.*

Detachment 5th Cavalry—1 sepoy wounded; 1 horse missing.

3rd Irregular Cavalry—1 sepoy, 1 camp follower, 3 horses, killed; 1 European officer, 1 sepoy, 1 camp follower, 5 horses wounded.

No. 6 Lt. Field Battery—1 camp follower wounded.

H. M. 9th Foot—2 privates killed; 1 officer, 1 serjeant, 7 privates, wounded.

26th Regt. N. I.—1 sepoy killed; 2 European officers, 4 havildars, 4 naicks, 17 sepoys wounded.

Capt. Broadfoot's Corps of Sappers and Miners—2 sepoy killed; 1 serjeant, 1 native officer, 1 drummer, 4 sepoy, wounded.

Total—2 privates, 4 sepoy, 1 camp follower, 3 horses killed; 4 European officers, 2 serjeants, 7 privates, 1 native officer, 4 havildars, 4 naiks, 1 drummer, 24 sepoy, 2 camp followers, 5 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

*Names of Officers wounded.*

Captain Tait, commanding 3rd Irregular Cavalry, slightly.

Captain R. S. Edmonds, H. M. 9th Foot, severely.

Major G. Huish, 26th Regt. N. I. severely.

Ensign G. Robertson, 37th Regt. N. I. slightly.

G. PONSONBY.

No. 474.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor to Captain Havelock.*

*Camp, Mammoo Khail, August 26, 1842.*

SIR,—In my report of yesterday's date to you, for the information of Major-General McCaskill, K.C., commanding the troops engaged on the hills and in front of Koochee Khail, on the 24th instant, with the enemy, I beg to observe that I have inadvertently omitted to mention that Captain Taylor, of the 26th Native Infantry, was in command of that portion of the force, consisting of two companies of the 26th Native Infantry, half a company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, and about thirty or forty Sappers, which were so warmly engaged during the day in defence of the left of our position, when much pressed by the enemy retiring before Brigadier Tulloch's column. Those troops behaved with great spirit and gallantry; and Captain Taylor deserves every praise for his zeal and exertions on the occasion.

I have, &c.,

A. B. TAYLOR.

No. 475.—*Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp at Quetta, August 26, 1842.*

SIR,—In continuation of my dispatch to your address of the 19th instant, I have now the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that I withdrew the garrison of Killa Abdoolla on the morning of the 22nd, and that the column and convoy under my charge arrived at this place this morning without difficulty or opposition.

I shall immediately enter upon the arrangements which will be necessary to give effect to the instructions of Government, in reference to our removal from hence, and shall have the honor of reporting from time to time the progress of these arrangements.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

No. 476.—*Mr. Maddock to the Commissary-General.*

*Simla, September 12, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General requests that you will inform him what measures you have adopted, or have it in contemplation to adopt, for the

supply of the armies which may be expected to cross the Punjab on their return from Affghanistan in November and December.

2. You must bear in mind that they will, in all probability, be accompanied by large numbers of followers and have many sick and wounded.

3. The Governor-General desires that you will, upon this subject, place yourself in communication with Mr. Clerk who is now at Simla.

I have, &c.,

T. II. MADDOCK.

No. 477.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Gundamuck, August 31, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters as per margin\* in the Secret Department. With reference to the second paragraph of the letter, I beg to state, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, that I have made arrangements for raising a body of 200 men, armed with jezails, for the purpose of holding posts between this and Jellalabad, for the protection of the road. I anticipate much advantage from the employment of these men; but more particularly in security for the passage of the dawks, which have for the last two days been detained by a party of thieves, holding a position at Neemlah, between this and Sir Robert Sale's camp at Fatteeabad. I have fixed the rates of monthly pay for these men as follows, and I trust that this arrangement will be sanctioned by the Right Honorable the Governor-General:—

1 Native Commandant at 100 rupees per mensem . .	100
2 Rissaldars . . . 50 . . . . .	100
10 Havildars . . . 14 . . . . .	140
2 Standard Bearers . . . 10 . . . . .	20
1 Meerza or Scribe . . . 15 . . . . .	15
2 Bheestees . . . . 6 . . . . .	12
200 Privates . . . . 8 . . . . .	1,600
Total . . . . .	1,987

The rate of pay for each private is fixed at 8 rupees, on the understanding that each man is to provide himself with powder and ball; and no man is to be enlisted who cannot produce a good sword and matchlock.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 478.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Gundamuck, August 31, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to inclose, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, copy of a letter which I yesterday addressed to the Adjutant-General of the Army, reporting my return to this camp, with the troops therein detailed. The village of

\* Allahabad, August 9, 1842; Allahabad, August 10, 1842.



Mamoo Khail is not on the road to Cabool ; as the enemy had taken up a position there, it was necessary to attack and disperse them, and to punish the inhabitants of the village for having harboured them. But these objects being attained, my return to this position became desirable, for the purpose of collecting supplies, and making all the arrangements for an advance upon Cabool.

A party of 200 horsemen is said to be on the road between this and Saarkhab ; and the brother of Mahomed Shah Ghilzye, and some other chiefs are said to be at Hissaruck with some followers ; but they are in want of pay and in a disorganized state.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 479.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Simla, September 13, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, announcing the unexpected arrival of Prince Futteh Jung in your camp.

2. It is satisfactory to his Lordship to be informed of his Royal Highness's safety.

3. When the movement of Major-General Nott upon Cabool was first contemplated, the Governor-General directed that Prince Timour should not accompany the army of Major-General Nott, but should be sent with the portion of the force retiring by Sinde, his Lordship being unwilling to give to Prince Timour any appearance of support, and to divide, in any manner, the party attached to the family of the late Shah Shooja at Cabool.

4. Prince Timor has, accordingly, accompanied Major-General England's column.

5. No event has occurred to alter, in the slightest degree, the Governor-General's original determination to abstain, under the present circumstances of Afghanistan, from recognizing as Sovereign any pretender to the throne of Cabool. At the same time, his Lordship directs me to renew the expression of his willingness, and of his desire, to be enabled to recognize, at the earliest period, a Government in Cabool, supported by the Affghans themselves, and capable of maintaining relations of friendship with neighbouring States.

6. The Governor-General cannot, however, delegate the power of recognizing a new Sovereign or Government ; and you will report to his Lordship every circumstance tending in your opinion to guide his judgment in deciding upon that most important point.

7. If the Prince Futteh Jung should be still in your camp, when you receive this letter, or if you should have the means of communication with him, you are desired to inform his Royal Highness that, whatever may be the choice of a Sovereign made by the Affghan chiefs and people, his Lordship considers that the decease of his Majesty Shah Shooja, and recent events, have practically abrogated the Tripartite Treaty, entered into between the British Government, the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and the late Shah Shooja ; and it may be advisable that, on any fitting

occasion, you should intimate to the Affghan chiefs, that such is the understanding of the British Government.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 480.—*Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock.*

*Simla, September 13, 1842.*

SIR,—The Governor-General directs me to inform you that, in the event of the prisoners not being in your hands when you receive this letter, his Lordship deems it expedient that you should cause it to be intimated to Mahomed Akbar Khan that, in the event of any further delay taking place in their delivery to you, upon the proposed condition of the release of all the Affghan prisoners in our hands, it is his Lordship's intention to remove Mahomed Akbar Khan's family from Loodiana ; and that it is under his Lordship's consideration, whether Mahomed Akbar Khan's wife and children should not be immediately sent to Calcutta, and eventually to England.

2. Mahomed Akbar Khan must be aware that the Government in England cannot afford to any one education in the Mahomedan faith, and that there are no means of obtaining it there.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 481.—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.*

*Simla, September 16, 1842.*

GENERAL,—Before you receive this letter every attainable object of your advance upon Cabool must have been accomplished, and you will be considering the period and the means of your return.

The efforts of the Commissariat are unremitting to increase the carriage at your disposal ; so that there may be ample supply for the whole of your force and Major-General Nott's.

I have directed that the same machinery which was before employed may be again put in motion, for the purpose of procuring for you every mule, in the upper provinces, capable of service.

These will meet you on your march to the Sutlej, and fill up your losses. The Commissariat has already received an intimation that preparations must immediately be made for provisioning your army on its march to the provinces.

The state of the Punjab is such, that you should not depend upon the country for your daily supplies. I have desired that you may have the means of carrying ten or fourteen days' provision.

The state of the Punjab to which I have adverted, makes me even more anxious than I have always been to see your army on this side of the Sutlej. I hope that no conflict between the parties at Lahore will take place, so as to interfere, in any way, with the passage of the animals sent, and to be sent to you ; or with your obtaining the necessary supplies ; but you must consider such events as absolutely impossible.

Under all circumstances so imperatively demanding your return, I trust you will not permit any consideration whatever to delay your homeward march ; but will put your army in motion for India at the earliest possible period, under the impression that no greater calamity could befall us, than your remaining at Cabool during the winter.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 482.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Simla, September 21, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General to transmit to you the inclosed extract from a letter from Major-General Pollock to the Adjutant-General of the army, showing the extreme disappointment the Major-General had experienced through the delay of the march of 500 bullocks, hired at Peshawur, and 700 camels, between Attock and that place.

2. The Governor-General desires that you will, as far as you can, ascertain the cause of this delay, so injurious to the Major-General's combinations ; and especially, whether the Sikh authorities in any manner contributed to this untoward detention of the animals, by want of zeal in the execution of orders, or by throwing difficulties in the way of our officers.

3. The Commissary-General has been instructed to execute a strict inquiry upon the subject.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 483.—*Mr. Hamilton, Secretary to the Government in the North-West Provinces, to Mr. Maddock.*

*September 6, 1842.*

(Extract.)—Colonel Gwatkin has reported the departure of the last drove of the baggage-train from Haupper, on the 22nd ultimo.

2. 2,230 mules are reported by Lieutenant the Honorable R. Byng, to have crossed the Sutlej up to the 19th ultimo ; and divisions of 500 will be forwarded, at regular intervals, until the whole 4,500 have passed on. Lieutenant Byng has been directed to proceed to Peshawur with as much expedition as possible, to arrange for the distribution of the train under Major-General Pollock's orders, and to prevent any delay *en route*.

No. 484.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Simla, October 5, No. 43, 1842.*

HONORABLE SIRS,—The dispatches from Major-Generals Pollock and Nott, which accompany this letter will inform you that, on the 30th August, Major-General Nott defeated Shumsodeen Khan, about thirty-eight miles from Ghuznee ; and on the 5th again, on the heights, on the north-east of Ghuznee ; against which place batteries were prepared,

on the night of the 5th, but the enemy evacuated the town and citadel during that night, and they were taken possession of by Major-General Nott's troops at daylight on the 6th.

The work of demolition was carried on during the 7th and 8th ; and, on the 9th, Major-General Nott's army left Ghuznee, leaving the gates and principal buildings on fire, and having totally destroyed the citadel, and made breaches in the walls, which, without immediate repair, must fall during the winter.

On the 8th of September, Major-General Pollock defeated the Ghilzyes and Jezailchees of Mahomed Akbar ; and, on the 13th, the Major-General entirely defeated Mahomed Akbar, at the head of 16,000 men, at Tezeen.

On the 16th, Cabool and the Bala Hissar were occupied by the British troops.

On the 17th, the army of Major-General Nott arrived within five miles of Cabool.

Such of the prisoners, taken by the Affghans on the retreat from Cabool, as were near Cabool, came into the British camp on the 15th. 700 Kuzzilbashes, with Sir Richmond Shakespear, left Cabool for the Bamecan road, on which the remaining prisoners had been carried ; and it was expected on the 17th that, on the following day, they might be delivered up to Sir Richmond Shakespear.

The feelings with which I have regarded these successful operations will be seen on a perusal of the general orders prefixed to the dispatches published on the 21st and 30th ultimo.

It appears by a letter (private) from Major Outram, of the 20th ultimo, that, on the preceding day, Colonel Reid, with the first column of Major-General England's army, arrived safely at Dadur. The second column will have left Quetta on the 21st ; and the left was to move about the 1st of this month.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 485.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*\*

*Camp, Soorkab, September 7, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I marched from Gundamuck this morning with the first division of the troops, under the immediate command of Major-General Sir R. Sale, G.C.B., as follows :—

*First Division, under the command of Major-General Sir R. Sale, G.C.B.*

Two guns, 3rd Troop, 1st Battalion Horse Artillery ; 6 guns, No. 6, Light Field Battery ; 3 guns, Mountain Train ; Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons ; 1 squadron, 1st Light Cavalry ; 3 Rissallahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry ; Her Majesty's 9th Foot ; Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry ; 16th Native Infantry ; 35th Light Infantry ; 5th Company, Sappers and Miners ; Broadfoot's Sappers ; Makeson's Bildars.

*Second Division, under the command of Major-General McCuskill.*

Two guns, 3rd Troop, 1st Brigade ; 2 guns, 3rd Troop, 2nd Brigade ; 2 squadrons and head-quarter 1st Light Cavalry ; 3 Rissallahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry ; Her Majesty's 31st Foot ; right wing 33rd Native Infantry ; right wing 60th Native Infantry ; Sikh contingent consisting of 200 horse, 300 infantry, 5 camel guns, 10 long jezails.

*Troops at Gundamuck.*

Two guns, 3rd Troop, 2nd Brigade ; 1 squadron 5th Light Cavalry ; 1 squadron and head-quarter 10th Light Cavalry ; left wing 33rd Native Infantry ; left wing 60th Native Infantry.

The Second Division will march under the command of Major-General McCuskill, K.H., to-morrow morning, and will be accompanied by the Sikh Contingent which arrived at Gundamuck yesterday.

I was under the necessity of leaving at Gundamuck the troops above-mentioned, and have written to have the party strengthened by a squadron of cavalry and a wing of native infantry from Jellalabad. I have left an officer of engineers, and have ordered up a commissariat officer from Jellalabad to collect supplies for our return.

The camp will be entrenched, and it is in a good position.

I should hardly have considered it safe leaving the party at Gundamuck but that 1,000 Sikhs will arrive there to-morrow, and the remainder will follow in a few days. It will be a great object having a depôt of supplies on our return to Gundamuck.

With reference to the great want of carriage-cattle which I have experienced, I consider it my duty to report, that 500 bullocks were hired last month at Peshawur to go to Cabool ; they were dispatched on the 22nd ultimo, and might with ease have reached me, but they did not come, and I have since heard that they did not leave Jumrood till the 30th. It has occasioned me very great disappointment. The unaccountable detention also of about 600 camels, between Attock and Peshawur, has been another source of annoyance, for, with the known difficulties I have had to contend against, they might have reached me by forced marches carrying no loads.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

*No. 486.—Notification by the Governor-General of India.*

*Sinla, September 21, 1842.*

The Governor-General has this day received the reports of three victories obtained on the 30th of August, by Major-General Nott, over 12,000 Affghans thirty-eight miles south-west of Ghuznee ; on the 8th of September, by Major-General Pollock, over the troops of Mahomed Akbar Khan, and the Ghilzye chiefs at Jugdulluck ; and on the 16th of June by the expedition on the coast of China, within the mouth of the River Yang-tse-Kiang, at the city of Woosung.

In this last operation and those immediately succeeding it, Vice-Admiral Sir W. Parker and Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Gough took 364 guns from the Chinese.

On the 3rd of September, Major-General Nott had advanced to Nancee, within a short march of Ghuznee.

On the 9th of September, Major-General Pollock had advanced to Kutta Sung, and had experienced no opposition.

Formed as the troops under Major-General Nott have mostly been, by four years of constant service, and habituated as they have been to victory under their able commander, the Governor-General had anticipated their success against any force which could be brought against them. It is to the Governor-General a subject of sincere satisfaction, that the events of this campaign should have opened a more extensive field to that brave army on which it may make manifest to the world the high qualities which he has long known it to possess.

Major-General Pollock has, through the prudence of his arrangements, and the correctness of the movements directed by him, had the gratification of affording to his troops the opportunity of proving their superiority to the Afghans, on the very scene of the last disaster on the retreat from Cabool: and Major-General Sir R. Sale, at the head of the garrison of Jellalabad, worthily supported by the reinforcements from India, has had the glory of leading the army on its triumphant return to the capital of Afghanistan.

The Governor-General regards with the highest admiration the noble ardour which has, in these several operations, been manifested equally by the officers and soldiers of both nations and of all arms. He sees in the successes already obtained the certain promise of other more decisive victories, calculated to impress upon all the enemies of the British Government a conviction of the futility of resistance to the forces under his direction, and tending, under the continued favour of Providence, to effect the first object of his desire, the restoration of peace to Asia.

By order, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 487.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Kutta Sung, September 9, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, a copy of a letter which I have this day addressed to the Adjutant-General of the army, detailing the operations against the enemy near Jugdulluck yesterday.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

P.S.—I have this moment received two letters from Major-General Nott to your address, which I have read, thinking they might contain information which would regulate my movements.

No. 488.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lunley.*

*Camp, Kutta Sung, September 9, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I left Soork-ab on the morning of the 8th instant, in progress to Jugdulluck, with the following troops:—

1st Division, under the command of Major-General Sir R. Sale, G.C.B., 2 guns 3rd troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery, 6 ditto No. 6 Light Field Battery, 3 ditto Mountain Train, Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, 1 squadron 1st Light Cavalry, 3 Rissallahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 26th Regiment Native Infantry, 35th Regiment Light Infantry, 5th Company Sappers, Broadfoot's Sappers, Mackeson's Bildars.

On approaching the hills which command the road through the Pass, I perceived their summits were occupied by a considerable number of men ; and a nearer view enabled me to ascertain the nature of their position, which was one of singular strength and difficulty of approach. The enemy were assembled in bodies apparently under different chieftains each having a distinguishing standard.

The hills they occupied formed an amphitheatre inclining towards the left of the road on which the troops were halted while the guns opened, and the enemy were thus enabled on this point to fire into the column, a deep ravine preventing any contact with them. The practice of the guns was excellent, yet the enemy appeared so determined on making a stand, that the bursting of the shells among them on the right hill, which was of a conical shape and difficult ascent, had not the effect of making them relinquish it, or of slackening their fire, which now became heavy from all parts of their position, causing several casualties.

It is with the deepest feeling of regret I have to deplore the loss of Captain Nugent, officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, who was shot here, and died almost immediately. I had lately received the most important and valuable assistance from him ; the service has lost a promising officer, and the department to which he belonged a most efficient member.

As the guns appeared to have little effect in forcing the enemy to quit the heights, I resolved upon attacking them. For this purpose Captain Broadfoot was detached to the extreme left of the enemy's position, and his Sappers commenced ascending a steep hill, on the top of which the enemy were entrenched in a sungah. Her Majesty's 9th Foot, under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, were directed to cross a deep ravine and assault the hills on the opposite side, where the enemy held a ruined fort, and were with their chiefs and cavalry in considerable numbers. Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, led by Captain Wilkinson, commanding the regiment, attacked the hill, which may be considered the key of the position. The 9th, accompanied by two companies of the 35th Native Infantry, under Lieutenants Boileau and Trench ; the 11th by 110 men of the 26th, led by Captain Gaban (Major Huish, although present in the field, was prevented by his wound, received at Mamoo Khail, from assuming the command), rushed up the height simultaneously, and the animated and enthusiastic cheer they gave seemed to strike a panic in the enemy, for they dared not wait the collision, but fled down the hills, and were enabled to escape chastisement by the nature of the ground, which was so well calculated to favor their retreat. At this moment Major Lockwood, with Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, galloped up, and had very nearly succeeded in overtaking the enemy's cavalry ; but I am sorry to say, they also effected their safety by flight.

Captain Broadfoot had completely succeeded in the attack he made,

and the enemy were dispersed in every direction, a large body of them retiring to the summit of a high mountain. On this apparently inaccessible height they planted their standards, and showed every demonstration of maintaining it. As the achievements of the day would have been incomplete were they suffered to remain, I decided upon dislodging them. The troops named in the margin,\* advanced under cover of Captain Abbott's guns, and those of Captain Backhouse's mountain Train. Seldom have soldiers had a more arduous task to perform, and never was an undertaking of the kind surpassed in execution; these lofty heights were assaulted in two columns, led by Captains Wilkinson and Broadfoot; the discomfited Ghilzyes not relishing an encounter, betook themselves to flight, carrying away their standards, and leaving our troops in quiet possession of their last and least assailable stronghold.

It gratifies me to be enabled to state, that we have thus signally defeated, with one division of the troops, the most powerful tribes and the most inveterate of our enemies, the original instigators and principal actors in those disturbances which entailed such disasters on our troops last winter. The following are the chiefs who were present in the action:—

Uzeez Khan, Gool Mahomed Khan, Saadut Meen Khan—Jubber Kheil Ghilzyes.

Rhodah Buksh Khan, Azul Khan, and Khojeh Mahomed Shah Khan.—Chiefs of Tezeen, Babukkur Kheil Ghilzyes.

Sirdar Khyroolla Khan, Barukzye, Shah Ghażee Khan, Gool Ghilzye, Hajee Ali Tajick.—Sent by Mahomed Akbar Khan from Cabool, to co-operate with the Ghilzyes.

Ibrahim Khan, and Mullick Suddoo.—Lughman Chiefs.

The petty chiefs of Hissaruck were also engaged, and indeed the whole strength of the Ghilzye force may be considered to have been brought against us, numbering, on this occasion, from four to five thousand men.

Let me now express how much I owe to the brave officers and soldiers who have thus gallantly asserted their superiority in arms; were I to name all who merit eulogy, I should feel obliged to enumerate every officer who was present.

I feel considerable diffidence in mentioning the name of Major-General Sir R. Sale, G.C.B., whose heroic conduct in the field stands so little in need of my commendation. On this occasion I was an eye-witness to the personal intrepidity of this highly-distinguished officer, as he led up the heights in advance of his own regiment under a very hot fire.

To the officers in command of regiments and detachments, and to the heads of departments, also to the officers of my personal and the general staff, I feel especially indebted to the zealous and efficient manner in which they performed their respective duties; and I trust his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will bring to the notice of his Lordship the Governor-General, that every individual engaged has exerted himself to the utmost to serve his country.

\* Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 1 company 26th Native Infantry, 1 ditto 35th Light Infantry, 5th company Sappers under Lieutenant Becher, Broadfoot's Sappers.



I have the honor to inclose a rough sketch of the scene of operations, and a return of the killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Troops of the 1st Division of the Advance under the command of Major-General Sir R. Sale, at the Storming of the Heights of Jugdulluck, on the 8th of September, 1842.*

General Staff—1 officer killed; 1 officer wounded.

No. 6, Light Field Battery—1 native officer, 2 privates, wounded.

Mounted Train—1 sergeant, 1 private, 1 driver, wounded; 1 mule, killed.

Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons—2 troopers, wounded.

Squadron 1st Light Cavalry—1 horse killed.

Head-Quarters and Detachment 3rd Irregular Cavalry—1 trooper, 1 horse, killed; 2 troopers, 3 horses, wounded.

5th Company Sappers—1 private wounded.

Her Majesty's 9th Regiment—1 sergeant, 2 privates, killed; 1 sergeant, 16 privates, wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—1 private, killed; 2 sergeants, 12th privates, wounded.

26th Regiment of Native Infantry—1 naick, 4 sepoys, wounded.

25th Light Infantry—4 privates, wounded.

Captain Broadfoot's Sappers—1 sergeant, 5 privates, wounded.

Total—1 officer, 1 sergeant, 4 privates, 2 horses, 1 mule, killed; 1 officer, 1 native officer, 5 sergeants, 1 naick, 50 privates, 3 horses, wounded.

Total of all ranks killed and wounded 64.

*Remarks.*

Captain Nugent, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, killed, and Major-General Sir R. Sale, K.C.B., slightly wounded.

One dooly bearer killed, and one wounded.

One camp-follower wounded.

G. PONSONBY.

No. 489.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Kareez Oosman Khan, August 29, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, that on the morning of the 18th instant, a body of the enemy attacked our rear guard. I directed the officer in command of the cavalry to detach a party to assist in dispersing it.

The accompanying letter from Captain Christie details the result.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

No. 490.—*Captain Christie to Captain Delamain.*

*Camp, Kareez Oosman Khan, August 28, 1842.*

SIR,—Agreeably to the instructions conveyed to me through Lieutenant Forbes, Adjutant 3rd Light Cavalry, I proceeded to the rear with two rissallahs of the 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry, and three rissallahs of my own regiment, and now do myself the honor to report the result as follows, for the information of Major-General Nott :—

I proceeded at a trot for about a mile and a half, when we were closing well with the enemy; all of a sudden we came on a ravine with steep

sides, which, for a time, completely brought us up ; however, we managed to file down and form again on the opposite side. This delay allowed the enemy to move a long way a-head ; but getting the detachment into a smart gallop, we succeeded in coming up with them just as the foremost of them had reached the bottom of the hills. We cut up about fifty of them ; Lieutenant Chamberlain's party from the other flank destroyed twelve more.

The enemy, I should think, amounted to about 300 horse and foot.

Every man did his duty ; so it is impossible to offer any remark on individuals ; and I shall only add, that I was quite satisfied with the conduct of all.

I beg to return lists of the killed and wound.

I have, &c.

J. CHRISTIE.

No. 491.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Gonine, 38 miles S.W. of Ghuznee, August 31, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, that Shumsoodeen, the Affghan governor of the fortress of Ghuznee, brought nearly the whole of his army, about 12,000 men, into the vicinity of my camp yesterday, at three o'clock p. m.

I moved out with one-half of my force : the enemy advanced in the most bold and gallant manner, each division cheering as they came into position, their left being upon a hill of some elevation, their centre and right along a low ridge until their flank rested on a fort filled with men ; they opened a fire of small arms, supported by two six-pounder horse artillery guns, which were admirably served : our columns advanced upon the different points with great regularity and steadiness, and, after a short and spirited contest, completely defeated the enemy, capturing their guns, tents, ammunition, &c., and dispersing them in every direction. One hour's more daylight would have enabled me to destroy the infantry.

Shumsoodeen fled in the direction of Ghuznee, accompanied by about thirty horsemen.

I inclose a list of killed and wounded on the 28th and 30th instant ; also a return of ordnance, ammunition, &c. &c., taken from the enemy.

The behaviour of the troops, both European and Native, was such as I anticipated, and afforded me complete satisfaction.

I beg leave to bring to the favourable notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, the undermentioned officers : many of them have served under my command for the last three years, and have been conspicuous for their zeal and gallantry in the various affairs which have occurred with the enemy during that period, and especially in the action of the 12th of January last, and have invariably upheld the reputation of our arms, and the honour of our country.

Brigadier, Wymer, commanding the 1st Infantry Brigade ; Lieutenant-Colonel McLaren, commanding 16th Regiment Native Infantry ; Major Hibbert, commanding Her Majesty's 40th Regiment ; Captain Burney,

commanding 38th Regiment Native Infantry ; Captains Christie and Haldane, commanding corps of Bengal Irregular Cavalry ; Major Sotheby, commanding the Artillery ; Captain Blood, commanding Bombay Foot Artillery ; Major Sanders, Bengal Engineers ; Lieutenants North and Studdert, Bombay Engineers. Majors Leech and Rawlinson, of the political department, attended me in the field, and rendered me great assistance in conveying my orders.

My best thanks are due to my staff, Captain Polwhele, Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-General, Captain Waterfield, Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant Tytler, Deputy Assistant-Quarter-Master-General.

Annexed is a letter from Brigadier Wymer, speaking in the highest terms of his Brigade-Major, Captain T. H. Scott, of the 38th Regiment Native Infantry. I fully appreciate this excellent officer's merits ; he has been with me in four actions. I trust I shall not be thought presumptuous in expressing a hope that he will receive some mark of the favour of Government, by Brevet or otherwise.

I cannot close this dispatch without expressing my admiration of the crashing and gallant conduct, rapid movement, and correct practice of Captain Anderson's troop of Bengal Horse Artillery ; nothing could exceed it ; and I beg leave to bring this officer, and Lieutenant Turner, attached to the same troop, to the particular notice of his Lordship, as officers who have on many occasions rendered me most essential service.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

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No. 492.—*Brigadier Wymer to Major-General Nott.*

*Camp, Chuppakhana, September 1, 1842.*

SIR,—Adverting to division orders of yesterday, expressive of your praise and thanks to the troops employed under your command in action with the enemy on the afternoon of the 30th instant, I hope you will not consider it ill-judged on my part, bringing to your favorable notice the valuable assistance I derived from the active services of Captain Scott, Major of Brigade to the 1st Infantry Brigade, under my command, whose exertions during the fight on that day, demand and merit my best praise and acknowledgments. This being the second time of the display of Captain Scott's abilities when in action with the enemy, as my personal Staff, will, I hope, plead my apology for recommending him to your notice, and the favorable consideration of Government, in any way you may have it in your power to mention him as a meritorious and deserving officer.

I have, &c.,

G. P. WYMER.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Field Force under the command of Major-General William Nott, in the Engagements with the Enemy on the 28th and 30th of August, 1842.*

2nd Troop Bengal Irregular Horse Artillery—1 syce, 1 horse, wounded.

3rd Company 1st Battalion Bombay Artillery—1 bearer, killed, 1 gunner, 1 trumpeter, 1 private, 1 driver, 2 horses, wounded.

3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry—1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 jemadar, 4 havildars, 1 farrier, 10 privates, 6 horses, killed ; 2 lieutenants, 1 jemadar, 1 trumpeter, 5 privates, 4 horses, wounded.

1st Regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry—1 havildar, 11 privates, killed ; 1 jemadar, 2 havildars, 12 privates, 16 horses, wounded ; 9 horses missing.

Christie's Horse—2 havildars, 5 privates, 19 horses, killed ; 1 lieutenant, 1 jemadar, 13 privates, 17 horses, wounded ; 4 horses, missing.

Her Majesty's 40th Regiment of Foot—1 lieutenant, 2 corporals, 10 privates, wounded.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment of Foot—1 corporal, 3 privates, 1 tent lascar, 1 bheestie, wounded.

16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—2 privates, wounded.

42nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 private, wounded.

Total—1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 jemadar, 7 havildars, 1 farrier 26 privates, 1 bearer, 25 horses, killed ; 4 lieutenants, 3 jemadars, 2 havildars, 3 corporals, 1 gunner, 2 trumpeters, 47 privates, 1 tent lascar, 1 bheestie, 1 syce, 1 driver, 40 horses, wounded ; 13 horses, missing.

Grand Total—104 officers and men, 65 horses, killed and wounded ; 13 horses missing.

#### *Officers killed.*

Captain H. Bury, 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry.

Brevet Captain G. O. Reeves, 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry.

#### *Officers wounded.*

Brevet Captain G. S. Ravenscroft, 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry.

Lieutenant T. A. Mackenzie, 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry.

Lieutenant Meason, Her Majesty's 40th Regiment of Foot.

Lieutenant N. B. Chamberlain, Christie's Horse.

W. NOTT.

*Return of Ordnance, Ammunition, &c., captured in Action with the Enemy, by the Field Force under the command of Major-General Nott, on the 30th August.*

*Camp, Gonine, August 31, 1842.*

2 field carriages with limbers (one broken by our shot and left on the field), 40,000 musket ball cartridges (as originally packed in the Honorable Company's magazines, destroyed on the enemy's encamping ground), 132 filled six-pounder cartridges (destroyed on the enemy's encamping ground), 4 sets of unserviceable harness, 4 horses, 2 brass six-pounders, 9 unserviceable 6-pounder common case shot, 24 unserviceable six-pounder hammered round shot.

F. S. SOTHEY.

No. 493.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Powell, Adjutant-General of the Bombay Army, to Lieutenant-Colonel Melvill, Military Secretary to Government, Bombay.*

*Poona, November 2, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to transmit to you the inclosed official note from Captain C. Delamain, commanding the 3rd Regiment Light Cavalry dated Cabool, the 26th September last, reporting the particulars of the affair in which Captain Bury, and Brevet-Captain Reeves with sixteen men of that regiment were killed, which his Excellency begs you will submit for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

I have, &c.,

S. POWELL.

No. 494.—*Captain Delamain to the Adjutant General of the Army.**Cabool, September 26, 1842.*

(Extract.)—Being temporarily removed from the Bombay Presidency, it the more becomes my painful duty to report to you with the least possible delay, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the death of Captain Bury, and also of Brevet-Captain Reeves of the regiment at present under my command, who, together with sixteen native officers non-commissioned officers and troopers were killed in an encounter with the enemy under Sirdar Shumsodeen Khan on the 28th ultimo.

The cavalry first turned out on an alarm of grass-cutters being cut up, and having proceeded about four miles, the enemy appearing in small bodies, a troop was dispatched under Captain Bury to cut up some fifteen men making for the hills, which having effected, he rejoined the main body. The enemy now showed to the amount of 5,000 or 6,000 horse and foot; when it became necessary to retire, which was conducted in the most orderly manner at a walk for about a mile. The enemy had now, however, closed in, in great numbers, to within fifty or sixty yards, and pouring in a very heavy fire, it became necessary to make an effort to drive him to a greater distance. I, therefore, ordered the squadrons (two in open column) to front, and directed Captain Bury to lead his to the charge. This was done in the best spirit by all, and they closed with the enemy; but being met on the rise of the hill by a tremendous fire from matchlockmen, in addition to the horse opposed to them, they were, I regret to say, hurled back in disorder, carrying the remainder with them. It is, however, to the credit of the men, that at the distance of three or four hundred yards, they rallied being still under a heavy fire, and the retreat was conducted in the best order. Captain Bury was cut down whilst gallantly leading the charge; Captain Reeves and many men being shot in the same advance. In addition to the above, I am sorry to have to add that Brevet-Captain Ravenscroft and Lieutenant Mackenzie were severely wounded; the former in the first attack, Lieutenant Mackenzie in the second—they are both doing well. Eight men, including Soobadar Major, wounded. Six horses killed.

No. 495.—*General Orders by the Governor-General of India.**Simla, September 30, 1842.*

The Governor-General announces to the army and to the people of India, the occupation of Ghuznee by Major-General Nott, on the 6th of September, and its entire destruction by the Candahar division of the army.

Major-General Nott had the satisfaction of releasing in the neighbourhood of Ghuznee three hundred and twenty-seven Sepoys of the 17th Native Infantry, from the slavery to which they had been reduced by the Affghans.

The Governor-General likewise announces the complete defeat of Mahomed Akbar Khan at the head of 16,000 men at Tezeen, on the 13th of September, by Major-General Pollock, and the occupation of Cabool by the troops under that General, on the 16th of September.

The British flag now waves in triumph from the highest point of the Bala Hissar.

Thus have all past disasters been retrieved and avenged on every scene on which they were sustained ; and repeated victories in the field, and the capture of the cities and citadels of Ghuznee and Cabool, have advanced the glory, and established the accustomed superiority of the British arms.

The Governor-General has derived much satisfaction from the report made by Major-General Pollock, of the admirable conduct of the troops of His Highness the Maharajah Shere Sing, acting in co-operation with the British army.

The Governor-General rejoices in this new proof of the cordial good understanding which prevails between the British Government and that of Lahore.

The report of Major-General Pollock leads the Governor-General to expect that, long before this day, all the British prisoners taken by the Afghans will have been brought into the General's camp. Those who had been left near Cabool were already at liberty.

The Governor-General, in the name of the Government and of all the people of India, offers to Major-General Pollock and Major-General Nott, and all the officers and troops under their respective commands, his grateful and heartfelt acknowledgments of the important services they have performed.

The Governor-General directs that the recent successes obtained by the armies in Afghanistan be fully made known to all the troops at all stations of the army, and that at all those stations a salute of 21 guns be fired for the capture of Ghuznee, and a similar salute for the capture of Cabool.

By orders, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 496.—*Major-General Nott to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Ghuznee, September 8, 1842.*

My dispatch of the 31st ultimo will have informed you of my having defeated the Affghan army commanded by Shumsoodeen.

On the morning of the 4th instant, I moved on Ghuznee. I found the city full of men, and a range of mountains running north-east of the fortress covered by heavy bodies of cavalry and infantry ; the gardens and ravines near the town were also occupied. The enemy had received a considerable reinforcement from Cabool, under Sultan Jan.

I directed Major Sanders, of the Bengal Engineers, to reconnoitre the works, under escort of the 16th Regiment Native Infantry, and a party of irregular cavalry. This brought on some smart skirmishing, in which our sepoy's behaved to admiration. Captain White, of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, commanding the light companies of the army, was pushed forward, accompanied by Anderson's troop of Horse Artillery, to support the reconnoitring party, and I at once determined on carrying the enemy's mountain positions before encamping my force. The troops ascended the heights in gallant style, driving the enemy before them until every point was gained.

The village of Bullal is situated about 600 yards from the walls of Ghuznee, upon the spur of the mountain to the north-east, and observing it to be a desirable spot for preparing a heavy battery to be placed 300 paces in advance, I ordered it to be occupied by two regiments of infantry and some light guns, and retired the columns into camp.

The engineer officers, sappers and miners, and infantry working parties were employed under the directions of Major Sanders, during the night of the 5th, in erecting a battery for four 18-pounders; these guns were moved from camp before daylight on the morning of the 6th; but, before they had reached the position assigned them, it was ascertained that the enemy had evacuated the fortress.

I directed the city of Ghuznee, with its citadel, and the whole of its works, to be destroyed. I forward the engineer's report.

In these operations our loss has been much less than might have been expected from the numbers and positions of the enemy, and the fact of the troops having been necessitated to move under the range of the guns of the fortress.

I inclose a list of the killed and wounded.

The exertions of Major Sanders of the engineers, were as usual most zealous, and my thanks are due to him and the department under his charge.

I beg to notice the following officers: Brigadier Wymer; Major Hibbert, commanding Her Majesty's 40th Regiment; Captain Evans, in temporary charge of the 16th Regiment Native Infantry; Captain White, Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, commanding the light companies of the force; Major Sotheby, and officers of the Artillery.

I have every reason to be satisfied with my staff, Captain Polwhele, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Waterfield, Aide-de-camp; Captain Ripley; and Lieutenant Kay, Deputy Judge-Advocate-General.

I continue to receive the greatest assistance from Major Leech.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

P. S.—I have recovered about 327 of the sepoy of the 27th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, who had been sold into slavery, and dispersed in villages 40 miles round Ghuznee.

No. 497.—*Memorandum by Major Sanders.*

*Camp, Rozeh, near Ghuznee, September 9, 1842.*

On the morning of the 5th September 1842, General Nott moved his camp to take up a position before Ghuznee. An advanced party was ordered to protect a reconnoissance of the works undertaken by the engineer department. On the approach of this party to the hills north of the city, it was opposed in force, but was immediately supported by the General, and, thus reinforced, cleared the hill of the enemy, and took possession of the village of Bullal, within 400 yards of the city.

The General immediately directed this important point with the heights near the village to be maintained, and they were occupied by two Regiments of Native Infantry and two 9-pounder guns.

While these operations were going on, the camp was established at Rozeh,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the city. The guards required for the protection and general duties of the camp absorbed so many men that but few were available for the duties of a siege. The General, therefore, determined not to invest the place in form, and directed the Engineer to concentrate the resources at his disposal in one spot, where protection might be most conveniently afforded to the siege operations.

With advertence to these instructions, the Engineer proposed to establish a battery on the ridge of the hill north of the town, in advance of the village of Bullal, and distant about 350 yards from the nearest point of the walls. From this battery it was expected that the four 18-pounder guns would lay open the thin flank wall connecting the citadel on the west with the town wall, in a few hours. The defences of the citadel could be swept from the same point by the light artillery : and the lines of loop-holed wall which would bear on the advance of the storming party were all viewed in enfilade from the site selected for the battery. The advance of the party to the assault would have been greatly facilitated by the existence of a thick dam of earth across the ditch, immediately opposite the point marked out for the breach.

It was further proposed that the principal assault should be supported by two other attacks ; one an attempt to blow in the water-gate (both the others having been strongly built up, and the causeways in front of them cut through) another to escalate a weak point near the Cabool gate, which would have been greatly aided by the fire of the artillery from the hill.

This project met the General's approval ; and at dusk, on the evening of the 5th September, a working party composed of the Sappers, and of 160 men from the regiments occupying the hill, commenced work on the battery. By 4 A. M. on the 6th September, cover for the party had been secured across the ridge of the hill, and so much progress made in the execution of the work as to lead to reasonable expectation that the four 18-pounder guns and two 24-pounder howitzers would be established in position, and ready to open their fire during the day.

Early on the evening of the fifth, a brisk matchlock fire was kept up from the citadel on the hill, but this gradually slackened, and at 10 P. M. had entirely ceased. The enemy's infantry had been observed at dusk crossing the river near the water-gate, with the intention, it was supposed, of attacking the working party during the night ; but towards the morning of the 6th, there were grounds for believing the fort was evacuated. At daylight this was ascertained to be the case by Lieutenant North of the Engineers, who took possession at that hour of the water-gate, without opposition, leaving Ensign Newton and 20 Sepoys of the 16th Native Infantry in charge of the gateway, and returning to the battery for further assistance. The whole of the working party was immediately moved into the town, of which and of the citadel of Ghuznee, they were in possession before sunrise.

EDWARD SANDERS.



No. 498.—*Major Sanders to Major-General Nott.**Camp, Rozeh, near Ghuznee, September 9, 1842.*

SIR,—On the occupation of the fortress of Ghuznee by the troops under your command, I received orders from you to take measures for the destruction of the citadel, to as great an extent as the means at command, and the time afforded by a halt of two days, would permit.

2. I have now the honor to report, that the engineer department attached to your force has been employed during the 7th and 8th instant on the work of demolition, and to state the progress effected.

3. Fourteen mines have been sprung in the walls of the citadel, all with good effect. The upper fort has been completely destroyed; the second line of works extensively breached in two places; and the outer and lower walls have their revêtements blown down and greatly injured in three places.

4. In several spots remote from the mines, the walls, though they have not fallen, are so seriously shaken by the explosions that, unless immediate and energetic measures are adopted, on the departure of your force, for their repair and security, they must crumble down during the ensuing winter.

5. The gateways of the town and citadel, and the roofs of the principal buildings, have been fired and are still burning.

I have, &amp;c.,

E. SANDERS.

*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Field Force under the command of Major-General Nott, in the Engagement with the Enemy before Ghuznee, on the 5th September, 1842.*

2d Troop Bengal Irregular Horse Artillery—1 horse killed; 1 private, 1 syce, 5 horses, wounded.

1st Troop Bombay Horse Artillery—1 syce wounded.

3d Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry—1 horse killed; 1 horse wounded.

1st Regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry—1 private, 1 horse, killed; 1 jemadar, 5 privates, 7 horses, wounded.

Her Majesty's 40th Regiment of Foot—1 private killed; 3 privates wounded.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment of Foot—3 privates wounded.

2d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—4 privates wounded.

16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 private killed; 1 ensign, 1 havildar, 4 naicks, 11 privates, wounded.

27th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, doing duty with 16th Native Infantry—1 private wounded.

42d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—2 privates wounded.

43d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—4 privates wounded.

Total—3 privates, 3 horses, killed; 1 ensign, 1 jemadar, 1 havildar, 4 naicks, 34 privates, 2 syces, 13 horses, wounded.

Grand Total—46 officers and men, and 16 horses.

*Officer wounded.*

Ensign Stannus, 16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.

*Return of Ordnance Ammunition captured in the Fortress of Ghuznee, by the Force under the command of Major-General Nott, on the 6th of September 1842.*

*Camp, Ghuznee, September 6, 1842.*

40 dungaree bag cartridges, 100 blue lights, 35 boxes filled with musket ammunition, 25 boxes filled with gun ammunition, 15 empty

ammunition boxes, 20 empty treasure boxes with straps, 25,000 musket ball cartridges (15,000 of these unserviceable), about 2,000 gun and jingal ball cartridges, 6 field pieces, carriages, 1 garrison carriage. 6 maunds of charcoal, 5 buff hides, 7 jingals or wall pieces, 9 unserviceable tin lanterns, 8 pigs of lead, 10 muskets without locks, 3 mounted brass light field pieces (three, six, and eight-pounders), 1 mounted heavy sixty-eight pounder, 3 mounted and 1 dismounted iron light field-pieces (two, six, and eight-pounders), 10 jars of country ordnance powder (about 150lbs. each), 1 piece of cotton rope, 1 bag of saltpetre, 60 six-pounder English round shot, 550 round shot of sorts, 300 one and two pounder jingal round shot, 12 gun sponges of sorts, 5 jezails.

F. S. SOTHEY.

No. 499.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Mudlock.*

*Camp, near Cabook, September 17, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, a copy of my despatch of date the 14th instant, to the address of Major-General Lumley, Adjutant-General of the Army.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 500.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Boothhak, Sept. 14, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I marched from Seh Baba on the 11th instant, and arrived at Tezeen the same day, where I was joined by Major-General McCaskill, with the 2nd division. On the 12th I halted, in consequence of the cattle of the 2nd division having suffered from the effects of fatigue caused by their forced march: this halt the enemy imagined to be the result of hesitation, and, in the afternoon, attacked the picquets on the left flank, and became so daring, that I considered it necessary to send Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, with 240 men of Her Majesty's 9th foot, to drive them back; some sharp fighting took place, and the enemy was driven up the neighbouring hills, from the crests of which they kept up a heavy fire. Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, however, with a small party, crept up one end of a hill, unperceived by the enemy, who were hotly engaged in their front, and lay concealed until joined by a few more of his men, when, rushing on the flank of the astounded Affghans, he inflicted a severe lesson, pouring in a destructive fire upon them, as they fled down the hill. A chieftain was found among the slain, who, it is supposed, was the brother of Khodabux Khan. The enemy remained inoffensive on our left flank, in consequence of this very well planned and gallant affair of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor's, and withdrew to the right, where they commenced a furious attack upon a picquet, consisting of eighty men of the 60th Regiment of Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Montgomery, who sustained the assault with great resolution until reinforced.

ments reached him when the enemy were beaten off; in this attack the picquet had four killed; Lieutenant Montgomery and seventeen men were wounded. The enemy came so close that frequent recourse was had to the bayonet. Their attempts on the picquets continued through the night, but were invariably unsuccessful.

The valley of Tezeen, where we were encamped, is completely encircled by lofty hills; and on the morning of the 13th, it was perceived that the Affghans had occupied in great force every height not already crowned by our troops: I commenced my march towards the mouth of the Tazeen Pass, where I left two guns, two squadrons of Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, a party of 1st Light Cavalry, and 3rd Irregular Cavalry. The enemy's horse appeared in the valley, with the intention of falling upon the baggage; but it gives me very great pleasure to state, that the Dragoons and Native Cavalry (regular and irregular) made a most brilliant charge, and with such effect, that the whole body of the enemy's force was completely routed, and a number of them cut up.

The pass of Tezeen affords great advantages to an enemy occupying the heights; and, on the present occasion Mahomed Akbar neglected nothing to render its natural difficulties as formidable as numbers could make it. Our troops mounted the heights, and the Affghans, contrary to their general custom, advanced to meet them, and a desperate struggle ensued; indeed, their defence was so obstinate that the British bayonet, in many instances, alone decided the contest. The light company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, led by Captain Lushington, who, I regret to say, was wounded in the head, ascending the hills on the left of the pass under a heavy cross fire, charged and overthrew their opponents leaving several horses and their riders, supposed to be chiefs, dead on the hill; the slaughter was considerable, and the flight continued during the greater part of the day, the enemy appearing resolved that we should not ascend the Huft Kotul: one spirit seemed to pervade all, and a determination to conquer overcame the obstinate resistance of the enemy, who were at length forced from their numerous and strong positions, and our troops mounted the Huft Kotul, giving three cheers when they reached the summit. Here, Lieutenant Cunningham, with a party of sappers, pressed the enemy so hard, that they left in their precipitation a twenty-four pounder howitzer and limber, carrying off the draft bullocks. Having heard that another gun had been seen, and concluding that it could not have gone very far, I detached a squadron of Dragoons under Captain Tritton, and two horse artillery guns under Major Delafosse, in pursuit: the gun (a twelve-pounder howitzer) with bullocks sufficient for the two guns, was soon captured. The Dragoons again got among the enemy, and succeeded in cutting up many of them. Captain Broadfoot, with the sappers, advanced, and, with the Dragoons, happened to fall in with another party of the enemy, of whom upwards of twenty were killed. I have ascertained there were about 16,000 men in the field opposed to me, a considerable portion of whom was cavalry; Mahomed Akbar Khan, Mahomed Shah Khan, Ameenollah, and many other chiefs with their followers were present, all of whom I have reason to believe have taken to flight. We have gained a complete victory, and our enemies have suffered severely, having several hundreds killed, losing their guns and three standards, one of which was taken from the enemy's

horse by the 1st Light Cavalry. Although many attempts were made at the baggage, none were successful, chiefly owing to the judicious and admirable arrangements of Lieutenant-Colonel Richmond, commanding the rear-guard, and for which he deserves the greatest credit.

The Lahore contingent, under the able direction of Captain Lawrence, has invariably given the most cheerful assistance, dragging the guns, occupying the heights, and covering the rear-guard. While ascending the Huft Kotul and at Tezeen, their long jezails told effectively in keeping the ground.

Major Skinner, Her Majesty's 31st Foot, had been detached with a strong party on the night of the 12th, for the purpose of dislodging a body of the enemy on the heights in front of the camp: this duty was performed with great gallantry the next morning, and his operations contributed much to frustrate the attempts of the enemy on our right flank. As the Major's movements were for some time separate from those of the main column, I deem it expedient to annex his report.

The enemy being completely dispersed, we pursued our march, and encamped at Khoord Cabool without further opposition. The troops on this, as on all former occasions where they have been engaged with the enemy, showed the most determined valor, and I feel that I cannot too highly praise their conduct; each regiment seemed to vie with the others in their endeavours to dislodge the enemy, which they most effectually accomplished. I have received from Major-General McCaskill, C. B., who on this occasion commanded the main column, every assistance, and from Major-General Sir R. Sale, G.C.B., commanding the advanced guard, the most zealous co-operation. The following officers have also given me every reason to be satisfied with their exertion:

Brigadier Monteath, C.B., commanding the Fourth Brigade; Brigadier Tulloch, commanding Second; and Brigadier White, commanding Cavalry Brigade; Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton, commanding Her Majesty's 31st Foot; Lieutenant-Colonel Richmond, commanding 33rd Native Infantry; and Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, K.H., commanding Her Majesty's 9th Foot; Major Skinner, Her Majesty's 31st Foot; Major Huish, commanding 26th Native Infantry; Major Delafosse, commanding Artillery; Major Crommelin, commanding 1st Light Cavalry; Major Lockwood, commanding Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons; Captain Napleton, commanding 60th Native Infantry; Captain Seaton, commanding 35th Regiment Light Infantry; Captain Ferris, commanding Jezailchees; Captain Wilkinson, commanding Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; Captain Broadfoot, commanding Sappers; Captain Tait, commanding 3rd Irregular Cavalry; and Captain Lawrence, commanding the Sikh Contingent; Captain Abbott, Chief Engineer; Captain Abbott, commanding Light Field Battery; Captain Alexander, commanding 3rd Troop and 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery; Captain Backhouse, commanding Mountain Train; and Lieutenant Beecher, commanding the Sappers and Miners. The services of Mr. Mackeson, commanding the Bildars, have always been conspicuous. Superintending-surgeon Stiven's care in providing for the conveyance and comfort of the wounded has met with my approbation. From Major Thompson, at the head of the Commissariat Department, I have received every assistance; likewise from Captain Lane, Commissary of Ordnance, whose exertions

have been unremitting throughout. From the following officers of my personal and the General Staff I have on this, as on every other occasion, received the most effectual aid; Captain Macgregor and Lieutenant Pollock, Aides-de-Camp; Lieutenant Sir R. Shakespear, Military Secretary; Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Codrington, Assistant Quarter-Master-General; Captain Riddle, Pay-master; Captain Macadam, Deputy Judge-Advocate-General; Lieutenant Mayne, officiating Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General. The following Officers of Division and Brigade Staff have also effectively performed their respective duties:—Captain Havelock, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General; Brigade-Majors Havelock, Smith, Wade, Lugard, and Brevet Captain Fitzgerald, Artillery Division Staff. I must not omit the expression of my regret for the fate of Hyder Ali, the Native Commandant of the Jezailchees, a most gallant and enterprising soldier, who was killed while attempting to seize one of the enemy's standards.

I have the honor to forward reports from Lieutenant-Colonels Richmond and Taylor, and Major Skinner, with returns of killed and wounded, and of ordnance, ammunition, and stores captured.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

*Return of Killed and wounded of the Troops under the command of Major-General Pollock, C. B., in the Tezeen Valley, and on the Hofi Kotul, on the 12th and 13th September, 1842.*

3rd Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery—1 rank and file wounded.

3rd Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery—1 rank and file wounded.

2nd Company 6th Battalion Artillery—1 rank and file wounded; 1 mule missing.

Mountain Train—1 native officer, 1 rank and file wounded; 1 mule killed, 1 mule wounded.

Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons—2 horses killed; 1 serjeant, 4 rank and file, 11 horses wounded.

1st Regiment Light Cavalry—5 horses killed; 5 rank and file wounded.

3rd Irregular Cavalry—2 rank and file, 7 horses, killed; 4 rank and file, 10 horses wounded.

Her Majesty's 9th Foot—2 serjeants, 1 drummer, 8 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 25 rank and file wounded.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—1 rank and file, killed; 5 rank and file wounded.

Her Majesty's 31st Foot—2 rank and file killed; 7 rank and file wounded.

26th Regiment Native Infantry—3 rank and file killed; 11 rank and file wounded.

33rd Regiment (right wing)—7 rank and file wounded.

35th Light Infantry—3 rank and file killed; 1 European officer, 8 rank and file wounded.

60th Regiment Native Infantry (right wing)—5 rank and file killed; 2 European officers, 1 serjeant, 22 rank and file wounded.

Captain Ferris's Jezailchees—1 native officer, 1 rank and file killed; 2 native officers, 5 rank and file wounded.

Captain Broadfoot's Sappers—3 rank and file killed; 2 native officers, 2 serjeants, 9 rank and file wounded.

Total—1 native officer, 2 serjeants, 1 drummer, 28 rank and file, 14 horses, 1 mule, killed; 4 European officers, 5 native officers, 5 serjeants, 116 rank and file, 21 horses, 1 mule, wounded; 1 mule missing.

Total of all ranks killed 32, horses 35; wounded 130; horses 3.

*Names of Officers Killed and Wounded.*

*Killed.*

Hyder Ali, Commandant, Jezailchee Regiment.

*Wounded.*

Captain Lushington, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, severely.  
 Captain Geils, 60th Native Infantry, slightly.  
 Lieutenant Norton, 35th Native Infantry, severely.  
 Lieutenant Montgomery, 60th Native Infantry, slightly.

G. PONSONBY.

*Return of Ordnance, Ammunition, and Stores, captured on the line of march between Tezeen and Khoord Cabool, by the Force under the Command of Major-General Pollock.*

*Camp, Khoord Cabool, September 13, 1842.*

One brass twelve pounder howitzer (No. 139, weight 6 cwt. 2 qr. 6 lbs., cast 1836, Hutcheson, horse artillery piece), 1 brass twenty-four pounder howitzer (No. 35, weight 8 cwt. 2 qr. 22 lbs., cast 1828, T. Timbulo, foot artillery piece), twelve pounder howitzer sponge, 1 twenty-four pounder howitzer sponge, 55 filled port-fires, 4 common washers, 4 washers with hooks, 8 inch pins, 4 nine or twenty-four pounder howitzer ammunition boxes, 2 unserviceable store boxes, 41 unserviceable filled  $5\frac{1}{2}$  inch fuzes, 99 unserviceable 2 inch spherical case fuzes, 1 fuze marker, 1 driving mallet spherical case fuze, 1 iron trail handspike, 3 skeins of slow match, 1 fuze setter, 1 portfire socket, 10 filled and set twenty-four pounder howitzer common shells, 9 filled and set twelve pounder howitzer common shells, 5 twelve-pounder spherical case shells, 6 twenty-four pounder howitzer canister, 8 twelve-pounder canister, 1 unserviceable nine-pounder carriage, 1 unserviceable twenty-four pounder howitzer carriage, 2 clip bands pole yoke, 1 unserviceable common handspike, 1 locking chain, 6 trace chains, 2 pole or trace chains, 1 priming wire, 5 bullock yokes, 7 unserviceable bullock yokes, 1 carpenter's two feet rule, 1 adze, 2 gimblets of sorts.

N. B.—No tangent scales or elevating screws to either of the above pieces of ordnance.

H. DELAFOSSE.

No. 501.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Camp, Khoord Cabool, Sept. 13, 1842.*

SIR,—I have to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., commanding the troops in Afghanistan, that, agreeably to his orders, I proceeded, at half-past five o'clock yesterday evening, with 250 men of Her Majesty's 9th, to the support of the guards in charge of the public cattle feeding on the left of the camp in the Tezeen valley, which were much pressed by the enemy. On clearing the left picquet, I was joined by Major Huish with a small party of the 26th Native Infantry. I threw forward a strong body of skirmishers, who quickly drove back those of the enemy on the plain, pursuing them to a range of low hills, where they made a stand till dislodged by our advance: further on, I found the enemy, in force from 500 to 600, had taken post along the crest and on the top of a range of steep hills running near a mile from the northward into the Tezeen valley; those towards the north were assailed by Captain Lushington, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, with the left support and skirmishers; whilst I directed the attack against their front and left flank,

which being turned, I ascended the heights between two ridges which concealed my approach till close to the summit, and within twenty yards of their main body, consisting of over 300 men. Collecting thirty to forty men, with Lieutenants Elmhirst, Lister, and Vigors, I ordered bayonets to be fixed, and the enemy to be charged, which was done with such resolution and effect, that the whole mass taken by surprise, was pushed headlong down the hills, nor did they rally till out of musket shot. Their loss must have been very severe, as I observed numbers lagging behind to carry off their killed and wounded. As it was getting dark, I deemed it imprudent to pursue the enemy further, ordered the halt to be sounded, and, after remaining in possession of their position for half an hour, retired without molestation. It affords me great gratification to bear testimony to the spirit and gallantry displayed by officers and men on this occasion, especially Major Huish, 26th Regiment of Native Infantry, Captain Lushington, and those concerned in the charge on the enemy.

I beg to transmit a return of the killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,

A. B. TAYLOR.

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No. 502.—*Major Skinner to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Boothkhak, Sept. 16, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Major-General commanding the army in Afghanistan, that I ascended the heights above the Tezeen valley, in front of our camp, with the detachment in the margin\*, on the afternoon of the 12th instant, and occupied the ridge till daylight next morning. From a communication with Major-General Sir Robert Sale, G.C.B., I learnt that I was to take the high peaks to the right of my position, and, having driven the enemy from them, continue to operate among the lower hill to the head of the Huft Kotul, on the right flank of the advance guard of the army. These peaks were occupied in some force by the enemy, who was, however, easily driven from them and cleared away to the higher hills on my right. I ascended the first peak, which, although the way was steep, was not very difficult, in two small columns; the first, the companies of Her Majesty's 9th and 26th Native Infantry, under Captain Borton, of the 9th Foot; the second under Lieutenant Sayers, of the 31st, composed of, the two companies of Her Majesty's 31st Foot and 33rd Native Infantry covered by the Sappers and Jezailchees under Lieutenant Orr. I detached Lieutenant Sinclair, of the 13th Light Infantry, with the company of his regiment and one of the 35th Native Infantry, to the higher peak on the right hand, and supported him by Lieutenant Orr and the Sappers (after I had possession of the first height), who ascended by a steep ridge that connected them. Lieutenant Sinclair attained the summit of the hill without loss, driving the enemy away, and held it until

\* One company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, 1 ditto 13th Light Infantry, 1 ditto 31st Foot, 1 ditto 26th Native Infantry, 1 ditto 35th Native Light Infantry, 1 ditto 33rd Native Infantry, 50 Broadfoot's Sappers, 50 Jezailchees.

the main column of advance came in sight, when he led his column on my right over the hills at the base of the higher mountains. The height I gained descends to the high road by a succession of small peaks, each connected by a narrow ridge; the enemy occupied, with small parties, each of these peaks, and was driven in succession from them. Captain Borton, at the head of a party of the 9th Foot, made a gallant charge upon a strongly posted party of the enemy, and drove them away; he showed a deal of boldness, however, and made repeated attempts to recover his ground, taking advantage of the necessarily slow advance of the supporting parties from the steep and difficult nature of the hills. After I gained all the peaks, and the enemy had fallen back, I continued parallel to the main column over the hills to some distance beyond the top of the Huft Kotul. Considering the great number that at one time opposed me, until the appearance of the main column drew them off, my loss was not great, while the enemy suffered considerably. I beg leave to bring to the notice of the Major-General the very good conduct of the officers and men who were under my command.

I have, &c.,

THOMAS SKINNER.

No. 503.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Richmond to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Camp, Boothkuk, Sept. 14, 1842.*

SIR,—Major-General Pollock, C.B., commanding the troops, having intrusted me specially with the command of the rear guard of the army from Tezeen through the Huft Kotul Pass, on the 13th instant, and having placed at my disposal the troops detailed in the margin\*, I have now the honor to report the operations of the day, for the Major-General's information. Having made the necessary disposition of my force to protect the baggage in the valley of Tezeen, and to secure the gorge of the pass, the different picquets were gradually withdrawn to strengthen the latter. Soon after, I observed a large body of the enemy collecting near the fort of Tezeen, south-east of my position, and directed Lieutenant Douglas, whose guns had been previously posted on a commanding point, to open on them; but the distance proving too great for shells, the fire was discontinued. The enemy, I suppose, encouraged by this, formed his cavalry in the valley, to the number of about 600 men, with the evident intention of moving towards my post. I instantly decided on anticipating him; and, as Captain Alexander's (horse artillery) three guns were still on the ground, I availed myself of his services by sending forward his guns within range of the enemy, supported by the front squadron of Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons under Captain Unett, one

\* Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, 160; 1st Regiment Light Cavalry, 295; Detachment 3rd Irregular Cavalry, 60; Sikh Cavalry, 200; total sabres, 750. Two nine-pounders, No. 6 light field battery; picquets, Her Majesty's 9th and 31st Foot, 143; 4 companies 26th Regiment Native Infantry, 310; right wing, 33rd Native Infantry, 129; 35th Native Light Infantry, 291; picquets, 60th Native Infantry, 124; Sikh Infantry, 300; total bayonets, 1,300.



squadron of 1st Light Cavalry under Brevet Major Scott, and the detachment of 3rd Irregular Cavalry under Captain Tait, with orders to charge the enemy if the ground proved favorable, and an opportunity offered. This soon occurred, the guns having made good impression ; and the instant I observed the cavalry advance, the other squadron of dragoons was hurried forward under Major Lockwood, as a support, thus insuring the success achieved by the spirited and gallant charge of their comrades in front, which completely dispersed the enemy, who left about fifty men on the field, and a standard, the latter taken by the 1st Light Cavalry, the bearer of which was cut down by Brevet Captain Goad.

Having accomplished all I wished, the troops returned to their original position in excellent order, covered by the very effective fire of the guns directed by Captain Alexander, and by a company of the 35th Regiment of Light Infantry, the latter ordered forward for the purpose.

As the enemy showed no disposition to molest us further, and the whole of the baggage having entered the pass, the horse-artillery and dragoons were permitted to commence their march ; but, before the latter had filed off, the enemy brought two guns to bear upon our position, which obliged me to place the remainder of the cavalry under cover of the high ground in the vicinity : these guns fortunately did no harm, and were soon after either withdrawn by the enemy, or silenced by a fire of round shot from Lieutenant Douglas's 9-pounder, ably directed by that officer, and by Captain Lawrence, Political Agent, commanding the Sikh contingent, who handsomely volunteered his services on the occasion.

After allowing the main column and baggage to get well forward in the pass, I directed the remainder of the cavalry to enter, and followed with the infantry, the different parties of which gradually retired on the posts I had previously occupied, the enemy's infantry closing in and opening a heavy fire, which continued till we reached the top of the pass, a distance of three miles ; and, although I was compelled to hold my ground near the top of the pass for a long time, to admit of the guns and baggage passing over, I am happy to say that the enemy, though he pressed our several posts very warmly, did not then, or at any other time, obtain the slightest advantage, and at length desisted from molesting us, which enabled me to reform the troops and continue my march towards camp, where I arrived about 8 o'clock P. M. with all the stores and baggage except a few loads of grain ; also some camels and bullocks unable to proceed, which were destroyed on the road, agreeably to orders.

My best thanks are due to the officers and men engaged, both European and Native, for their cheerful endurance of fatigue under an intensely hot sun, and for their gallant bearing when in contact with the enemy ; the whole seemed animated with one and the same spirit, which enabled them to overcome difficulties of no ordinary nature, highly creditable to British soldiers, and especially so to the Bengal Sepoys. I feel it also just to notice the useful assistance afforded by the men of the Sikh contingent under Captain Lawrence, who took their full share of duty in the valley of Tezzen, and in defending the different posts in the pass.

Accompanying I have the honor to forward a return of the killed and wounded, which I rejoice to observe is not so heavy as might have been expected from the nature of the operations.

I have, &c.,

A. F. RICHMOND.

No. 504.—*Major-General Nott to Major-General Pollock.*

*Camp, Urghundee, Sept. 16, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, that Shumsoodeen, Sultan Jan, and other Affghan Chiefs, having assembled about 12,000 men, occupied a succession of strong mountains intercepting my march upon Beenee Badam and Mydan, on the 14th and 15th instant. Our troops dislodged them in gallant style, and their conduct afforded me the greatest satisfaction.

The artillery distinguished themselves; and I beg to mention the names of Captain Leslie, Bombay Horse Artillery; Captains Blood, Bombay Foot Artillery, and Anderson and Turner, of the Bengal Horse Artillery, and the 38th and\* 43rd Bengal Native Infantry. I beg to bring under the favorable notice of Government, Captain White, of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, in command of the light companies of Her Majesty's 40th and 41st Regiments, and of the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, and 43rd Bengal Native Regiments, for the able manner in which he carried my orders into effect, and for the gallantry displayed by him and the companies under his command, in ascending the mountains and driving the enemy from their positions. I had every reason to be pleased with the conduct of all troops, European and Native. I forward a list of killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,●

W. NOTT.

*Return of Killed, and Wounded of the Field Force under the command of Major-General Nott, in the Engagements with the Enemy, on the 14th and 15th of September, 1842.*

2nd Troop Bengal Horse Artillery—2 horses wounded.

3rd Company 2nd Battalion Bengal Foot Artillery—2 magazine lascars wounded.

1st Troop Bombay Horse Artillery—3 horses wounded.

3rd Company 1st Battalion Bombay Foot Artillery—1 private, 2 drivers, wounded.

3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry—1 private killed, 1 horse wounded.

1st Regiment Bengal Irregular Horse—1 naick, 4 privates, 8 horses, wounded.

Christie's Horse—1 private 10 horses wounded.

Her Majesty's 40th Regiment of Foot—1 drummer, 1 private killed; 1 lieutenant, 3 privates wounded.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment of Foot—1 private killed; 1 corporal, 1 private wounded.

2nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 lieutenant, 1 private wounded.

16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 havildar, 11 privates, wounded.

38th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 havildar, 11 privates wounded.

42nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 havildar, 2 privates, wounded.

43rd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—1 lieutenant, 1 subadar, 1 havildar, 15 privates, wounded.

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\* Note.—So in the original, but a name seems to be omitted.

3rd Regiment Irregular Infantry—5 privates wounded.  
 Total of each—1 drummer, 3 privates killed; 3 lieutenants, 1 subadar, 4 havildars,  
 2 corporals, 45 privates, 2 drivers, 2 magazine lascars. 21 horses, wounded.  
 Grand Total of killed and wounded—63 officers and men, 24 horses.

• *Officers Wounded.*

Lieutenant E. Eagar, Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, severely.  
 Lieutenant Mainwaring, 2nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, slightly.  
 Lieutenant G. Holroyd, 43rd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, slightly.

W. NOTT.

No. 505.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, near Cabool, Sept. 16, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, a copy of my dispatch to the address of Major-General Lumley, Adjutant-General of the army.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 506.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Cabool, Sept. 16, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that on the 14th instant, we marched from Khoord Cabool to Bootkhak. I took the precaution of sending parties to crown the heights of the Khoord Cabool pass, but we met with no opposition. On the 15th I moved on to Cabool, and encamped on the race course. This morning I proceeded to the Bala Hissar, with the following troops; a troop of horse artillery under Major Delafosse; a company of each regiment of infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor; the 3rd dragoons, under Major Lockwood; a troop of the 1st regiment light cavalry: a rissallah of the 3rd irregular cavalry, with the whole of the General and Division Staff. The object was to plant the British colours in the Bala Hissar, on the spot most conspicuous from the city. The Prince Futteh Jung, who joined my camp at Gundamuck, expressed a wish to go with the party, to which I assented. On our arrival at the spot selected, the colours were hoisted, the band of Her Majesty's 9th foot immediately struck up the national anthem, "God save the Queen," and a royal salute was fired from the guns of the horse artillery, the whole of the troops present giving three cheers.

I left the colours in the Bala Hissar, to be hoisted daily as long as we remain. The infantry also remain under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, but they will be relieved on the arrival of Major-General Nott by a native regiment from his force. I expect Major-General Nott will reach Cabool to-morrow or the next day. Since our arrival here we have not been able to obtain any certain information of Mahomed Akbar. It appears, however, that Ameenollah has separated from him. Neither of them has ventured to return in the direction of Cabool.

The following prisoners have come into camp: Mrs. Trevor with eight children; Captain and Mrs. Anderson, with three children; Captain Troup, and Dr. Campbell. Unless some very unforeseen circumstances

occur, I expect to obtain possession of the remainder of the prisoners in the course of eight or ten days, with the exception of Captain Bygrave, who, I regret to find, has been taken by Mahomed Akbar, and was with him during the action of the 13th instant.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 507.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Simla, Oct. 5, 1842.*

HONORABLE SIRS,—I received last night a private letter from Major-General Pollock; dated the 21st ultimo, of which I enclose an extract, by which you will perceive that all the Europeans prisoners, except Captain Bygrave, are in our hands, and that Sir Robert Sale, at the head of a light force, was bringing them into Cabool, where they were expected to arrive on the 22nd.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 508.—*Notification by the Governor-General of India.*

*Simla, Oct. 5, 1842.*

Since the public notification of the 30th ult. the Governor-General has received the gratifying intelligence of the safety of all the European prisoners but one, in the following extract from a communication from Major-General Pollock, C.B., dated the 21st ultimo.

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No. 509.—*Major-General Pollock to the Governor-General of India.*

*Camp Cabool, Sept. 21, 1842.*

(EXTRACT).—It gives me the greatest gratification to be enabled to state that the whole of the European prisoners are now quite free from the hands of Mahomed Akbar, except Captain Bygrave. I will make my official report on this subject whenever they reach my camp, which will no doubt be to-morrow. I sent a lightly equipped force, under Sir R. Sale, to meet them, and the whole of the party is with him, with the following exceptions, who have already reached my camp:—

Major Pottinger, and Captain Johnson, arrived this morning.

Mrs. Trevor and eight children.

Captain and Mrs. Anderson and three children.

Captain Troup and Dr. Campbell.

One European woman and four privates.

By order, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 510.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Cabool, Sept. 22, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that, having received intimation from

Bameean, that the European officers and soldiers, prisoners there, had made arrangements by which they hoped to effect their own liberation, I, at the suggestion of Mohun Lall, with the concurrence of Khan Sheereen Khan, Chief of the Kuzzilbashes, sanctioned the speedy departure of 700 of his horse on the 15th instant, the day of our arrival here, to meet the party. Some difficulty occurring on the score of money, I advanced 10,000 rupees, which were delivered by Sir R. Shakespear, who accompanied the Kuzzilbashes. Being apprehensive that attempts would be made to intercept the prisoners, I detached Major-General Sir R. Sale, with the troops named in the margin,\* on the 19th instant, to the Urghun-dee Pass ; and the circumstance proved fortunate, as a delay of twenty-four hours would have enabled Sultan Jan, who was in pursuit, to overtake our people. I am happy to state, that the whole who were in confinement (as per subjoined roll), with the exception of Captain Bygrave, who is with Mahomed Akbar, arrived in my camp yesterday evening.

I cannot conclude without recording my opinion, that to Khan Sheereen Khan and Mohun Lall, may be attributed the safety of the prisoners ; and, I have reason to believe the chief of the Kuzzilbashes to be a steadfast adherent to the British Government.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE POLLOCK.

*List of Prisoners released on the 21st September, 1842.*

Major-General Shelton, H. M. 44th Foot.  
 Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, 27th Bengal N. I.  
 Major Griffiths, 37th Bengal N. I.  
 Captain Boyd, Commissariat.  
 „ Johnson, ditto S. S. F. 26th N. I.  
 „ Burnett, 54th N. I.  
 „ Souter, H. M. 44th Foot.  
 „ Waller, Bengal Horse Artillery.  
 „ Alston, 27th N. I.  
 „ Poett, 27th N. I.  
 „ Walsh, 52nd Madras N. I.  
 „ Drummond, 3rd Bengal L. C.  
 Lieutenant Eyre, Bengal Artillery.  
 „ Airey, H. M. 3rd Buffs.  
 „ Warburton, Bengal Artillery S. S. F.  
 „ Webb, 38th Madras N. I. S. S. F.  
 „ Crawford, Bengal 3rd N. I. S. S. F.  
 „ Mein, H. M. 13th Light Infantry.  
 „ Harris, 27th Bengal N. I.  
 „ Melville, 54th Bengal N. I.  
 „ Evans, H. M. 44th Foot.  
 Ensign Haughton, 31st Bengal N. I.

\* Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons, 1st Light Cavalry, Backhouse's Mountain Train, 2 companies of Her Majesty's 9th Foot, 4 companies of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Broadfoot's Sappers, Ferris's Jezailchees, 80 Sikh Horse, and 160 foot soldiers under Captain Lawrence.

Ensign Williams, 27th Bengal N. I.  
 „ Nicholson, 27th Bengal N. I.  
 Conductor Ryley, Ordnance Commissariat.  
 Surgeon Magrath.  
 Assistant Surgeons Berwick and Thomson.  
 Lady Macnaghten.

„ Sale.  
 Mrs. Sturt and one child.  
 „ Mainwaring and one child.  
 „ Boyd and three children.  
 „ Eyre and one child.  
 „ Waller and two children.  
 „ Ryley, wife of Conductor Ryley, and three children.  
 „ Bourne, wife of private Bourne, 13th L. I.  
 „ Wade, wife of Sergeant Wade.

Major Pottinger, Bombay Artillery.  
 Captain Lawrence, 11th Light Cavalry.

„ Mackenzie, 48th Madras N. I.  
 Mr. Fallon, and Mr. Blewitt, clerks, not in the service.

Her Majesty's 44th Foot—Sergeants, Wedlock, Weir, and Fair ;  
 Corporals Sumpter and Bevan ; Drummers Higgins, Lovell, and Brana-  
 gan ; Privates Burns, Cresham, Crotin, Driscoll, Deroney, Duffy,  
 Mathews, M'Dade, Marron, M'Carthy, M'Cabe, Nowlan, Robson,  
 Seyburne, Shean, Tongue, Wilson, Durant, Arch, Stott, Moore, Millar,  
 Murphy, Marshall, Cox, Robinson, Brady, and M'Glynn ; Boys, Grier  
 and Milwood.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—Privates Binding, Murray,  
 Magary, Monks, Macculiar, M'Connell, and Cuff.

Bengal Horse Artillery—Sergeants M'Nee and Cleland ; Gunners, A.  
 Hearn, Kean, and Dulton ; Sergeant Wade, Baggage Sergeant to the  
 Cabool mission.

G. PONSONBY.

No. 511.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Cabool, September 23, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward, to be laid before the Governor-General, the accompanying report forwarded to me by Major Pottinger. The return in safety of the prisoners may be attributed in a great measure to the negotiations of Mohun Lall, and the active co-operation of the Kuzzilbash chiefs, in addition to the judicious measures adopted by Major Pottinger ; but I cannot advert to this subject without bringing to the notice of the Governor-General, the part taken by Lieutenant Sir Richmond Shakspear, who voluntarily accompanied the Kuzzilbash Horse, and urged them on with unusual expedition, and which proved to be most opportune, for had Sir R. Shakspear arrived with his party a few hours later, it is probable we should not have recovered the prisoners, as Sultan Jan arrived soon after the departure of the prisoners from Bameean, with 1,000 horse, and would no doubt have followed them, had he not heard of the force sent to protect them.

I have, &c.,

GEO. POLLOCK.

No. 512.—*Major Pottinger to Major-General Pollock.*

*Camp, Cabool, September 21, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report my arrival in your camp, and beg to lay before you the following statement of the measures we had recourse to at Bameean to effect our release.

On the 10th of this month, Syed Morteza Cashmery, an agent of Ali Reza Khan Kuzzilbash arrived at Bameean; he had received from Moon-shee Mohun Lall verbal assurances that all those who would engage in effecting our release should be handsomely rewarded, and that a pension should be paid to himself, and to Saleh Mahomed Khan, who commanded the Affghan Regiment, sent to escort the prisoners to Toorkistan. Syed Morteza brought urgent letters from the Kuzzilbash chiefs to their clansman Saleh Mahomed, and, having gained over his brother Mahomed Sadig Khan, paid him fifty out of 100 rupees which had been furnished by Mohun Lall, and carried him along with himself. They alighted at the dwelling of Mahomed Turymut Beg, the chief of the Bameean Tajiks, and Syed Morteza thence sent Mahomed Sadig to speak with Saleh Mahomed; the result was an interview between Syed Morteza and Saleh Mahomed, when the latter declared that he would only consent to treat with myself and the other English officers.

Saleh Mahomed then had an interview with me, and afterwards Captains Lawrence, Johnson and myself had a meeting with him and Syed Morteza, in which we agreed to give him a present of twenty thousand rupees and to continue to him the command of his regiment on his present salary of one thousand rupees a month; granting him a full pardon for all past offences, and that we should sign a paper to this effect. Having so far discovered the sentiments of Saleh Mahomed Khan, we brought him to Major-General Shelton, and laid before that officer and Colonel Palmer the plan; both these officers declined affixing their signature to any such paper, lest they should implicate themselves with Mahomed Akbar Khan; whereupon we consulted with Major Griffiths and the rest of the prisoners, and resolved to attempt the plan at all risks, and that if we found it were an attempt to overreach us, we should try to seize the weapons of the guard, and hold out in the fort till succour arrived.

As soon as this arrangement had been completed we sent off Syed Morteza, chief of a tribe of the Hazarehs, to invite his aid, and he came in the next day, *i. e.* the 12th. Whereupon Nayb Zoolfeyar the Governor sent a message to say he was willing to join us, and I requested as a mark of his friendship he would send arms for our party, which, however, he did not. The Meer Akhom Ahmed Khan also received a letter ordering us to be marched into Turkistan, but Saleh Mahomed Khan refused to obey the order to start that day, as the men wanted pay. The 13th, I received a letter from Nayb Zoolfeyar offering service, and replied by requesting arms to be sent; as he did not send any, nor shew any friendly feeling, but was said to be consulting with Ahmed Khan to attack us, I gave an order to Deen Mahomed Khan, the former Governor of Bameean (on the part of Khan Shyman Khan) to assume the government, and employed men to frighten the Meer Akhom by telling him (as if from friendship) we had resolved to seize him, and promised the three

companies a gratuity of four months' pay ; these steps, joined to the arrival of Meer Qelb Ali of Besowut to join us had the desired effect ; the governor sent his brother to proffer service, and the Meer Akhom fled, carrying off the Ghilzye firelock-men with him. On the 15th, news of the British troops having advanced was received and the Nayb Zoolfeyar came in and personally visited us, on my saying I would go and see him if he did not come to me ; however, I could not persuade him to give us arms, but as it appeared imprudent to turn him into an enemy, I directed Deen Mahomed Khan to hold the order I had given him in abeyance, till the conduct of Nayb Zoolfeyar might be further developed. On the 15th, I received a note from Meerza Shahjy informing me of the defeat of the Affghan troops at Jugdulluck and our advance from Ghuznee ; also, that the Kuzzilbash tribes had risen in Cabool, which determined us to march the next day.

On the 16th we marched to Tepchy Bala and encamped with the castles in our front, so that we could occupy them if need be. On the morning of the 17th, I received a letter from Sir Richmond Shakespear informing me that he had reached Siri Cheseshmeh with 610 Kuzzilbash horse to our aid ; we immediately crossed the Kaled Pass and marched to the castle of Meer Moran Beg, near the foot of the Hajykek Pass, where we were joined by Sir Richmond Shakespear with the Kuzzilbash horsemen, who had marched ninety miles from Cabool, over that mountainous country, in two marches.

The 18th, being supplied with seventy-seven horses by the Kuzzilbash and twelve by the Hazarehs, we managed to march to Geedendewar. At that place we learned that a body of horse and foot from the Shekharty and Ghourbend districts had marched on Kaled to intercept us.

On the 19th, with the same assistance as before, we marched to Thikanch where he heard that the Pass of Sefyd Khak was occupied by the Affghans, intending to check us ; Sir R. Shakespear immediately wrote to request that the British officer who report also told us was advancing in that direction would occupy the Pass, and to say we would, if opposed, hold out in some of the castles about, till relieved ; on the morning of the 20th, we marched and found the cavalry of Major-General Sir R. Sale's detachment at Kowte Ashroo, and his infantry holding the heights, and I had the pleasure of joining his camp at Arghendeh, whence I proceeded with Sir R. Shakespear to Major-General Nott's camp and, remaining there during the night, joined yours this morning.

It would be unjust in me if I did not bear witness to the zeal of Syed Moorteza Shah, and mention that if Saleh Mahomed had not acceded to our terms he could with ease have carried us off, as, besides his own men, 350 Ghilzye Jezailchees were in the valley and the Walee of Khoolum had sent an officer with 2,000 men (two standards) to Kahmerd to aid the Affghan party, and that he showed much courage as well as skill in the manner of conducting his proceedings, so, that we effected the business without bloodshed.

I have given the Hazareh Chiefs, who joined us at first, remissions on their revenue, to the amount as specified opposite their names in the margin,\* and on our march back, I paid for the necessary supplies to

\* Myr Jelb Aly, 3,000 gerdandewar ; Seyd Myr Mahomed Rezeh, 500 ; Myr Wejef Aly, 500 fowlady ; Myr Mahomed Noor, 500 ditto ; Myr Mowhib, 3,000



the party, by orders on the revenue, to the amount of the supplies furnished. I would further beg to bring to your notice particularly the services of Myr Mohib, of Fowlady, Meer Mahomed Kerym of Bameean, and Myr Qelb Ali of Besowut, and trust that you will consider them worthy of receiving a dress of honor (Khilat,) each as a mark of your satisfaction at their conduct.

To Syed Moorteza, to whose exertions we chiefly owe our release, I have made no direct promise, but have held out hopes to him of a reward of five thousand rupees, and a pension of one hundred rupees a-month, according to the hope held out to him by Moonshee Mohun Lall.

In concluding this, I venture to request your supporting the steps I have taken, and recommending them to Government ; and trust, that my assuming the powers of a political agent, under the circumstances of the case, may be pardoned, for I believe in no other way could the release of our captives have been achieved, though I could with ease have effected my own escape. With regard to the pension of a thousand rupees, the prisoners have agreed to pay the amount, if Government consider it too large ; but, considering that the man was then in receipt of that sum monthly, and that he may be obliged to flee the country if the Barukzyes regain power, I trust you will not consider it too large a sum to recommend the payment.

I have herewith the honor to transmit a list of the prisoners who were with us at Bameean, and who have now joined.

There are a small number of natives of this country, and Hindostanee servants, who were in the public service attached to the officers of the late Sir William Macnaghten's mission, and who have been reduced to utter destitution. As these men apply to me, I shall feel obliged by receiving orders, if I shall collect their claims, and lay them before you ; or if I shall refer them to some other-officer, that their cases may be investigated.

I have omitted to state, that on the 29th and 30th August, the prisoners having agreed among themselves that they would raise a subscription for their release, and the party having selected Captain Lawrence, Captain Johnson and myself as their agents, we opened a negotiation with Saleh Mahomed Khan, by Captain Johnson and Captain Lawrence severally offering to engage themselves for the payment of a lac of rupees to Saleh Mahomed Khan, if he would agree to aid in our release ; and Captain Johnson explained to him, that if he (Saleh Mahomed) would delay our march, so that when Major-General Nott's army reached Mydan, we might by a forced march, join his camp. To both these proposals Saleh Mahomed Khan returned distinct refusals, and afterwards treated us with considerable harshness, giving orders that no one should go beyond the line of sentinels round our tents, threatening to kill us if any escaped, and in other ways showing himself displeased with our proposition.

I have, &c.,

ELDRED POTTINGER.

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day zingy ; Myr Mahomed Kerym Bey and clan, 3,500 Baeeaman ; Myr Aly Bey, Syghan. This one did not join, as he was not required. Myr Mahomed Ailla, 2,000 bosowut ; Myr Hesen Naib, 400 bosowut ; Myr Fyzallah Bey, 500 fowlady ; Myr Zefer, 500 kaloo ; Myr Morad 500 kaloo Myr Nejef Ali, 200 fowlady ; Myr Syfallah Weky, 1,000 khargar.

No. 513.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.**Camp, Cabool, September 27, 1842.*

SIR.—I have much satisfaction in reporting, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, the arrival in camp this morning of Captain Bygrave, the only person who remained in the hands of Mahomed Akbar Khan. It appears that Captain Bygrave was allowed to join my camp by Mahomed Akbar, who has sent a letter to my address, a copy and translation of which shall be forwarded by the next opportunity.

I have, &amp;c.,

GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 514.—*General Orders by the Governor-General of India.**Simla, Oct. 4, 1842.*

The Governor-General, earnestly desirous of evincing the gratitude of the Government of India towards the general officers, officers, and non-commissioned officers and privates engaged in the operations of the present campaign in Afghanistan, is pleased, after communicating with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to declare the following resolutions :

• 1. All the general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, serving under the command of Major-General Pollock, of Major-General Nott, and of Major-General England, between Attock and Ali Musjid, and in and above the Khyber Pass, and in and above the Bolan Pass, on the 8th of September, shall receive a donation of six months' batta, payable on the 1st of January, 1843.

2. In perpetual commemoration of their distinguished services, the 2nd and 16th Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry shall be hereafter regiments of grenadiers, and the 38th, 42nd and 43rd Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry shall be hereafter regiments of light infantry.

3. The regiment of Bengal irregular infantry, lately known as the 3rd Regiment of Infantry, in the service of Shah Shooja, shall, in consideration of the valour, discipline, and fortitude manifested by that regiment on many occasions, and especially in the defence of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, continue embodied under its present commandant, Captain J. H. Craigie, and be brought on the strength of the Bengal army as an extra regiment, and be denominated the "regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzye." The future establishment of the regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and other details consequent upon this resolution, will be made known in a separate order.

4. Major-General Nott will communicate to the Governor-General the designations of every corps engaged in the several actions with the enemy in the vicinity of Candahar, between the 1st of January and the 10th of August, 1842, specifying the particular actions in which such corps were engaged ; and the Major-General will state which of such corps are in his judgment entitled to bear hereafter the word "Candahar" upon their standards or colours and appointments, in commemoration of their services.

To such corps of the Indian army as the Major-General may name, the honor of so bearing the word "Candahar," will be immediately accorded by the Governor-General.

5. The several corps of the Indian army which on the 6th of September occupied Ghuznee, and the several corps which on the 16th of September and the following days occupied Cabool, will hereafter bear upon their standards or colours and appointments, the word "Ghuznee" and "Cabool" respectively, with the figures "1842" underwritten.

The several corps under Major-General Nott, which reached Cabool subsequently to the 16th of September, will be equally entitled with the troops previously occupying that city to the honor of bearing the word "Cabool" with the figures "1842" underwritten, upon their standards, or colours and appointments.

6. Major-General Pollock will communicate to the Governor-General the designations of the corps under his command, which were engaged in the operations preceding the occupation of Cabool, but did not advance to that city, and will name such of those corps as he may deem entitled to bear the word "Cabool," with the figures "1842" underwritten, upon their standards or colours and appointments, as having contributed to the capture of that city by their previous service in this campaign; and to such corps, being on the Indian army, as the Major-General may so name, the honor of so bearing the word "Cabool," will be immediately accorded by the Governor-General.

7. To every general officer, officer, non-commissioned officer and private, present on the occasions above-mentioned in action with the enemy in the vicinity of Candahar, will be presented a silver medal inscribed

Candahar,  
1842.

and to every general officer, officer, non-commissioned officer and private, present with the army under Major-General Nott, in the operations leading to the capture of Ghuznee, and the occupation of Cabool, will be presented a similar silver medal inscribed

Ghuznee,  
Cabool,  
1842.

Where the same person shall be entitled to both distinctions one medal only will be presented, and such medal will be inscribed

Candahar,  
Ghuznee,  
Cabool,  
1842.

Major-General Nott will transmit to the Governor-General nominal lists of the several general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, so entitled respectively.

8. Major-General Pollock will transmit to the Governor-General, a nominal list of the general officers, officers, non-commissioned and privates, present in action with the enemy, in the several operations of his army leading to the occupation of Cabool, and to every person named in such list, a silver medal will be presented, inscribed

Cabool,  
1842.

On the reverse of these several medals, will be inscribed the words

Victoria  
Vindex.

9. To every officer, non-commissioned officer and private, present within Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and forming part of the garrison thereof during the late investment and blockade of that fort, will be presented a silver medal bearing a mural crown, with the superscription of "Kelat-i-Ghilzye," and on the reverse the word.

Invicta,  
1842.

Captain J. H. Craigie, late commandant of the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, will transmit to Major-General Nott, a nominal list of the officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, so present at Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and so entitled to the medal above granted, and to every person named in such list, when sanctioned by Major-General Nott, the medal will be given.

10. All the medals above-mentioned are to be worn suspended to a ribbon, similar to that which will be given with the Jellalabad medal which will be henceforth the military ribbon of India.

11. The regimental colours of the regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, will be composed of the three colours of the military ribbon of India, and in the centre thereof will be inscribed the word "Kelat-i-Ghilzye."

12. The Governor-General will, after communication with, and in conjunction with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, represent to the authorities in England, the high services rendered by the officers of Her Majesty's and of the Indian army, in the operations of the present campaign in Afghanistan, in order that they may be duly submitted to the gracious consideration of Her Majesty.

13. Medals similar to those presented to the general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of the Indian army will be prepared for the general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of Her Majesty's army having respectively similar claims to the honor of wearing such medals; but the authority to wear such medals depends upon Her Majesty's most gracious pleasure.

J. STUART.

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No. 515.—*General Orders by the Governor-General of India.*

Simla, November 8, 1842. •

The Governor-General has received a letter from Major-General Pollok, C. B., dated Jellalabad, 26th October 1842, with reference to the General Order of the 4th ultimo, from which the following is an extract:—

"In the 6th paragraph I am directed to communicate the designations of corps under my command, which were engaged in the operations preceding the occupation of Cabool, but did not advance to that city, and to name such of those corps as I may deem entitled to bear the word "Cabool," with the figures "1842," underwritten upon their standards, or colours, and appointments.

"In reply to this paragraph I beg to state, that I consider the services

of all the regiments and detachments attached to the army under my command, have been such as to entitle them to this honorary distinction, and I have, therefore, noted the designation of each as follows :

*Engineers.* Nos. 4 and 5 companies of sappers and miners.

*Artillery.* 3rd troop 1st brigade horse artillery.

3rd ditto 2nd ditto ditto.

2nd company 2nd battalion foot artillery.

2nd ditto 6th ditto ditto.

4th ditto 6th ditto ditto.

No. 6 light field battery.

Captain Backhouse's mountain train.

*Cavalry.* Her Majesty's 3rd regiment of light dragoons.

1st regiment of light cavalry.

10th ditto ditto.

One squadron, 5th light cavalry (Captain Oldfield.)

3rd regiment irregular cavalry (Captain Tait.)

*Infantry.* Her Majesty's 9th regiment of foot.

Ditto 13th ditto ditto.

Ditto 31st ditto ditto.

6th regiment native infantry.

26th ditto ditto.

30th ditto ditto.

33rd ditto ditto.

35th ditto ditto.

53rd ditto ditto.

60th ditto ditto.

64th ditto ditto.

Captain Broadfoot's regiment of sappers and miners.

Captain Ferris' regiment of Jezailchees."

The Governor-General, in compliance with the above recommendation, accords to all such regiments, corps and detachments in the above list as are in the service of the Government of India, the honor of bearing the word "Cabool," with the figures "1842," underwritten upon their standards, or colours, and appointments.

By order, &c.,

T. II. MADDOCK.

No. 516.—*General Orders by the Governor-General of India.*

*Camp, Ferozepore, Dec. 13, 1842.*

The Governor-General has received the following Roll from Major-General Nott :

*Actions fought in the Vicinity of Candahar between the 1st January, 1842, and the 10th August, 1842.*

Names and Places.	Troops.
Kalée Shuck,..... 12th Jan. 1842 ...	{ Two Troops Anderson's Horse Artillery, Captain Blood's Bombay Battery, (9 pounders); detachment 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry; Her Majesty's 40th Foot; 2nd and 16th Regiments of Grenadiers; 38th and a wing of the 42nd Regiment Light Infantry.
{ Kunje Kuk, Panj-wale, and Tiloo Khan, ..... } 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th March, 1842.	{ Two Troops Anderson's Horse Artillery; Blood's Bombay Battery (9-pounders); Detachment 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry; Her Majesty's 40th Foot; 16th Regiment of Grenadiers; 38th, 42nd, and 43rd Regiments of Light Infantry.
{ Defence of the city of Candahar, when attached by a large body of Afghans. } 10th March, 1842..	{ 2nd Regiment of Grenadiers, and 4th Company 2nd Battalion of Bengal Foot Artillery.
Baba Wullie ..... 25th March, 1842..	{ One Troop Anderson's Horse Artillery; Detachment 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry; Her Majesty's 40th Foot; 2nd and 16th Regiments of Grenadiers, and the 38th Regt. of Light Infantry.
Candahar Cantonment, 29th May, 1842...	{ One Troop Anderson's Horse Artillery; Her Majesty's 41st Foot; and the 42nd and 43rd Regts. of Light Infantry.

W. NOTT.

I am of opinion that the regiments and detachments noted in this Roll, are entitled to have "Candahar" upon their colours.

W. NOTT.

The Governor-General in pursuance with the General Order published at Simla, on the 4th of October, and in conformity with the opinion above expressed by Major-General Nott, declares, that all such of the above-mentioned corps as are in the service of the Government of India, are entitled to bear the word "Candahar," with the figures "1842," underwritten upon their colours and appointments.

*No. 517.—Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, near Cabool, September 28, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I have detached Major-General McCaskill, K. H., with the following troops:—

Two 18-pounders, and detail of Artillery.	Christie's Horse.
Capt. Blood's Light Field Battery.	Her Majesty's 9th Foot.
Mountain Train.	Her Majesty's 41st Foot.
Two Squadrons Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons.	26th Native Infantry.
One Squadron 1st Light Cavalry.	42nd " "
	43rd " "
	Broadfoot's Sappers.

2. In consequence of want of carriage, I shall not be able to leave this till about the 10th proximo, and as I had received intelligence that a party of the enemy were endeavouring to collect followers in the vicinity of Charekar, I have deemed it advisable to dislodge them at once. The detachment will be back before I can march, and if the enemy were not dispersed, they would, in all probability, increase considerably in numbers, and prove extremely inconvenient to the force on our leaving this to return to the provinces.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 518.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Cabool, October 1, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward a copy of a letter from Major-General McCaskill, K. H., commanding the force which I detached under his command, for the purpose of dispersing the enemy collected in the vicinity of Charekar, as stated in my letter of the 28th instant.

The success of the Major-General's operations against Istalif, is most gratifying, that place being considered by the Afghans as totally inaccessible to our troops.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 519.—*Major-General McCaskill to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Camp, Istalif, September 30, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the satisfaction to acquaint you, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., that the troops under my command yesterday made themselves masters of the strong and populous town of Istalif, totally defeating the numerous levies collected for its defence, under the infamous Ameer Oollah Khan Loghuree, Kaojie Ameer Kotwal, Hazin Khan (an assassin of Sir Alexander Burnes) Hazir Alec Khan, Khulcefa Ibrahim, and many other chiefs of Cabool and Kohistan.

The Major-General is aware that the force detailed in the margin\* was placed at my disposal for operations in these valleys, on the 25th. The two brigades formed a junction near Khowja Rawash on the 26th; moved to an encampment near Zinuree on the 27th, and pitched their tents within four miles of this place on the 28th. The same evening I reconnoitred the enemy's position. It is impossible to conceive ground naturally stronger. The town of Istalif, consisting of masses of houses and forts, is built on the slope of a mountain, in the rear of which are yet loftier eminences, shutting in a defile which leads to Toorkistan, and in no way can this place of abode of 15,000 people be approached but by

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\* Artillery.—Captain Backhouse's mountain train, Captain Blood's battery of 9-pounders (Bombay), two 18-pounders.—Cavalry.—Head Quarters and two squadrons of Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, 1st squadron, 1st Light Cavalry, Captain Christie's (late S.S. 2nd Regiment) corps of cavalry.—Infantry.—Brigadier Tulloch's Brigade (with the addition of Captain Broadfoot's Sappers and Miners, and the exception of the 60th Native Infantry), Brigadier Stacy's brigade.

surmounting ranges of hills separated by deep ravines, or traversing by narrow roads, its gardens, vineyards, and orchards, fenced in with strong enclosure walls ; the whole of them, with the mountain side and tops of the houses, were occupied by Jezailchees ; and the strongest proof is afforded that the enemy, after this disposition, considered the place as unassailable, by their having retained within the town, the wives and children not only of the inhabitants, but of thousands of refugees from Cabool.

The observations which I was enabled to make under a sharp jezail fire, and the report of Major Pottinger, induced me to determine to assault, the next morning, the right of the enemy's extensive position, as it was there that I could hope to bring the artillery most effectively into battery. Arrangements were made with this view. The troops were formed into two columns of attack and reserve : Brigadier Stacy's and Captain Blood's battery, and the 18-pounders the left ; these were supported by the third column, under Major Simmons, Her Majesty's 41st, consisting of a wing of his regiment and the cavalry under Major Lockwood : Captain Christie's corps protected the baggage.

The troops moved soon after daylight, and traversing the plain in perfect order, passed nearly from the left to the right of the enemy's position. Our light troops and guns repressed the occasional attacks of their jezailchees from the gardens, who were numerous and most audacious ; but when the column arrived in front of the village Ismillah, I resolved to make a combined attack on this point ; Brigadier Tulloch's brigade assailed its left, and Brigadier Stacy, making a long detour, attacked the right.

I cannot express in adequate terms my admiration of the style in which the former column, covered by skirmishers, rushed upon the gardens, filled with bold and skilful marksmen. Her Majesty's 9th Foot, the 26th Native Infantry, and Captain Broadfoot's Sappers, vied with each other in steady courage ; and their rapid unhesitating advance soon left the enemy no resource but flight. Very shortly after this assault, the three light companies of Her Majesty's 41st, the 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry, covering their own column, got into action, and, on their side, stormed the village and vineyards with distinguished gallantry. The combination was steadily persevered in, and though I had few opportunities of using the artillery with effect, I had soon the gratification of seeing the enclosures, forts, heights, suburbs and town successively won by the two columns. The enemy were driven from them, and pursued with a rapidity which left no time to rally, and a singular spectacle was then presented in the escape up the mountain side of the women and children from the place, to which no interruption was offered ; but, as detached parties of the beaten Affghans still occupied some very lofty heights, the mountain train ascended them by a dizzy pathway, and dispersed the fugitives by its effective fire. Our reserve was now established on the lower heights, and the whole of the place, filled with property of every description, much of it plundered from our army in 1841, was in the hands of our force ; two guns, brass field pieces, were also taken, and one of them seized with such promptitude, that its captor, Lieutenant Elmhirst, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, turned its fire upon the fugitives with some effect. I directed the town to be set on fire in several places,



after taking out various supplies which might be useful to our troops, and the work of demolition is still proceeding under the direction of Major Sanders, of the Engineers. Our loss has been trifling, for the advance of our officers and men was too rapid and decisive to allow of the sharp fire of the enemy telling much upon them ; and, deceived by the direction of the reconnoissance of the 28th, the Affghans had expected the attack on their left, and posted their guns and the *élite* of their force in that quarter.

I have now the pleasing task of expressing the amount of my obligation for their exertions in the field, to Brigadiers Tulloch and Stacy, commanding brigades and columns ; to Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, R.H., Her Majesty's 9th Foot ; Major Huish, of the 26th Native Infantry ; and Captain Broadfoot, of the Sappers, commanding corps on the right, which bore the brunt of the action ; to Major Simmons, Her Majesty's 41st Foot, commanding the reserve ; to Captain Backhouse, commanding the mountain train, and Captain Blood, commanding the battery of 9-pounders ; this last was ably aided by Lieutenant Terry. I have received valuable assistance throughout our operations from Major Pottinger, C.B., and Major Sanders, Engineers ; and yesterday from Captain Mackenzie and Lieutenant Airey, Her Majesty's 3rd Buffs, and Lieutenant Webb, 30th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, temporarily attached to me ; and, since we marched from Cabool, as on former occasions, from my own staff, departmental and personal, viz., Captain Havelock, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General ; Lieutenant Mayne, Deputy Assistant Quarter-master-General ; Lieutenant Pollock, Artillery, Aide-de-Camp to the Major-General, who volunteered his services with me ; and Lieutenant Bethune, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, my own Aide-de-Camp. Regarding the last-mentioned officer, I take the opportunity of rectifying an oversight on my part. I ought specially to have reported to Major-General Pollock, Lieutenant Bethune's valuable services in the recent affair at the Huft Kotul, in which I was intrusted with the command of the main column. Brigadier Tulloch reports, in very strong terms, the good conduct on the present occasion, of Captain Smith, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, his Brigade-Major. I inclose a return of the killed and wounded, and of the two guns captured.

I have, &c.,

JOHN McCASKILL.

*Return of Killed and Wounded of the Troops under the command of Major-General McCaskill, K.H.*

*Camp, Istalif, September 30, 1842.*

Mountain Train—1 European officer wounded.

3rd Company 1st Battalion Bombay Artillery—2 rank and file wounded.

Christie's Irregular Cavalry—2 horses killed, 2 horses wounded.

Her Majesty's 9th Regiment Foot—1 rank and file killed ; 1 officer, 1 serjeant, 10 rank and file wounded.

26th Regiment Native Infantry—1 rank and file killed : 1 European officer, 3 havildars, 8 rank and file, wounded.

Broadfoot's Sappers—2 rank and file killed ; 1 European officer, 6 rank and file, horse, wounded.

Her Majesty's 41st Regiment—1 officer, 1 rank and file, killed ; 4 rank and file wounded.

42nd Regiment Native Infantry—4 rank and file wounded.

Total—1 officer, 5 rank and file, 2 horses, killed ; 4 European and Native officers, 4 serjants and havildars, 37 rank and file, 3 horses, wounded.

*Names of Officers Killed and Wounded.*

Lieutenant Evans, Her Majesty's 41st Foot, killed.

Lieutenant Richardson, Horse Artillery, slightly wounded.

Lieutenant and Adjutant Spencer, 26th Native Infantry, slightly wounded.

Lieutenant Lister, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, slightly wounded.

Captain Broadfoot, Sappers, slightly wounded,

Lieutenant and Adjutant Orr's charger wounded.

H. HAVELOCK, *Captain.*

*Return of Ordnance captured from the Enemy on the 29th September, 1842.*

*Camp, Istalif, September 30, 1842.*

Two brass 6-pounder field pieces, of native manufacture.

J. B. BACKHOUSE, *Captain.*

*No. 520.—Major-General McCaskill to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Camp, Khwaja Rowash, October 6, 1842.*

SIR,—The troops entrusted to my charge for a special service in the Kohistan, having pitched their tents at this place, previously to returning to their respective encampments, I take this opportunity of requesting you to solicit the attention of Major-General Pollock, C.B., to some points, which, in the hurry of our active operations, I had neglected to dwell upon. I have already intimated, that Brigadier Stacy's report of the part borne by his brigade in the capture of Istaliff, on the 29th ultimo, did not reach me till the 2nd instant. It will ever be matter of regret to me, if this accidental delay should prevent the merits of some of the officers and troops under me, being prominently brought to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, and his Excellency the Commander-in-chief. The brunt of the action certainly fell on the Infantry corps, and Sappers of Brigadier Tulloch's brigade ; but the credit of turning the enemy's extreme right,—of allowing him no respite or breathing time on that line ;—of aiding in completing the capture of the town, when its possession was hotly disputed from behind walls, and from the tops of houses, from court yards, and in winding streets built on steep declivities, is due to the regiment under Brigadier Stacy. My commendations have been especially earned by Major G. Browne and Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, for the share they took in these gallant efforts, and for the exemplary humanity displayed by the men towards the unfortunate families of the vanquished. That corps was zealously emulated, and supported, by the 42nd Native Infantry under Major Clarkson, and the 43rd under Major Nash.

In addition to the services of Major Sanders, as Field Engineer, I ought to have remarked on the distinguished gallantry with which he accompanied the heads of columns in the advance of Brigadier Tulloch, against the gardens and town. Neither must I leave, without record, the marked intrepidity of Lieutenant Mayne, Deputy Assistant-Quarter-master-General, in pointing out the path of the same column amidst the hottest of the fire, and in aiding in following up the victory. I have

before mentioned, that the light companies of Her Majesty's 41st, and the 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry, covered the manœuvres of their own brigade. This onset was led very bravely by Lieutenant Evans, who was afterwards killed in the town (and was succeeded in command by Lieutenant Madden), and by Lieutenant Woollen, 42nd Native Infantry, and Captain Macpherson, 43rd Native Infantry.

I have, &c.,

JOHN McCASKILL.

No. 521.—*The Governor-General to Major-General Pollock.*

Simla, October 12, 1842.

GENERAL,—On the 7th instant, I was informed that a letter had been received here, from an officer on the staff of your army, to the effect that you intended to commence your movement towards the Indus, on the 8th.

On the 10th instant, letters were received here, to the effect that two brigades of your army had been detached to the Kohistan, and were expected to be absent eight days.

Neither the Commander-in-Chief\* nor myself, have received any dispatch from you, intimating this intention of detaching two brigades to the Kohistan, or mentioning the day on which your movement towards the Indus would commence.

In your letter to me, dated the 21st ultimo, you stated, that you could not then fix a date for your return, as you did not know how soon you might get camels. You mentioned, however, that you hoped to get more than 1,000 camels; and the force from Candahar is understood to have been fully supplied with carriage.

I conclude that the movement of two brigades to the Kohistan has for its object the dispersion of some assemblage of the enemy in that quarter, and, at the same time perhaps, the affording of opportunities of escape to some of the Native soldiers and followers who may be there.

I trust that you will not have engaged in any enterprise of which the effect can be to delay your return one day.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 522.—*Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.*

Camp, near Quetta, September 12, 1842.

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that having arranged that the troops now here should descend the Bolan Pass, and move on Sukkur in three columns, I have despatched the leading column, consisting as per margin\*, on its destination, this morning, accordingly.

2. I have somewhat anticipated the intended moment of this march,

\* Six guns Bengal Artillery (three of which are serviceable). One rissalah 1st Irregular Cavalry; 12th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry; 2nd Regiment Irregular Infantry; Light Comp. 21st Native Infantry; Detachment of Sappers; all the sick of the Bengal Native Infantry; Ordnance Stores, &c.

owing to the very favorable reports I have received of the season in the low country,—owing also to the favorable influence of such a movement on the proceedings of the Ameers of Sind who are still collecting forces, for no very intelligible or well-explained purpose ; and I have further been influenced in thus removing a portion of the troops from this unhealthy locality, by the report and request of the chief medical officer to that effect.

3. I do not propose, however, that the second column should march until the end of this month, and I shall follow with the last troops, during the first week in October, withdrawing, as I pass, the various garrisons in Cutch, &c., agreeably to the instructions of his Lordship the Governor-General, conveyed to me by Major-General Nott.

4. I have no reason to suppose that the troops will meet with any interruption in their march to the Indus, beyond the usual efforts of depredation on the baggage ; but I am of opinion that the misfortunes which the tribes below fully expected us to have encountered in the passage of the Kojuck mountains, were to have been a very general signal for strife against all the British remaining in these countries.

5. I have not permitted any ordnance, or other serviceable stores, to be destroyed, and have, hitherto, been tolerably successful in hiring carriage to aid in conveying the public property towards Sukkur.

6. His Highness, Prince Timour, having expressed a wish to leave Quetta, and to accompany the column which marched this morning, I did not fail to instruct the officer in its command, to pay the Prince every attention in his power.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

No. 523.—*Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, at Quetta, September 23, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, and in continuation of my letter of the 12th instant, that I have dispatched the second column of troops and stores from hence, as per margin\*, *en route* to Sukkur.

2. Although I still hear of the efforts of the Ameers of Sind, to induce the Beloochees and others to molest us in the operation of our retreat, I feel every confidence that, with due precaution, we shall accomplish this service without any very serious impediment.

3. I propose to make the final movement from this place, on or about the 1st proximo, and I am much influenced in marching at an early date from this ground, by the sickness which prevails here ; for although I have sent forward all the European and native sick soldiers of the Bengal army, who accompanied me from Candahar, there is a large proportion of officers and men still at Quetta under medical treatment, and fresh cases continue, though not of a severe nature, daily to occur.

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\* Two 9-pounders Bombay Artillery, one 24-pound howitzer ditto, two guns late Bolan Rangers, one rissallah 1st Irregular Cavalry, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, 1st Regiment late Shah's Infantry, Light Company 8th Bombay Native Infantry, Detachment Sappers, sick and invalids of Her Majesty's 40th and 41st Regiments ; Ordnance Stores.

4. The means of conveying so many invalids has been a matter of some embarrassment ; but to render myself somewhat independent of the caprice of the Brahooe contractors, in the essential matter of "carriage," I have reserved nearly the whole of our Government camels for the use of the rear of column, and have kept the troops which compose it, as little encumbered with baggage and stores as possible, the better to protect the divisions already *en route*, the officers in command of which, are instructed to fall back on each other, or on me, or to halt, if necessary, and as circumstances may require. But there is every reason to hope and to suppose, if any plans are matured for our interruption, or if any attacks are intended by the tribes through those countries we are about to pass, that such would fall on that part of the force which thus remains in the rear, to conclude the final evacuation of their territories.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

No. 524.—*Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, near Sir-i-ab, October 1, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that the third and final column of troops, as per margin\*, left Quetta this morning, *en route* to Sukkur.

2. The country in this vicinity appears tranquil, and no event of importance has occurred, since my dispatch of the 23rd ultimo.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

No. 525.—*Major-General Sir Charles Napier, commanding the Forces in Sind and Beloochistan, to Mr. Maddock.*

*Sukkur, October 12, 1842.*

SIR,—I lose no time in forwarding the enclosed dispatch from Major-General England, which has this moment reached me. I hope I may be allowed to offer my congratulations to the Governor-General, on the successful termination of so arduous and difficult an operation.

I have, &c.,

C. NAPIER.

No. 526.—*Major-General England to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, near Dadur, October 10, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that the troops destined to descend to the Indus by the Bolan Pass, finally evacuated

\* Head Quarter Staff, Captain Cooper's troop of Horse Artillery, Poona Auxiliary Horse, 6th Regiment Native Infantry, 20th Ditto, 5th Regiment Irregular Infantry, detail Madras Sappers and Miners.

Quetta on the 1st instant. and have accomplished their march through that defile without much difficulty.

2. In order to facilitate the movement of this large body, which, with the acquisition of the garrison of Quetta, consisted of more than seven battalions, with details of cavalry, eighteen pieces of artillery, and an increased retinue of invalids, and of stores, I divided it into three columns of route, retaining the last in as light a form of equipment as possible, in the hope and supposition that, if the tribes, through whose country we should pass, were inclined to attack us, they would prefer to make their chief efforts on the last departing division ; and I, therefore, sent the greater portion of the sick and public stores with the leading divisions accordingly.

3. It has proved that this conjecture was right, because the two preceding divisions have been wholly unmolested in their progress through the pass, whereas, on the morning of the 3rd, I found the Kakurs posted, in some numbers, on the steep ground which commands the upper extremity of the narrow zig-zag near Sir-i-bolan.

4. These insurgents, however, had only time to deliver a few rounds on the column, when their attention was fully engaged by the flanking parties which covered our left, and which I now reinforced by a strong detachment of the 6th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, and by nearly the whole of the 5th Regiment of Irregular Infantry, under Major Woodhouse and Captain Macdonnell, respectively.

5. I had every reason to be satisfied with the handsome manner in which our troops ascended these stupendous heights, and cleared them of the enemy ; and Major Woodhouse speaks very highly of the conduct of a party of Brahoos Horse which accompanied him to this affair.

6. On this occasion, also, Major Ostrum gave me his able assistance, as well as in flanking the lower extremity of the Bolan Pass near Kundye, where I had good reason to expect again to meet some hostile tribes ; but the total disappointment of the Kakurs on the 3rd, and the effectual flanking arrangements made, on all occasions, by our troops seem to have prevented any renewal of interruption.

7. I beg leave to inclose a list of the casualties, which have occurred during their passage of the Bolan defile.

8. As I now consider the chief difficulties of this march to have terminated, I trust, I may be permitted to bring to the notice of his Lordship, the Governor-General, the general good conduct of the troops I have had the honor to command, during these prolonged and laborious operations ; and I venture to submit the names of Major Waddington, Commanding Engineer ; Major Wyllie, Major of brigade ; Major Boyd, Acting Assistant Quartermaster-General ; Captain Davidson, Deputy Commissary-General ; and Surgeon Wight, in chief medical charge ; and to claim his Lordship's favourable estimate of the exertions of these officers in their several departments and capacities and it is with the utmost satisfaction, I am enabled to assure his Lordship that, owing to the discipline which has been exacted, these British columns, in emerging from the Bolan Pass, will leave, amongst the peaceable inhabitants of the countries they have quitted, a well-merited character for forbearance and humanity ; whilst, in the deliberate and systematic order of their march, during which, every enemy has been beaten off, and no stores lost or

captured, the power of our arms has been alike equally and imperiously made manifest.

9. The garrison of Sebee will be withdrawn to-morrow, and that of Dadur on the 12th or 13th, when I propose to resume my progress to the Indus.

I have, &c.,

R. ENGLAND.

*Return of Casualties in Skirmishes with the Enemy, since the march of the Headquarters from Quetta, on the 1st, to its arrival at Dadur, on the 9th instant.*

*Camp, Dadur, October 10, 1842.*

Poona Auxiliary Horse—2 horses wounded.

6th Regiment Native Infantry—1 private wounded.

20th Regiment Native Infantry—1 assistant-surgeon killed; 2 privates, 1 bheestie, wounded, 4 dooly bearers missing.

5th Irregular infantry (late Shah's)—1 private, killed; 1 subadar, 5 privates, 1 lascar, wounded.

Total—1 assistant-surgeon, 1 private, killed; 1 subadar, 8 privates, 1 bheestie, 1 lascar, wounded; 4 dooly bearers missing; 2 horses wounded.

Grand Total—2 killed; 11 wounded; 4 missing; 2 horses wounded.

Assistant-Surgeon J. Brickwell killed.

The Brahoo Chief, Mahomed Khan, slightly wounded, and 1 horse killed.

H. WYLLIE, Major.

#### *Remarks.*

1 private dangerously wounded; 3 privates, 1 bheestie, 1 lascar, severely wounded; 1 subadar, 4 privates, slightly wounded.

Total Wounded—11 men, and 2 horses severely.

### No. 527.—*General Orders by the Governor-General of India.*

*Simla, October 20, 1842.*

The Governor-General has much satisfaction in announcing the successful termination of the arduous and difficult operation confided to Major-General England, of withdrawing, through the Kojuck and Bolan Passes, into the valley of the Indus, a portion of the force lately stationed at Candahar, and all the scattered garrisons of the intermediate places between the eastern face of the Kojuck mountains and the plains of Cutchee.

This operation, less brilliant in its circumstances than that entrusted to Major-General Pollock and Major-General Nott, was yet one which demanded the greatest prudence in the making of every previous arrangement for securing the safe descent of the several columns, and which called into exercise many of the higher qualities which must contribute to form the character of an accomplished General.

The Governor-General could not but regard with some anxiety, the progress of this movement, requiring so much of delicate management in its execution; and it is a subject of extreme satisfaction to him, that the same complete success should have attended this, which has, during the present campaign, attended every other part of the combined operations of the armies beyond the Indus.

The Governor-General requests, that Major-General Sir Charles Napier will express to Major-General England, and to all the officers,

and troops, which were under his command, the entire satisfaction with which their whole conduct has been viewed on this occasion.

The Governor-General also requests that Major-General Sir Charles Napier will communicate to Major Outram, and the other Political officers, his thanks, for the zeal and ability they have manifested in the collection of the means of carriage and supply, and in their various transactions with the native chiefs and tribes, tending to facilitate and secure the descent of the several columns of the army.

By Order, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 528.—*Notification by the Governor-General of India.*

*Simla, October 25, 1842.*

The advance of the British armies to Ghuznee and Cabool, having led to the restoration to freedom of the British prisoners in the hands of the Affghans, Dost Mahomed Khan, his wives and family, and the wife and family of Mahomed Akbar Khan, and many Affghan chiefs, remain in the absolute power of the British Government, without having any means of procuring their liberation.

To this condition of disgrace and danger has Mahomed Akbar Khan reduced his father, and his wife, and his family, and the chiefs, his countrymen, by making war upon women, and preferring the continuance of their captivity and suffering, for objects connected only with his own safety, to the general exchange of prisoners, which was offered by the British Government, and the consequent restoration to liberty of those, whose honour and whose happiness should have been most dear to him.

But the British Government is desirous of terminating, at the earliest period, all the evils which have arisen out of the Affghan war; and the Governor-General, enabled by the recovery of the British prisoners, who were in the hands of the enemy, to follow the course most in accordance with clemency and humanity, declares that when the British army returning from Affghanistan, shall have passed the Indus, all the Affghans, now in the power of the British Government, shall be permitted to return to their country.

The Affghan chiefs who are thus released, will, before they pass the Sutlej, present themselves at the Durbar of the Governor-General, in his camp at Ferozepore.

The wives of Dost Mahomed Khan and Mahomed Akbar Khan, and all the ladies of the family and household, will be conducted with all respect to the frontiers of Affghanistan.

By Order, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 529.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Khoord Cabool, October 13, 1842.*

(Extract.)—I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, my arrival at Khoord Cabool, in



progress to Hindostan. I left Cabool, yesterday morning, with the 1st and 2nd divisions, and the troops under Major-General Nott, as per margin,\* for Bootkakh, having detached Major-General Sir R. Sale, with the 1st and 2nd brigades, the mountain train, 1st Light Cavalry, 3rd Irregular Cavalry, and Christie's Horse, over the Gaspund Durrah Pass, for the purpose of turning that of the Khoord Cabool; in consequence of which movement we marched through the principal defile without a shot being fired. Previous to my departure from Cabool, I destroyed with gunpowder the grand bazaar of that city, called the Chahar Chuttah, built in the reign of Arungzebe, by the celebrated Ali Mirdan Khan, and which may be considered to have been the most frequented part of Cabool, and known as the grand emporium of this part of Central Asia. The remains of the late Envoy and Minister had been exposed to public insult in this bazaar, and my motive in effecting its destruction, has been to impress upon the Affghans, that their atrocious conduct towards a British functionary has not been suffered to pass with impunity. A mosque also at one end of the bazaar, and another near the cantonment, filled with venetians, otherwise ornamented with European materials, and designated as the Feringhee Mosque, to commemorate the events of last year, has likewise been destroyed.

No. 530.—*Major-General Pollock to the Governor-General.*

*Jugdulluck, October 16, 1842.*

(Extract.)—It is very gratifying to be able to state, that we have met with no opposition since we left Cabool, except what must always be expected where the whole population is armed, and we have, consequently, had small parties of thieves occasionally firing on the rear guards. During each night that we have encamped, not a shot has been fired, and on the line of march, not a man is to be seen on the hills.

\* 1st Division—Four guns 3rd troop 1st brigade, horse artillery, No. 6 light field battery, two 18-pounders and detail E. artillery, mountain train, Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, four rissalahs 3rd Irregular Cavalry, one squadron 1st Light Cavalry, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 26th Native Infantry, 35th Light Infantry, 5th company Sappers and Miners, Broadfoot's Sappers, Jezailchees, Bildars, Sike contingent.

2nd Division—Two guns 3rd troop 2nd brigade Horse Artillery, Captain Blood's battery of 9-pounders, two squadrons 1st Light Cavalry, Her Majesty's 31st Foot, 2nd Regiment Native Infantry, 16th ditto (so in original), wing 33rd Native Infantry, wing 60th ditto.

General Nott's Force—One troop Bombay Horse Artillery, one troop (late) Shah Shooja's force, detachment Foot Artillery, 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry, detachment 1st Irregular Cavalry, detachment 1st Irregular Cavalry (so in original), Christie's Horse, detachment Sappers and Miners, detachment Madras Sappers and Miners, Her Majesty's 40th Foot, 16th Native Infantry (so in original), 38th Native Infantry, 3rd (late) Shah Shooja's force, Her Majesty's 41st foot, 2nd Native Infantry, 42nd Native Infantry, 43rd Native Infantry.

No. 531.—*Captain Lawrence, Assistant Agent to Governor-General, to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Oosman Khan's Fort, October 21, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock commanding, that according to his instructions I brought the Lahore contingent yesterday morning to the village of Urguy, within three miles of the town of Kujjur; where, having pitched my camp, I at once proceeded to Kujjur, which town, with its adjoining forts, we found evacuated, the inhabitants flying from the latter as the troops approached.

We burned the town of Kujjur, the village of Urguj, and eight forts, including two belonging to Muzuffer Khan, the Chief of Khogianies, and one of Munzon Khan Barukzyes.

The fort of Mirza Aga Jan, and also two small forts adjoining the village of Urguj have been spared, the latter being occupied by our dawk people and some old Syeds.

Not a shot has been fired; but, had there been a determined enemy to oppose us, we should, from the nature of the ground and the loose discipline of the Lahore troops, have experienced some trouble.

Captain Tower and Lieutenant Mackeson, of the 33rd Native Infantry, permitted to accompany me, have proved very useful.

Unless I receive orders to the contrary during the day I will burn this fort.

I have, &c.,

H. M. LAWRENCE.

No. 532.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, October 23, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, a copy of a letter which I yesterday addressed to the Adjutant-General of the Army, reporting my arrival at this place. I have also the honor to forward a copy of a letter from me to the same address, transmitting a dispatch from Major-General Nott.

I have made preparations for the destruction of the fortifications here, and trust to be enabled to march in progress to Peshawur on the 25th instant. I will write again on this subject, directly I have heard from Major-General Nott, whose arrival here is still uncertain.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

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No. 533.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Jellalabad, October 22, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, my arrival here this morning, with the first division of the troops. Major-General McCaskill will arrive to-morrow, and Major-General Nott on the day following.

I withdrew, from Gundamuck, the detachment which had been left for the purpose of keeping open the communication ; the wing of the 33rd Native Infantry has joined the head-quarters of the regiment, which is with the 2nd division ; and the wing of the 60th, joined by that left at Gundamuck, is attached to the 1st division, as are also the squadrons of the 5th and 10th Light Cavalry.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 534.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, October 23, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward a dispatch from Major-General Nott, detailing his progress over the Huft Kotul, with a return of casualties. I have understood that the column under Major-General M'Caskill has experienced some loss, but I have not as yet received a report from that officer.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

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No. 535.—*Major-General Nott to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Camp, Giant's Tomb, October 15, 1842.*

SIR,—I beg to report, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., that the rear-guard of the force, under my command, was yesterday attacked by large bodies of the enemy in the Huft Kotul Pass. I sent 200 sepoy, and a wing of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, and two companies of Her Majesty's 41st, under command of Major Hibbert, to the assistance of Captain Leeson, of the 42nd Regiment Native Infantry, who had charge of the rear. Our sepoy defeated and dispersed the enemy. Captain Leeson speaks in high terms of the gallantry of the officers and sepoy under his command.

Major Hibbert, and the wing of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, and the two companies of Her Majesty's 41st, under Captain Blackburne, behaved with their accustomed gallantry ; my thanks are due to all the troops engaged. I enclose a list of killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,

W. NOTT.

*Return of Killed and Wounded during the attacks on the Rear Guard of Major-General Nott's force, on the evening of the 15th and morning of the 16th October, 1842.*

1st Troop Bombay Horse Artillery—1 private, 2 horses, killed ; 2 privates, 1 horse keeper, 5 horses, wounded.

Christie's Horse—1 horse killed ; 1 lieutenant, 1 private, 5 horses wounded.

Her Majesty's 40th Regiment—1 private wounded.

38th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—2 privates wounded.

3rd Regiment Irregular Infantry—1 havildar, 3 privates wounded.

2nd Brigade, 42nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—3 privates killed ; 1 lieutenant, 1 assistant-surgeon, 3 havildars, 4 naicks, 23 privates, wounded.

43rd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry—2 privates killed, 1 naicks 2 privates wounded.

1st Regiment of Irregular Cavalry (Haldane's)—2 privates wounded.

Total—12 privates, 3 horses, killed; 2 lieutenants, 1 assistant surgeon, 4 havildars, 5 naicks, 36 privates, 1 horse-keeper, 10 horses wounded.

Grand Total of killed and wounded—61 officers and men, and 13 horses.

*Officers wounded.*

Lieutenant and Brevet Captain W. Jervis, 42nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.

Lieutenant N. B. Chamberlain, Christie's horse.

Assistant-Surgeon J. H. Serrel, 42nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry.

N. B.—1 havildar, 1 naick, and 1 sepoy, of the 27th Native Infantry, doing duty with 42nd Native Infantry, are included in the above.

W. Nott, *Major-General.*

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No. 536.—*Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock.*

*Camp, Ali Boghan, October 27, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, my departure from Jellalabad, with the whole of the troops, excepting General Nott's division after destroying the fortifications of that city.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

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No. 537.—*The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.*

*Simla, October 19, 1842.*

(Extract.)—Mr. Clerk, the Envoy to the Maharajah Shere Sing, brought to me, yesterday, the Faqueer Azeczoodcen, who has been Minister of Lahore for thirty-four years.

2. The inclosed letter addressed by me to Major-General Pollock, shows the result of our short conference.

3. It may be inconvenient that the Lahore Government should not have made up their minds sooner, upon the points adverted to in that letter, for, it is not impossible that, in obedience to his present instructions, Major-General Pollock may have destroyed the new fortifications of Jellalabad, on withdrawing his troops, before the letter can reach him.

4. As there is not the least prospect of the early formation of any Government in Affghanistan, with which we could hold amicable intercourse, the arrangement agreed to is most advantageous to us in all respects.

No. 538.—*The Governor-General of India to Major-General Pollock.*

*Simla, October 18, 1842.*

GENERAL,—The Faqueer Azeczoodcen having personally assured me, on the part of the Maharajah Shere Sing, that the Maharajah will never recognize any Government in Cabool which shall not have been previously recognized by the Government of India, I have informed the Faqueer that, upon the retirement of the British army, Jellalabad shall

be given up to the Sikh troops in its present state ; that is, without any injury being done to the fortifications : and you will, accordingly, so give up that place to the Sikh army, when its occupation shall be no longer necessary to you.

I have assured the Faqueer, that the British Government will not interfere in any manner in the future government of Jellalabad, or in the management of the territory dependent upon it ; the Faqueer promising on the part of the Maharajah, that no person shall be employed in the government or management thereof, who shall be deemed and declared by the British Government to be its enemy.

I have informed the Faqueer that if, upon your evacuating Jellalabad, there should be any stores in the place, which you do not require for the use of your army, you will dispose of them to the Sikh army, for such fair price as may be agreed upon, and this you are authorized to do.

You are authorized to dispose of any Affghan guns, or other military stores, in the same manner as stores of grain.

You will not act upon the instructions given in this letter, unless you should receive from the Maharajah Shere Sing a letter, reciting the substance of this letter, and informing you, who, on his Highness's part, is authorized to receive Jellalabad from you, and to agree for the purchase of the stores.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

No. 539.—*Mr. Maddock to Mr. Clerk.*

*Simla, October 18, 1842.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Governor-General to transmit, for your information, and communication to his Highness Maharajah Shere Sing, the accompanying copy of a letter this day addressed by the Governor-General to Major General Pollock.

2. In communicating this letter to the Maharajah, I am desired to request that you will acquaint his Highness, that the Governor-General has acquiesced in the arrangement mentioned therein, under the impression that the interests of the British Government and those of the Maharajah, with respect to Affghanistan, are the same.

I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

No. 540.—*Major-General Pollock to the Governor-General of India.*

*Camp, Jellalabad, October 23, 1842.*

MY LORD,—I have had the honor to receive your Lordship's letter dated 12th instant.

With reference to the 1st paragraph, I can safely assure your Lordship that I never, from my first arrival at Cabool, expected to leave that place so early as the 8th instant, and I believe I may, with very great truth assert, that I never gave any one reason to believe, that I could march at so early a period. My first expectation was, that I should not

be able to move till the 15th. I afterwards hoped to move on the 10th instant, and as soon as I saw a fair prospect of my being able to do so, I expressed such an expectation in my letter to your Lordship, but could not even then speak confidently. Even on the 10th instant, in writing to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, I could not say more than I hoped that I might be able to report my departure on the 12th instant.

Camels and bullocks came in on the afternoon of the 11th, but not so many as were required ; I was, however, determined to make no further delay.

I beg to say that until I wrote to your Lordship, it was impossible for me to fix a probable day for my departure, though I knew many officers in camp had fixed their own day, on which I was to move, without any reference to my real intentions or expectations.

A report of the movement of the two brigades was forwarded. The report was delayed a day, but their moving forward after their junction, depended on information I might receive of Ameenollah, who had collected a body of men at Istaliff. There were several objects contemplated in sending the brigades, but the principal one was to disperse the force collected under Ameenollah ; secondly, by appearing in force, in Kohistan, it was hoped the native prisoners would be released ; and, thirdly, it was not at all improbable, that the advance of such a force might have induced the Ghoorbund Chiefs to secure the person of Mahomed Akbar. A number of native prisoners were released, and the dispersion of Ameenollah's retainers prevented their following us on our return towards the provinces.

If, after this explanation, your Lordship still considers me guilty of neglect, in not reporting, I can assure your Lordship, that it has been my constant and earnest desire to keep your Lordship correctly informed on all subjects ; and if I have erred, I may with truth say, I have done so very unintentionally.

Your Lordship appears to have anticipated the object I had in view, in detaching the brigades.

There may appear to be some contradiction to my assertion, that the enemy were prevented following us, when your Lordship peruses the reports of Generals Nott and McCaskill, but I am still of opinion (and my opinion is formed from information I have received from good sources) that the only enemy we have had to contend with, has been the brigands of the country, who, even in times of peace, are always to be found where there is prospect of plunder. I have crowned the heights the whole distance, and have had a strong rear-guard. I have not only met with no opposition, but we have scarcely seen an inhabitant. Most certainly there has not been any organized resistance.

I beg to add, with reference to your Lordship's last paragraph, that when I detached the two brigades, their absence was limited to twelve days. I was aware that I could not march before that time, and during their absence, I was making every exertion to complete the commissariat supplies, &c.

I have reason to believe, that the operations in Kohistan produced a most beneficial effect. Istaliff was considered the strongest place in that province, and the inhabitants so little expected our success, that not a woman or child had left the town. It was not my original plan to enter

Kohistan at all, but from the information I received, I thought that the object of my advance would not be complete unless a severe example were made, a notorious enemy of the British Government having been allowed to congregate a considerable force, within three or four marches of the capital.

I have, &c.,

G. POLLOCK.

No. 541.—*Major-General McCaskill to Captain Ponsonby.*

*Camp, Junrood, November 4, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., that the force placed under my immediate command finally broke up from Dakka on the morning of the 2d instant. It reached Lundi Khana before 10 A.M., and in the course of that day and night a troop of horse artillery, and the whole of the caannon and carriages of the park, with the exception of the Jellalabad gun, were laboriously brought up to the level ground at the head of the pass by the troops of the 2d brigade. Those regiments moved down cautiously and without opposition the next morning to Ali Musjid, and the 3d brigade was directed to follow their movement, marching at daylight.

I regret to add, that it was overtaken by night in the defiles leading to that place, and that its rear guard met with a serious disaster, the particulars of which are communicated in the accompanying report from Brigadier Wild.

Captain Lane, Commissary of Ordnance, had received from me an ample escort, with sappers and bildars, on the morning of the 3rd, in consequence of the confident expectation which he entertained of getting the Jellalabad gun up the acclivity of Lundi Khana. He reports to me, however, that he was finally compelled to leave it on the road, having first requested the artillery officers of Major-General Nott's division to take charge of it, which he considers to have been assented to. His party was attacked by a large body of Afredeen near Ghurree Lala Beg; but he saved his detachment from serious loss by judiciously throwing it into a fort, and making a spirited defence. Lieutenant Corsar, under my instructions, sent out parties of his corps this morning, with great activity and promptitude, into the pass, and recovered the howitzer and both carriages which had been captured by the enemy, and I am not without hopes of regaining the second gun.

The bodies of the officers who fell have also been brought in.

I have the honor to forward the return of killed and wounded.

I have, &c.,

JOHN McCASKILL.

No. 542.—*Brigadier Wild to Captain Havelock.*

*Camp, Ali Musjid, November 3, 1842.*

SIR,—For the information of Major-General McCaskill, K.H., I have the honor to acquaint you, that I marched with my weak brigade agree-

ably to orders this morning at day break. On reaching the place where the big gun had been left by the 2nd brigade yesterday, I used my utmost exertions to get it on ; and on finding that I had not succeeded till 10 A. M. in getting it on above half a mile, it being then not above one-third of the way up from the fort of Lundi Khana ; and foreseeing the evil consequences of being benighted in proceeding (agreeable to orders also,) to Ali Musjid to-day, I ordered Captain Lane to have it blown up, and moved on with the artillery and train left behind by Captain Alexander, with as much celerity as I could. When I saw the baggage fairly coming up to the top of Lundi Khana, I proceeded to join the advance, composed of the advanced guard, the two troops of the 5th Cavalry, and the artillery under Lieutenants Smith and Christie, and the remaining bulk of the 64th Regiment under Colonel Moseley, consisting of about 90 rank and file. On arriving there, I found they had been engaged. Some bullocks that were being carried off by the Afredees were recovered by Captain Oldfield, on whom a heavy fire was opened from a hill, by which he had one trooper and three horses wounded, and one killed. I immediately sent up crowning parties, and two shells being also thrown up, the enemy quickly fled. It then proceeded, followed by the baggage ; and, though fired upon from the hill, on the left on the way to Ghurree Lala Beg, by keeping the baggage well to the right over the plain, no harm was done. I made two or three more short halts to allow the baggage to close well up. I then passed on to the head of the column, and entered the pass. Everything going on as well as could be wished. To afford additional protection to the rear, I directed Lieutenant Christie, with his two mountain guns, to remain with the rear guard ; and everything continued to go on well till darkness came on, when a rush was made by a large number of Afredees from under the cover of the dark bushes in the pass, firing, throwing stones, and rushing in with their knives on the mountain train ; and I deeply grieve to say, that it appears to have been carried off ; Lieutenant Christie to have been killed, and Ensign Nicholson, of the 30th, with the rear guard, also killed. Lieutenant Ross, of the same corps, also with the rear guard, after cutting down one Afredee, was knocked off his horse by a stone thrown at him by another, and I fear he is severely injured. The baggage, as far as I can ascertain, has all arrived in camp safe ; but there have been numbers of killed and wounded in the rear guard, whose numbers have not yet been ascertained. As soon as I can do so, I shall submit a correct report of the whole ; but I cannot attribute the misfortune of to-day to any other cause than having been benighted in the pass, owing to the delay the big gun occasioned, and also to the extreme weakness of my brigade, which in no part of the column afforded a sufficient strength ; but this I have repeatedly reported. The exhausted state of men and cattle, who, in addition to very hard work, had (the former,) nothing to eat or drink to-day, till they reached the river at this place ; and the latter, who had no food either yesterday or to-day, nor water till they arrived here, renders them very unfit for work to-morrow.

I have, &c.,

C. F. WILD.



No. 543.—*Major-General Pollock to Major-General Lumley.**Chumkunnee, November 9, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the arrival of Major-General Nott, with the troops under his command, at Jumrood, on the 6th instant, and to inclose his dispatches, with a return of casualties.

I had directed the Major-General, after bringing away the guns left for the protection of the garrison, to destroy the fort of Ali Musjid ; the Engineer's report of which I have now the pleasure to forward.

I have, &amp;c.,

GEORGE POLLOCK.

No. 544.—*Major-General Nott to Captain Ponsonby.**Camp, near Peshawur November 8, 1842.*

SIR,—I have to acquaint you, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., that the rear-guard of my force, under the command of Major Browne, of Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, was attacked by the enemy, on marching to and from Ali Musjid. The arrangements made by Major Browne, assisted by Major Simmonds, of Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, appear to have been admirable, and the enemy were speedily defeated.

I inclose a return of killed and wounded. I directed the fort of Ali Musjid to be destroyed. The Engineer's report is herewith transmitted.

W. NOTT.

*Return of killed and wounded during the attack on the rear-guard of General Nott's force, on the 4th and 6th of November, 1842.*

	KILLED.			WOUNDED.				
	<i>Privates, Sepoys, and Sowars.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>		<i>Lieutenants.</i>	<i>Serjeants and Havildars.</i>	<i>Drummers.</i>	<i>Privates, Sepoys, and Sowars.</i>	<i>Horses.</i>
Bengal 3-2 Foot Artillery .....	...	...		...	1	...	...	...
Bombay 3-1 Ditto .....	...	...		1	...	...	...	...
Christie's Horse .....	1	4		1	...	...	...	3
Her Majesty's 40th Regiment Foot .....	...	...		...	...	...	3	...
Her Majesty's 41st Ditto .....	...	...		...	...	...	4	...
2nd Regiment Bengal Grenadiers .....	...	...		...	...	...	3	...
16th Regiment Bengal Grenadiers .....	...	...		...	1	...	2	...
38th Regiment Light Infantry .....	3	...		...	...	...	...	...
42nd Ditto Ditto .....	...	...		...	...	...	...	...
43rd Ditto Ditto .....	...	...		...	...	...	2	...
Total of each...	4	4		2	1	1	15	3
Total ...	4 men.	4 hrs.		19 men.—3 horses.				

W. NOTT.

Grand total of killed and wounded, 23 officers and men, and 7 horses.  
 Officers wounded.—Lieutenant and Adjutant Terry, Bombay Foot  
 Artillery, severely ; Lieutenant Chamberlain, Christie's Horse, ditto.

No. 545.—*Major Sanders, Engineers, to Major-General Nott.*

*Camp, Junrood, November 6, 1842.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report that, agreeably to your directions, the defensive works on the hill at Ali Musjid, consisting of the fort, and of a square of buildings recently erected by the British authorities at that fort, have been entirely destroyed.

I have, &c.,

E. SANDERS.

No. 546.—*Notification by the Governor-General of India.*

*Camp, Ferozepore, December 17, 1842.*

This day Major-General Sir Robert Sale, G.C.B., passed the Sutlej at the head of all the troops which composed the garrison of Jellalabad.

The Major-General has received at the foot of the bridge by the Governor-General and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The army of reserve, formed in one line extending two miles and a half, received the Major-General, and the garrison of Jellalabad, in review order, with presented arms.

A salute of nineteen guns was fired as the Major-General passed the centre of the line.

Captain Somerset, Military Secretary, and Captain Colville, A. D. C. to the Governor-General, had on the 14th instant, conveyed the medals granted to the garrison of Jellalabad, under an escort of the body guard, to the camp of the Major-General, and all the officers and soldiers of the garrison passed the bridge of the Sutlej, wearing the honor they have so justly won.

*The following are the names of the surviving Officers to whom the Medal has been presented.*

Major-General Sir Rbt. Sale, G.C.B.	13th (Prince Albert's) Light Infy.
	Lieutenant Colonel R. Pattisson.
	Major H. Havelock.
	„ A. P. J. Wilkinson.
	„ H. C. Wade,
	„ J. H. Fenwick.
	Captain P. R. Jennings.
	„ A. E. F. Holcombe.
	Lieutenant G. King,
	„ W. A. Sinclair.
	„ Hon. E. J. W. Forester.
	„ D. Rattray.
	„ G. Wade.
	„ J. W. Cox.
	„ F. Van Straubenzee.
	„ T. B. Speedy.
<i>Artillery.</i>	
Major A. Abbott, C.B.	
„ J. B. Backhouse.	
„ G. H. Macgregor, C.B.	
Lieutenant M. Dawes.	
Assistant-Surgeon E. Hare.	
<i>5th Light Cavalry.</i>	
Major E. T. Oldfield, C.B.	
Lieutenant E. W. C. Plowden.	
Cornet A. Wrench.	
<i>Anderson's Horse.</i>	
Lieutenant W. Mayne.	

Lieutenant G. G. C. Stapylton.

„ R. Parker.

„ A. Oakes.

„ G. Talbot.

Adjutant J. S. Wood, lieutenant.

Assistant-Surgeon J. Robertson.

„ „ G. W. Barnes.

Lieutenant William Williams, 54th  
foot, doing duty with Her Ma-  
jesty's 13th Light Infantry.

*Doing duty with the 35th Regiment  
Native Infantry.*

Major J. Fraser, 11th Light Cavalry.

„ H. P. Burn, 1st Native Infy.

Captain J. G. Gerard, 1st European  
Regiment.

Lieutenant R. Dowson, 5th Regt.  
Native Infantry.

„ W. R. Hillersdon, 53rd  
Native Infantry.

### *35th Regiment Native Infantry.*

Lieut.-Colonel T. Monteath, C.B.

Major T. Seaton.

„ A. Younghusband.

Captain T. M. E. Moorhouse.

Lieutenant J. Towgood.

„ M. N. Coombs.

„ E. J. Boileau.

„ R. B. Norton.

### *Broadfoot's Sappers and Miners.*

Major G. Broadfoot, C. B., 34th  
Regt. Madras Native Infantry.

Lieutenant J. G. G. Orr.

„ F. Cunningham.

Surgeon J. Forsyth.

Assistant-Surgeon W. Brydon.

### *Commissariat.*

Major Mainwaring, 16th Bengal  
Native Infantry.

The Governor-General will transmit the Medal to the mother of the late Colonel Dennie, who fell in the battle of the 7th of April; and to the relatives of the officers and soldiers of the garrison, who have died since that day.

By order, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

### *No. 547.—Notification by the Governor-General of India.*

*Camp, Ferozepore, December 18, 1842.*

This day Major-General Pollock, C.B., passed the Sutlej, at the head of the artillery and cavalry, and of the 2nd brigade of infantry of the army under his command.

The Major-General was received at the foot of the bridge by the Governor-General.

The 26th Regiment of Native Infantry attached to the 2nd brigade, was, at the desire of the Governor-General, formed into a hollow square, and the Governor-General entering the square with Major-General Pollock, informed Major Huish, commanding the regiment, that Major-General Pollock having, in an especial manner, expressed his obligations to the 26th regiment, and represented their exemplary conduct on all occasions as meriting a particular mark of the approbation of the Government, he had great gratification in bestowing upon them, on their return to India, the honor of being henceforward a regiment of Light Infantry.

By order, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.





